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SUMMARY 
The Intronllction begins with David Haberman's graphic description 
of multinational petroleum corporations as "private supranational gov-
ernment organizations" in which he calls for the "orderly disposition of 
world petroleum resources between the producing and consuming nations 
••• on a sovereign level, i.e., as between governments through multi-
lateral treaties, international arbitration and enforcement, etc ...... 
A review of recent criticism of multinational corporations in con-
junction with the Third World call for a New International Economic 
Order is explored as major reasons for the timely study of the nature of 
MNC relationships. 
Current trends in the discipline of international law are examined 
indicating a propensity toward utilizing an interdisciplinary approach. 
A survey of literature on multinational corporations in relation to in-
ternational law is presented suggesting a concensus only insofar as 
agreement that the law should take cognizance of the fact that private 
corporations are now active participants in areas formerly reserved for 
states which have been the traditional suhjects of international law • 
. The question as to how this should be accomplished remains open to 
debate. 
Many international law theorists have seemingly been stymied hy at-
tempting to define multinational corporations and to necide the degree 
to which they may be said to have international legal personalities. 
Evidence that MNCs function on an equal basis with states is cited from 
chapters in this thesis. The possible transformation of municipal law 
or practice to international customary law is also exemplified with 
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instances from the paper including the practice of refusing to buy hot 
oil. 
A perusal of international organizations which impact on ~1NCs is 
included along with an examination of the current nirection and status 
of such impacts. The OECD Guidelines and the work of the U.N. Commis-
sion on TNCs are contemplated as two of the more important contrasting 
results of the call for NIEO by the Group of 77. In particular the Com-
N 
petition section of the OECD Guidelines is scruttn.ized with emphasis on 
the restriction of trade precedents found in the EEC Treaty of Rome and 
the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act. 
With a cursory reference to the ohvious economies of scale in-
volved, the selection of British Petroleum as the unique perspective 
from which to view the relationship between multinational petroleum cor-
porations and governments is presented, with a concluding survey of cur-
rent steps being taken by organized international society to recognize 
MNCs as suh.iects of international law. 
Chapter 2 describes the infancy of the petroleum industry in which 
precedents are established for government regulation. Specifically de-
liberated are the events leading to the nevelopment of the Standard Oil 
Co. as the prototype of monopolistic restraint of trade on the part of 
industry and the application of the Sherman Act in order to curtail such 
antitrust practices culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court's Dissolution 
Decree of 1911. 
The second part of Chapter 2 delineates the effects of a global 
emergency on government-industry relationships in which maximum coopera-
tion for efficiency super cedes the need for protection of the free en-
terprise system of competition. 
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Chapter 3 scrutinizes the origins of British Petroleum and the par-
adoxical nature of her structure indicative of government participation 
in an industry vital to national defense. Due to her lack of indigenous 
oil at the time, security of supply was of particular concern to both 
Britain and BP and her diplomatic activities with Iran on behalf of the 
company were merely the first of many to corne. The concession agreement 
itself was also to set a precedent for many years. 
Chapter 4 elucidates the effects of various synergistic MNC rela-
tionships, in which the strength of alliances are altered in order to 
manipulate global events leading to the most expeditious means of en-
hancing profit. The American majors, citing depletion of indigenous 
crude as reason for acquiring foreign sources of oil in the Middle East, 
engage State Department assistance in gaining market entry into a tradi-
tionally British sphere of influence. The U.K. C~vernment was similarly 
exercizing diplomatic influence in order to retain her impregnable posi-
tion through BP of controlling all the known world reserves outside the 
U.S. 
The principle of reciprocity was utilized in the U.S. Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 threatening to refuse domestic foreign-owned corpo-
rations the right to operate in America were similar privileges denie,{ 
U.S. nationals. The San Remo Agreement, the first post-war redistrihu-
tion of the Iraq Petroleum Co. which excluded U.S. participation, 
brought forth not merely strong State Department protests hut the unpre-
cedented application of the Open Door Policy to the area of Middle East-
ern oil concessions. The resulting renegotiation of the Iraq Petroleum 
Co. culminated in the Red Line Agreement, a secret treaty between 
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multinational oil corporations, in effect, dividing the world among 
themselves. 
Chapter 5 explores the example of Texas as a model for regulation 
examining the short and long term effects of the Texas Railroad Comrnds-
sion as an effective regulatory body. 
Chapter 6 details the implementation of synergism between govern-
ments and oil companies by explicating the complexities involved in 
maneuvering issues through the American municipal legal regime by re-
viewing the chaotic Roosevelt Era. 
World War II from the American perspective as portrayed in Chapter 
7 reflects the dichotomy of American foreign and domestic policy espe-
cially regarding antitrust and government involvement in industry fi-
nancing. It also further exemplifies the implementation of synergism in 
attaining partisan goals. Precedents for settling offshore disputes 
over sovereignty are found in the Submerged Lands Act also discussed in 
this time setting as is the ultimate negation of the Red Line Agreement 
by the conclusion of a new Iraq Petroleum Co. agreement reflecting the 
shift of political power as a result of World War II. 
Chapter 8 begins with a discussion of the Iranian oil embargo and 
deliberates the events involving petroleum in the Middle East througp 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Such implications for international law as 
the application of the principle of hot oil on the part of BP and the 
difficulty she had in finding a court which would hear her complaints 
are emphasiZed as well as home government diplomatic and/or clandestine 
participation on the part of industry. 
The use of Price-Waterhouse as a binding third-party reviewer of 
financial capacity of companies as a prerequisite for participation in 
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the revised Iranian concession is suggested as a precedent which could 
be followed by Some future international regulatory body. 
Qadaffi's model of concession agreements favoring independents is 
explored as is the leapfrog precedent and other cartel activities re-
sponsible for the radical impact of OPEC. 
On the other hand, relaxation of domestic American antitrust en-
forcement is explored as well as the implications of the refusal by the 
Seven Sisters to sell oil directly to the British and American fleets 
during the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. 
Chapter 9 utilizes a thorough discussion of Bpls entry into the 
American market and the development of Alaskan oil to portray the modern 
American legal regime. Many of the issues which confront those organi-
zations involved in drafting codes of conduct for MNCs are examined in 
light of customary practice in America. 
Chapter 10 uses the North Sea to review the status of the British 
legal regime in a similar review of current issues in the British legal 
regime. 
Chapter 11 goes a step further by illuminating a loophole in orga-
nized world society by graphically outlining the manner in which BP sys-
tematically broke UN sanctions against Rhodesia which had heen called 
for by the British Government, Bpls ma)or stockholder. The implications 
for international law are quite clear concerning financial disclosure 
about subsidiaries and the need for Some method of enforcement which 
would be effective in regulating MNCs on a globalO-- not merely munici-
pal -- level. 
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Chapter 12 concludes this study by reviewing the current status of 
the international dialo~le on MNCs regarding international law, ann by 
exploring the popular theories concerning the future of MNCs. 
The synergistic nature of the relationship between MNCs and govern-
ments is exemplified by a review of the congruent goals of home states 
and companies regarding security of supply whether for national security 
or profit maximization. This symhiosis is further illustrated hy out-
lining precedents established throughout the paper with implications for 
future developments. 
Following is a survey of American antitrust policy as a model for 
review of an issue as it has effected the development of petroleum law. 
Other issues are summarized as are some of the personalities who have 
effected the industrv. 
After a cursory review of current steps on the part of organized 
world society to recognize MNCs as subiects of international law in spe-
cific instances, a creative approach to the problem of effectively regu-
lating the conduct of multinational corporations is presented. A con-
federacy of countries having signed a treaty or other international 
agreement wou~d be entitled to enforce sanctions or levy fines against 
MNCs accused of nonconformance with estahlished codes of conduct. 
These fines could he collected according to a fixed percentage of net 
profits per country hy all signatory nations for every offence. Thus, 
any charge brought by any signatory could be punished by fine in all 
signatory countries. Therefore, the impact of the synergistic relation-
ships between petroleum corporations and governments could be effective-
ly regulated. 
ix 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The oil cartel ... [presents] a classic study of the impact of 
a handful of the world's largest most powerful multinational 
corporations upon foreign and domestic policies of not only 
the United States, hut, indeed, upon the several nations of 
the world with respect to a vital world commodity, namely, oil 
••• Middle East government actions, and the world oil crises 
which they precipitated, represented but a logical extenSion, 
indeed the inevitable culmination of a long, well defined his-
torical process that was set in motion by these very oil com-
panies at least 40 or 50 years ago. That process saw the evo-
lution and exploitation of a most complex and extraordinary 
symbiotic relationship between these seven maior international 
oil companies on the one hand, and the several governments of 
the United States, Western Europe and the Middle East on the 
other ••• a kind of private supranational government, an in-
tricate system which has grown up through close to a half cen-
tury of closely coordinated and cooperating joint ventures and 
arrangements around the world among these seven international 
companies ••• a private United Nations ••• its members sever-
ally and collectively possess massive wealth and resources, 
including an exchequer, shipping fleets, production facili-
ties, pipelines, refineries, etc., which exceed by far the re-
sources available to many nations of the world. Furthermore, 
these companies have shared for many years a broad community 
of interest and a functional unity of policies and actions in 
the dispositions of such wealth and resources. This has been 
facilitated by the highly developed technical and diplomatic 
capabilities which these companies have frequently and effec-
tively exercised en bloc in sophisticated high-level dealings 
with the governments-or-the world. 
Like many other world government organizations, this private 
government emerp;ed from a period of internecine ecnllonlic war-
fare among these companies that was finally resolved by a 
series of "peace treaties" in 1928. In their exercise of vir-
tually sovereign power, this bloc of companies has consistent-
ly promoted and exploited national economic needs and interna-
tional differences, government ignoranCe, and the gaping lacu-
nae in the fabric of international regulatory control mecha-
nisms ••. in pursuit of their private commercial goals • 
.•• affected governments have not always been unwitting accom-
plices. Indeed, in many instances governmental policies have 
been lodged in the hands of officials who had themselves been 
involved either directly or indirectly with these same corpo-
rations ••• several nations sought in various ways over the 
years to regulate these companies for their respective 
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national interests ••• the resulting general patchwork of 
country-by-country regulation has fallen far short of the com-
prehensive system required for effective control of interna-
tional cartel activities operating far beyond national bounda-
ries ••• (the U.S. and U.K.) government (have), to date, 
shared the general failure to regulate those companies effec-
tively ••• the signal shortcoming of (American and British) 
national policy and, indeed, that of the Western European na-
tions on this issue, has been our collective failure to recog-
nize, at least since the end of World War II, the central 
proposition that the orderly disposition of world petroleum 
resources between the producing and consuming nations must ul-
timately be resolved internationally on a sovereign level, 
i.e., as between governments, through multilateral treaties, 
international arbitration and enforcement, etc •• ,.l 
The call for a new economic order has given impetus to the need for 
the international legal regime to enact an enforceable regulatory code 
applicable to multinational corporations. The rapid expansion of these 
multinational corporations coupled with strong home states who are pri-
marily interested in maintaining their own sovereignty and protecting 
Western interests has created a synergenic relationship of such propor-
tions as to preclude submission to any international legal body, thereby 
preventing effective regulation on any scale more extensive than munici-
pal law. 
Beginning in the 1960s and through the first half of the lQ70s, 
criticism of multinational corporA.tions became remarkably widespreacl, 
r,",sulting in demands for increased regulation and control of interna-
tional companies by Some government officials and international civil 
servants. On the other hand, others recommended only improved transpar-
ency and hetter self-policing. Developing country governments, acting 
through the United Nations and other international agencies, are now 
calling for a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) in which addi-
tional constraints will be imposed on the operations of multinational 
corporations, and they have spoken out on such issues as permanent 
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sovereignty, information disclosure/reporting, technology transfer, re-
strictive business practices, equity ownership, taxation, transfer pric-
ing, and accounting standardization. At times, these pressures have 
overshadowed the responsible inquiries being pursued by governmental 
bodies seeking ways to cope effectively and fairly with, and to benefit 
from, the phenomenon of the multinational corporation as it affects the 
national interests of nation-states. 
with the enormous advance of modern science and technology 
which has occurred over the last decades of our age and which 
faced the law-maker with a number of new problems to be re-
solved in the international and municipal legal orders ••• 
great new possibilities for the development of mankind have 
been opened. A development competition enbracing all coun-
tries and continents has begun, being accelerated by the in-
creased rate of social and economic progress. The law (both 
municipal and international) is an important means for regu-
lating the direction of these developments. It should not 
hamper the process of further economic, scientific and techno-
logical development of all states and nations. It may, how-
ever, channel the directions of this development, rationalize 
it to such an extent that it does not endanger mankind and its 
natural environment. -,-here is thus a need to develop and per-
fect the law in that respect in order to ad;ust it to the re-
quirements of the changi~g world. 2 . 
If the rules of international law prescribe appropriate standards 
of social conduct,3 then the formation of these r1lles in the case of 
petroleum law with which this paper deals, since the commodity plays 
such an important role in glohal society. 
Today it would be inconceivable to study problems of [oil] law 
while ignoring the contribution of sociology, [politics], [ec-
onomics], and statistics. Likewise, on all the points where 
law enters into contact with technology -- exploration of 
outer space, information systems, use of nuclear energy, pro-
tection of the environment -- cooperation with representatives 
of other disciplines, often within the exact sciences, is be-
coming indispensable • 
••• interdisciplinary studies now are the fashion in all 
fields of research. It would be unjust to see this as a pass-
ing vogue, for it meets a positive need emanating from the in-
terpenetration of different disciplines of the human sciences, 
indeed between the humane and the exact sciences. 4 
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A review of international law in relation to multinational petrole-
urn corporations in particular, the Seven Sisters S -- from three com-
plementary perspectives provides a basis for better understanding of the 
problems inherent in the law creating process. 
The interdisciplinary treatment of international law makes it 
possible to view international law from the outside, especial-
ly in sociological, historical, and ethical perspectives. In 
the sociological perspective, it is possible to offer an ex-
planation of the social functions fulfilled hy international 
law. The historical perspective provides insight into the 
growth potential of international law. The ethical perspec-
tive furnishes a normative measuring rod by which to test the 
moral adequacy of any particular system and rule of interna-
tional law. 6 
Whatever may be the content of the law applicable to multinational 
. corporations, its very nature incurs definitional complications. When 
such law can he found and defined, it must be decided whether to classi-
fy it as public or private international law. Perhaps the only adequate 
answer is that it partakes of the nature of hoth. 
The definition of multinational corporations is, in itself, a con-
troversial issue. It is significant that hoth the United Nations Center 
on Transnational Corporations and the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development have maintained that it is possible to carryon 
practical work without a precisl~ r1.efinition. The main reason for avoirl-
ing a clear-cut definition is political, accor~ing to Wang, for a number 
of countries, notably the socialist states an(} several developing coun-
tries, insist that their enterprises should not be lUmped together with 
those of monopoly capitalism. 7 
From a substantive point of view, different definitions may very 
well be adopted for different purposes. For example, the definition for 
purposes of national regulation may vary from the definition to be used 
in an international code of conduct; the definition for a general code 
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may be different from that for international standards of accounting and 
reporting. For the purpose of this paper, the term multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) may be understood in the broad sense offered by the Group 
of Eminent Persons and be used interchangeahly with multinational enter-
prises or transnational corporations. 
A survey of the literature on multinational corporations in rela-
tion to international law indicates that it has been suggested in recent 
years that a new body of substantive law he developed and applied to in-
ternational economic transactions. Although this international economic 
law has been varously referred to as international law (Mann, Haight),B 
transnational law (Jessup),9 a new law Merchant (Schmitthof)lO and gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations (McNair, 
Friedmann, Schwarzenberger),ll its proponents have been motivated hy one 
strong consideration, namely that the law should take cognizance of the 
fact that private corporations are now active participants in areas for-
merly reserved for states which have heen the traditional suhjects of 
international law. 
Some writers suggest that this new hody of international economic 
law should constitute a separate juridical order, divorced from interna-
tional law (Verdross, McNair). 12 Others, that this international eco-
nomic law should just be an extension of puhlic international law (Mann, 
Friedmann, Schwarzenberger).13 
Whether this is a complete independent hody of law or is sub-
ordinated to international law or to Some other, more inclu-
sive body of law, is in itself immaterial, as long as it is 
understood that it is distinct from the traditional hody of 
international law. The need for determining its relative po-
sition with respect to international law cannot be denied. 14 
Since the participation of private corporations at the level of 
international law would now seem to be a fait accompli, they should be 
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recognized as at least limited international legal personalities, sub-
ject to the rights and duties of sovereign states. In so doing, multi-
national corporations would be entitled to the right of arbitration un-
der the ageis of the International Court of Justice, as well as subject 
to the duties and responsibilities of sovereign states. 
Even though traditionally, sovereign states have been considered 
the principal subjects of international law, nothing prevents states 
from recognizing dependent states with limited international personali-
ty. According to Schwarzenberger, "International personality may be un-
limited, as in the case with independent states, or limited as in the 
'case of dependent states or international institutions." Similarly, 
states are free to recognize, for all or limited purposes, nontypical 
subjects such as international institutions, and even individual persons 
as subjects of international law'. "In relation to itself, each subiect 
of international law is free to recognize any other entity as a subject 
of international law."lS 
Bishop also feels that "there is no inherent reason why interna-
tional legal personality may not be conferred upon private organiza-
tions.,,16 
Friedmann would modify this argument hy limiting sUb.iectivity. 
"There is no reason why there should not be different degrees of subiec-
tivity in international law."l7 He goes on to say; "It would be as dan-
gerous to uncritically accord suhjectivity to the private corporation in 
international law as it would be to deny its factual participation in 
the evolution of puhlic international law." HI 
In each case, whether any entity has been so recognized is merely a 
question of evidence. 
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Schwarzenberger further explains: 
The chief participants [in the international legal regime] --
the sovereign states, especially the strongest among them --
tend to view themselves as ultimate ends and are inclined to 
insist on control of the means indispensable for their survi-
val in any crisis •••• They form alliances and counteralli-
ances for aggressive and defensive purposes, create precarious 
systems of balance of power and, as they see fit, pursue poli-
cies of involvement or isolation. 
In such situations, the primary function of law is that of a 
law of power; i.e., the law assists in maintaining the suprem-
acy of force and the hierarchies established on the basis of 
power and gives to such quasi-orders the respectability and 
sanctity of law. International law in unorganized interna-
tional society serves these purposes in a variety of ways; 
e.g., the independence of states is one of the cornerstones of 
international customary law, [which] includes ••• access to 
raw materials and markets •••• Similarly, whether a state de-
cides to participate in an international congress or confer-
ence depends on its own will. Moreover, in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary, unanimity is required for any deci-
sion reached in the assembly of any such international gather-
ing. Finally, any binding third-party settlement of a dispute 
by reference to law or equity depends on the consent of the 
parties concerned. 19 
Access to raw materials and markets is discussed throughout this 
paper, as is voluntary participation in international gatherings (See 
particularly the discussion of the Red Line Agreement in Chapter 4 and 
the London Policy Group in Chapter 8.) 
••• international customary law puts at the disposal of its 
subjects the right to apply measures short of· war by way of 
reprisal against alleged breaches of international law .... 
In fields less central to the systems of open power politics 
or power politics in disguise, international law is permitted 
also to fulfill the functions of a law of reciprocity and a 
law of coordination. Thus, for example, on the basis of in-
numerable treaties over the centuries, a body of international 
maritime law, now largely codified in the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions on the Law of the Sea, has grown up.20 
The Law of the Sea is discussed in relation to the North Sea in Chapter 
10. 
The two constitutive elements of international customary law 
are (1) a general practice of states on a universal, general, 
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or regional basis, and (2) the acceptance by the states con-
cerned of this practice as law. 
The origin of international customary law is frequently found 
in earlier treaty clauses, which, subsequently, were taken for 
granted, as with the rules regarding the minimum standard ap-
plicable to foreign nationals and their property. Occasional-
ly, as in the law of the sea ••• individual rules of interna-
tional law have developed out of roughly parallel practices of 
the leading powers. 21 
The practice of refusing to buy "hot" oil which was well estab-
lished as a general practice by the ma.ior petroleum companies in East 
Texas (Chapter 5), ~vas later not merely accepted, but specifically 
callen for by BP in Iran under Mossadeq. BP obviously accepted the 
practice of refusing to buy "hot" oil as law, per se, since she threat-
ened to take any offenders to court -- "any court in the world which 
would hear her case" (See Chapter R). 
This illustrates the process of estahlishing a practice which be-
comes accepted as law on an international hasis -- in effect, then. the 
development of quasi-international customary law. 
The hasic rules of international customary law, essentially 
the international law of unorganized international society, 
can be summarized in the following fundamental principles: 
sovereignty, recognition, consent, goon faith, freedom of the 
seas, international responsibility, ann self-defense. 22 
Perhaps the best example of MNCs exercising quasi-sovereignty is 
the refusal by RP to sell oil to the British fleet nuring the lq73 Min 
East Crisis, despite a direct order from her part-owner home government. 
Exxon's similar refusal to the American fleet helps emphasize the aunac-
ity of the MNCs in challenging their own horne government's sovereignty 
over them at a time of national alert. The companies, for their part, 
were seemingly more concerned about future profits than in patriotic 
duty or suhmission. 
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When commercial law is practiSed on an international scale, the 
definitional quagmire again appears. As a private enterprise, a company 
is free to do business with whomever she pleases. Under international 
law, an international legal personality is free to enter into any kind 
of consensual engagement; to grant recognition in such events as the co-
~ption of new subjects which might be indicated as a result of the sign-
ing of such consensual engagements as a business contract or concession 
agreement; and to execute ann fulfill such consensual engagements in 
good faith. Some of the major concession and other international agree-
ments of the Seven Sisters -- and in particular, those of BP -- are 
traced from Iran and the Middle East (Chapters 7 and 8), through Alaska 
(Chapter 9), the North Sea (Chapter 10), and even some of the more clan-
destine agreements in Rhodesia (Chapter 11). 
The rules on the freedom of the high seas, now largely codified in 
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High Seas and on Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, reinforce the principle 
that use of the high seas, and the sea bed must be exerciseri with rea-
sonable regard for the interests of others. The Conventions of 1954, 
1962, and 1969 for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea hy Oil provide 
a limited implementation of this rule. The implications of this princi-
ple in light of the nature and scale of the global petroleum industry 
and modern technological capahilities are unlimited. 
The principle of international responsibility gives impetus to this 
and all other rules of international law in that "the breach of any in-
ternational obligation constitutes an illegal act or international tort, 
the cOTIlmission of which implies duty to make reparation.,,23 
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By granting limi te .. l personality to MNCs, these companies would then 
be obligated under this principle of international responsibility to 
abide by all applicable rules of international law; on the other hand, 
they would also be entitled to participate directly in the law creating 
process, contributing their technical expertise to the process. The in-
ternational organizations which impact on MNCs could conceivably benefit 
from company input, especially in the current effort to devise a petrol-
eum code of ethical practices -- reminiscent of the role of the American 
Petroleum Institute in devising a similar code for the American munici-
pal regime in the Roosevelt Era. A detailed account of such contrihu-
tions may be found in Chapter 6. 
Since ultimate responsibility for international regulation lies 
with international law in organized world society, according to 
Schwarzenherger, then a review of the accomplishments and limitations of 
such international organizations is indicated. 
Some of the strongest pressures for controls have originated in the 
international organizations, which mainly developing country gove Olfnents 
have used to air their concerns on MNCs over a broad range of issues. 
Most of these organizations are considering or developing MNC Codes of 
Conduct, Guidelines, or specific industry studies and recommendations 
and are engaged in other activities which, taken as whole, are now 
shaping the future "regulatory" environment for MNC ,glohal operations. 
The developing countries, over the past couple of years, have heen 
motierftting their anti-MNC rhetoric. Rut, at the same time, the develop-
ing countries have heen actively supporting the development of the es-
tablished bureaucracies in th~ UN system, such as the UN Centre on TNCs, 
whose staffs will carryon the regulatory work program born in the New 
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International Economic Order and delve into new issues affecting 
business. 
The most puhlicized regulatory activities affecting MNCs, and the 
most significant as well, are those involving codes of conduct in the 
following five international bodies: (1) United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations, where the prime objective is to draft a 
broad code of conduct to be adopted by the UN's Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and General Assemhly; (2) Economic and Social Council, 
where a working group is attempting to draft a legally-binding multilat-
eral' treaty to eliminate corporate bribery and curh extortion pressures; 
(3) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 
which the developing countries are pressing for a legally-hinding code 
of conduct on technology transfer following, completion and adoption in 
1980 of an agreement to end restrictive business practices by MNCs; (4) 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has 
been implementing a package for MNCs and OECD governments, and where 
guidelines on transhorder data flows were completed in 1980 and cruciRI 
new initiatives in this area undertaken. 
A number of other international and regional organizations are 
either considering or have already made proposals affecting the MNCs. 
For instance: (1) International Labor Organization (ILO) -- Geneva; (2) 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) -- Geneva; (3) Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) 
Regional Economic Commissions 
Washington, D.C.; (4) United Nations 
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, 
Latin America, and Western Asia; (5) European Economic Community (EEC) 
-- Brussels; (6) Council of Europe -- Strasbourg, France; (7) United Na-
tions Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) -- Vienna; 
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(8) Non-Aligned Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations -- Havana; 
and (9) The World Health Organization (WHO) -- Geneva. For a complete 
glossary of international organizations impacting on MNCs and an accom-
panying organizational schematic diagram, see Appendices A and B. 
Their already significant impact on MNCs can be expected to grow 
since demands for legally-binding codes of conduct and even drafts for 
model legislation continue to emerge from such nongovernmental organiza-
tions as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
and the OECD's Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), therehy serving to 
buttress the work of the international governmental bodies. 
The push for extensive regulation of MNCs by host countries both 
through the international organizations and individually is largely an 
outgrowth of developing country demands for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO).24 
Briefly, the logic on which NIEO is based is a replacement of the 
existing international economic system, which allegedly did not take 
into account the developing world, with a new system in which the less 
developed countries (LDCs) will be entitled to special economic bene-
fits. Consequently, NIEO calls for a reiection of the concepts of a 
market system, private business decision-making and free trade. In-
stead, emphasis has been shifted to the primacy and needs of states, a 
condition in which government-owned and government-regulated institu-
tions form the basis for national and international economic growth. 
Rather than an improvement in the existing system, the ·new strategy 
calls for its total replacement, and is designed to redistribute the 
world's wealth from the rich to the poor countries as reparation for 
alleged past developed country sins of exploitation. The shift is from 
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a system based on profit to one based on equity. As significant forces 
in the existing economic order, multinational corporations, or trans-
national corporations, as they are now called in the UN system, have re-
ceived a barrage of criticism from the developing nations, which accuse 
MNCs of colonial exploitation of their vital resources. 
The efforts to estahlish a NIEO are being made by the "Group of 
77", an informal group of developing countries, now actually numbering 
about 117, under the leadership of Mexico, Jamaica, Venezuela, Algeria, 
India and a few other key 1DCs. The 1DCs' demands are set forth in a 
number of landmark General Assembly Resolutions, including the "Declara-
tion and Programme of Action on a New International Economic Order" and 
"Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States." 
Those nations demanding the "New Order" are, in fact, calling for a 
replacement of the existing international market-oreinted economic sys-
tem, which they contend unduly discriminates against the 1DCs, with a 
new system in which these countries will be entitled to special prefer-
ences. The international organizations where NIEO achieves its strong-
est support are ECOSOC and the UN Commission on TNCs, UNCTAD, 110, and 
the Organization of American States. In these bodies, whether over de-
bate on MNC codes of conduct, model laws, or international conventions, 
developing countries are calling for increased control of multinational 
companies, for re~llation of the market place, and for the imposition of 
governmental decision-making as the key to economic development. In the 
past, their arguments have been pictured as little more than rhetoric, 
but their demands are now being carefully weighed; and the developed 
countries have begun significant conciliatory efforts to answer them. 
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Multinational corporations, which have both aided and benefited 
from the existing economic system, have become targets of continuous at-
tacks by developing count"ries. These nations, which are advocating 
NIEO, see MNCs as agents of neo-colonialist (capitalist) domination and 
exploitation of their scarce national resources. They, consequently, 
have set as their goal regulation of MNC subsidiaries with the ultimate 
intention of forcing them to act as sources of national economic growth. 
The inspiration for the LDCs' new tactics derives from the phenome-
nal success achieved by OPEC in quadrupling oil prices over several 
months at the beginning of lq74. The shift in bargaining power which 
OPEC achieved is a primary objective of NIEO. 
The potential impact of NIEO on multinational corporations can be 
outlined as follows: (1) NIEO encourages nationalization by calling for 
strict state regulation of all economic activities within the state's 
borders. (2) The practice of expropriation according to national rather 
than international law may yield little or no compensation for the con-
fiscated property, since absolute national sovereignty gives a state a 
choice as to whether or not it need pay compensation. (3) The practice 
of restricting profit repatriation may limit the efficient allocation of 
financial resources. (4) If a host government determines that an HNC 
investment is not socially beneficial to its populace, that investment 
may be prohibited. (5) NIEO supports commodity cartels and thereby re-
jects market forces of demand and supply for governmental decisions on 
prices and pro(1uction levels. And (6) passage into national law of pro-
visions of the many codes of conduct for MNCs now being drafted could 
have serious consequences for such companies. For instance, one such 
provision would be information disclosure. Information would include 
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detailed financial data (profit levels, return on investment, etc.) by 
product division and by country. Another such provision would be trans-
fer of technology. An impact would result from national regulation of 
technology transfer (including the possihle reduction of payments for 
the technology), MNC guarantees that the technology conforms to host re-
quirements, special treatment for LDCs, and dispute settlement according 
to national law only. 
In Decemher 1974, however, another NIEO-inspired resolution was 
adopted by the United Nations. Entitled a "Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States,,,25 it laid out the sovereign rights of all states, 
including the following four: (1) to exercise full permanent sovereign-
ty over all wealth, natural resources, and economic activities within a 
country's horders, meaning locally-determined compensation ("hen foreign-
owned property is expropri~ted; (2) to form primary commodity producer 
cartels; (3) as far as LDCs are concerned, to be granted generalized 
preferential, non-reciprocal treatment in all international economic ac-
tivities; and (4) to use price indexation to maintain stahle commodity 
export prices. 26 
In recent years, criticism of multinationals has reached such pro-
portions that virutally every government employee, legislator, or 
policy-maker and every memher of the public in general has heard charges 
against the way they conduct husiness. Most governments want the bene-
fits that these corporations can bring to their countries: employment 
opportunities, capital, technology and access to markets. Hut they are 
concerned over such attendant problems as foreign ownership and control 
of key economic sectors, inroads against political sovereignty, and as-
saults on traditional cultural values. Thus host countries seek 
15 
benefits from multinational corporations while attempting to avoid unde-
sirable side effects -- prosperity on their own terms. 
The problem is that the companies are not oriented to the individ-
ual development goals or economic requirements of their host countries. 
They have their own profit and other business motives. While govern-
ments pursue a variety of economic and social objectives to protect the 
welfare of their citizens, the chief goals of multinational corporations 
are those of all business enterprises: profit and grolvth. Because of 
their size and the nature of their activities, multinational corpora-
tions possess significant power and influence. This is even more pro-
nounced in the petroleum industry due to the global dependence on oil. 
In the conduct of their regular business activities, corporations 
make decisions which may have far-reaching consequences for the socie-
ties in which they operate. This is true regardless of whether the "so-
ciety" in question is a small town somewhere in the United States, or a 
country in Western Europe or a country in the Third World. 
Multinational corporations are creatures which, after all, owe 
their existence to the domestic laws of the countries in Ivhich they 
operate. The power of governments to regulate their activities through 
the enforcement mechanism of the law must neither be dismissed nor for-
gotten. The multinationals are often accused of conducting their busi-
ness in an unlawful way. While this is probably true in a small per-
centage of cases, it is manifestly false the great majority of the time. 
Most multinationals carryon their activities well within the confines 
of municipal law. Problems arise because the goals of host country so-
cieties have changed and the laws of enforcement mechanisms have not 
changed to meet them. 
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Over the last several years, the belief has developed that because 
of the corporations' multinational character, international legal in-
struments are needed between countries to effectively "break the corpo-
rate horse to bridle." To this end, various codes of conduct have been 
proposed by international organizations in the belief that through these 
mechanisms multinational corporations could be steered into supporting 
the objectives of local development and other policies. 
Generally speaking it is difficult to come to grips with any body 
of law which of itself might be considered to govern the conduct of 
multinational corporations. Rather, it is a loose network of various 
domestic laws aimed at controlling commerce within the territory of in-
dividual nations, and to some extent controlling the activities of cor-
porations outside national territories when it is in the interest of the 
home, or occasionally host, country to do so and within its power to en-
force such control. It is therefore not legislation which is designed 
to regulate the conduct of multinational corporations, but rather domes-
tic commercial enterprises. 
Eventually choices will have to be made concerning the legal na-
ture, form, language and machinery necessary to complement the goals of 
companies and governments. In the meantime, all of the participants in 
this international arena seem to be working on solutions. Multinational 
corporations have themselves become more cautious in their dealings with 
governments. Some individual corporations have established formal codes 
and standards for themselves. Their collective efforts have resulted in 
a set of guidelines for international investment sponsored by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce. 
17 
Of the various codes of conduct which have been promulgated in the 
international forum, two have emerged as preeminent: the OCED package 
and the code eminating from the UN Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has been 
the first intergovernmental organization to produce guidelines for the 
conduct of multinational enterprises. The OECD Guidelines thus warrant 
careful review, not only because of the signatories (twenty-three indus-
trialized countries, accounting for 60 percent of the world's industrial 
production, 70 percent of world trade, and whose members are the home 
countries for over 90 percent of the world's multinational corpora-
tions), but also because, since it represents a working code, other 
codes being developed cannot help but take it into consideration. 
The Guidelines comprise one of five sections of the larger OECD 
"Declaration on International Investment and Hultinational Enterprises." 
The other sections concern: (1) the national treatment of foreign en-
terprises by member countries in whose territory these enterprises ope-
rate, (2) international investment incentives and disincentives, (3) 
consultation procedures under which business and labor organizations 
have input through their representative governments, and (4) a review of 
the entire Declaration within three years to evaluate its effectiveness 
and suggest ways to improve international cooperation. 
To describe the OECD package is to underline vital differences be-
tween it and the UN Commission. Though there have been substantial dif-
ferences in attitudes of OECD member governments toward the MNC, the 
tone of the resultant debate is quite different from that of the UN. 
18 
That the OECD has only developed nation members has perhaps as important 
psychological as economic implications. 
However, the composition of the Commission is not the most appro-
priate for achieving a balanced result susceptible of wide approval, 
either. Among its forty-eight members only ten came from the "WEO" 
group, i.e., from Western and other market-economy states. Yet, these 
states are the home states of most multinational corporations and almost 
any action concerning MNCs would require their cooperation. By contrast 
LDCs appear to be overrepresented in the Commission,27 as two-thirds of 
the activities of MNCs take place between states belonging to the WEO 
group.28 
A brief summary of major MNC impact issues, then, include consumer 
protection, employment/industrial relations, environmental protection, 
illicit payments, information disclosure/reporting, international ac-
counting standards, investment subsidies (incentives/disincentives), 
patents, licensing, and trademarks, "restrictive business practices/ 
antitrust, taxation/transfer pricing, technology transfer, transborder 
data flows, a"nd worker participation in management. 
Norms for MNCs are established by the OECD Guidelines in a number 
of areas. 
As matters of general policy, standards are established which state 
that enterprises should take fully into account the policy objectives of 
member countries in which they operate. While the OECD is of course an 
organization of limited membership, there seems to be no reason for 
restricting application of a general principle of this nature to member 
countries. In fact, most of the other criteria in the generR.l policies 
section are not so limited: cooperation between the local community and 
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business interests, filling pqsts by taking "due account of individual 
qualifications without discrimination as to nationality," abstaining 
from illegal political contributions, not giving (or being solicited 
for) bribes, and supplying national entities with information which may 
be needed relevant to the activities of those entities in such jurisdic-
tions, with due account for business confidentiality, all seem princi-
ples capable of general application. 
The disclosure criteria of the OECD Guidelines are rather carefully 
circumscribed. This has been a controverted and sensitive area. The 
OECD standards go to information which should be published "on a regular 
basis within reasonable time limits but at least annually," They in 
general describe the type of information normally published by enter-
prises under most reasonably sophisticated national laws or customs. A 
principal issue here, as it is likely to be in the UN Co~mission, is 
that of the appropriate geographic area for which enterprises shoald re-
port; most MNCs are reluctant to publish country-by-country operating 
results, especially if those results reveal profits, and most particu-
larly if profits are to be reported on a product line basis. There is 
nonetheless a considerable amount of detail called for by the OECD text, 
which makes a contribution to that "transparency" which has been often 
suggested'. 
The provisions on competition reflect policies familiar to those 
knowledgeable in either American antitrust law or Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Rome Treaty. The generality of Some of the phrases, such as the ad-
monition to "refrain from actions which would adversely affect competion 
in the relevant market by abusing a dominant position of market power," 
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and certain of the examples of such abuse, such as "anticompetitive 
abuse of industrial property rights," have caused some concern to MNCs. 
The financing guideline is one which is susceptible to highly sub-
jective interpretation -- that in managing their activities, MNCs should 
"take into account the established objectives of the countries in which 
they operate regarding balance of payments and credit policies." By way 
of contrast, Annex I of the Report on the First Session of the UN Com-
mission (E/5655, E/C.10/6) lists as one of the areas of concern of the 
Group of 77, "Excessive outflow of financial resources from host coun-
tries due to practices of TNCs and a failure to generate expected for-
eign exchange earnings in the host country." Thus, the Commission has 
proposed a standard of conduct in regard to the effect of the MNC on the 
balance of payments much different from that of OECD. 
The taxation gui.deline refers both to the furnishing of information 
necessary to calculate taxes correctly and refraining from use of "par-
ticular facilities available to" MNCs "such as transfer pricing which 
does not conform to an arms-length standard, for modifying in ways con-
trary to national law the tax base on which members of the group are as-
sessed." Transfer pricing is, of course, one of the topics most dis-
cussed in other forums, both national and international. It reflects a 
COTllJ1J.on concern -- that artificial pricing may deprive one government or 
another ot its rightful share of the profit base on which taxes might be 
levied. Because of accounting difficulties and complexities, and be-
cause of company practices which may have been established with no pur-
pose other than convenience in mind, it is also a topic of only illusory 
simplicity. 
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The guidelines also contain rather detailed provisions on both Em-
ployment and Industrial Relations and on Science and Technology. The 
one attempts to set up principles essential to good labor relations ann 
to collective bargaining; the other seeks a compromise between the ac-
tivities of MNCs and the policies of nations "to the fullest extent pos-
sible" and "~ith due regard to the protection of industrial and intel-
lectual property rights," the rapid diffusion of technologies. 
To a large extent, the technique of providing timely and relevant 
information and reports will assist in avoiding not only conflicts be-
tween MNCs and governments, but also between national governments. Such 
conflicts are not likely to be eliminated. The competing interests are 
both numerous and important. One MNC competes with another. Labor, 
even within national boundaries, has diverse objectives: one sector 
will support a liberal trade policy, while another will find good reason 
to oppose it. Consumers and environmentalists may be opposed to 
strongly-held labor views. National governments seek to benefit their 
own constituencies. Philosophies may differ: some labor organizations 
see much benefit in co-determinism; others see it as a device for reduc-
ing the bargaining strength of labor. The list of such resources of 
conflict is long. But the informational and reporting approach, com-
bined with an open and continuing forum for discussion and conciliation, 
offers good hope for a maximum degree of useful harmonization. 
Both the OECD and the UN Commission represent attempts to establish 
uniform norms for the activities of MNCs. Were either code to be suc-
cessful, it would establish, at least within the area of its jurisdic-
tion, a generalized standard. In the case of OECD, the standard is rea-
sonably well articulated; in the case of the Commission, the schedule 
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calls for discussion of such a standard only during the 1978 meeting of 
the Commission. OECD, while it does not set up any authoritative mecha-
nism for either interpretation or dispute-settlement, does provide for 
frequent consultation and inquiry into the manner in which the code is 
operating. What sort of supervisory or other mechanisms may be suggest-
ed by the Commission remains to be seen. In each case, examination of 
the results of a code will be aided by the existence of a permanent and 
competent staff. 
The only way to make such a code on multinational corporations ob-
ligatory would be the conclusion of a treaty. However, in order to be 
meaningful, any such treaty would have to be adhered to by at least the 
USA, EEC, Canada, and Japan, as well as by the leading socialist and de-
veloping countries. Given the very conflicting areas of concern indi-
cated by the Group of 77 to the Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions, it seems hopeless to draft a treaty which would obtain the re-
quired world-wide approval. 
While voluntary compliance with a code of conduct, on the other 
hand, may not have the legal weight of such a treaty; in practice, as 
Seidl-Hohenveldern points out, a voluntary code may be effective. 
OECD has provided quite a machinery in order to ensure at 
least a certA-in measure of compliance with these rules. Any 
alleged violation of the OECD Guidelines may be discussed be-
fore OECD panels to be established for that purpose. Again, 
these measures remA-in below the expectations of the Developing 
Countries, which want binding rules, protected by enforceable 
sanctions against any violation of such rules. By comparison, 
the adverse pUblicity gained by a hearing before an OECD panel 
of inquiry appears to be a very mild measure indeed. Yet, ex-
perience with other OECD panels shows that such hearings are a 
quite efficient way to ensure effective compliance with rules 
edicted by OECD. Thus a meeting of " minds along these lines 
will in all likelihood give much more to Developing Countries 
than they could ever hope to obtain by adamant adhesion to 
their original very far-reaching demands. Let us hope that 
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all interested countries will gradually come to see these 
points. 29 . 
Many of the precepts basic to the OECD code are anathema to the ma-
jority of the Commission. There are many differences in point of view 
among the OECD members; yet they are slight compared to those which ex-
ist between the members of the UN Commission. Essential to an under-
standing of those latter differences is recognition of the fact that the 
concept of a balanced code which is fundamental to the OECD documents is 
not accepted by the majority of the Commission. In the view of the 
Group of 77, articulated clearly throughout the debates, the code is to 
be one element in a re-orientation of the terms of international trade 
and investment, within the concepts of the New International Economic 
Order. It is therefore regarded as an instrument for rectifying, not 
achieving, a balance -- a balance which is believed to have been and to 
be unjust to developing nations. If, as this suggests, the objective is 
to enhance the negotiating power and improve the bargaining position of 
the developing nations, "balance" within the four corners of the code is 
logically irrelevant at best and harmful at worst. 
Whatever the merit of these assumptions or this logic, that a code 
must be balanced is a basic tenet of those nations roughly defined as 
the OECD group. In the circumstances, and given the disputatious char-
acter which, in the United Nations, has attache(l i:o ellen such a phrase 
as "in accordance with pri.nciples pf international law," it might seem 
that little advance toward either unification or harmonization of law as 
it applies to MNCs will emerge from the Commission's labors. 
The basic Western position on code of conduct negotiations in the 
UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, in UNCTAD and in any other 
organization involved in international investment issues, has long been 
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based on the following basic premises: (1) that all codes be voluntary 
in nature; (2) that all codes provide for obligations and responsibili-
ties for both companies and governments; (3) that the firms covered in-
clude those of private, mixed and public ownership; (4) that governments 
not discriminate against MNCs in favor of national companies or vice 
versa; and (5) that standards of international law govern all commercial 
dealings. 
The Guidelines section of the Declaration was the most difficult to 
negotiate. The United States was the strongest, but by no means the on-
ly, advocate of voluntary rather than mandatory guidelines. The deci-
sion to call these principles "guidelines" rather than a code reflects 
the essential point that they are only suggestions to member nations and 
their corporations. The Guidelines do not change existing laws nor do 
they add a single new one. 
The Guidelines were designed in such a way as to insure that they 
would not introduce distortions into the flows of international trade, 
either in the treatment given by national governments to multinationals 
or in the competition among multinationals. This raised such is'31les as 
equitable laws on national disclosure of information and consistent 
standards of corporate conduct to be applied by all companies in all 
circumstances. These problems had to be resolved in such a way as not 
to inhibit the growth of multinational corporations which the OECD mem-
bers consider to be valuable tools for continued international economic 
expansion. 
Each company may voluntarily decide whether to adhere to the stan-
dards of conduct of the Guidelines or to ignore them; there is no re-
quirement to sign on and no official list of subscrihers will be 
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maintained. The Guidelines recognize different territorial conditions, 
varying product mixes and the diversity in corporate structures. There-
fore, each company is allowed to decide for itself how to apply the 
standards in light of its own circumstances, keeping in mind that this 
must be accomplished in the context of local laws, regulations, and cus-
toms. 
Since the Guidelines are voluntary, critics of the OECD effort 
question whether this effort will make any appreciable difference in the 
behavior of multinational corporations or host countries. Yet in the 
United States, for example, both the State Department and such business 
and industry groups as the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Na-
tional Association of Hanufacturers, the USA-Business and Industry Ad-
visory Committee to the OECD, and the United States Council to the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce have all urged their members -- through 
meetings, publications, letters, and discussions -- to seriously con-
sider the Guidelines as a "constructive and balanced attempt to resolve 
some of the present and potential difficulties related to international 
investment," and make a "significant effort to promote widespread under-
standing" of the Guidelines. 
The long history of attempts to negotiate codes of conduct, 
stretching back at least to the abortive Charter of the International 
Trade Organization, in 1948, indicates that while general codes of broad 
application are extremely difficult to agree on, understandings of more 
limited scope have often been worked out, formally or informally. Thus, 
while fundamental questions of the allegedly extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust laws remain unresolved, practical arrangements, like 
the consultative procedures which have long been in effect between the 
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United States and Canada, or within the Restrictive Business Practices 
Committee of the OECD, have very substantially mitigated if not elimi-
nated actual cases of conflict. 
Another ameliorating factor has been the gradual harmonization in 
fact, sometimes without formal agreement, between national laws. Thus, 
development of doctrine under Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty and 
the United States Sherman Act have substantially narrowed differences. 
In another area, the inflow of foreign direct investment capital has re-
sulted in the proposal of legislation which would regulate such invest-
ment and, in some cases, prohibit it. 
What these bodies may discuss, propose or approve in terms of MNC 
codes, guidelines, or other measures, may serve in whole or in part as 
models for national legislation to be adopted as binding law by home and 
host governments. Furthermore, public opinion throughout the world will 
be strongly influenced by the actions and decisions taken by these orga-
nizations, as witnessed by several recent moves undertaken by the World 
Health Organization which impact the operation of several MNCs. 
On the other hand, such codes can often have a reverse effect by 
imposing obligations and controls on governments as well. This balanc-
ing of responsibilities is an integral part of the OECD's international 
investment package, and many MNCs have already been active in promoting 
it. In addition, involvement by MNCs in the deliberative process could 
be useful in the shaping of constructive proposals to serve their own 
enlightened self interest. 
For all the theoretical hopes and dreams pinned on the MNC codes of 
conduct as an impleluent for accommodating global society's changing 
social, economic, and political character, a closer evaluation of one 
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specific issue -- that of antitrust -- will exemplify many of the im-
plied technicalities. For this purpose the Competition section of the 
OECD Guidelines will be analyzed. 
The Competition Guideline contains three substantive paragraphs and 
one procedural paragraph. Generally speaking, Paragraph 1 condemns 
abuses of dominant position of market power, Paragraph 2 concerns verti-
cal restrictions imposed on purchasers, distributors and licensees, and 
Paragraph 3 concerns participation in unlawful cartels and restrictive 
agreements. Paragraph 4 exhorts multinationals to consult and cooperate 
with antitrust enforcement authorities, with the most important aspect 
being the clause concerning provision of information. 30 
While several attempts to formulate common competition principles 
or international codes have been made in the past,31 the Competition 
Guideline of the OECD Guidelines is the first such effort to gai'l ap-
proval by an international body. It must be viewed against the histori-
cal background of a substantial increase in foreign antitrust legisla-
tion since World War II, notable in the Common Market,32 West Germany,33 
and the United Kingdom. 34 
Multinationals face a growing and sometimes conflicting prolifera-
tion of competition rules and enforcement policies. This situation is 
complicated by the demand of LDC's for international regulation of re-
strictive business practices and transfers of technology. For example, 
the UNCTAD Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices 35 is pres-
ently studying, inter alia, the formulation of a model antitrust law for 
LDC's.36 The OECD has also been active in the restrictive business 
practices area. Recommendations for voluntary consultation and coopera-
tion among antitrust officials have been issued 37 as well as reports on 
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various antitrust topics, such as refusals to deal,38 market power,39 
and patent and license restrictions. 40 The OECD Committee of Experts on 
Restrictive Business Practices 41 was also responsible for the Competi-
tion Guideline. The result was the formulation of a very broad state-
ment of principles whose exact content and application may be quite dif-
ficult for multinationals endeavoring to follow the Competition Guide-
line to determine. 
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the OECD does not 
now contemplate publication of a legislative history of the Competition 
Guideline which would certainly aid in its interpretation. However, 
Some of that history is known. Of particular significance, the Working 
Party of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices sub-
mitted its draft of the Competition Guideline subject to a number of 
reservations. 43 First, the Competition Guideline does not imply that 
multinationals engage in restrictive business practices, or that such 
practices are more prevalent among multinationals than among national 
companies, or that multinationals are more of an anti-competitive 
force. 44 Second, standards of behavior dealing with difficult legal ~nd 
economic concepts such as "abuse of market power" do not provide simple 
rules for business executives, and such concepts have been given real 
meaning only through interpretation by competent tribunals or some other 
body.45 Third, the Working Party had not yet concluded that standards 
of behavior or guidelines were the best approach for eliminating those 
restrictive business practices which multinationals do engage in. 46 
The primary purpose of the OECD Guidelines is to ensure that the 
operations of multinationals are in harmony with national policies. The 
purpose is not to create a multinational code of conduct, nor is it 
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necessarily, or primarily, intended to harmonize the competition laws of 
OECD member countries. Although many of the principles invoked in it 
are based to some extent upon rules which have evolved in the Common 
Market and certain OECD member countries, notably the United States and 
West Germany,'the Competition Guideline does not simply reflect existing 
national antitrust laws. It is more a recital of certain antitrust con-
cepts articulated in sufficiently broad terms so as to permit OECD mem-
ber countries to interpret them consistently with their respective na-
tional policies. Thus, multinationals must continue to emphasize com-
pliance with national rules, and should not view the Competition Guide-
line as a surrogate. They should expect, however, that these national 
laws might be influenced by the OECD Competition Guideline. 
Given the substantial differences among OECD member countries to-
ward competition policy,47 it remains to be seen how much specific guiri.-
ance the Competition Guideline can provide to multinationals. Some 
clarification may result from the eventual use of the consultation pro-
cedure established under the Declaration. 48 
Because of the generality of language, the Competition Guideline is 
not intende(1 to be applied so as to judge or evaluate particular busi-
ness practices of specific multinationals. In other words, mult llBt i.of1-
als should view the Competition Guideline not as a code or statute ap-
plicable to a particular arrangement or business practice, but rather as 
an expression of areas of antitrust concern to OECD member countries. 
Before discussing each specific provision of the Competition Guide-
line, three other general comments should be made. First, the singling 
out of multinationals for separate treatment, as contrasted with purely 
domestic entitites, may not be entirely appropriate in the competition 
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area. Those antitrust principles for which there is the greatest ac-
ceptance rest on economic and sociopolitical premises of competition be-
tween all business entities. Therefore, it is questionable whether a 
distinction should be made, for antitrust purposes, on the basis of 
whether a business entity, either privately or government-owned, is 
"multinational" or not. One result of such a distinction could be to 
place multinationals at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis purely do-
mestic traders and producers. This possibility is somewhat mitigated by 
Paragraph 9 of the Introduction to the Guidelines which states that: 
The Guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of 
treatment between multinational and domestic enterprises; 
wherever relevant they reflect good practice for all. Accord-
ingly, multinational and domestic enterprises are subject to 
the same expectations in respect of their conduct wherever the 
Guidelines are relevant to both. 
The Competition Guideline should be read in light of that paragraph. 
The second comment concerns the possible invocation of the Competi-
tion Guideline by non-OECD members, notably LDC's. For example, a de-
veloping country might informally invoke or refer to the Competition 
Guideline when objecting to the business conduct or policy of a multina-
tional. While technically speaking the Guidelines apply only to those 
operations of multinationals which are within -the OECD member countries, 
or at least the twenty-three member countries which signed the Declara-
tion, there is nothing to prevent an LDC from saying to a multinational, 
"You are violating your voluntary Guideline." A multinational faced 
with such an informal invocation of the Guidelines, as contrasted with 
the formal promulgation of the Guidelines as national legislation, 
should point out the limited nature and inherent difficulties of the 
Competition Glideline and that the Guidelines comprise part of a broader 
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package which also deals with non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
investment incentives and disincentives. 
The ambiguous and broad language of the Competition Guideline, to-
gether with the unfamiliarity of many Third World officials with Western 
antitrust concepts, could raise difficult problems for multinationals 
should Third World countries attempt to use the Competition Guideline to 
pressure multinatlonals doing business in their countries. Horeover, 
the absence of any enforcement mechanism or procedural safeguards under 
the DECD Guidelines could magnify those problems. In a sense, the 
"voluntary" nature of the Guidelines could be a double-edged sword when-
ever the Guidelines are informally invoked by a developing country. 
That is a possible danger; whether or not it is a significant one re-
mains to be seen. 
The third general comment is that the fundamental question remains 
as to whether the Competition Guideline can be applied, or is even com-
prehensihle, i.n non-market or centrally-directed economies. Indeed, 
state intervention frequently alters the underlying premises and· condi-
tions of the competitive process which exist in the so-called market 
economies. Such state intervention exists to an even greater extent in 
the international trade area where balance of payments policy, national 
security concerns and protectionist polici.es, to name only three exam-
ples, frequently modify and override competition policies. Since the 
Guidelines apply only to companies engaged in international trade, it is 
questionable to what extent the Competition Guideline can or will be in-
terpreted with any degree of consistency. 
Moving to the Competition Guideline itself, the opening language 
states that "enterprises" should conform "to official competition rules 
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and established policies of the country in which they operate •••• ,,49 
There are several problems here. It is not clear what "enterprises" are 
included. The crucial factor is multinational or transnational opera-
tions, whether or not those operations are through subsidiaries or 
branches. Questions of coverage do exist. For example, it is doubtful 
whether the mere licensing of foreign patents or participation in for-
eign joint ventures would bring a U.S. firm within the meaning of this 
term. There is also the question whether the term "enterprise," refer-
ring to a global entity such as a parent and subsidiaries, will make a 
parent responsible for all its subsidiaries and vice versa. Introduc-
tory Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines states that they "are addressed to 
the various entitites within the multinational enterprise ••• according 
to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them 50 For 
example, a U.S. parent and its wholy-owned subsidiary in West Germany 
may be treated as a single "enterprise" under the Guidelines and each 
may be held accountable for the actions of the other with respect to 
their observance. This becomes especially important with respect to 
Paragraph 4 of the Competition Guideline which exhorts, inter alia, co-
operation with antitrust enforcement officials, particularly with re-
spect to disclosure of information. 51 Thus, a U.S. parent may be asked 
to provide documents located in New York to officials of the German Car-
tel Office as part of an investigation of a German subsidiary. Under 
U.S. and Common Market law a parent and its subsidiaries are considered 
under certain circumstances a single unit. While the U.S. case law is 
not entirely clear, the determining factor for single treatment might be 
described as "control" by the parent of the subsidiary.52 While Intro-
ductory Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines does not expressly adopt the 
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"control" standard, it offers no substitute standard and a U.S. company 
might employ the "control" test at least as a rule of thumb. Had such a 
principle been in effect, the Rhodesian experience might have been quite 
different (See Chapter 11). 
There is also some inconsistency or at least tension in the opening 
language of the competition guidelines between treating the entire mul-
tinational operation as a single unit and requiring that the multina-
tional, viewed as a single unit, conform "to official competition rules 
and established policies of the countries in which [the whole unit] 
operates ...... 53 It is somewhat difficult to see how the multinational 
enterprise as a single unit can be expected to conform to what are often 
conflicting national laws and policies in the competition area. In many 
instances, separate parts of the multinational may be compelled to fol-
low conflicting laws and policies of the different national jurisdic-
tions in which they operate. 
This inconsistency or tension in the opening language of the Compe-
tition Guideline points up the probable purposes underlying the Guide-
line's treatment of a multinational enterprise as a single I-Ini t, which 
are twofold: (1) to facilitate antitrust investigations of local activ-
ities by fostering the obtaining of information from foreign parents and 
affiliates; and (2) to place "responsibility" on parents for nonobser-
vance of the Competition Guideline by subsidiaries and affiliates. 
Since the Guidelines are voluntary, are without binding legal effect, 
and are not to be applied to evaluate the particular conduct of a spe-
cific enterprise, the nature and gravity of such "responsibility" is 
quite unclear. 
34 
Two final points should be noted about the introductory clause of 
the Competition Guideline. First, the term "enterprise" includes any 
form of commercial activity, e.g., individual, partnership, corporation. 
Second the clause emphasizes that existing national competition laws 
take precedence over the OECD Competition Guideline. 
Paragraph 1 of the Competition Guideline deals with the abuse of a 
dominant position. 54 The general concept of "abuse of a dominant posi-
tion" by a single firm reflects well settled antitrust law in the Common 
Market and is roughly analogous to the American concept of "monopoliza-
tion" under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 55 Paragraph 1 contains three 
conditions: There must be a "dominant position of market pm-ler," abu-
sive conduct, and an adverse effect on competition in the relevant mar-
ket. Since Paragraph 1 is derived primarily from Article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome,56 it is instructive to look at the Common Market's in-
terpretation of an "abuse of a dominant position" in order to ascertain 
what the OEeD language might mean. 
Three cases may be cited. First, a U.S. manufacturer with a world-
wide monopoly of a raw material necessary for the production of medicine 
discontinued selling the raw material to an Italian customer, with whom 
it was competing, or was about to compete, in the sale of an end prod-
uct. This also could be described as a supply squeeze by a vertically 
integrated monopoly. It was held to be an abuse of a dominant position 
because of the monopoly's refusal to deal. 57 Second, a U.S. manufac-
turer holding through European subsidiaries a dominant position in the 
German market for certain types of metal cans acquired a competing manu-
facturer. The horizontal acquisition was held to be an abuse of a domi-
nant position. 58 Third, and most important, a U.S. banana producer was 
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held to have abused its dominant position by engaging in the following 
practices: charging different prices (30 to 50 percent differentials) 
in different countries for equivalent transactions without objective 
justification; imposing resale restrictions; and charging "unfair" or 
"excessive" prices. 59 Unduly high or excessive prices standing by them-
selves probably would not constitute a violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Such prices might be used as evidence of monopoly power; 
yet, in themselves probably would not constitute abusive or bad conduct 
which gives rise to monopolization. 60 
There is, however, a similar basis for such interpretations in the 
American municipal regime. As described in Chapter 2 of this work, 
Rockefeller's model for abuse of a dominant position to achieve monopo-
lization provoked the initial imposition of the Sherman Act, and his 
tactics are still effective today. BP, as another example, marked her 
official entry into the American market by running into antitrust prob-
lems before she even concluded the merger with SORIO (See Chapter 9). 
While Paragraph 1 of the Competition Guideline closely parallels 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, substantial differences exist between 
them. Perhaps most importantly, Paragraph 1 is at first glance much 
narrower irr its coverage than Section 2 in that the former does not ap-
ply until an enterprise has already achieved a "dominant position" and 
has thereafter abused it. 61 On the other hand, Section 2 prohibits con-
spiracies or attempts to attain a monopoly or dominant position. For 
example, U.S. courts have found a violation of Section 2 where a company 
engaged in "predatory" or "exclusionary" practices even where that com-
pany had a small market share well under what could be considered monop-
oly power or a dominant position within a relevant market. 62 
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On the other hand, the European concept of "dominant position" may 
be more flexible with less emphasis on market share percentages than is 
the case with the American concept of "monopoly power" which usually im-
plies at least a 60 or 70 percent market share in addition to abusive 
conduct. By contrast, the Common Market has placed less reliance on 
market share percentages in establishing a dominant position under 
Article 86 and has frequently relied upon other factors such as access 
to financial resources, 63 raw materials and consumer markets, 64 geo-
graphic spread of output,65 and technological predominance. 66 Reliance 
on such factors could result in the finding of a dominant position even 
though a firm's market share is well below the threshold figure under 
U.S •. antitrust law. Similarly, under German antitrust law a dominant 
market power is rebuttably presumed where a single firm has only one-
third of the market. 67 Thus, multinationals might anticipate that other 
OECD members might take a broader and stricter view of "dominant posi-
tion" than that generally given "monopoly power" under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. It would seem that each of the Seven Sisters run the risk 
of being declared to be in a dominant position in some markets merely by 
definition rather than percentqge share of the market. 
Other questions also remain unanswered under Paragraph 1. For ex-
ample, must the dominant position exist in the same market where compe-
tition is adversely affected? Could France, for example, justifiably 
invoke Paragraph 1 against a U.S.-based multinational which holds a 
world-wide dominant position in the manufacture of a product and discon-
tinues selling to a French dealer, where the manufacturer has only 5 
percent of the market in France?68 There is also the question whether 
independent enterprises can be grouped together in order to demonstrate 
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a dominant position, i.e., the case of a "shared monopoly". This con-
cept has been rejected under U.S. antitrust law,69 but has been accepted 
in some OECD countries, notably West Germany.70 
The concept of "abuse" in Paragraph 1 appears to parallel the U.S. 
monopolization concept of "predatory", "exclusionary", or otherwise 
anti-competitive or unfair business conduct. 71 A U.S.-based multina-
tional that is not engaged in conduct which would constitute actual mo-
nopolization under U.S. antitrust laws can be somewhat secure that it is 
not committing an "abuse" under Paragraph 1 as that term may be inter-
preted by other OECD nations. There are Some very significant excep-
tions, most of which concern either high or excessive prices or differ-
ent prices to purchasers in different countries. 
Five examples of abuses of a dominant position are set out in Para-
graph 1. The list should not be considered exhaustive, since Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome give examples, and they are not consid-
ered exhaustive. 72 
Paragraph lea) concerns anti-competitive acquisitions and is based 
primarily on the Contin_e_ntal Can case in the COIlLTllOn aarket Ivhich held 
that the acquisition of a competitor by a holder of a dominant position 
constituted an abuse. 73 U.S. law is much broader in that it prohibits 
mergers which may merely lessen competition in the future; a dominant 
position is not needed to invalidate the merger. 74 The efficacy of 
Paragraph lea) is highly doubtful for several reasons. First, municipal 
policies toward merger control differ radically among even the OEeD mem-
ber countries. 75 Moreover, where a country imposes merger controls on 
competition grounds, the question whether an acquisition is "anti-
competitive" is a very complex one which cannot be answered in the 
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abstract and which likely would be answered in varying ways by different 
nations. 76 Second, many OECD countries already screen foreign takeovers 
or acquisitions of domestic firms. 77 Compliance with the formal, or as 
in the French case informal,78 conditions for government approval of a 
foreign takeover will take precedence over the DEeD Competition Guide-
line. Thus, Paragraph lea) offers little or no guidance to multination-
als contemplating an acquisition in an OECD country. 
Paragraph l(b) concerns predatory behavior toward competitors and 
reflects a generally accepted principle which on its face is consistent 
with U.S. antitrust law. The generality of the language, however, may 
permit wide divergencies of interpretation. Nonetheless, Paragraph 1(b) 
reflects existing U.S. antitrust law. The problem is that there is sub-
stantial controversy surrounding the "predatory" nature of some prac-
tices, For example, in many situations it .is not clear whether pricing 
is "competitive" or "predatory",79 There is also the question whether 
business activity harmful to a competitor should be proscribed when 
there is no apparent or short-run harm to competition and consumers. 80 
Paragraph l(c), which concerns unreasonable refusals to deal, is 
also largely consistent with existing U,S. and most other antitrllst 
laws,81 The main question under Paragraph l(c) is whether it prevents 
exclusive distributorships, as well as refusals to license patented or 
unpatented technology, trademarks, copyrights and other industrial prop-
erty. It would seem likely that it does not, since the Common Market 
has specific rules on exclusive distributorships.82 Including token in-
dependents as appeasement in such joint ventures as the Iraq Petroleum 
Co. (Chapters 4 and 7) and Alyeska (Chapter 9) might be considered re-
fusals to :leal. 
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Paragraph led) concerns the an.ti-competitive abuse of industrial 
property rights. The extreme generality of this provision prevents it 
from providing any meaningful guidance in this highly complex area of 
antitrust and industrial property law. While most antitrust laws pro-
hibit specified licensing and other arrangements on certain grounds, 
municipal rules vary and conflict to such a degree 83 that at the present 
time multinationals should look to them rather than to this guideline. 
Paragraph l(d) La highly important, however, not as a Gllirleline, but 
rather as a signal that many countries are and will be taking a harder 
antitrust look at the use of industrial property rights. 
Paragraph lee) is one of the most important. It can be best under-
stood as having two separate clauses, each of which covers different 
types of pricing practices by a firm with a dominant position: (1) dis-
criminatory or unreasonably differentiated pricing; and (2) anti-
competitive transfer pric.ing. The prohibitions in each clause raise po-
tefltia11y serious problems for mu1tin:-=tti.on:-=tls. 
The first clause deals with discriminatory, that is, unreasonably 
differentiated, pricing. However, it is unclear whether this clause re-
fers to price discrimination among purchasers within a single country, a 
I 
Robinson-Patman type provision,;84 or to price differences he tween or 
among different countries, a Chi<il~i_t_a __ (l!nited Bra~~~)_ situation; 85 or to 
the selling or dumping of goods in one country at a price below the fair 
market value in the country of manufac,::ure. 86 In view of the concern in 
the Common Market regarding differences in pricing of the same goods in 
different countries, it would seem likely that the second category is 
intended. The activities in the East Texas oil fields (Chapter 5) exem-
p1ify the dangers inherent in price cutting. 
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This part of Paragraph 1(e) seems to reflect the European rather 
than the American concern. But the remedy of ordering a roll-back of 
prices or of setting maximum prices which was adopted hy the Europeans 87 
is rejected in the United States as an antitrust remedy.8S Price-
fixing, although a hotly debated issue during the Roosevelt Era, was 
never passed into law in America (See Chapter 6). A U.S.-based multina-
tional with a dominant position which sells the same product in differ-
ent countries at substantially different prices must be prepared to face 
the possibility of complaints under Paragraph 1(e). 
The second clause of Paragraph 1(e) deals with pricing transactions 
between affiliat,=n entities. Here again, the concerns underlying the 
guideline are mainly European and not American. The provision is appar-
ently intended to reach two marketing situations. The first is "subsi-
dization" whereby higher profits obtainen elsewhere permit a particular 
subsidiary or affiliate to engage in local below-cost pricing to gain 
entry or increase its market share. 89 The second is discrimination by a 
vertically integrated multinational against independent retailers in 
favor of company-owned outlets. 90 
The former, if it consisted of below-cost pricing, would probably 
be unlavlful in the United States, but it is far less clear whether it 
would be unlawful in the absence of other illegitimate practices. 91 
OECD concerns in this area must be seen against the background of a more 
vocal Third World concern with the transfer pricing of multinationals 92 
The proviSion should be understood, then primarily as an expression of 
growing concern with such pricing practices on the part of certain OECD 
member countries and the TI1ird World concern with transfer pricing. It 
is doubtful, however, whether transfer prices ordinarily implicate 
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antitrust policies -- unless there is a classic price squeeze situation 
rather than taxation, customs and other municipal policies. 
With regard to discrimination by vertically integrated firms, U.S. 
law does not generally require such firms to sell their products to in-
dependent retailers at exactly the same price as they charge company-
owned retail outlets. 93 An interpretation of Paragraph l(e) which re-
quires such uniformity would be a significant departure from U.S. anti-
trust law. 
Paragraph 2 concerns vertical restrictions imposed on downstream 
pu~chasers, distributors, and licensees. 94 A dominant position or mo-
nopoly need not exist in order for Paragraph 2 to apply. However, un-
like U.S. or Common Harket law, no conspiracy or concerted action is 
necessary. 95 The expressions "freedom to resell, export, purchase" and 
"to develop their operations", together '.-lith such concepts as "trade 
conditions" and "sound commercial practice" have no clear meaning in the 
antitrust field. Given these ambiguities, together with the breadth of 
the exeptions of conditions, it is doubtful whether this paragraph will 
provide a great deal of practical guidance beyond calling attention to 
certain concerns of foreign countries. 
TI18 primary concern underlying Paragraph 2 is with restrictions on 
exports anJ re-expocts imposed on local licensees, distributors and 
other resellers. 96 Common ~1arket and developing countries are particu-
larly sensitive about such restrictions. Paragraph 2 could be inter-
preted as going beyond U.S. antitrust·law or perhaps as being contrary 
even to other U.S. laws such as the Trading With the Enemy Act. 97 
Joint ventures appear to be excluded and restrictions on subsidi-
aries should be not covered in view of the legislative history of this 
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provision which in an earlier form covered "competitively important, 
wholly-owned subsidiaries."98 
The phrase "freedom to ••• purchase" is apparently intended to 
cover tie-ins and should not be interpreted as imposing an obligation on 
multinationals to sell to whoever demands. Given the broad language and 
enumerated conditions, Paragraph 2 cannot be expected to provide much 
practical guidance with respect to tie-in arrangements; it is more an 
expression of DECD concern about the imposition of tie-ins upon unwill-
ing purchasers and licensees. As the emphasis is on "freedom" of pur-
chasers and licensees to resell, etc., the Paragraph is apparently not 
directed to restrictions voluntarily entered into. 
International and domestic cartels are the subject of Paragrapq 
3.99 This is a significant declaration by twenty-three industrialized 
nations accepting U.S. antipathy to cartel arrangements such as price-
fixing, division of markets, allocation of customers and limits on pro-
duction. Like Section I of the Sherman Act and Article 85 of the Treaty 
of Rome, concerted action or a conspiracy is required. IOO 
While the general condemnation of cartels in Paragraph 3 raises no 
particular problems for U.S.-based multinationals, its language raises 
two points worthy of comment. First, earlier drafts which barred "coop-
eration" with cartels or restrictive agree~entslOI raised fears that 
presnm:-lhly innocent activity, such as mere pncenasing from a cartel, 
might be covered hy the Guideline. "Cooperation" was replaced by the 
phrase condemning actions "purposely strengthening the restrictive ef-
fects" of cartels. While this amendment certainly removes mere purchas-
ing from a cartel as a proscribed action, it does not remove all doubts 
concerning a situation where a multinational is compelled by a foreign 
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government to participate in or aid a nation-state cartel, like OPEC. 
For example, a foreign government compulsion defense to an antitrust 
claim exists under U.S. law. 102 The final qualifying clause relating to 
cartels which "are not generally or specifically accepted under applic-
able national or international legislation" raises many questions and is 
subject to a plethora of interpretations. 
Paragraph 4 concerns consultation and cooperation. 103 This final 
paragraph is unique in being the first international guideline or state-
ment of principles to include a procedural provision. The apparent con-
cern is that enforcement of antitrust law with respect to multinationals 
is hampered by the refusal of parent companies to provide information 
demanded by investigators. 
Exactly what consultation and cooperation entails is unclear. The 
scope, however, is broad. Parents and subsidiaries are treated as a 
single unit and the Guideline can be interpreted to require cooperatiol1 
il.ld the provision of information to any nation "whose interests are di-
rectly affected" even though the multinational has no subsidiary or 
branch there. It also is not at all clear what is meant by "safeguards 
normally applicable in this field." It is doubtful whether such safe-
guards exist. 
In summary, the Competition Guideline is not a multilateral code of 
conduct reflecting the existing antitrust legislation and policies of 
OECD member countries. Rather the Competition Guideline should be 
viewed by multinationals as identifying those areas of antitrust concern 
which are shared by OECD member countries. Despite these shared con-
cerns, the generality of the Competition Guideline will permit each OECD 
member country to impart a content to the Guideline consistent with its 
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own municipal policies. Multinationals should continue, therefore, to 
emphasize compliance with municipal antitrust rules and policies and 
should not treat the Competition Guideline as a surrogate. 
This does not mean, however, that the Competition Guideline will 
have no practical significance. First, the extensive work which went 
into the formulation of the Competition Guideline, its acceptance by the 
DECD member countries, and the consultation procedures may very well 
move DECD member countries and, perhaps more importantly, their anti-
trust officials toward stronger and more pro-competition national poli-
cies and enforcement. The educational effect of the increasing exchange 
of information and views among officials can be a real and substantial 
one. Such a movement toward stronger antitrust enforcement can certain-
ly occur even without a "harmonization" of municipal laws in the formal 
or technical sense. 
Second, it can be expected that Paragraph 4 of the Competition 
Guideline and the consultation procedures of the Guidelines generally 
will themselves encourage greater cooperation among national enforcement 
officials. For example, multinationals should contemplate that Para-
graph 4 will be invoked by national authorities in order to facilitate 
investigations of local activities by seeking informations from foreign 
parents, subsidiaries and affiliates. More specifically, Paragraph 4 
may result in increased pressure on multinationals to disclose informa-
tion to enforcement officials pursuant to antitrust investigations and 
actions. 
The theory of antitrust policy is that certain kinds of restraints 
are undesirable when they affect competition in some defined market. 
This general premise applies to the Competition Guideline as well. It 
45 
is clear that the Guideline is directed at and is limited to certain 
kinds of effects which result from either collusive or predatory con-
duct. Furthermore, there is obviously a market notion in the Competi-
tion Guideline. It employs the concept of territoriality, analogous to 
the Sherman Act, which limits U.S. antitrust jurisdiction to acts af-
fecting the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States,I04 or the 
antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Rome. lOS The latter provisions 
are not directed at export restraints that have no impact in the Common 
t1arket. Their purpose is to encourage free tcade within the Community, 
and in a broader sense, to facilitate the economic integration of the 
Community. These provisions encompass extraterritorial conduct only 
when that conduct has an impact within the Common Market. As a juris-
prudential matter, this is generally true of any particular municipal 
law. Municipal laws are obviously limited to the extent that the juris-
diction of a given country is recognized by other countries. 
The second problem is that, unlike other legislation, the political 
history and the political setting of the Competition Guideline is un-
clear. The Sherman Act had a political history in that it was enacted 
as the result of a populist movement against trusts. I06 It also had a 
legal history in the sense that, although the common law concept of re-
straints of trade was expanded in the Sherman Act, it also provided a 
point of reference in case law. I07 The Sherman Act also had an ethical 
setting in that notions like predatory behavior toward competition were 
developed as a model against which certain kinds of restraints and their 
effects could be measured. 
The motivation behind the provisions of the Treaty of Rome is also 
known. It was to encourage the growth of trade within the Common Market 
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and to facilitate the economic integration of the nations of the Commu-
nity.l08 The municipal laws of a number of Third World countries which 
focus on issues like technology transfer also have a political base in 
that they are attempting to encourage the self-sufficiency of local en-
terprises, discourage restraints on their export capability, and the 
like. The political purpose and the political setting of the Competi-
tion Guideline, however, is much less clear. 
The third problem with the Competition Guideline is that it con-
tains some very sweeping phrases and no process by which concrete mean-
ing can be given to them. The Treaty of Rome and Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act also contain Some very broad language, but in those laws 
there is at least the comfort of knowing that there is a developing body 
of case law for guidance. It would appear then, that the Competition 
Guideline is not law, but a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" in the 
words of Justice Holmes, 109 just as the Sherman Act came back to haunt 
the very companies which supported its passage. 
These observations lead to one empirical note with regard to how 
multinationals might use the Competition Guideline. To the extent that 
companies have municipal antitrust compliance procedures, they will look 
to the Competition Guideline fairly late. 
For companies based in the United States, the internal review pro-
cess would first consider the body of law that has evolved as a conse-
quence of the Sherman Act. If the company has operations within the 
Common Market, it then would consider the kinds of practices that have 
been attacked, challenged or condemned in the case law under the Treaty 
of Rome. If the company has an operation in Germany, obviously it would 
look at German municipal law. Similarly, if the company has an 
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operation in Argentina or Mexico, it would look at their provisions on 
technology licensing, and so. on. 
The Competition Guideline does not change this process. The inter-
nal review process should begin with those antitrust provisions which 
have been enacted into law, to which sanctions are attached, on the 
basis of which there will be a body of judicial interpretation, and 
which can be evaluated in terms of their political and social purposes. 
This does not mean that the Competition Guideline can be ignored. 
Perhaps a more appropriate way to look at it is that occasionally tt 
will shed some light on the direction in which municipal law will move. 
It certainly may throw some light on the direction in which Common Mar-
ket law will continue to evolve. The Competition Guideline also may in-
dicate what in the way of municipal antitrust legislation may develop 
over time in Third World countries, and may show how those countries 
will inter'pret some of their existing laws. Therefore, the Competition 
Guideline is a sort of checklist, albeit a supplemental checklist. 
The Guidelines not just the Competition Guideline but the over-
all document -- should be reviewed in historical perspective. Obvious-
ly, the world at large is engaged in a growing international dialogue on 
the conduct of multinational companies. In this regard the Guidelines 
are perhaps significant in terms of identifying trends, and to that end 
are helpful in discerning the direction or movement of the law. 
On the other hand, as has been documented, much of the basis for 
the principles laid out in the Guidelines emanates from municipal law, 
especially in the case of American antitrust law. The petroleum indus-
try is the obvious vantage point from which to view the MNC. Each of 
the Seven Sisters, as individual units, dwarf every other MNC; yet, as 
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an oligopoly, they present such an awesome magnitude of resources that 
even Western governments find it difficult, if not impossible, to com-
pete with such a cartel. 
An examination of the Trans-Canadian Pipeline proposal, suggested 
by the Canadian Government as an alternative to the Trans-Alaskan Pipe-
line (TAPS) -- the largest privately-financed construction project in 
history -- shows that Canada, for example, lacked not only the technical 
expertise, but also the financial capabilities to develop such a massive 
project. Chapter 9 details the various alternatives to TAPS which were 
considered and the financial and technical problems surmounted by 
ALYESKA, the consortium of private companies formed for the express pur-
pose of designing, financing, building, and operating TAPS. 
While the Alaskan investment would be impressive in and of itself, 
it must be considered in conjunction with the global actions of these 
mammoth enterprises, including the simultaneous development of the North 
Sea and of virtually all other known petroleum reserves throughout the 
world. 
Having considered the size of the oligopoly, and realizing the ex-
tent of the world's dependence on oil, it follows that the American ,Gov-
ernment as home government to five of the Seven and host to the 
others; as the only industrialized country unscathed by World War II, 
and as such, the leading proponent of free enterpcise; and as both the 
largest producer and consumer of oil, herself -- should have developed 
the most mature, sophisticated municipal regulatory system with which to 
foster such an industry. It stands to reason, then, that her body of 
law would set precedents and become one of the main contributors to the 
establishment of accepted general practice in unorganized world society. 
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It is, therefore, important to trace the development of petroleum law in 
America -- especially that of antitrust law -- from social, historical, 
and ethical perspectives in the attempt to come to a workable solution 
to the antitrust issue on a global scale. 
Even Britain in the 1960s did not have the technical expertise or 
the financial capabilities to develop her own indigenous oil in the 
North Sea. Yet, British Petroleum would appear the ideal vehicle 
through which to examine the overall developments of the industry. As 
the sun sets on the British Empire, BP remains as one of the few great 
remnants of that era, in that she still operates in over 130 countries 
today. Not only was she the first great oil company outside America, 
almost as old as Exxon herself, her global rank with Exxon and Shell to-
day is unquestioned. When she did enter the American market, in which 
she controls 11 percent of the proven indigenous oil and gas reserves, 
she chose to do so through the auspices of the Standard Oil Company of 
Ohio (SORIa), a direct offspring of Rockefeller's great monopoly. 
Steeped in the tradition of both common and international law, her con-
tributions to the industry in general, and specifically her influence on 
American municipal law -- especially that of antitrust -- was apparent 
long before she actually entered the American market. BP's close histo-
ry of working relationships with the bi.ggest of the American majors, 
particularly in view of her British nationality, would appear to render 
her a more objective observer, offering a slightly different slant in 
her relationship with the U.S. Government as well. 
It is her paradoxical relationship with her own part-owner home 
government, however, which allows for exploration of the implications 
inherent in a mixed economy such as Britain's. 
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These various relationships are examined over an extended period of 
time under diverse circumstances in order to fully analyze their syner-
gistic nature. 
Therefore, this thesis utilizes an interdisciplinary approach to 
international law in respect to multinational corporations and their 
various symbio~ic relationships with states. The actual functioning of 
\) 
MNCs in unorganized world society has been traced from social, histori-
cal, and ethi.cal perspectives, the result of which indicates that MNCs 
already exhibit a degree of at least quasi-sovereignty in their dealings 
in the international arena. As a result, the organized world society 
should recognize MNCs as limited international legal personalities in 
their own right and commence the process of defining what limits are in-
he rent in their nature. 
One of the more obvious definitional problems involves the concept 
of SO\Tt~rei..~rltf ''lith its traditional implication of territory. The issue 
of sovereignty over a state's own natural resources becomes inextricably 
muddled when -- in practice -- MNCs exercise quasi~sovereignty over the 
lands they own, lease, or for which they contract for mineral extraction 
rights. In fact, the entire history of concession agreements -- usually 
with states or state-owned corporations formed for the express purpose 
of contracting with multinational corp.)r.'itions -- indicates that such 
sovereignty is, in effect, negotiable, and bound by contract as an im-
plement of international law. 
Such concession agreements involve state development in varying de-
gress and as such traverse the thin line dividing private and public in-
ternational law. Therefore, as Friedmann points out, corporations which 
participate in international economic development agreements perform 
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functions which pertain to the sphere of public rather than private in-
ternational law and this must be reflected in their legal status. 110 In 
many of these agreements, arbitration clauses accord equal status to the 
governmental and private participants. The need for this treatment as 
equals has been reflected recently in the provision made by the World 
Bank-sponsored Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes for a 
conciliation and arbitration procedure between governmental and private 
participants in investment transactions on a level of equality. III 
The European Community treaties also give procedural standing equal 
to that of governments to private enterprises and associations. Under 
Article 33 of the ECSC, enterprises and associations have a right to ap-
peal against decisions and recommendations of the High Authority on the 
grounds of legal violations of the Treaty. Under Article 173 of the EEC 
Treaty, any "natural or legal person" has a right of appeal against the 
decisions, as distinct from the recommendations or opinions of the Coun-
cil and the Commission, provided that the decisions or regulation in 
question is "of direct and specific concern.,,112 
These, then, are the first steps of recognition of MNCs as interna-
tional legal personalities by organized international society. Another, 
albiet less direct, indication of imminent recognition is the UN General 
Assembly's unanimous adoption of Resolution 2501 (XXIV) on 12 November 
1969 which 
recommends that the International Law Commission should study, 
in consultation with the principal international organiza-
tions, as it may consider appropriate in accordance with its 
practice, the question of treaties concluded between states 
and international organizations or between two or more inter-
national organizations. 113 
Agreements such as the Red Line Agreement -- in effect, a "treaty 
between two or more international organizations" -- would finally 
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achieve "validity", having had the "quality" of international law con-
ferred upon it (See Chapter 4). 
It can no longer be denied that multinational corporations 
especially those in the petroleum industry -- are an ipso facto part of 
the international legal regime and that their international political, 
social, and economic functions as structural components of systems of 
the world order "can only be neglected at our peril.,,114 
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CHAPTER 2 
STANDARD OIL: FOUNDATIONS OF SYNERGISM 
The development of the doctrine of international law 
followed only slowly in the wake of the practice of 
international law. In the early days of interna-
tional law, it sufficed to have lawyers trained in 
the canon and civil law. They tended to apply to 
novel situations the concepts of municipal law with 
which they were familiar. This accounts for the 
long continued overemphasis in the doctrine of in-
ternational law on analogies from more mature sys-
tems of internal community law to a differently 
structured society law. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
••• represented but a logical extention, indeed the inevitable 
culmination of a long, well defined historical process that 
Was set in motion by these very oil companies at least 40 or 
50 years ago. 
David I. Haberman 
The interdisciplinary treatment of municipal law makes it possible 
to view international law objectively, especially in the sociological, 
historical, and ethical perspectives, providing insights into the prac-
tice of international law today. Thus, an understanding of British 
Petroleum's position in unorganized international society presupposes 
consideration of the development of the Standard Oil Co. For not only 
did the Standard become the first big oil company, the American Govern-
ment's attempts at regulating her provided the basis for most future 
regulation of oil companies. It should be noted that it was through 
Standard Oil Co. that BP later entered the U.S. market. Thus, in order 
to better understand the factors contributing to the complexities of 
British Petroleum's various relationships in the international legal 
community, it becomes imperative to begin with the Standard. 
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John D. Rockefeller and his skillful organization, with profit mo-
tivation and the need for stability as impetus, developed the Standard 
Oil Co. into the industry's first big monopoly by systematically setting 
out to control the exploration and producing, transporting, refining, 
and marketing aspects of the industry. 
The Standard's financial and industrial success could only 
have been attained by men with remarkable business acumen, 
tremendous energy, and an indomitable determination to suc-
ceed. Business success is measured in pecuniary terms. 
These men attained it. With an eye open always to the main 
chance, they quickly seized opportunities as they presented 
themselves ••• and, whenever advantageous, created new oppor-
tunities for increasing the scope of the operation. 1 
The need for price stability was evident in the early 1860s when 
production was low, causing prices to be high: the production in 1860 
Was 500,000 barrels a day; the price was $20.00 a barrel. In 1861 pro-
duction hit a high of 2 million barrels a day and the price stumbled to 
$0.10 a barrel. As the extreme fluctuations continued, Standard at-
tempted to stabilize prices by eliminating competition and by increasing 
demand beyond production capabilities. 
The Standard Oil Co. was accused of engaging in unfair practices, 
including interfering with the construction of independent pipelines 
whether by purchasing land along the proposed routes of the independents 
or by securing rights of way of her own across such routes. Frequently 
the support of the railroads was enlisted so that they would refuse to 
extend rights of way across their routes to rivals of the Standard. In 
states where pieplines were given the right of emminent domain, this 
would cause nothing more than delay, litigation, and expense; but in 
states where pieplines were not extended this right, it served effec-
tively to defeat the independent pipeline projects. Another method em~ 
ployed several times by the Standard interests Was to obtain control of 
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independent pipeline enterprises by purchasing a part of their stock. A 
method more frequently resorted to was to force independents out of 
business by paying premiums on crude oil at the wells to those producers 
in the immediate vicinity of an independent line. 
In view of the wide scope of the Standard's operations the company 
could afford to practice price discrimination of this sort in limited 
areas when competition may have been especially keen without influenc-
ing, to an appreciable degree, the average price which it paid. The 
small independent, however, in meeting this competition on all or a ma-
jor portion of his business, frequently did so at an absolute loss. In 
some instances, in order not to prejudice its business at other points, 
the Standard organized "bogus" independent companies in whose name the 
discriminating practices were conducted. When these methods failed in 
their objectives the Standard in some cases purchased outright th~ <Ji.1. 
we 11" or refineries upon which the independent pipe lines were dependent 
for their continued existence. Either expedient served to deprive the 
pipeline of the business which it had formerly handled. In one case, 
the transportation company lost the source of traffic; in the other, its 
customers, for the purchase of the crude transported. And all along, 
the Standard consistently ref~sed either directly or indirectly to 
transport all for Ot~.1'=L than Standard refineries. 
It is frequently contended that one of the chief influences which 
gave forces to the general movement toward combination in industry dur-
ing the closing decades of the nineteenth century was the desire to se-
cure e~onomies which presumably inhere in large-scale production. An 
early study of the petroleum industry, however, does indicate that once 
the Standard's monopoly control was established, her larger scale of 
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operations afforded economies which served to fortify further her posi-
tion of power. This seems particularly true of its pipeline and refin-
ery operations. 
There is no doubt that the Standard's larger pipeline system could 
be operated more economically than the smaller lines of the indepen-
dents. Likewise, the greater number of its refineries and the larger 
scale of operations at particular plants enabled her to do husiness at 
lower cost than could the smaller"independents. Her refineries were 
scattered widely over the country and were conveniently located with 
reference to population centers. 
Thus in 1906 the Standard Oil Co. controlled the output of 20 re-
fineries located in 12 states. The Standard was thereby enabled to keep 
her transportation charges low on refined products through the elimina-
tiorl of cross-freights. The larger size of the individual plants -- the 
Standard's Bayonne refinery and her Philadelphia refinery each distilled 
50 percent more illuminating oil in 1904 than all the independents com-
bined -- undoubtedly contributed to her economic superiority. A large-
scale plant can afford to install the apparatus necessary to extract 
from petroleum its full range of values, thus giving it an advantage 
over the small plant. 2 
In order to establish a monopoly, one may either control one of 
every step of the production process (horizontal monopoly) or all of any 
one stage of the production (vertical monopoly). John D. Rockefeller 
and his organization set out to accomplish both feats simultaneously. 
In 1862 Rockefeller and Samuel Andrews established a small refinery 
in Cleveland, Ohio. By 1865 Rocekfeller had divested himself of all 
other holdings to devote his full energy to oil. In 1870 various 
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refineries combined to form the Standard Oil Co. which controlled 10 
percent of the total refineries in America. The Standard had already 
begun to secure a few markets by this time. By 1872 the South Improve-
ment Co., controlled by a group of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh refiners, 
was established to obtain favorable railroad freight rates. 
The South Improvement Co. began by making secret agreements with 
several leading railways whereby open freight rate on oil shipments was 
to be considerably increased, yet the South Improvement Co. was to be 
allowed a substantial rebate on oil shipped not only by herself but also 
by her competitors. A premature announcement of these plans led to 
fierce opposition in the oil community culminating in a demand for a 
congressional hearing. The railroads concerned quickly repudiated their 
contracts. He.qnwhile, the Standard Oil Co. had. used the power inherent 
in the impending arrangements to acquire (sometimes by coersion) twenty-
one of the twenty-six independent refineries in Cleveland, thus increas-
ing her refinery capacity from 1,500 barrels a day to 10,000 barrels a 
day. In addition, the Standard managed to secure for herself favorable 
freight discriminations with the railroad.s just a few weeks after the 
collapse of the South Improvement Co. deal. 
It should be noted that although the South Improvement Co. failed 
in her express purpose of concluding a favorable deal with the rail-
roads, an important by-product -- that of information gathering was 
discovered to be invaluable in future to Standard in evaluating 
strengths and weaknesses of competitors and in perfecting the timing of 
Standard's ultimate plan for monopolistic acquisition. This pattern has 
heen incorporated on a global scale as standard practice by the major 
oil companies. By looking at this series of events in historical 
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perspective, it becomes evident that through skillful scientific busi-
ness management, Standard Oil Co. manipulated the system to her advan-
tage. 
The Petroleum Refiners' Association (PRA) , headed by Rockefeller 
and Standard, controlled four-fifths of all American refineries. By 
1874 the Central Association of Refiners replac.ed the PRA. This new as-
sociation not only (vas len by Rockefeller, but through him was con-
trolled by the Standard Oil Co.; the Standard was given the responsibil-
ity for making all purchases of crude oil and for making allotments to 
the memher refineries. Standard Oil was also given control over sales 
of refined products, and negotiation of all freight and pipeline ex-
penses. This, in effect, gave Standard Oil Co. a working horizontal 
monopoly. 
By 1875 Standard had increased its stock by 300,000 shares and had 
begun ahsorbing refineries allover the U.S. Standard used the addi-
tional capital raised from the 300,000 new stock issues to secure con-
trol over most of the leading independent refineries by affecting a se-
cret exchange of her own stock for stock in the independent companies. 
In this manner it secured control over refineries located in Brooklyn, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Parkersburg, and practically all of the in-
dependent refineries in the Oil Creek region. So rapidly had the pro-
cess of absorption and combination been progressing that from 1870 to 
1879 the Standard's control of refined petroleum products had increased 
from approximately 10 percent to the monopolistic figure of 90 percent. 3 
The formation of the first Standard Oil Trust in 1879 was an at-
tempt to consolidate the control of all the various companies owned into 
a centralized power structure coordinating all activities. In the 
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interest of efficient management, the thirty-seven stockholders (there 
had been only three or four at the time of Standard's organization) en-
tered into a trust agreement whereby they turned over the stock which 
they owned in more than thirty separate companies to a board of three 
trustees who in turn agreed to manage the stock in the interests of the 
stockholders. 
The extreme hazards involved in the oil field-production aspects of 
the industry were generally left for the speculative wildcatter. Thus, 
this high risk area was the last aspect of the industry to be attacked 
by Standard. She never did enjoy a monopoly over production -- nor was 
it necessary in light of her exclusive rights to buy crude -- but the 
Forest Oil Co., established by Rockefeller in 1879, became the largest 
single producer in America and remained so until the 1911 dissoluti.on. 
The Tidewater Pipeline Co. completed a pipeline in June 1879 from 
oil regions west of the mountains to the seaboard as a feeder to inde-
pendent refineries near New York City. This was a direct attempt by the 
independent companies to skirt the pipeline and railroad control of 
Standard, thereby maintaining their independent existence. 
Standard reacted promptly and decisively to this threatened new 
competition: (1) She lowered transportation rates hy rail and pipeline; 
(2) She acquired control of many of the independent refineries for which 
the Tidewater was a feeder; (3) She began construction of a trans-
mountain pipeline of her own. These three factors effected a compromise 
with Tidewater through a purchase of minority interest in the company's 
stocks. 
Standard marketing subsidiaries systematically divided the nation 
geographically, each section being sub-divided into smaller areas with 
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local agents actively pursuing all potential markets. To establish and 
maintain this marketing control, detailed information regarding activi-
ties of competitors was very useful. Such Were the original plans of 
the South Improvement Co. who had bound the railways to file detailed 
daily reports on all oil shipped, including the shipper, the quantity 
and kind of oil, the name of the consignee, the ,lestination and cost of 
the freight. Although the surreptitous plans of the South Improvement 
Co. were abandoned, the Standard's spy system, which utilized local 
freight agents, oil salesmen, and local dealers, secured at one time or 
another virtually all the information in regard to oil movements of com-
petitors that the South Improvement Co. originally had hoped to provide. 
Thus, monopoly of the marketing aspects of the ~Uhltl"'i: <:1 "'-3.S established 
by Standard in record time. 4 
By 1882 the first Standar(t Oil Trust was replaced simply by ex-
changing stock. A board of trustees consisting of nine members, issued 
stock certificates to the stockholders equal to the face value of the 
properties acquired in exchange for the actual stock. The trustees did 
not acquire absolute ownership of the stocks, but rather retained con-
trol of the stocks on behalf of the joint account of holders of trust 
certificates; i.e., the holders of trust certificates lost their title 
to particular stocks or properties but received instead a proportional 
interest in all the stocks and properties. This new trust comprised the 
entire capital stock of fourteen oil companies, a major portion of the 
stock in twenty-six other companies, and the interests of Some forty-six 
individuals. Thus, the control -3.nd coordination of activities among 
the various components of Standard Oil was now consolidated. 
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In 1890 the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed, which ••• 
made it illegal to "monopolize trade" and outlawed all "combi-
nation or conspiracy in restraint of trade". On paper, this 
act represented a major advance over the previous common-law 
restrictions on monopolistic conspiracies. But it was adopted 
with little discussion, indeed without attracting much atten-
tion of a favorable or unfavorable nature; and beyond an an-
tipathy toward "monopolizing", there is no evidence that any-
one had clear notions as to which actions were to be regarded 
as legal or illegal. 5 
The Hepburn Act, passed in 1906, declared that all pipelines cross-
ing state lines were common carriers and as such were subject to regula-
tion by the Inters tate Commerce Commission. This was designed primarily 
to restrain the Standard Oil Co. from lowering its pipeline rates below 
cost in unfair competition with independent companies. The law was 
evaded, however, and Standard's pipelines never acted as common carriers 
until after the 1911 dissolution. 6 
In 1903 under Republican leadership the Bureau of Corporations was 
established as an investigating body to function under the direction of 
the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor. Its duties were to 
investigate the affairs of corporations engaged in interstate commerce. 
Soon after its organization, it began an investigation of the Standard 
Oil Co. The first report on this organization, covering the field of 
transportation, was submitted by the commission in May 1906. Soon af-
terwards a two volume report covering the entire petroleum industry \vas 
made public. This was a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the his-
tory and activities of the Standard. In the investigation, special at-
tention was directed toward the extent of the Standard's monopolistic 
control and the methods by which this control had been secured. 7 
As a result of the Bureau of Corporations' investigation, prosecu-
tion proceedings were instituted by the Department of Justice against 
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the Standard Oil Co. in U. S. Circuit Court, Hissouri district. A bill 
Was filed in November 1906 alleging violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. The trial extended over a period of approximately three years. 
The testimony and records filled some 23 volumes and covered more than 
12,000 pages. Facts established during the trial indicated that the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey directly owned stock in 65 companies 
and controlled indirectly, through ownership of stock in subsidiaries, 
49 other companies, a total of 114 concerns. In the original bill, 71 
corporations and 7 individuals had been named as defendants. 8 
A decision was handed down in November 1909. The decree ran 
against the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, thirty-six domestic subsidi-
aries, and one foreign subsidiary. The Court held that the stock of 
thes~ thLett-seven corporations was acquir~(l ;ill.1 h~L1. hy means of ille-
gal combinatioflLn vio l::ltion of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the Stan-
dard was enjoined from voting the stock of these subsidiary companies 
and from exercising or attempting to exercise control over their ac-
tions. The subsidiary companies were also enjoined from paying divi-
dends to the parent organization. Dissolution of the combination was 
ordered. The dissolution was to be effected by distribution of "the 
shares to which [the shareholders of the principal company were] equita-
bly entitled in the stocks of the defendant corporations.,,9 
Appeal was made by the- Standard to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The decision was handed down in May 1911. "In condemning these 
flagrant monopolies, the Supreme Court enunciated the mentioned 'rule of 
reason': Only unreasonable restraints of trade (agreements, mergers, 
predation, and the like) were to be considered illegal." 10 
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Chief Justice White in setting forth the opinion of the Court 
reviewed briefly the intent of the antitrust law: 
[The debates] show conclusively, however, that the main cause 
which led to the legislation was the thought that it Was 
required by the economic condition of the times, that is, the 
vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and 
individuals, the enormous development of corporate organiza-
tions. The facility for combination which such organizations 
afford, the fact that the facility was being used, and that 
combinations known as trusts were being multiplied, and the 
widespread impression that their power had been and would be 
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public general-
ly.l1 
The monopolistic combination was ordered to dissolve itself in or-
der that competition might be restored. However commendable the law and 
its interpretation may have been, in its application to the oil indus-
try, it seems to have been practically invalidated at the outset by the 
method of dissolution agreed upon. The stocks of the various subsidiary 
corporations affected by the decree were distributed to the holders of 
stock in'the New Jersey Corporation on a pro-rata basis; i.e., according 
to the amount of stock held in the holding company. Thus, the holders 
of a majority of the stock in the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey now be-
came the holders of a majority of the stock in each of the constituent 
concerns, and as such exerted a controlling influence in all. But the 
Court had done its duty, and the Department of Justice seemed satisfied 
with the dissolution. 
The immediate effect of the 1911 dissolution of Standard was an in-
tensified atmosphere of competition among independents (including those 
corporations formerly associated with Standard). Each independent now 
sought expansion in order to attain the organizational effectiveness of 
a truely integrated firm, such as Standard had become before 
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dissolution, following the basic pattern established by Standard, al-
though progress Was slow due primarily to the political atmosphere. 
The long-term results show dissolution to be a turning point in the 
U.S. petroleum industry from monopolistic to oligopolistic in nature. 
Although increased dependence on petroleum and technological changes oc-
cur during this time period, their combined effect is gradual until 
World War I provides the impetus for a more pronounced effect. Just as 
the independents had been the controlling factor in spurring the U.S. 
Government to take action regarding Standard's monopoly, so the trend 
continues and develops thus establishing a precedent whereby the U.S. 
Government reflects the needs of the oil industry, often justified as a 
special case -- as is exemplified during World War I when the government 
policy moves from negative legislation (antitrust, e.g.) to positive 
regulation demanded by the industry itself. 
The Standard Oil experience in America set several patterns: (1) 
The petroleum industry Was an industry of immense scale; (2) It was an 
industry dominated by entrepreneurs; (3) Its financing was shrouded in 
subterfuge and secrecy; (4) Ethics Were pragmatically applied; (5) Se-
cure supply was crucial; and (6) Government regulation was attempted 
through hearings and antitrust legislation. These patterns, as will be 
illustrated in later chapters, have affected the practice of interna-
tional law which, according to Schwarzenberger, precedes the development 
of the doctrine of international law; therefore, Standard Oil and the 
American Government can be said to have set precedents for the future 
international legal regime to consider. 
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World War I also had a profound impact on the pattern of American 
government-industry relationships: a new policy of maximum cooperation 
for wartime emergencies superceded the need for dissolution of monopoly 
and antitrust actions. 
The demand for oil, both from the private sector and -- like the 
U.K. -- from the Navy and other branches of the armed services, combined 
with the petroleum industry's concerns for conservation and price sta-
bility, increased until in 1917, after considering the additional factor 
of the extensive buying of the Allied Purchasing Commission, President 
Wilson established a series of commissions designed to coordinate the 
joint government-industry efforts for cooperation in maximum production 
for the wa~ effort (See Figure 1). These commissions were headed and 
staffed primarily by personalities from the industry itself, which de-
spite the conflict of interests, led to the effectual self-regulation of 
the industry. 
Many business leaders were enthusiastic about the new cooperative 
relationship between the federal government and the oil industry. Cit-
ing Herbert Hoover, Standard's A.C. Bedford told the Western Petroleum 
Refiners Association in October 1917: "We must keep our eyes on the 
goal of a still more complete and wholehearted cooperation, of a more 
perfect coordinated unity of aims and methods." The possibility of sta-
bilizing competition within an industry through consultation represented 
an unusual opportunity -- what pools, trusts, and mergers had been un-
able to accomplish because of antitrust laws, could be achieved under 
this new device for intra-industry cooperation. At the same time these 
committees facilitated greater cooperation between the oil industry and 
the federal government, and thus allowed officials a greater measure of 
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FIGURE 1 
WORLD WAR I REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 
control in regulating business practices. The Great War created the at-
mosphere for optimum efficiency, and fostered the idea of scientific 
management. 
Stabilization of the oil industry as a common goal of government 
and business was a theme emphasized repeatedly by Bedford, the acknowl-
edged leader of the oil industry. "Such cooperation and mutual forbear-
ance may not be in strict accord with the law of competition," he told 
the convention of the Western Petroleum Refiners, "but it is not con-
trary to the laws of fair dealing.,,12 Cooperation and not competion 
would lead to greater efficiency. Not only would it increase profits, 
but it would aid in conserving the visible exhaustible supply of oil. 
"Government control does not necessarily signify disaster to an indus-
try," Bedford admonished. 
If the zonal distribution of petroleum products is necessary 
to supply national needs, zonal distribution will be accom-
plished. If pooling of tank cars and ships will more effi-
ciently meet national demands, those facilities will be 
pooled. If well drilling supplies must be allocated ••• if 
licensing of jobbers and others is necessary •.• everything 
that is necessary will be done. 13 
Thus, the thinking of business leaders such as Bedford was leading to a 
changed conception of cooperation within the industry and its relation-
ships I"itl-) the federal and state governments. 
The conflict between independent oil producers and a monopolistic 
Standard Oil Co. had abated. When the National Petroleum Association, a 
leading organization for independent oilmen, met in 1918, it supported 
resolutions endorsing cooperation rather than competition within the oil 
industry. Perhaps the change was best dramatized hy the association's 
dinner in honor of Bedford, who represented the company that less than a 
decade before had been its archenemy and foe. 14 An industry "rent 
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asunder by bitter competition" now worked for cooperation in many 
spheres to achieve stabilization. Public policy recognized the change 
by encouraging voluntary self-regulation among oilmen under the aegis of 
federal supervision. 
The pressure of wartime demands for petroleum led to the develop-
ment of similar attitudes within government. As head of the Oil Divi-
sion, Mark Requa urged above all for cooperation not competition --
in the industry. Requa held the ends such a policy could achieve to he 
beneficial for both. Like Bedford, he argued that the greater efficien-
cy and, thus, increased profits, would be immediate results of the dimi-
nution of competition. "1oreover, he too was concerned with the deple-
tion of the nation's oil supply and the necessity for adoption of con-
servation measures. IS The cult of efficiency, ~rowing out of the scien-
tific management movement at the turn of the century, had made as deep 
an impression on managers in husiness as it had on those in government. 
Several important developments emerged during this time which were 
to have long-term effects for the industry. The importance of the oil 
depletion allowance arose from the need for conservation. Oilmen were 
urged to improve the technical efficiency of their methods in drilling, 
producing, and refining; Requa even threatened to close refineries that 
in his opinion were inefficient. Requa used his influence to promote 
tax reductions for oil producers by favoring a depletion allowance, 
which Congress provided in the Revenue Act of 1913, allowing oil pro-
ducers to deduct S percent of the gross value of their annual oil and 
gas production. .The Revenue Act of 1916 removed the percentage deduc-
tion, allowing instead a "reasonable" allowance for depletion, not to 
exceed the actual cost of discovery. As the wartime mobilization 
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program continued to increase it tempo, oil producers urged Congress in 
1917 to liberalize the depletion allowance. The U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee held lengthy hearings on the problem in April, 1918, at which 
Requa and Bedford and other leading petroleum industry representatives 
testified. The gist of their argument was that in most cases deductions 
of the cost of discovery did not allow producers to replace their ex-
hausted properties. The Senators were sympathetic, especially since 
they were desirous of encouraging maximum production of oil now that it 
was becoming a strategic mineral resource. The report of the Committee 
reflected this aim quite openly. It recommended a reduction of surtaxes 
and excess profits "to stimulate prospecting and exploration." Hean-
while, several Congressmen introduced hills in the House to increase the 
depletion allowance for oil in view of its important role. 
The Senate accepted these recommendations by increasing the deple-
tion allowance in the War Revenue Act of 1918. The specific provisions 
that applied to petroleum producers did not allow them to base their 
"reasonable" deductions either on discovery cost or on "fair market val-
ue" of their properties. This provided them with far more flexibility 
than earlier laws provided. In most cases the market value of mineral 
properties greatly exceeded direct discovery costs, and thus Congress 
provid.ed oil producers with a vastly improved basis for securing tax 
benefits. Since this privilege was designed to increase production --
in the interest of national defense -- the depletion allowance reflected 
a consensus among government and businessmen in wartime. 
Requa encouraged pooling of fuel oil within the industry in order 
to meet all petroleum needs. In addition the Administration sought 
price stabilization, because increasing demands for petroleum inevitahly 
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provoked rising prices. When this met opposition from many small inde-
pendent operators who felt they would be driven out of business, Requa 
and Bedford met the independents and a compromise was worked out. The 
significance of the compromise transcended the immediate issue, for it 
reflected the industry's ability to govern itself. As Bedford said, 
"The plan is unusual and unique in that it is wholly a voluntary action 
of the industry."16 
The government's convenient disregard for antitrust infringements 
is explicated by the resolution of the dispute between the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Fuel Administration. Understandably, the mem-
bers of the recently created (1914) Federal Trade Commission, estab-
lished to enforce antitrust legislation, had not yet caught the new 
drift in policy. Since th~i.(" prime function was to maintain competition 
in American industry and to pCelTellt concentration and consoli'1ation of 
business corporations within the conceptual framework of the New Free-
dom, Requa's version of the New Nationalism seemed strong, indeed~ In 
April, 1918, the FTC issued a much publicized report, accusing oil pro-
ducers and refiners of profiterring; it also charged Standard Oil of 
Indiana with violation of the FTC and Clayton Acts in her marketing 
practices. If the federal government \.,as to meet her oil requirements, 
the report noted, nationalization of the indstry might well be neces-
sary.l? It should be noted, however, that these charges were hased on 
inquiries made in 1915, three years before publication. If outdated, 
they nevertheless revealed an effort by the FTC to challenge Requa's 
policies. 
But the New Nationalism prevailed. Requa and his Oil Division im-
mediately sprang into action to prevent formal proceedings by the FTC. 
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Requa argued that the Lever Act, under which he exercised authority, 
took precedence over the Federal Trade Commission Act. Still, he was 
willing to discuss compromise. Under an agreement made between the FTC 
and the Fuel Administration, the Federal Trade Commissioners could pro-
ceed to charge Standard of Indiana with false advertising and with mak-
ing exclusive agency contracts to restrain trade. In turn, the FTC 
would do nothing to interfere with industry pooling agreements for the 
allocation of supplies under the Oil Division's directions. The FTC al-
so agreed to abide by all future decisions of the Fuel Administration, 
although the latter was to keep the Commission informed of any actions 
that infringed upon the antitrust laws in peacetime. Although the mat-
ter was not noted officially, apparently Requa also promised the FTC 
that he would use his powers to prevent an anticipated rise in crude oil 
prices. In a letter to Standard's Bedford he state,} publicly that he 
would look most unfavorably orr such an increase. IS 
While this system of wartime regulating commissions achived its ul-
timate goal of maximufll production and government-industry cooperation, 
the end of the war heralded the legal necessity for dismantlement. How-
ever, both government and industry recognized the need for some such 
mechanism to continue close government-industry cooperation. 
Therefore, the American Petroleum Institute (API) was established 
~irtually at the very moment of dismantlement of the wartime machinery. 
Its aims were: (1) to promote cooperation within the industry and be-
tween the industry and government; (2) to collect data on new processes, 
trends, and statistics; (3) to foster marketing; (4) to represent mem-
bers in dealing with the federal government and foreign governments; (5) 
to promote conservation; and (6) to develop foreign oil sources and 
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markets. The American Petroleum Institute developed into a powerful or-
ganization which still functions today (Refer to Figure 1). 
By the end of World War I, then, petroleum was recognized as one of 
the most important elements in determining a nation's strength. This 
recognition was reflected by both the British and American Governments 
in their domestic and foreign policies, a precedent which has continued 
until today. Although these actions took different paths due to such 
factors as indigenous oil or the lack of it, both governments fostered 
the development of their respective oil industries, often treating them 
as special cases. 
For the next seventy-five years the American oil companies, while 
limited by antiturst at home, continued to strive for maximum efficiency 
in order to best control supply and thus price. They followed Rocke-
feller's pattern, expanding it to a global scale. 
The British petroleum industry developed in quite another way 
because of its lack of indigenous oil. Her primary concern was security 
of supply for national defense. 
82 
Notes to Chapter 2 
1George Ward Stocking, The Oil Industry and the Competitive System: 
A Study in Waste, (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1925). The fol-
lowing discussion is based on this account unless otherwise specified. 
2See U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Corpora-
tions, Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Petroleum In-
dustry (hereafter cited as Bureau of Corporations Report on Petroleum 
Industry), 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907-
1909), 1, pp. 25-26; 2, p. 650. 
3See Bureau of Corporations Report on Petroleum Industry, 1, pp. 48 
et seq. 
4See Ida Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company, 2 vols. (New 
York: 1904), 2, pp. 34-41. 
5From Samuelson, pp. 523-524. 
6See Bureau of Corporations Report on Petroleum Industry, 1, pp. 
26-29. 
7See U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Corpora-
tions, Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Transportation 
of Petroleum (hereafter cited as Bureau of Corporations Report on Trans-
portation), 2 May 1906, (Washington, D.C.: Government printing Office, 
1906). 
8See Bureau of Corporations Report on Transportation. 
9See U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. Reports 45; 
and U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 173 Federal Reporter, p. 
199. 
10Samuelson, p. 534. 
11From U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 22 U.S. Reports 50. 
12Speech from Oil and Gas Journal, 4th April, 1918. 
13Speech from Oil and Gas Journal, 4th April, 1918. 
14New York Sun, 10th October, 1918. 
15Requa's speech, National Petroleum News, 29th May, 1918. 
160il and Gas Journal, 16th August, 1918. 
17U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Investigations into the Price of 
Gasoline, April, 1916, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1916). 
83 
18Nat ional Petroleum News, 12th June, 1918, and 15th May, 1919. 
84 
CHAPTER 3 
BRITISH PETROLEUM: FOUNDATIONS OF SYNERGISM 
Law is primarily conditioned by its social environ-
ment rather than the reverse. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
That process sa., the evolution and exploitation of a most com-
plex and extraordinary symbiotic relationship between these 
seven major international oil companies on the one hand, and 
the several governments of the United States, Western Europe 
and the Middle East on the other •••• 
David I. Haberman 
Since petroleum was not indigenous to the British Isles in any com-
mercial quantities,1 the need for secure supplies forced the British to 
seek oil abroad and intensified the British Government's involvement in 
the industry from the outset, creating a social environment which caused 
her role to be much more direct than that of the U. S. Government in the 
American industry. 
British Petroleum was actually founded due to the impulsive specu-
lation of another strong personality, William Knox D'Arcy, in 1901. 
D'Arcy had only recently returned to England from AustralL.l 
Ivith the fortune he and his father, a lawyer, had made in the 
Mt. Morgan Gold Company, Queensland, Australia, in 1882. 
Various sources disagree as to whether the fortune was made by 
D'Arcy or his father. 2 
He was a man who 
seemed bent on dazzling London with his new-found wealth. He 
had the only private box at Epsom, apart from the royal fami-
ly's, and at his town house in Grosvenor Square, he enter-
tained on a grand scale; on one memorable occasion Caruso and 
Melba both sang to his guests on the same evening, and he 
never tipped servants less than a gold sovereign. With his 
walrus moustache and enormous girth he looked the typical he-
donist of the Edwardian era, but like a good Edwardian he be-
lieved that money should be put to work as well, as spent. 3 
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D'Arcy, seeking investments for his millions, had been spurred by 
accounts of Spindletop. Thus, upon learning from two archiologists in 
Paris that the Director General of the Persian Customs, General Antoine 
Kitabji, an Armenian and an influential financial figure under the Shah, 
had acquired certain Persian oil concession rights and was attempting to 
sell these rights -- an offer which had been refused by another Arme-
nian, the professional go-between in oil matters, Calouste Gulbenkian 
D'Arcy sent two French geologists to investigate the rumors of "the land 
of eternal fires". 
On 28 May 1901 he concluded a deal with the Shah of Iran in which a 
sixty-year concession was granted. The concession was granted in return 
(apart from bribes) for a cash payment of £20,000, shares equalling 
£20,000 to £30,000, an additional £20,000 in shares for the Prime ~1inis­
ter and the two ministers who negotiated the terms, plus 16 percent of 
any fOLthcoming profits. 4 It covered 480,000 square miles, the entire 
country exclusive of the five northern provinces near Russia. This had 
been an attempt to pacify the Russians. O'Connor notes on p. 278 that 
"it was necessary to get the grant signed in a surreptitious manner in 
the absence of the only Russian Embassy expert who could read Persian." 
D' Arcy was obligated to begin work within two yenrs. (',eueLal Kitabji, 
for his part, recc~iv(~(l £50,OO() for his rights and a job at £1,000 a year 
as Imperial Commissioner to supervise the concession. 
The ambiguity of financial arrangements, following Rockefeller's 
example, Was reinforced by D'Arcy's agreement with Kitabji. In arriving 
at the terms of the concession agreement D'Arcy set the precedent for 
dealing with the ethical problem of graft which remains evident in less 
developed countries today. Iran was compared by the British Hinister, 
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Sir Arthur Hardinge, with a "long mismanaged estate, ready to be knocked 
down at once to whatever foreign power bid the highest or threatened 
most loudly its degenerate and defenseless rulers."S 
Calouste Gulbenkian, an individual of great importance, later re-
gretted the day he failed to pick up the Persian Concession: 
But We all thought it was a wildcat scheme and it looked so 
speculative that we thought it was a business for a gambler 
and not at all for our trio [Sir Henry Deterding, one of the 
founders of Royal Dutch Shell, Sir Frederick Lane, the oil 
promoter, and Gulbenkian himself] ••• D'Arcy is considered a 
great pioneer of the oil industry, but to tell the truth he 
Was a great gambler and his success was due to sheer luck, 
rather than to any industrial or economic foresight. 6 
Tugendhat and Hamilton's commentary of the negotiations on p. 64 
depict Iran as welcoming D'Arcy's offer: 
The imperial ministers dealt with Marriott [D'Arcy's secre-
tary] more as if they were the servants of an impoverished and 
spendthrift landowner wishing to raise money on his estate 
than as the representatives of an independent state. They had 
little idea of oil's value, and no interest in its future. 
T,1ey 'yere concerned more with getting money out of D'Arcy than 
in imposing conditions on his operations, and they were suc-
cessful in achieving their objective ••• The Persians' 16 per-
cent. share of the profits was rather generous compared with 
the 12 1/2 per-cent. royalty usually paid to landowners in the 
United States, but both sides thought they had done well: the 
company because the arrangement would give them protection in 
bad years, and the Persians because they thought profits would 
always go on rising. 
D'Arcy's drilling operations began in 1902 by G.B. Reynolds, who 
encountered numerous difficulties from the onset. G.B. Reynolds was a 
former official in the Indian Public Works Department, who had once 
drilled for oil in Sumatra. He was forced to contend with such astound-
ing conditions as bribing the local chiefs with protection money; toler-
ating the hot summers which were known to have temperatures of 110 de-
grees Fahrenheit in the shade before seven o'clock in the morning; sus-
taining delays due to shipment of equipment from England via Basrah; 
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surviving an outbreak of smallpox which broke out in the neighboring 
settlement upon which the expedition relied for food and water; and en-
'during a plague of locusts. Oil was finally struck in January 1904 only 
to dry up again by May. 
D'Arcy continued to live in his quasi-royal life-style, and after 
having lost £225,000 personally, beginning to feel the financial strain 
of his Middle Eastern venture, he sought financial backing from Sir 
Ernest Cassel, the London financier, the Rothchilds, and others. How-
ever, most financiers "would have nothing to 1.0 with the matter till oil 
was found."? 
At about this same time the British Navy became interested in the 
technological advantages of oil. While conferring with Baron de 
Rothschild in Cannes, D'Arcy received notice from an emissary of the 
British Admiralty to return to London. Among officers of the Royal Navy 
the belief in the technological advantages of oil versus coal had stead-
ily gained in popularity to the point that upon being named First Sea 
Lord, Admiral Lord Fisher appointed an Oil Committee chaired by the 
Civil Lord of the Admiralty, E.G. Pretyman, to investigate the possibil-
ities of changing the Navy from coal to oil despite the fiasco which 
occurred when the HMS Hannibal first tested oil fuel. 
The proposition of replacing the Navy's use of coal with that of 
oil would depend, according to the Admiral and his advisors, on a source 
of oil controlled by a British company in an area dominated by Britain 
and located a reasonable distance from Europe. With this end in mind, 
the Navy brought D'Arcy and the Burmah Oil Co. together to form a joint 
enterprise. Burmah, a small but experienced oil company, thus promised 
to supply the necessary working capital and to develop any field that 
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might be found. Members of the Concessions Syndicate were also reas-
sured by a statement from the Foreign Office: your clients or any 
British company formed to acquire and work the Concession can count on 
such support and protection as British subjects are always entitled to 
expect from HM Government. ,,8 
Although this statement was actually intended as protection from 
the Russians, it soon became necessary to provide protection from the 
various Persian tribes as well, since Teheran's control was only 
nominal. 
Therefore, without the permission of the Persian Government, the 
Bakhtiari received some $10,000 a year for "protecting" the oil fields, 
$5,000 for similar duties on the pipeline, and 3 percent of prospective 
profits, all of which was paid out of the government's 16 percent. In 
addition to a troop of Bengal Lancers which the Army sent as protection, 
the Navy detached HMS Comet to the scene; however, she ran aground on a 
mud bank on the way. 
After two more dry wells and four unsuccessful months ,of drilling 
at Masjid-i-Salaman (the Mosque of Solomon), the concession holders were 
tiring of the substantial financial drain which included the problems of 
dev(~loping the field, transporting the oil to tidewater, building port, 
and marketing the product. 
Sir Arnold Wilson, who had been sent as a young officer to head the 
Bengal Lancers' troops, wrote indignantly to Sir Percy Cox, British 
Resident at Bushire in charge of Empire affairs around the Persian Gulf: 
It amazes me that the director ••• should be in a position to 
risk the complete loss of a concession ••• r.,ithout consulting 
with the Foreign Office and without telling you or the I'1inis-
ter or the Government of India. They have all the vices of 
absentee landlords. Cannot Government be moved to prevent 
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these fainthearted merchants, masquerading in top hats as 
pioneers of Empire, from losing what may be a great asset?9 
Reynolds decided to wait for confirmation on the cable recalling 
him to London. Although Lt. Wilson quotes from the cable in his diary 
(See Longhurst, as quoted in Tugendhat and Hamilton, p. 66), no copy of 
the cable has been traced, and the mailed instructions were to carryon 
until reaching 1,600 feet before giving up. 
Meanwhile, Reynolds continued drilling past the 1,100 feet mark un-
til two weeks later at 4.30 am, on 26 May 1908 the well gushed 50 feet 
in the air. 
The custodians of the Empire called in Burmah Oil whose Scotsmen 
founded Anglo-Persian Oil Company by investing £2 million; at the sug-
gestion of the Admiralty, 88-year-old Lord Strathcona, of Canadian 
Pacific fame, was called out of retirement to chair the company. 
In Glasgow, where the shares were issued, the enthusiasm was so 
great that lines of applicants five and ten deep struggled for places at 
the bank counter, and among the most pressing of the distinguished fig-
ures asking for special favors was Field Marshal Lor'l Kitchener, who had 
learned of the oil fields from a Daily Telegraph correspondent just back 
from Persia. 
Expenses in developing the Persian oil field again surpassed all 
estimates: building a refinery and a 130-mile pipeline to the coast 
Were prerequisites to exporting the oil. By 1913 no oil had yet been 
sold, and the young company (vas once again in financial straits, until 
Well F7 in 1914 suddenly increased her production from 33,000 gallons 
per day to 600,000 -- earning the distinction of the most celebrated 
Persian gusher. The Abadan refinery was now strained by Well F7's out-
put alone. 
90 
The great well justified the faith that Winston Churchill, who had 
become First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, had placed in oiL 
Churchill was interested in building ships which would not only be 
faster than those of the Germans, but also more heavily armed. If coal 
Was retained as the fuel it would be possible to achieve the necessary 
speed, but only at the cost of sacrificing a turret to accommodate the 
extra boilers. 10 
The advantages conferred by liquid fuel were inestimable. 
First speed. In equal ships oil gave a large excess of speed 
over coal. It enabled that speed to be attained with far 
greater rapidity. It gave 40 per-cent. greater radius of ac-
tion for the same weight of coal. It enabled a fleet to re-
fuel at sea with great facility. An oil burning fleet can, if 
need be, and in calm weather, keep its station at sea, nour-
ishing itself from tankers \yithout having to send a quarter of 
its strength continually into harbour to coal, wasting fuel on 
the homeward and outward journey. The ordeal of coaling ships 
exhausted the whole ship's company. In wartime it robbed them 
of their brief period of rest; it subjected everyone to ex-
treme discomfort. With oil a few pipes were connected with a 
tanker or the shore and the ship sucked in its fuel with hard-
ly a man having to lift a finger ••• The use of oil made it 
possible in every type of vessel to have more gun power and 
more speed for less size and cost. It alone made it possible 
to realize the high speeds in certain types which were vital 
to their tactical purpose. 11 
His address before the House of Commons on 7 June 1914 adds to his 
argument: 
If we cannot secure the access to this island of oil ships, we 
cannot secure the access to this island of the whole of the 
great volume of our trade on which we shall depend in war as 
in peace, if we are to maintain ourselves effectively •.• The 
proposition that the Navy should be able to keep our ports 
open and to keep our trade routes safe in time of war for all 
the vast merchant fleets which traffic with this island, and 
yet should lack the power to bring in the comparatively few 
but from our point of view, specially interesting oil cargoes, 
is a proposition which is naturally, inherently and, if need 
be, demonstrably absurd ••• Nobody cares in war time, how much 
they pay for a vital commodity, but in peace -- that is the 
period to which I wish to direct the attention of the Commit-
tee -- price is rather an important matter, and as we hope 
that there will be many years of peace to every week of war, I 
cannot feel that we are not fully justified in taking up the 
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time of the Committee in considering how, in years of peace 
and in a long period of peace, we may acquire proper bargain-
ing power and facilities with regard to the purchase of oil. 
The price of oil does not depend wholly or even mainly on the 
ordinary workings of supply and demand. 12 
He stressed the commercial consequence as opposed to the strategic 
significance of the government's financial involvement in oil although 
he was acutely attentive to the Navy's logistical problems. One of the 
corollaries of the share purchase detailed a long-term contract insuring 
Naval supplies. Sir Edward Grey, MP, summarized Churchill's arguments 
in the House of Commons Debates of 7 June 1914 (See Hartshorn, p. 233): 
"What you want is an independent source of supply which is, as far as 
possible, uncontrolled by any agency which can exact undue prices or 
what the customer considers undue prices." 
Royal Dutch Shell, BP, and even Standard of New Jersey had been 
considered as potential Naval suppliers by the Royal Commission on Oil 
Supplies, led by that "oil maniac" Lord Fisher. In his investigation of 
Royal Dutch Shell, he concluded that Henry Deterding was "Napoleonic in 
his audacity and Cromwellian in his thoroughness". 
Deterding considered oil the most extraordinary article in the 
commercial world, citing production as the only impediment to its sale. 
There is no need to look after the consumption, and as a 
seller you need not make forward contracts, as the oil sells 
itself. Only what you want is an enormouS long, long purse to 
be able to snap your fingers at everybody, and if people do 
not Want to buy it today to be able to say, all right; I will 
spend a million sterling in making reservoirs, and then in the 
future you will have to pay so much more. 13 
The idea of allowing a Dutch firm with close German ties to become 
chief suppli.er of the Navy was abhorrent to Churchill's "imperialist 
principles". Deterding, however, was not so concerned with the politics 
involved as he was in selling as much oil as possible to both sides at 
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as high a price as attainable. Thus, when a considerable faction of 
Tories, supported by Deterding and Shell, objected to Churchill's propo-
sition of governmental acquisition of a majority control of BP, 
Churchill retorted: "We have no quarrel with the Shell. We have always 
found them courteous, considerate, ready to oblige, anxious to serve the 
Admiralty and to promote the interests of the British Navy and the 
British Empire -- at a price. The only difficulty has been the price 
.... He then included Standard when he added that "the oil supplies of 
the world are in the hands of vast oil trusts under foreign control •.•• 
Oil has to be bought in a monopoly-ridden market.,,14 
Nonetheless, a large contingent still favored coal-powered ships 
primarily due to the security of supply in time of War. 
Churchill outlines his reasons for favoring oil at this time: 
For many years the policy of the Foreign Office, of the Admi-
ralty, and of the Government of India has been to conserve in-
dependent English interests in the region of Persia, and, 
above all, to prevent this region falling under the control of 
the Shell or any other foreign or cosmopolitan company •.• 
Our ultimate policy is that the Admiralty should become the 
independent owner and producer of its own supplies of liquid 
fuel, first, by building up in this country an oil reserve 
sufficient to make us safe in war and able to override price 
fluctuations in peace; secondly, by acquiring the power to 
deal in crude oils as they come cheaply into the market ••• 
This second aspect of our ultimate policy involves the Admir-
alty being able to refine, retort, or distil crude oil of var-
ious kinds, until it reaches the qu~lities required for naval 
use ••• The third aspect of the ultimate policy is that we 
must become the owners, or at any rate, the controllers of the 
source, of at least a proportion of the supply of natural oil 
which we require. 1S 
Concerned over the socialistic implications, the suggestion was 
made that Churchill's aims could be achieved by means of contract rather 
than by outright purchase. But Churchill refused to be swayed, arguing 
that any contract would enormously enhance the company's profit, and it 
would be to the government's advantage to participate in this profit. 
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He promised that the government would not intervene in the private en-
terprise aspects of BP. Two directors would be appointed by the govern-
ment who would hold a restricted veto power which would be applicable 
only in political and diplomatic concerns; they would not be involved in 
administration. 
Parliament, thus convinced, ratified the proposal by a vote of 245 
to 18, giving the government a voting interest of just over 50 percent. 
When BP purchased the chemical interests of the Distillers Company 
in 1967, part of the payment was made in shares. As a result, the gov-
ernment's shareholding was reduced to slightly under 50 percent. 16 No 
increase in the number of governmental directors has ever been suggest-
ed; nor has any direction over the company's commercial policy been at-
tempted. However, the question of governmental intervention in foreign 
affairs for mutu.:ll benefit has long been debated. The extent to which 
the British Government intervened specifically to advance the interests 
of the British oil companies (as contrasted to intervention for military 
reasons or as part of a more general economic policy relating to areas 
under its control or tutelage) has been widely disputed. Gibb and 
Knowlton in their history of Standard Oil (especially Chapter 11) see 
the negotiations as a struggle between "British imperialism" through the 
Foreign Office and the American demand for the "open door". Elizabeth 
Monroe, on the other hand, finds very little support for the argument 
that the government actively supported British "concession hunters": 
Apart from the efforts that the British Government made before 
1914 in the Ottoman Empire, and the few words that it spoke 
to the Persian Grand Vizier in 1901 in support of D'Arcy, it 
seldom used its influence on behalf of concession hunters. 
Even in places where it was entitled by pledge or treaty to 
approve the nationality of the concessionaire (as it was in 
Kuwait or Bahrain), it preferred to leave British aspirants to 
fend for themselves. The list of occasions on which it gave 
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no help is very long. It gave none, for instance, to the 
British negotiator in Jidda in 1933 when he sought from Ibn 
Saud the prize (now the Arabian American Oil Company fields in 
Eastern Arabia) that he saw pass to an American rival because 
the Iraq Petroleum Company had authorised him to "speak only 
of rupees, where gold was demanded". It gave none when the 
western Arabian concession, later fruitless, was negotiated in 
1936; none when the Turkish (later Iraq) Petroleum Company ne-
gotiated and re-negotiated agreements with the Iraq Government 
in 1924-5 and 1931; none in Syria in ~937-8; while in Bahrain 
in 1929-30 it was amenable about waiving exclusive British 
rights, and agreed to operations by American firms which took 
Canadian nationality for the purpose. 
Developm8nts in Kuwait were less straightforward, but the end-
product was the same; the British Government never tipped the 
scales with the Ruler in the two years (1932-3) during which 
the American Gulf Oil Company and APOC [Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company] waited on his decision between them ••• 17 
Many countries including Pakistan and Venezuela have forbidden con-
cessions to BP on the basis of its governmental complexion. Lord 
Strathalmond, a Managing Director, summed up the suspicions with admira-
ble British restraint: even in Persia, they were never quite con-
vinced that I had not come straight from Whitehall. ,,18 
Thus it was that Britain's investment in her OWn oil company became 
the prototype despite the continuing enigma of division of interests. 
According to Hartshorn, p. 233, "It ••• must have proved perhaps the 
most profitable investment of British public money in any industrial op-
eration in our time." Churchill later estimated the value of government 
holdings in BP at £40 million, boasting that the initial expenditure had 
not cost the taxpayer a penny thanks to the return on BP which by 1937 
had repaid the Treasury £16 million in interest and dividends. 
Although BP failed in her primary objective to fuel the Navy during 
World War I mainly due to the efficiency of German submarines, the com-
pany prospered. Yet, in reality, it Was the coal-powered ships that 
roamed the seas while most oil-fueled warships remained empty at anchor. 
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"To make doubly sure that they would stay in port, the German consul at 
Bushire liked to go shooting game around Ahwaz, which happened to be the 
nearest center to the fields and pipelines.,,19 
The British reacted to the eventual cutting of the pipeline by 
landing at Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, bringing the entire 
area under direct military control. They dealt directly with Sheik 
Khazaal, ignoring Teheran -- an arrangement which lasted until 1924 when 
the province of Kuzistan was finally forced to submit to the authority 
of the Persian Government. 
Despite the problems of the British Navy, World War I transformed 
oil from a mere source of revenue for tycoons and speculators to a stra-
tegic raw material. Its importance was exemplified in the first few 
weeks when Paris taxis rushed troops to the Battle of the Marne. There-
after, the allied armies became increasingly dependent on the internal-
combustion engine. 
By the end of the war the British Army alone had 79,000 cars 
and trucks and another 34,000 motor bicycles in service com-
pared with the 827 cars and 15 motor bicycles with which its 
expedi tionary force entered the f raj; tan~zs took over from the 
cavalry as the spearhead of the advance, while in the air the 
"aviators" added a touch of glamor to the squalor of the 
trenches. 20 
Or, as Lord Curzon is so frequently quoted as saying, "Truly posterity 
will say that the Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil," (New _~o_r_k 
~im~, 23 November 1918). 
The founding of British Petroleum followen many of the patterns 
established by the rise of Standard Oil in America: (1) Churchill, 
among others, recognized the emensity of the scale of the industry and 
proceeded accordingly; (2) the industry was dominated by such strong 
personalities as D'Arcy, Strathcona, and Churchill; (3) its financing 
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was enigmatic; (4) graft was an accepted part, especially in the Middle 
East; (5) while secure supply was crucial to the American industry in 
terms of profit, it became important to Britain because of defense of 
Empire. These parallel developments of the American and British petro-
leum industries create a social environment conditioning any future in-
ternational law, thus assuring a Western bias to any future delibera-
tions in the international legal regime. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RED LINE AGREEMENT: QUASI-INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law should also be distinguished from 
quasi-international law; that is to say, the law 
governing relations similar to those covered by in-
ternational law, but outside the pale of interna-
tional law because at least one of the parties lacks 
international personality. Concession agreements 
between oil companies and sovereign states fall into 
this category. In case of doubt, they are subject 
to the municipal law of the state granting the con-
cession. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
Like many other world government organizations, this private 
government emerged from a period of internecine economic war-
fare among these companies that was finally resolved by a 
seri'es of "peace treaties" in 1928. 
David I. Haberman 
Up to this point the oil companies in the United States had been 
satisfied with their own North American sourc~s of oil; they were pro-
ducing 64 percent of the world's oil by the end of World War I. These 
companies now became interested in developing foreign sources for three 
reasons: (1) the deep-seated fear that America was depleting her petro-
leum reserves; (2) the cost of leasing from private landowners (usually 
at a one-eighth royalty rate) was generally higher than securing rights 
from governments, even before the use of the foreign tax credit; and (3) 
the widespread concern over a foreign monopoly of all foreign oil re-
sources. 
The burgeoning of petroleum use in American industrial expansion 
prompted major domestic companies to secure oil concessions in Mexico; 
however, it should be noted that this was the exception rather than the 
rule. By the early 1920s the situation altered dramatically. The 
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following statements illustrate the breadth of this widespread fear of 
depletion. 
"The position of the United States in regard to oil can best be 
characterized as precarious" (G.O. Smith, Director of the U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey, New York Times, 1 January 1920). He predicted the exhaus-
tion of American petroleum reserves within ten years and urged drastic 
action (New York _~imes, 5 January 1920). He pointed to American explo-
ration of foreign oil sources as the solution. 
W.C. Teagle, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey's chairman of the 
board, felt that the great problem of the future was to meet the tremen-
dous pressure of new demands -- diverse uses of petroleum were raising 
American consumption by about 9 percent a year. Teagle urged world-wide 
prospecting to meet the heavy demands for petroleum products (New ~~~~ 
Times; 5, 30 January 1920). 
Herbert Hoover, president of the American Institute of Mining and 
Mechanical Engineering in 1920, noted that the great need of the age was 
to apply scientific principles in the oil industry to eliminate waste 
(Ne~~~r_k __ T_i!ll.e_s_; 18, 19 February 1920). 
A report from the U.S. Bureau of Mines emphasized that the U.S. was 
rapidly using up its oil supplies, estimated to last no longer than 20 
years (U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin No. 177 [Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1919] pp. 5-7). 
Mark Requa, head of the Oil Division of the Fuel Administration, 
pointed to the gap between increasing consumption and production (Ne~ 
Yor~!imes, 6 October 1920). 
According to an industry source, "Fear of an oil shortage in the 
United States was uppermost as a factor in international relations after 
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World War I. It was a holdover fear from a narrow escape from scarcity 
in 1917-1918 when in the midst of war."l 
The known major reserves of petroleum outside No'rth America were 
controlled by foreign interests, primarily by British Petroleum and 
Royal Dutch Shell. "The British position is impregnable," boasted Sir 
Edward Mackey Edgar, a public relations man and share-pusher for Shell's 
Venezuelan company. "All the known oil fields, all the likely or proba-
hIe fields outside of the United States itself, are in British hands or 
under British management or control, or financed by British capital. We 
hold in our hands the secure control of the future of the world's oil 
supply.,,2 
In response to the Senate request of March 1920 that the President 
report to it on the restrictions being imposed on American citizens 
wishing to explore for petroleum in foreign countries, 3 the State De-
partment supplied a series of reports, shockingly portraying the mea-
sures being taken to exclude American interests from foreign oil fields, 
especially from those under the control of Britain and the Netherlands. 4 
One of the resulting proposals \vas to establish a government corpo-
ration to develop oil resources abroad -- in striking resemblance to the 
British establishment of BP in 1914. 5 This proposal, however, has never 
been approved by the U.S. oil companies, although it has been repeatedly 
suggested throughout the years. 
Instead, Congress established the principle of reciprocity by pass-
ing the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which made U.S. public lands avail-
able to domestic foreign-owned corporations for exploitation of oil and 
other minerals, with the understanding that, were similar privileges de-
nied U.S. nationals, they would not be allowed to "buy stock ownership, 
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stock holding, or stock control own any interest in any lease acquired 
under the provisions of this act."6 
This principle of reciprocity was soon tested when the American 
Consul in Jakarta learned of the Dutch Government's intention to grant 
the sole oil exploration concession of "the 'most valuable mineral oil-
fields in the whole colony" of the Netherlands East Indies (Djambi resi-
dency of South-eastern Sumatra) to a new Dutch company half owned by 
Royal Dutch Shell, with her English connection. 7 The State Department 
strongly protested to the Netherlands who refused to alter their posi-
tion, prompting the U.S. Government to inform the Dutch in no uncertain 
terms that: 
No foreign capital may operate in American public lands unless 
its Government accords similar or like privileges to American 
citizens, and, furthermore ••• in the light of the future 
needs of the United States sach very limited and purely defen-
sive provisions ••• might become inadequate should the princi-
ple of equality of opportunity not be recognized in foreign 
countries. 8 
To emphasize the American posture, the Department of the Interior 
refused on the grounds of Dutch discrimination against American busi-
ness -- to grant Shell an oil exploration permit on certain public lands 
in Utah. In 1927 the Dutch finally capitulated and requested that the 
United States consider her a "reciprocating" country under the Hineral 
Leasing Act. The threat of denying investment privileges in the world's 
greatest petroleum producing and consuming country proved to be too much 
to ignore and an agreement was soon worked out allowing the American 
companies to explore in the Netherlands Indies in return for the U.S. 
declaring the Netherlands a reciprocating country. 
The American oil companies found it necessary to solicit governmen-
tal assistance as leverage in enacting the principle of reciprocity for 
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the express purpose of entering foreign markets previously considered 
the Empire's spheres of influence. This is an early example of the syn-
ergistic relationship developing between the American Government and the 
American oil industry, at least outside of domestic operations. The 
American Government seemingly has little difficulty in adjusting to a 
dichotomy of policies regarding restraint of trade and antitrust at 
home, and total cooperation, pooling, etc., abroad. 
Elsewhere, we see international law being utilized to disguise 
power politics. Gulbenkian had brought various parties together to form 
the Turkish Petroleum Co. just prior to World War I. Almost half was 
owned by BP who already had the nearby Iranian Concession, a quarter by 
Royal Dutch Shell, and the remaining quarter by the German Deutsche 
Bank, who had financed the Baghdad railway. Of course, Gulbenkian 
claimed 5 percent as his commission. O'Connor points out on p. 304 that 
the Turkish Government later claimed the concession had never been 
signed, merely initialed. 
During the war Churchill, convinced that the future control of 
the Empire demanded transit through the Near East, sponsored 
the disastrous Dardanelles campaign and ordered the occupation 
of Abadan and the Persian oil fields, using the island of 
Bahrein in the Gulf as a base. In the Sykes-Picot agreement 
of 1916, Britain's paramount rights in southern Mesopotamia 
Were recognized, while France held suzerainty in Mosul. At 
Lord Curzon's insistence, Clemenceau in 1918 yielded the claim 
to Mosul in return for an assurance of access to its oil. 
This upset the French empire-builders, and a tussle ensued in 
1919, with Paris threatening to call in Standard as an ally. 
At the San Remo conference in 1920 matters between the Allies 
were" patched, with Britain retaining Mosul but granting the 
Deutsche Bank's 25 percent interest in Turkish Petroleum to 
the French who had to promise however to permit }10sul oil to 
pass duty-free through the French mandates of Syria and 
Lebanon. 9 . 
Gulbenkian, of course, managed to retain his original 5 percent. 
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The Ottoman Empire itself had been divided into British and French 
mandates as spoils of war. There was also an attempt to "ensure that 
oil rights throughout the area would be in the hands of British, 
British/Dutch and French Companies."10 
[The San Remo Agreement] was a classical European horse-trade, 
and it deliberately excluded the United States, on the semi-
plausible grounds that America had not declared war on Turkey 
and was not therefore concerned with the peace treaty. But 
the Americans were outraged when the agreement came to light. 
The American Ambassador in London delivered a strong note to 
the Foreign Office implying that Britain was trying to corner 
the world's oil, and recalling (in stately language) that 
America had helped to win the war and was entitled to a share 
in the spoils. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, 
replied that oil from the British Empire and Persia amounted 
to 4.5 per-cent. of the world's production, whereas the United 
States controlled (with Mexico) about 82 per-cent. 11 
The State Department viewed the San Remo Agreement as the final ex-
clusion of American initiative in the Hiddle East. Since Britain had 
already secured ::lgr:,~emef1ts with the Sheikdoms of Kuwait and Bahrein that 
their oil development would be entrusted only to British subjects, the 
State Department feared that Britain was using her political supremacy 
in this area to establish her economic supremacy in world oil commerce. 
Thus news of the San Remo Agreement brought strong protests from 
the State Department: "It is not clear how such an agreement can be 
consistent with the principles of equality understood and accepted dur-
ing the peace negotiations at Paris.,,12 
The American oil industry actually gave impetus to these diplomatic 
initiatives on the part of the State Department. Exxon had first ex-
pressed an interest in Iraq in 1919 but had been informed that the De-
partment could not support merely a single company, although it would 
help an American cartel. 
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Therefore, the American Petroleum Institute formally adopted a res-
olution asking for State Department assistance in correcting the devel-
oping pattern of Middle Eastern exclusion of American enterprise. "If, 
under a protectorate or any other form of control," the resolution de-
clared, 
Britain and French interests ••• should be permitted to 
gain and maintain an exclusive right of development in Persia 
and in Turkey, to say nothing of the other oil-bearing lands 
embraced within the peace settlements ••• we do not hesitate 
to say that the results to the American petroleum industry 
might eventually prove to be disastrous. 13 
The API was informed by the Secretaries of State and Commerce in 
August 1921 that preliminary geological surveys in Iraq should be 
undertaken by the API on behalf of all interested members (which, in 
addition to Exxon, included Texaco, r~lf, Atlantic Refining, Sinclair, 
and the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana). By November 1921 Secretary of 
State, Hughes, told the companies that he would inform them as soon as 
he had learned "that permission for prospecting in Mesopotamia [was] 
being or may be granted by the authorities in that territory ...... 14 
Exxon, however, as the companies' representative, engaged in nego-
tiations over an American interest in Iraq with BP, who apparently had 
been persuaded by Gulbenkian that it woulrl be better to join with the 
Americans rather than fight them and suffer the ensuing commercial and 
diplomatic repercussions. The State Department pragmatically responded 
to Exxon's private negotiation: 
It is not the desire of the Department ••• to make difficul-
ties or to prolong needlessly a diplomatic dispute or so to 
disregard the practical aspects of the situation as to prevent 
American enterrrise from availing itself of the very opportu-
nities which our diplomatic representations have striven to 
obtain. 1S 
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The U.S. companies, backed by their government, insisted on apply-
ing their Open Door policy to this area of oil concessions, specifically 
that favored treatment not be accorded nationals of anyone country, 
that concessions not be so large as to be exclusive, and that no monopo-
lis tic concession be granted. 
The Open Door policy was established in 1899 and 1900, accord-
ing to U.S. Secretary of State John Hay's notes, to preserve 
the commercial Open Door to, and the territorial integrity of, 
China, and to protect the vulnerable Phillippines from Japa-
nese attack. It was confirmed in the Root-Takahira Agreement 
of November 30, 1908, by which Japan and the United States 
agreed to help maintain the status quo in the Pacific, to re-
spect each other's territorial possessions, and jointly to 
support the Open Door in China and the independence and terri-
torial integrity of that country. In a statement to the Japa-
nese and Chinese governments on May 11, 1915, it was again 
confirmed. This statement, drafted by Robert Lansing, Counse-
lor of the U.S. State Department, declared that the United 
States would not recognize any Sino-Japanese agreement violat-
ing the political and territorial integrity of China and the 
Open Door policy. Under steady Anglo-American pressure the 
Japanese yielded their imperialistic amhitions and approved an 
agreement that reaffirmed the historic American policy of the 
Open Door and non-interference, by signing the Nine Power 
Treaty, February 6, 1922, along with representatives of the 
United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, and Portugal. It pledged the signatories to 
respect the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of China; 
to give China full opportunity to establish a stable govern-
ment; to uphold the Open Door in China; and to refrain from 
seeking special rights and privileges in China that would im-
pair the rights of friendly states. Thus, the Open Door had 
been established as the right to trade with the people of the 
Orient regardless of the claims of foreign governments to 
suzerainty, spheres of influence, and monopoly trading rights. 
Its application in Iraq, however, was the first such imposi-
tion outside the Far East. 16 
As an FTC staff report explains: 
in fact, they made the acceptance of this policy a sine 
qua non of their participation in [Iraq Petroleum Co.]. In 
this they were actively supported by the American Government. 
In its initial stages the "open door" policy was broadly in-
terpreted to mean freedom for any company to obtain, without 
discrimination, oil concessions, in mandated areas, particu-
larly in Mesopotamia •••• The "open door" policy which had 
been so strongly advanced was discarded in subsequent years 
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without a single test of its adequacy as a practical operating 
principle. 17 
The negotiations concerning the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in-
volved three main points: (1) the shareholding for each company; (2) 
the extent of the concession and the member companies' relationship with 
each other; and (3) the taxation arrangements. 
The question of the shareholding was the most important and 
provided plenty of scope for intercompany in-fighting. 
Deterding and Gulbenkian both remembered with bitterness the 
way the British Government had secured 50 per-cent. for Anglo-
Persian at the 1914 Foreign Office Conference, and they were 
determined to reduce its influence. Meanwhile the American 
group, led by Walter C. Teagle of Jersey Standard, argued that 
as a point of prestige they could not accept less than Shell 
or the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles. This combined pres-
sure was too much for Anglo-Persian, and in the end it had to 
accept the principle of equality: each group was given 23 
per-cent. of the shares, with the remainder going to 
Gulbenkian to make up his 5 per-cent., and Anglo-Persian was 
allowed to take 10 per-cent. [reduced to 7 1/2 per-cent. in 
1931] of the output for free as compensation. 18 
The debate over the extent of the concessions an,l the relationship 
between member companies was much more complex, and continued i.n a se-
ries of secret conferences of the Summer of 1928, culminating in the Red 
Line Agreement, the "most famous example of an arrangement to curtail 
competition ever made in the international oil industry." The notorious 
red line actually encircled a map of the old Turkish Empire. 
Deterding invited Walter Teagle, the head of Jersey Standard, 
and Sir John (later Lord) Cadman, the head of Anglo-Persian 
[and who in 1913 had headed the Cadman Commission of Inquiry 
into Persian oil for Churchill before the Government decided 
to buy its way into Anglo-Persian], to Achnacarry House in the 
Scottish Highlands, a hunting lodge belonging to the Cameron 
of Lochiel, which he had ostensibly hired for the grouse 
shooting. The house is situated in a wild stretch of moorland 
country, and the scene when the three most powerful men in the 
oil world gathered there could have been taken straight out of 
the pages of one of those John Buchan thrillers in which pow-
erful anonymous men would spend weekends at Scottish castles 
planning great coups for the destruction of Britain's 
enemies. 19 -----
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Officially entitled the "Pool Association of 17 September 1928" and 
also known as the Achnacarry Agreement and the "As is" Agreement, the 
Red Line Agreement detailen seven principles governing the entire world 
outside the United States and the Soviet Union, which attempted to stem 
the rising competion by freezing the market in its existing mold. By 
combining interests and sharing facilities -- refineries, storage tank-
ers, et ale -- the major oil firms would effectively stymie companies 
attempting to penetrate new markets, price cutters, and other disturbing 
elements. Each company would supply the markets nearest to it, thereby 
saving the cost of unnecessarily long tanker voyages. 
The Principles of the Red Line Agreement (taken from Tugendhat and 
Hamilton, pp. 100-101) are as follows: 
1. The acceptance by the units of their present volume of 
business and their proportion of any future increases in con-
sumption. 
2. As existing facilities are amply sufficient to meet the 
present consumption, these should be made available to pro-
ducers on terms which shall be based on the principle of pay-
ing for the use of these facilities, an amount which shall be 
less than which it wouln have cost the producer had he created 
these facilities for his exclusive use, but not less than the 
demonstrated cost to the owner of the facilities. 
3. Only such facilities to be added as are necessary to sup-
ply the public with its increased requirements of petroleum 
products in the most efficient manner. The procedure now pre-
vailing of producers duplicating facilities to enable them to 
offer their own products regardless of the fact that such dup-
lication is neither necessary to supply consumption nor cre-
ates an increase in consumption, should be ahandoned. 
4. Production shall retain the advantage of its geographical 
Situation, it being recognized that the value of the basic 
product of uniform specifications are the same at all points 
of origin or shipment and that this gives to each producing 
area an advantage in supplying consumption in the territory 
geographically tributary thereto which should be retained by 
the production in that area. 
109 
5. With the object of securing maximum efficiency and economy 
in transportation, supplies shall be dr'awn from the nearest 
producing area. 
6. To the extent that the production is in excess of the con-
sumption in its geographical area, then such excess becomes' 
surplus production, which can only be dealt with in one of two 
ways: either the producer to shut in such surplus production 
or offer it at a price which will make it competitive with 
production from another geographical area. 
7. The best interests of the public as well as the petroleum 
industry will be served through the discouragement of the 
adoption of such measures, the effect of which would be mate-
rially to increase costs, with the consequent reduction in 
consumption. 
Accounts vary as to who actually drew the red line on the map: 
Some say Gulbenkian; others say the French delegation. However, sources 
agree that although the British said it was historically inaccurate, 
they accepted the arbitrary line categorically and encouraged the 
Americans to follow their example. 20 
The State Department, however, urged the Americill1 companies to 
avoid any restrictive agreements -- an objective which prove'1 to he im-
possible to uphold. America's bargaining position was strong in that 
her firms supplied nearly three-fifths of the total foreign demand 
(Exxon alone controlled over 50 percent of the U.K. market). She was 
also armed with the combination of knowledge that Shell was searching 
for crude oil in the western part of the United States coupled with the 
reciprocity clause from the Mineral Leasing Act. Thus, negotiations, 
which had begun in 1922, were conclu'ded in 1928 to include America in 
the Iraq Petroleum Co. 
Gllbenkian insisted on retaining the original clause in which each 
partner undeLtook not to seek concessions in the former Ottoman Empire 
except through the company. That was, of course, as the State Depart-
ment pointed out, completely contrary to any principle of the Open Door, 
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although they eventually conceded. It was the pattern of many future 
consortia. 
Throughout the negotiations the British and French companies 
were supported by their governments, and at every turn the in-
terests of Calouste Gulbenkian had to be taken into account. 
He was determined to hold on to the 5 per-cent. share in the 
project which he had been guaranteed by Shell and Anglo-
Persian at the 1914 Foreign Office Conference, ann with his 
experience going back to his 1890 report to Sultan Abdul Hamid 
he knew more about the whole question than anybody else. He 
had also become a major figure in the international oil indus-
try in his own right. Nobody could quite say how; he never 
actually ran an organization or seemed to own any physical as-
sets; yet in concession deals allover the world he had become 
an indispensable middle man. His grasp of the industry's pol-
itics, his knowledge of each company's strengths and weak-
nesses, and his memory for the actions and promises of compa-
nies and governments were all unrivalled. On this occasion he 
had much less power than the other negotiators, but his ulti-
mate deterrent was the threat to expose their deals and trea-
ties in the courts, and it worked very well. 21 
"Never," Gulbenkian later wrote, "was the open door so heremetical-
ly sealed."22 
As the industry develops the body of quasi-international law 
evolves. The Mineral Leasing Act utilized the principle of reciprocity 
-- that set of legal rules, compliance with which rests normally on 
mutual advantages, rather than the fear of the application of external 
sanction.s -- which, according to Schwarzenberger, intrudes even into 
spheres that are closer to power politics. 
The San Remo Agreement, which incited America to apply her Open 
Door policy to Iraq; the 1914 Foreign Office Conference; as well as the 
series of conferences between 1922 and 1928; which established the Iraq 
Petroleum Co., may be easily categorized as quasi-international law, 
which again according to Schwarzenberger, includes agreements to which 
at least one of the consignees lacks full international personality. 
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The Red Line Agreement fails to fall so neatly into place, however, 
since none of the parties involved hold full international personality 
in that they are not recognized as sovereign states in the formal defi-
nition of terms. The agreement also falls outside the restrictive pa-
rameters of any municipal law. Therefore, the Red Line Agreement marks 
the initial embarkation of the major world oil companies into an un-
charted area of international agreements in which they more resemble 
quasi-sovereign states than private corporations. Since their actions 
directly effected the development of international customary law in this 
area, the Red Line Agreement itself should be considered quasi-
international customary law. 
ll2 
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CHAPTER 5 
TEXAS: A MODEL OF REGULATION 
While international law is a legal system that actu-
ally exists, the term municipal law is an abstrac-
tion from the multitude of legal systems that are 
internal to the individual subjects of international 
law •••• 
Ultimately, any municipal organ is governed by its 
own municipal law and must, if needs be, give prior-
ity to it. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
The oil cartel ..• [presents] a classic study of the impact of 
a handful of the world's largest most powerful multinational 
corporations upon foregin and domestic policies of not only 
the United States, but, indeed, upon several nations of the 
world with respect to a vital world commodity, namely oil •••• 
David I. Haberman 
The Red Line Agreement resulted in the formation of a global oli-
gopoly in the decade following World War I which arbitrarily divided the 
world oil supply among the few and limited production to maintain price 
stability and thus profit for the few. 
The most effective method of checking such a cartel would be gov-
ernmental regulation on a world basis. Since no world organization ex-
ists with the power necessary to regulate such a cartel, the possibili-
ties are limited to home and host governments or voluntary intra-
industry regulation. 
The Red Line Agreement had established a framework for voluntary 
intra-industry regulation -- only the "industry" was limited to cartel 
members. In effect, the Red Line Agreement recognized the majors to the 
exclusion of the independents; and therefore, any self-regulation on the 
part of the cartel members precluded self-regulation on the part of the 
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independents. It was the actions of these independents in America 
which, if left unregulated, would effect the world-wide balance of pro-
duction and price stability established by the oligopoly members. If 
production fluctuations in America went unchecked, as was the case in 
the East Texas oil fields in 1931, then British Petroleum's production 
in Iran would be effected, since no cartel member would want to contrib-
ute to a world glut of oil which would lower the market price. There-
fore, those cartel members based in America strongly lobbied for federal 
regulation to limit independents. 
When this was not forthcoming due to the total inaction of Presi-
dent Hoover, the majors turned to the state governments for regulation. 
Texas, in particular, held a unique position: since she entered the 
union as a sovereign republic, she was entitled to keep her public lands 
which gave her greater regulatory powers than other states who had en-
tered the union as territories. This concurrent right to regulation un-
derlies the recurring conflicts between federal and state regulation. 
The use of state regulation actually held several advantages for 
the majors: only in America under her federal system was such an option 
available; the oil producing states were limited to about four or five 
at this time; the political power of the majors was greatly multiplied 
in these oil-producing states due to their dependence on the oil indus-
try and its revenues, etc.; and by using state governments, the cartel 
members could easily apply the doctrine of divide and conquer so well 
established by Standard in applying monopolistic pressures on smaller 
firms. 
Texas, sole producer of at least 25 percent of America's oil at 
this time was first to initiate regulation on the state level. 
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Extensive oil explorations during World War I had resulted in market 
surpluses that led the Texas Legislature to pass the Conservation Act of 
1917, designed to eliminate waste in oil. The needs to alter income 
distribution, to allocate scarce resources, and to advance public policy 
objectives all come into playas issues upon which the Legislature took 
action. Under the Act, the Railroad Commission of Texas was to enforce 
law. Two years later a more comprehensive act enabled the Commission 
to exercise broad powers to enforce the prohibition of waste. 
The Texas Railroad Commission in 1919 began to regulate oil produc-
tion by holding hearings and conducting investigations of oil wastage in 
the state. By November 1919, it had gathered sufficient information to 
issue conservation rules. Perhaps the most famous of these was No. 37, 
which ordered proper spacing of wells --at forty-foot intervals -- in 
the interests of oil conservation. Yet, until 1929, even after the 1924 
discoveries, the Commission did not enforce its orders too strictly.1 
By 1927 the Commission already found over-production to be its pri-
mary problem. Even then, major Texas oil producers were considering 
plans for restricting output, but their voluntary efforts to enforce 
curtailment programs broke down repeatedly. Many of these oilmen thus 
approached legislators to seek state aid in limiting the amount of oil 
produced. In 1927, the oeprators in the Yates field made a prorationing 
agreement to limit production which the Railroad Commission approved. 
In the following year the Commission ordered operators in the Hendricks 
field in Winkler County to develop a similar plan for control of produc-
tion, for the increasing glut was threatening to demoralize the oil in-
dustry in the state, and indeed, to affect its entire economy.2 
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But voluntary efforts by individual groups of producers were in-
creasingly less effective in dealing with the tremendous volume of un-
wanted oil that poured from the rich Texas earth during the Hoover 
years. Early in 1930 a group of influential Texas oil producers filed a 
petition with the Railroad Commissioners urging them to initiate direct 
statewide control of production. During the summer of that year the 
Commission held hearings on this request and on the gravity of condi-
tions in the industry. Testimony of the oilmen who appeared before the 
Commission clearly revealed that they considered conservation programs a 
means for limiting production and for raising prices.3 
The crisis in the industry demanded immediate action, and guidance 
from Washington was nil. Therefore, while Hoover was urging voluntary 
cooperation, on 27 August 1930, the Texas Railroad Commission issued its 
first mandatory statewide prorationing order, designed to enforce rules 
and at the same time limit production to market demand. The Commission 
limited statewide production to 750,000 barrels a day, about 50,000 bar-
rels a day less than production of the preceding year. 
Governor Ross Sterling, himself a former president of Humble Oil 
Co., as well as many legislators, looked on this ruling with suspicion: 
they feared that it reflected an effort by the industry to manipulate 
prices, yet the order was also specific in requiring adoption of conser-
vation practices by producers. The Commission allocated total produc-
tion among Texas fields and then among individual operators. It deter-
mined monthly quotas through information secured at hearings and by re-
liance on the production forecasts of the u.S. Bureau of Mines. 4 Thus 
conservation and stability were paradoxically intertwined. 
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The Texas courts defended the Railroad Commission's power to regu-
late oil production. In a suit in which an independent oil company 
challenged prorationing, the Texas Supreme Court endorsed the Commis-
sion's actions. The company contended that the order was not designed 
to eliminate waste but to fix prices and that it violated the State Con-
servation Act of 1929. But the judges held that prorationing was mainly 
designed to eliminate physical waste and that any effects this policy 
might have on price levels was merely incidental. S 
As the Texas Railroad Commission was just beginning its task of 
stabilizing conditions in the state's oil industry, most of its labors 
were rudely disrupted in the spring of 1931 by the discovery of the rich 
East Texas fields. Exploitation of these pools could not have come at a 
less propitious time, for they had disastrous effects: their production 
of 800,000 barrels a day totaled more than that of all existing Texas 
oil wells combined. 6 
To cope with this new development the Commissioners tried to extend 
production control to the fields. In April 1931, they issued their 
first prorationing order for East Texas, now in the midst of a wild, 
frenzied boom. But many operators simply refused to obey the Commis-
sion's orders, and their large number made the Commission's task of en-
forcement virtually impossible. Some oilmen even threatened the Commis-
sion's agents with violence should they cut off the flow of the wells. 
Hundreds of others initiated court suits asking for injunctions to stay 
the Railroad Commission's orders. Meanwhile, they continued maximum 
production accompanied by wanton waste which further demoralized the al-
ready weak price structure of crude oil, with its global reverberating 
effects. By the summer of 1931, in the depths of the Great Depression, 
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the East Texas oil situation created utter chaos as crude oil sold for 
ten cents a barrel (compared with $3 a barrel in 1919).7 
While the President and his advisors did little more than to take 
notice of the situation, Governor Ross Sterling called a special session 
of the State Legislature for 14 July 1931. He asked it to enact a new 
conservation law that would specifically empower the Railroad Commission 
to limit oil production to reasonable market demand. There was much 
sentiment for such legislation among oil producers, for Oklahoma's pio-
neering regulations appeared to be reasonably effective. But the law-
makers were split over a variety of other alternatives. 8 
As the debate on the issue developed, suddenly, on 4 July 1931, a 
federal district court in Texas declared the Texas Railroad Commission's 
prorationing orders in East Texas invalid. Seriously divided, on 12 
August 1931, the Legislature enacted a weak conservation act that pro-
hibited physical waste only, granting the Railroad Commission no power 
to limit production to market demand. As the press interpreted this 
law, it annulled all of the Railroad Commission's prorationing orders 
promulgated during 1930 and 1931. 9 
Under the new Conservation Act the Railroad Commission was also re-
stricted in issuing orders; it was required to give operators ten days' 
notice and a hearing. As in Oklahoma, therefore, the federal courts 
were seriously interfering with the efforts of state authority to deal 
with the immediate economic crisis. 
At this same time (July and August 1931) oil operators and specula-
tors in East Texas were indulging in unrestrained production. They 
turned the chaos that had characterized the Texas oil industry during 
the spring into anarchy by August. By then East Texas was producing 
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about 1 million barrels a day, enough to meet one-third of all the crude 
petroleum requirements in the U.S. Crude at ten cents a barrel became 
common -- if there were takers. Much talk of violence was in the air, 
talk of dynamiting wells and pipelines to stop the production spree. 
The breakdown of the economy and of law enforcement in Texas seemed at 
hand amid the general gloom and hopelessness of the Depression. 10 
Secretary of Commerce, R. P. Lament, was in close touch with the 
situation but could offer no constructive suggestions. Similarly, Sec-
retary of the Interior, Ray L. Wilbur, kept himself informed, but took 
no action despite many frantic appeals from oil producers. The break-
down of law and order in the oil fields and the collapse of the indus-
try, evidenced no energetic response from President Hoover, who main-
tained a sphinxlike pose. In fact, he even refused to make recommenda-
tions to Congress for exploration of ways and means to aid the oil in-
dustry. This responsibility lay solely with the legislators, he be-
lieved. As for the Federal Oil Conservation Board (FOCB), he reiterated 
his conviction that it had no legal powers to control oil production, in 
East Texas or anywhere else in the U.S. And he emphasized repeatedly 
the administration's opposition to a tariff or an embargo against for-
eign oil.ll 
Thus the State Government of Texas itself had to take the drastic 
steps to meet the unprecedented crisis within its borders. Governor 
Sterling, in a mood of desperation, on 17 August 1931, declared East 
Texas in a state of insurrection. Dramatically, he placed the area un-
der martial law. He appointed General Jacob Walters as head of the 
state militia and ordered him to enforce a temporary shutdown of all oil 
wells in the East Texas field. The Governor then sent approximately 
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4,000 troops into the oil fields to police the closing of the wells, and 
to arrest all violators. 12 
Perhaps these episodes throughout the course of the Great Depres-
sion, better illustrate the breakdown of the national economy than the 
collapse of the oil industry in the Southwest. And few situations bet-
ter reveal the ineptitude of the Hoover Administration in dealing with 
Depression problems. In late August 1931, the drills were silenced as 
the militia poured into the region. A strange quiet settled over East 
Texas, a striking climax to the frantic production spree that had char-
acterized the previous six months. 
Meanwhile, late in August, the Railroad Commission began hearings 
on the possible imposition of production controls under the terms of the 
new Conservation Act. At these sessions most oil producers agreed that 
a total output of about 400,000 barrels a day in East Texas was compati-
ble with good conservation practices. Thus, on 2 September 1931, the 
Railroad Commission issued an order limiting statewide production to 
this amount. In turn, Governor Sterling promised to supply troops 
needed to enforce the quota. Therefore, the state militia did not leave 
the oil fields. 13 In fact, during the next fourteen months the Railroad 
Commission issued monthly prorationing orders, which the Governor en-
forced through martial law. Despite some violations, military control 
proved effective in limi"ting production. By July 1932 the price of 
crude oil rose to 85 cents a barrel, comparing favorably with the low 
point of 10 cents a barrel in the preceding August. 14 The resolute ac-
tion of the state had at least prevented total anarchy. 
Once again, however, the federal courts intervened to thwart the 
efforts of the state to deal with the economic crisis. With a singular 
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lack of realism, in May 1932, the Federal District Court for East Texas 
issued injunctions against state martial law on the grounds that the 
Governor had no authority to control oil production. Nevertheless, 
state troops remained in the oil fields in defiance of the injunction 
while the case was pending on appeal, and they succeeded in holding pro-
duction down to 400,000 barrels a day. Meanwhile, the Texas state 
courts upheld the Railroad Commission's prorationing orders. 
This conflict between state and federal jurisdiction did not ease 
what was already a highly critical situation. Tension heightened while 
the appeal slowly found its way from the Federal District Court to the 
u.s. Supreme Court. The fate of the oil industry in Texas and through-
out the nation was at stake. 
On 16 May 1932, the u.S. Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited 
decision. The particular case, involving the Champlin Oil Co., con-
cerned the legality of the Oklahoma prorationing statue. In a six to 
three decision the judges upheld the Oklahoma Conservation Act. In rea-
soning that this act resembled that of the one in front of the Texas Su-
preme Court, the Court declared the limitation of production to a rea-
sonable market demand to be a proper method for preventing physical 
waste, and that if it had an effect on prices, this was merely inciden-
tal. The ruling of the East Texas Federal Court was reversed. 1S 
Unfortunately, the u.S. Supreme Court's decision had little immedi-
ate effect in improving conditions in Texas. Unlike Oklahoma's law, the 
Texas Conservation Act of 1931 specifically prohibited the Commission 
from restricting production to market demand. Texas operators still 
filed suits against the Railroad Commission, charging that under the Act 
of 1931 it did not have the power to allocate production allowables in 
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relation to market demand. While many of these suits were pending in 
state courts, a large number of oil producers again went ahead to in-
dulge in an unrestrained production spree. They were encouraged by the 
Federal District Court for East Texas, which on 24 October 1932, in the 
Peoples Case, enjoined the Texas Railroad Commission from enforcing its 
limitation of production. 16 It seemed that unless the Texas Legislature 
enacted a new law specifically authorizing the Railroad Commission to 
restrict oil production to market demand in Texas any control the state 
attempted to impose on the industry was destined for failure. 
Consequently, in November 1932, the lawmakers passed a Market De-
mand Act, which specifically allowed the Railroad Commission to limit 
production to available market demand; the act defined waste as any oil 
production in excess of what transportation or market facilities could 
absorb. Memories of the past year's chaos led Governor Sterling to 
abandon his earlier fears of possible price regulation by the industry. 
He signed the bill willingly. 17 
Endowed with its new legal powers, the Railroad Commission in 
December 1932 began to issue new orders for curbing the flow of Texas 
oil. The Commission's engineers were able to show quite clearly at var-
ious hearings that scientific reasons alone dictated limitations of pro-
duction, especially the conservation of reservoir energy and the preven-
tion of premature encroachment of water into oil wells. Economic rea-
sons the need to maintain a measure of stability in the industry, and 
to prevent its collapse -- were no less pressing. 18 
The failure of the Hoover administration to provide guidance for 
stabilization of the oil industry left the problem squarely to producers 
themselves. With voluntary efforts increasingly ineffective, and with 
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the White House's refusal to concern itself with oil problems, petroleum 
producers prevailed upon state governments to undertake the close regu-
lation of the petroleum industry. 
In fact, the controls applied by the Texas Railroad Commission to 
restrict the amount of oil produced were far more rigorous than would 
have been possible under federal jurisdiction. Even in the depths of 
the Depression, public authorities rarely assumed the right to determine 
produ~tion quotas for private industries. 
The economic crisis called forth a revival of state mercantilism to 
maintain a semblance of economic and social order in the face of an ob-
stinate lack of realism on the part of the President and the federal 
judicia!y. 
Much future regulation both on the federal level in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom, among others, was modelled after the 
pattern set in Texas and other oil states in this time period. There-
fore, even though such state regulation might be considered quasi-
municipal law, its ultimate effect on the international legal regime 
warrants consideration. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ROOSEVELT ERA: IMPLEMENTATION OF SYNERGISM 
States and international institutions can act only 
through individuals. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
••• affected governments have not always been unwitting 
accomplices. Indeed, in many instances governmental policies 
have been lodged in the hands of officials who had themselves 
been involved either directly or indirectly with these same 
corporations. 
David I. Haberman 
Before Roosevelt was even inaugurated a delegation of oilmen ap-
proached him in December 1932 to explain their problems and to present 
various alternative proposals as solutions. Roosevelt, anxious to gain 
support for his administration's New Deal, promised early attention to 
these problems. 
C. B. Ames of Texaco, and president of the powerful American Petro-
leum Institute, publicly identified strong federal control to curb pro-
duction as an immediate need. 1 On that same day the API Executive Com-
mittee appointed a special board to negotiate an agreement with the gov-
ernors of Oklahoma, Texas, and Kansas. The board, which consisted of 
such prominent men as C. B. Ames (Texaco), J. Howard Pew (Sun Oil), 
W. F. Teagle (Standard, N.J.), Harry F. Sinclair (Consolidated Oil), 
among others, believed that if existing state laws were rigidly en-
forced, the glut of oil might be substantially reduced. 2 
In keeping with his promise to the oilmen, Roosevelt on the very 
day of his inauguration, 8 March 1933 -- asked his Secretary of Interi-
or, Harold Ickes, to call a meeting of the governors of oil-producing 
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states to meet in Washington later that month to consider ways and means 
of stabilizing the industry. Ickes also invited the API and other lead-
ers of the industry to attend. Roosevelt, meanwhile, had made public 
statements indicating his inclination to reinstate emergency measures 
similar to those used in World War 1. 3 
Secreatry Ickes welcomed the delegates on 6 March with a warning to 
.. put [their] house in order," backed by the implied threat of his per-
sonal preference for nationalization of the industry, and a committee of 
fifteen was appointed to work out a stabilization program. 4 Most inde-
pendent oil producers opposed any limitation of oil production, and 
asked Roosevelt during those first few days of April to require the ma-
jors to divest themselves of pipelines instead. 5 J. A. Moffet, one of 
Roosevelt's closest advisors and a vice-president of Standard, N.J., 
urged the creation of an oil czar. Alfred Langdon, Governor of Kansas, 
acting as spokesman for the governors, strongly favored appointment of 
federal quotas. 
U.S. Senator Arthur Capper, introduced a hot oil bill, written by 
Nathan Margold, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, to autho-
rize federal enforcement of prohibition of shipment of petroleum in vio-
lation of state regulatory laws. Capper also demanded a Department of 
Interior investigation into conditions in the oil industry. Simultane-
ously, Oklahoma Representative E. W. Marland, an important oil producer 
himself, introduced a similar hot oil bill in the House. His bill had 
been written in consultation with Secretary Ickes at President 
Roosevelt's suggestion. 
In keeping with the tempo set by Roosevelt in the First Hundred 
Days,6 Oklahoma Governor Murray no sooner signed a new proration law for 
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his state than he went to Amarillo, Texas, to discuss cooperation with 
other state governors. Leading oilmen supported the bill by testifying 
before the hearings on the bi11. 7 Throughout April the major companies 
bombarded the government with a steady volley of lobbying techniques in 
favor of strict federal controls. C. B. Ames, API President, made sev-
eral statements to the press, and R. C. Holmes, President of Texaco, 
wrote an emphatic letter directly to Roosevelt stating that overproduc-
tion could be remedied only by effective federal enforcement of restric-
tions on output. 8 Concerned for their own interests, the Mid-Continent 
Oil Producers' conference in Oklahoma City appointed a committee on 4 
May to convey their views to the President. 
Thus, support for the issues of federal enforcement of state pro-
duction quotas and greater restrictions on oil imports was not always so 
neatly divided into governors and major companies versus independents. 
Many factors effect a man's position such as the nature of his personal 
investments: whether or not his firm was engaged in interstate commerce 
or was producing oil outside the U.S. Splits began to emerge among the 
various pressure groups. Representatives of integrated companies seemed 
divided at an API meeting of 8 May at which directors deferred a deci-
sion on a specific course of policy since some favored centralization of 
authority in Ickes while others opposed it. Thus by 12 May the API 
adopted a wait-and-see attitude until the Administration's general poli-
cy toward business became clearer. Meanwhile, Governor Alred of Texas 
demured on his stand with other Governors. 9 
As overproduction grew worse throughout April and May, and East 
Texas continued to demoralize the entire country, the President received 
more and more support for his idea of reviving the World War I emergency 
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commissions. Mark Requa, wartime head of the Fuel Administration's Oil 
Division, wrote a letter to Roosevelt urging just that. 10 Lewis 
Douglas, in discussing industrial mobilization before the House Ways and 
Means Committee suggested re-establishment of the U.S. Food and Fuel Ad-
ministrations as models for congressional action. 11 
Being an astute politician, sensitive to the conflicting attitudes 
within the industry and recognizing the need for immediate action, 
Roosevelt thus changed his position which was reflected in a letter to 
Vice-President Garner and Speaker Rainey noting that two year emergency 
measures for federal limitation of oil production were imperative, al-
though such measures could be incorporated in more general legislation 
if necessary. No sooner had Senator Capper and Representative Marland 
introduced appropriate hot oil bills in Congress, than Roosevelt in-
structed Congress to abandon these bills for fear they would delay ac-
tion on his general industrial recovery measure, then being prepared by 
Raymond Moley.12 
Congressional dissention became evident. The Senate Committee 
Hearings on Finance reflected this confusion with Secreatry of Interior 
Ickes urging adoption of the Capper Bill separately from the General Re-
covery Measures in order to insure him the powers he needed. 13 The 
House Rules Committee was deadlocked five to five on the Marland Bill 
and Chairman Doughton flatly refused to include it in the General Recov-
ery Act until he received direct word from the President. 14 
Congress eventually compromised by including a brief general state-
ment to extend the National Industrial Recovery Act to cover the special 
problems of the petroleum industry, although Ickes had favored a lengthy 
ammendment detailing the powers he hoped to exercise. At the 
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President's direction, Senator Tom Connally's ammendment to prohibit 
shipment of hot oil was included as Section 9 (c) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act of 16 June 1933. 15 
Thus after careful consideration of all the various demands and in-
puts, a balanced, cost-feasible piece of regulation was selected to rem-
edy the market failures. It also crystalized important trends in 
government-industry relationships which had been developing for at least 
a decade. Donald Richberg, who drafted that part of the NIRA concerning 
industrial cooperation, clearly indicated that the act was designed to 
achieve stabilization of competition by integration and rationalization 
of the industry.16 No longer need businessmen worry about the legality 
of cooperative activities under antitrust laws. Senator Robert Waggoner 
suscinctly outlined the objectives of the bill in his testimony before 
the House Ways and Means Committee: 
The purpose of the present bill is not to abolish competition, 
but to lift its standards and to raise its plane so as to 
eliminate destructive practices. In other words, efficiency, 
rather than the ability to save at labor and undermine living 
standards, will be the determining factor in business success. 
Through the cooperative action made possible and lawful under 
this bill, industry may .•• provide for market research and 
analysis, cooperative marketing and sales promotion ••• sim-
plification and standardization. 17 
Shortly after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
NRA Administrator Hugh S. Johnson told trade associations to draft a 
code of fair competition to be used by the NRA. The API acted quickly, 
inviting virtually every oil producer organization to attend a meeting 
in Chicago to draft an industry-wide code to present to the NRA. Many 
of the names on the drafting committee were well known by this time: J. 
Howard Pew (Sun Oil), Harry Sinclair (Consolidated Oil), C. B. Ames 
(Texaco), and A. L. Beaty and W. R. Kingsbury (Standard Oil of 
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California). The new API President Axtell J. Byles threatened congres-
sional nationalization of the industry unless a unified industry code 
could be presented quickly. Concurrently, the API-proposed draft code 
was distributed among the delegates. 18 Nearly everyone agreed to enable 
the federal government to issue permits to allow drilling and to fix 
production quotas. However, the government right to fix minimum prices 
was another matter. Many of the independents as well as Ames of Texaco, 
Pew of Sun Oil, and Van Derwoude of Shell, strongly objected to price 
fixing. 19 Before adjournment in mid-June a draft for a code was adopted 
which closely resembled the API model. 20 By 1 July the oil marketers 
had approved the same code -- despite the fact that independents domi-
nated their drafting committee -- with one minor exception to change the 
retail distributing system for gasoline. 21 Price fixing remained in the 
draft despite Hugh Johnson's known opposition to it. 22 
Labor leaders objected to the conspicuous omission of provisions 
concerning wages and hours of labor in the code, so Johnson returned the 
Chicago Code to the API on 5 July for suitable revision. 23 
On 12 July Roosevelt issued an executive order under the NIRA, pro-
hibiting interstate shipment of hot oil -- to be enforced by the Interi-
or Department. 24 Previous legislation providing congressional sanction 
for the President's action had been introduced by Oklahoma Representa-
tive Marland. 29 
By Mid-July the API submitted the revised code to Johnson including 
a maximum 4o-hour week for labor and a minimum wage of 40 to 47 cents an 
hour. Administration of the code was based on Requa's World War I Oil 
Division of the Fuel Administration. A general planning and coordinat-
ing committee composed 26 producers and 28 refiners (no representatives 
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of labor) was selected from representatives in Chicago with Roosevelt's 
approval. 26 No sooner had this committee been selected than conflict 
again broke out on every possible issue. Harry Sinclair, Chairman of 
the Labor Subcommittee which had drafted the code, favored a 40-hour 
week. On 25 July Johnson appointed a five-member committee (represent-
ing the API, the independents, and two labor representatives) to work 
out a compromise. The Independent Petroleum Association, attempting to 
cut their labor costs, came out for 30 hours. Harvey Fremming, Presi-
dent of the International Association of Oil Field, Gas Well, and Refin-
ery Workers, urged a 30-hour week with a guaranteed daily wage of $4.75 
for a 6-hour day.27 
The issue of price fixing elicited much more serious rifts. 28 
Johnson, as has been noted, opposed federal price fixing as did Teagle, 
President of Standard, N.J. -- one of the architects of the Red Line 
Agreement, along with Deterding of Shell and Cadman of BP -- who would 
be adversely effected if U.S. prices were allowed to be set below the 
world price agreed upon by the oligopoly. Consenting with Teagle and 
Johnson were Standard, Ind., Shell, Texaco-, and Gulf. Teagle, in fact, 
forced the resignation of one of his vice-presidents over the issue 
J. A. Moffet, a son of one of John D. Rockefeller's early partners, a 
Democrat, a personal friend and close advisor to Roosevelt. Similar 
conflicts prevailed in other companies. W. R. Kingsbury of Standard, 
Calif., and Harry Sinclair of Consolidated Oil agreed with Moffet. The 
API in general and Wirt Franklin of the Independent Petroleum Associa-
tion also favored federal price fixing. This bitter disagreement almost 
totally disrupted the preliminary hearings on the code after just three 
days. Since the oil code was the first to be drawn up under the NRA, 
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the controversy cast a foreboding shadow over the entire industrial 
self-regulating experiment. 
Johnson was forced to draw up the code himself as he had threatened 
earlier. With Moffet's help he outlined a plan to consolidate some of 
the big producers, omitting price fixing. He proposed a 40-hour week 
for producers and 36 hours for marketers. Johnson failed in uniting the 
industry. Most independents demanded total exclusion of all imported 
oil. Some of the major producers favored some limitations on oil im-
ports. The larger companies wanted unitization. The independents, bent 
on breaking up the major integrated companies, still insisted on separa-
tion of pipelines and refineries. The independents insisted on admini-
stration of industry codes by the Department of Commerce. And finally, 
as the ultimate split in the seemingly hopeless cavern the majors 
favored administration of industry codes by the NRA.29 
Secreatry of Interior Ickes, still eager for the power of authori-
ty, approached Roosevelt for permission to present a code draft himself, 
including rigid price regulations, a stand for which he found support 
from oil magnates like Sinclair, Kingbury, and Wirt Franklin. Mean-
while, Johnson presented his version of the code to Roosevelt, unaware 
of Ickes' actions. Support from the majors his natural allies at 
this point -- was not forthcoming due to their inability to agree on 
Johnson's proposal which inadvertently strengthened Ickes' hand. 
Roosevelt, who frequently played one side against the other, on 19 
August 1933 ordered Johnson and Ickes to work out a compromise. 30 
Ickes won a decisive victory by persuading Roosevelt to appoint him 
as administrator of the oil code, rather than Johnson, as had been wide-
ly expected. 31 On 30 August Roosevelt named Ickes to direct execution 
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of the code, thus withdrawing jurisdiction from the NRA. To aid Ickes 
in the administration of controls, Roosevelt also appointed an industry 
advisory group, the Production and Coordination Committee, composed of 
fifteen individuals nominated by the API, independents, and trade asso-
ciations -- carefully selecting a majority who favored price fixing. 
The members of the Production and Coordination (P&C) Committee, 
most of whom represented smaller companies, not wishing to alienate 
those who, like Ames of Texaco, Sinclair of Consolidated, and Van 
Derwoude of Shell, supported the code but opposed price fixing, took no 
immediate action on this controversial issue, but left it to the 
President. 32 
Thus the petroleum code was finally promulgated on the basis of a 
tenuous consensus in industry and government. It granted the petroleum 
industry administrator power to determine monthly production quotas upon 
recommendations' made by the P&C Committee. He also received authority 
to restrict oil imports to an amount equal to that of the last six 
months of 1932. At the same time the administrator could issue regula-
tions for the marketing of refined products, and if necessary for price 
regulation, also under his jurisdiction was the administration of labor 
provisions, including Section 7 (a) of the NlRA as it applied to the oil 
industry. In functions and in structure, the oil administration greatly 
resembled the oil division of World War I's U.S. Fuel Administration 
(Refer to Figure 1).33 
Ickes, as head of the Oil Administration, was primarily concerned 
with limiting production. In addition to the Production and Coordina-
tion Committee, he also created a Petroleum Administrative Board to pro-
vide expert technical advice. Ickes set monthly oil quotas -- based on 
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the P&C Committee's recommendations -- for each state, reducing produc-
tion nationally by about 300,000 barrels a day. He ordered oil imports 
limited to that amount imported during the second half of 1932. Ickes 
stated -- after consultation with Roosevelt -- that price fixing would 
be a last resort. 34 
Labor groups were becoming discontent, largely because they had 
been ignored. Harvey Fremming, head of the oil workers' union, had sug-
gested joint industry-labor representation on a standing committee. 35 
Amid continuous protests from labor the P&C Committee suggested the cre-
ation of a Petroleum Labor Policy Board to be composed of one impartial 
member, three from labor and three from industry. After complaints over 
representation, the impartial membership was raised to three, but the 
labor board never represented labor as the P&C Committee represented in-
dustry.36 
Roosevelt and Ickes both rejected labor's demands for representa-
tion and ignored the issue of skilled and semi-skilled wage differen-
tials. It was assumed that Section 7 (a) of the NIRA would encourage 
collective bargaining, thus allowing labor a voice. Ickes approved the 
Labor Policy Board and began making appointments to such men as Profes-
sor George W. Stocking and Charles C. Jones, a company man from Bayonne, 
N.J., with whom Fremming refused to be seated. At the annual API meet-
ing Ickes and the oil code were hailed as a tantastic success, despite 
warnings by Ickes. 
By the end of the year many oilmen were still hailing the suc-
cess of the operation of the Code. C.B. Ames of Texaco, con-
sidered it a major step in achieving many of the oil indus-
try's objectives. Similar views were expressed by Teagle, who 
noted that his company's position had improved greatly as a 
result of federal efforts to prevent shipment of hot oil. 
A.J. Byles of the API heartily agreed. 37 
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Ickes had warned that more stringent regulation was sure to follow if 
code violations were not halted. 38 
Early in October Ickes appeared to have converted Roosevelt on the 
use of price fixing. Yet without a clear mandate from industry, the 
President was unwilling to commit himself. 39 Ickes actually announced 
on 16 October that, with the President's approval, he was preparing a 
price fixing order; within a few days his projected price schedules were 
circulating. 40 
Hearings on Ickes' price fixing order exposed total disunity on the 
issue among majors and independents. 41 Ickes conceded and recinded his 
price fixing order until 1 February 1934 on the condition that industry 
agree to maintain price levels. 42 In order to avoid federal price fix-
ing the companies created a money pool -- established with contributions 
of about $10 million, primarily by large corporations -- to buy up dis-
tress stocks, thus stabilizing prices. 43 
As the Petroleum Labor Policy Board's functions were never made ex-
plicit, they concentrated on accrediting authorized labor bargaining 
groups, then, as a conciliatory agency mediating strikes and other dis-
putes over working conditions. One such controversy concerned wages 
which as an issue -- had been ignored until the P&C Committee recom-
mended a specific minimum wage schedule to Ickes. At the public hear-
ings on the schedule, the Labor Board members countered by revising the 
schedule upwards. 44 Ickes approved the Labor Policy Board's revised 
schedule to be effective retroactively from September 1933. Nonetheless 
both industry and labor leaders were expressing dissatisfaction with 
Ickes' iron-fisted rule -- yet, he ultimately got his way. 
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Ickes continued to campaign for centralization of his powers over 
production and distribution of petroleum. In the spring of 1934 he had 
promoted congressional legislation which would make him the virtual ar-
biter of the industry. On 1 May 1934 Senator Thomas introduced a bill 
to expand Ickes' existing powers. Representative W. M. Disney Intro-
duced a measure to allow Ickes direct enforcement over hot oil quotas in 
the states. The Petroleum Administrative Board supported Ickes' con-
gressional bid for power and lobbied Congress to that end in hopes of 
stymieing the federal district courts in Texas which were increasingly 
issuing injunctions, curbing federal orders to curtail the flow of hot 
oil. 45 
However, during Congressional hearings on the bills, opposition 
from Texas was so strong, that Senator Tom Connally and Congressman Sam 
Rayburn (later to become Speaker of the House as well as LBJ's mentor) 
successfully blocked any extention of federal power, thus limiting Sec-
retary Ickes. 46 Instead, Pennsylvania Representative William P. Cole 
headed the most exhaustive congressional investigation of the oil indus-
try ever undertaken till then. The subcommittee report urged an inter-
state compact to control production rather than favoring additional pow-
er to Ickes as in the Thomas-Disney Bill.47 When Congress failed to en-
act federal production regulation, many oilmen again turned to the 
states. Soon afterwards, the P&C Committee passed a resolution in favor 
of an interstate compact. 
Although failing to acquire congressional powers for enforcement of 
hot oil infringements, Ickes managed an executive order creating a fed-
eral tender board which he set up in the disreputable East Texas field 
for the express purpose of issuing permits (tenders) to producers for 
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transporting oil out of the state. This measure effectively brought a 
much needed stability to the industry -- for a while. 48 
By mid-November API directors voted to support the interstate com-
pact under the conditions that it be accompanied by federal regulation 
of imports to balance production with demand, as well as with an effec-
tive hot oil bill. This was a reaction to Ickes. 49 Addressing the API 
convention in Dallas November 1934, Ickes called for legislation trans-
forming the industry into a public utility, subjected to rigid federal 
regulation. 50 The changing attitude of the API was mirrored in the 
states as Oklahoma Governor-elect E. J. Marland, former congressman who 
had sponsored many regulation bills for Roosevelt, invited state gover-
nors from oil-producing states to meet at his home in Ponca City 3 De-
cember 1934 to discuss possibilities of a compact and to sound his views 
for coordination among state governments in arriving at uniform state 
laws regulating production in relation to market demand by manipulating 
prices -- to be administered by a joint state-federal committee. Gover-
nor James Allred of Texas, however, refused any federal intervention in 
the soveriegn state of Texas and would only support federal participa-
tion in restriction of foreign oil imports and in the form of a hot oil 
law. 51 Since any agreement without Texas was meaningless, the final 
compromise, arrived at in Dallas, closely followed Governor Allred's 
plan but the Texans conceded in allowing a permanent interstate compact 
board oversee the execution of future interstate agreements. They also 
dropped objections to a provision that encouraged states to coordinate 
policies for the attainment of maximum recovery from oil reserves, which 
actually allowed the compact commission to recommend allowable produc-
tion quotas to those states that desired them. 52 
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The United States Supreme Court in the "Panama" Decision, on 7 
January 1935 declared Section 9 (c) of the NIRA invalid, deciding that 
federal officials lacked the power to enforce production quotas deter-
mined by state agencies. 53 The following day, Ickes sought legislation 
which would continue to outlaw the shipment of hot oil: within a month 
the Connally Hot Oil Bill was rushed through both Houses, giving the 
President the power to suspend its operation whenever he felt it would 
result in an imbalance in supply and demand. Enacted for a two-year pe-
riod, the Act was renewed until in 1942 Congress extended the Connally 
Hot Oil Act indefinitely.54 
The API wasted no time,in protecting their interests after the 
"Pana1Jla" Decision by advocating (1) the 1931 voluntary marketing rules 
for the industry, developed under the aegis of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion; (2) the incorporation of federal, state, and local committees of 
the NRA's P&C Committee into its own organization, becoming organs of 
the API's division of marketing; and (3) the continuation of the wage-
and-hour provisions of the NRA's Oil Code. 55 Roosevelt re-established 
the Federal Tender Board by executive order; he also felt voluntary 
codes were in violation of antitrust laws. Ickes, however, endorsed the 
API's resolutions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court again disrupted the petroleum industry by 
declaring the entire National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitution-
al. 56 ' 
The NRA experiment in federal regulation illustrated; (1) that 
cooperation among the states could be reasonably effective to restrict 
oil production, especially if supplemented by federal provisions over 
oil transported across state boundaries; (2) that state or federal laws 
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to enforce conservation measures -- unit agreements, drilling and pres-
sure laws -- were generally welcomed by responsible producers; and (3) 
that the NRA code selected the most workable features of public oil 
policies from the vast number of initial proposals although centraliza-
tion of federal regulatory powers was strongly opposed by some sectors 
of the industry -- especially in Texas. It was the Supreme Court's re-
actionary mood in 1935 that ended the NRA. 
Immediately after the Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional, 
Ickes approved the continuation of the companies' money pool agreement, 
thus avoiding the need for federal price fixing. 57 Roosevelt favored 
the Interstate Compact and sent the Downing Committee's draft-- now in 
the form of the Interstate Compact to conserve oil and gas -- to Con-
gress for approval. In his characteristic manner, Roosevelt convinced 
whomever he was talking to that he supported his particular cause. Rep-
resentative W. H. Disney, sponsor of the federal oil bill, had begged 
for clear Presidential support on the bill. In deference to Texan Sam 
Rayburn, Speaker of the House, whom President Roosevelt had asked for 
his suggestions concerning desirable legislation when he so violently 
opposed the federal oil bill, the President refused Disney direct sup-
port and merely encouraged Ickes to push for the Bill's passage. He 
soon sent a message to the Independent Petroleum Association urging co-
operation and self-regulation in the oil industry to obviate federal ac-
tion. 58 In response to a small group of Brandeisians propounding feder-
al antitrust actions as a means of solving problems in the oligopolist 
industries, Roosevelt initiated a revival of antitrust policies. This 
move on Roosevelt's part was strictly political rather than economic in 
motivation since the oil industry's problems of overproduction and 
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stabilization were not necessarily directly related to collusion among 
major oil producers; in fact, quite the opposite was true to a large 
extent. 
In mid-June a group of disgruntled oil jobbers, including represen-
tatives of the National Association of Petroleum Retailers, complained 
to the u.s. Attorney General of collusion among large companies in fix-
ing jobber margins,59 while Ickes continued to oppose the Interstate Oil 
Compact, subbornly favoring the Thomas Bill in order to gain the power 
necessary for him to control the industry by changing it into a public 
utility.60 
On 1 August Attorney General Robert H. Jackson announced initiation 
of antitrust investigation of the oil companies. FBI agents helped col-
lect data on the relationship between major companies and jobbers. 
Since the federal courts in Madison, Wis., were less crowded than else-
where, and since it was the home of progressive anti-monopoly sentiment, 
it was in this town that the Justice Department impaneled a Grand Jury 
to conduct the investigation April 1936. By July the grand jury issued 
criminal rather than civil indictments against 23 oil companies and 58 
individuals who allegedly conspired to fix prices. The trial on the 
first indictment began in October 1937. 61 
The Cole Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce preferred the Thomas-Disney Bill granting Ickes implemen-
tation powers. However, without Roosevelt's direct support for such a 
controversial issue -- not to mention the fierce opposition of Ickes' 
enemies from Texas -- the Cole Committee dropped the Thomas-Disney 
Bill. 62 At a White House Conference of 6 August 1935, Roosevelt had 
sided with Rayburn against Ickes and, together with Cole, Disney and 
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Charles Fahy (PAB) had drafted a new bill to continue the Connally Hot 
Oil Act for another two years, as well as to continue import restric-
tions on imported oil. With Presidential support, Cole offered House 
Joint Resolution (No. 407), ratifying the Interstate Oil Compact, renew-
able bi-annually.63 
In April 1938 Senator Guy Gillette (Iowa) introduced a bill to com-
pel separation of marketing from other lines of the petroleum business; 
a bill designed to break up the integrated companies which never passed. 
Senator Borah also urged that pipelines be divorced from oil-producing 
companies. 64 
The Temporary National Economic Committee, headed by Senator Joseph 
C. o 'Mahoney, and including representatives from the Justice Department, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), and the Departments of Labor, Commerce, and the Treasury, 
was created by Roosevelt in June 1938. It began hearings on 1 December 
1938 investigating many industries, and lasted until April 1941, filling 
37 volumes with testimony alone. Oil industry representatives testified 
on 25 September and 20 October 1939, discussing virtually every phase of 
their operations. 65 The TNEC sponsored a monograph by Roy Cook, a mem-
ber of Thurmond Arnold's staff on the extent of monopoly and economic 
concentration in the oil industry. Cook's paper emphasized the dominant 
role ~f the large integrated companies in the production, refining, 
transportation, and marketing of petroleum, stressing the importance of 
the oil industry to national defence. His conclusion indicated the pe-
troleum industry as prime for treatment as a public utility.66 
The oil companies, who needed Ickes' testimony at these hearings 
concerning his sanctioning of their arrangement, were afraid to supoena 
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Ickes for fear of just what he might feel inclined to say: Ickes did 
not wish to appear as a voluntary witness for fear of embarrassing 
Roosevelt. 67 
After hearing testimony at which Ickes did not appear, the Madison 
Court adjudged the defendents' guilty of a misdemeanor under the Sherman 
Act in September 1938, a decision upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court two 
years later. 68 
The ultimate antitrust suit -- dubbed the "Mother Hubbard Case" be-
cause of its scope -- charged 22 major oil companies and some indepen-
dents with 69 violations of the Sherman Act. The Attorney General had 
merely begun when World War II forced him to suspend the case. It was 
briefly revived in 1946, but federal lawyers asked for its dismissal in 
1951. 
While Roosevelt's New Deal offered little in the realm of policy 
innovation, it did serve to consolidate government and industry atti-
tudes on a national oil policy. Roosevelt's primary contribution, how-
ever, was in fashioning the administrative means of implementation. Af-
ter the NRA's demise, leaders in both industry and government insisted 
on maintaining the most pragmatic features: (1) the continuation of 
monthly production forecasts by the U.S. Bureau of Mines; (2) the Inter-
state Oil Compact; (3) the Connally Hot Oil Act; (4) an oil tariff; and 
(5) an emphasis on voluntary cooperation. These features remain opera-
tive today. Roosevelt's political astuteness enabled him to develop all 
his options simultaneously, ever ready to employ his Machiavellian tac-
tics to arrive at a workable solution. Thus it was that despite 
Roosevel t' s reputation as a "socialist", it was the states who ultimate-
ly gained in regulatory power. His antitrust phase proved incongruent 
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with the mainstream of national regulation since it emphasized the dis-
solution -- rather than regulation -- of large integrated companies; it 
was thus unrealistic in light of petroleum problems confronting both 
government and industry, and was consequently dropped after World War 
II. 
An examination of the Roosevelt Era illustrates the degree to which 
government and industry interact in the diplomatic process of piloting 
an issue through the system to its conclusion. It also graphically 
shows the differentiation of activities and the simultaneous coordina-
tion of these activities into an integrated policy. The degree of so-
phistication to which both industry and government have developed is 
evidenced not only on a federal, state, and local level, but in their 
ability to negotiate several issues on various levels -- ranging from 
intra-company and intra-government conflicts to global ones -- at the 
same time. Thus, a strong bond of mutual dependence and manipulation 
had developed between the American industry and the American government. 
These quasi-diplomatic activities of the 1930s established a modus 
operandi for affecting regulation which the Seven Sisters utilize today 
on a municipal level in every country in which they operate, which con-
sidered cumulatively must ultimately affect any international regula-
tion. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WORLD WAR II: DICHOTOMY OF AMERICAN POLICY -- DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
In an unorganized international society based on en-
tities that tend to put their own interest before 
the commonweal, the scope of a law of coordination 
or community law, in which the common interest over-
rides any incompatible sectional interests, is lim-
ited. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
In their exercise of virtually sovereign power, this bloc of 
companies has consistently promoted and exploited national 
economic needs and international differences, government 
ignorance, and the gaping lacunae in the fabric of 
international regulatory control mechanisms ••• in pursuit of 
their private commercial goals. 
David I. Haberman 
If municipal law is considered a prerequisite for the development 
of international customary law, then the role of limited cooperation 
during World War II and the following years played by the American Gov-
ernment and the American oil companies -- each subject to her own re-
\ 
spective interests -- set precedents later inculcated into the interna-
tional legal regime. 
The German invasion of Poland signalled a sudden shift in the 
American regulatory policy from peacetime production limitation to war-
time production maximization. Both government and industry were united 
in this goal throughout World War II as they had been in World War I. 
Although the industry-government experience of cooperation in the First 
World War was recalled as a precedent, the unheralded demands for oil 
proposed new pressing problems. 
Between December 1941 and August 1945 Allied requirements totalled 
7 billion barrels of crude petroleum, of which the United States 
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provided 80 percent. The logistics of transportation in the equitable 
distribution of oil also presented tremendous conflicts to be solved. 
More efficient technology for drilling and exploiting new wells was 
suddenly a top priority again. But by grants of subsidies and favorable 
tax provisions, and by shrewd allocation-of scarce machinery and drill-
ing supplies, federal and state authorities were able to boost the na-
tion's total oil output. Once again the maximum efficiency of 
government-industry cooperation -- achievable only through wartime emer-
ge ncy me as ur es was in operation. 
The shift in demand was reflected in new configurations of quasi-
diplomatic alliances most vividly evidenced in the hitherto unlikely al-
liance of Secretary of Interior Ickes and the integrated companies. The 
major conflicts, then, centered on the degree and method of government-
industry cooperation, and the long-term implications of the conse-
quences. 
Examples of these conflicts include the financing and regulation of 
pipelines, sovereignty over the tidelands and offshore drilling rights, 
and the oil companies' demands for a share of the mid-East market re-
flective of America's new post-war economic and military strength. 
Only a few months after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, 
German submarines had effectively disrupted Allied tanker traffic in the 
Atlantic, causing serious fuel oil and gasoline shortages in New 
England, who received 90 percent of her supply by sea. 1 
On 6 June 1941 Mark Requa's widow wrote Roosevelt to remind him of 
her husband's World War I experience in mobilizing the Oil Division of 
the U.S. Fuel Administration. The president asked Congress to enact 
legislation conferring broad powers to the Secretary of Interior to 
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control production and distribution of oil. However, private pipeline 
operators feared Ickes' proposal for a national pipeline. Meanwhile, 
eleven major companies formed a National Defense Pipelines and Emergency 
Pipelines Corporation to finance a privately-owned system. 
With no cooperation from Congress, Roosevelt evolked his executive 
powers to delegate authority in oil matters to Ickes. 2 Ickes -- through 
Presidential order -- now had the authority to establish voluntary ra-
tioning and arrange temporary transportation. In December 1940 Ickes 
warned Roosevelt that government-financed construction of a New England 
pipeline was necessary. Yet, Congress still was wary of granting Ickes 
such powers and stalled indefinitely on the issue. 3 
Finally, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
initiated -- at Presidential instigation -- an investigation of the en-
tire Southeastern oil transportation system. 4 
On 28 May 1941 the loan of fifty American tankers to the British 
under Roosevelt's Lend-Lease plan further reduced supply to the North-
east by 250,000 barrels a day. The need for new pipelines was obvious; 
however, the building of private pipelines was stymied in some states 
over rights-of-way. When the Georgia Senate refused to offend railways 
and railroad unions by granting rights-of-way to pipeline companies --
despite Roosevelt's personal endorsement of the bill -- deferring to 
federal legislation. Thus, in May 1941 Roosevelt turned to Congressman 
Sam Rayburn for federal legislation solving the rights-of-way issue. 
The antitrust issue also needed to be resolved. Based on Mark 
Requa's World War I experience, Ickes planned for close government-
industry cooperation. In early June 1941 Ickes asked Attorney-General 
Francis Biddle to suspend antitrust suits during the defense emergency. 
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However, it took a lively correspondence with Ickes -- and then only 
after White House pressure -- did Attorney-General Biddle acquiese on 
the antitrust issue. S 
Next, Roosevelt appointed Ickes as Petroleum Coordinator for Na-
tional Defense (PCND) which gave him federal advisory committees, and to 
coordinate petroleum policies of various federal agencies. 6 As usual, 
Ickes was widely criticized; he was accused by The Nation and other lib-
eral critics of packing his committees with executives, to which Ickes 
replied that he selected the best man available regardless of their af-
filiations. 7 
Ickes, thinking it would increase domestic supplies if oil exports 
were curtailed, ordered Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Administra-
tor of Export Controls Russel Maxwell to stop American oil exports to 
Japan, and in so doing infuriated both Hull and Maxwell. President 
Roosevelt himself wrote Ickes that only he himself and the Secretary of 
State had the power to suspend exports and that this was primarily a 
matter of foreign policy over which the Department of Interior had no 
jurisdiction. 8 At the same time, Ickes asked major oil companies to run 
a campaign urging voluntary reduction of public consumption; failing 
this the companies were urged to increase tanker loads and scheduled 
sailings. 9 The major companies had embarked dutifully on publicity to 
reduce public consumption (as directed by Ickes), but the effort was to 
no avail. 
However, the companies objected to Ickes' other directive to 
utilize railway tank cars for two reasons: (1) transport by rail cost 
ten times that by sea; and (2) reliance on rail carriers implied con-
struction of new and expensive facilities, since all existing facilities 
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were geared to water transport. Anticipating these objections, Ickes 
acquired "special case" dispensation for the petroleum industry from In-
terstate Commerce Commission Chairman Joseph P. Eastman regarding lower 
freight rates and from the Department of Justice regarding antitrust in 
relation to pooling reserves and shipments and to sharing increased 
transportation costs. The Petroleum Industry War Council (PIWC) and the 
Association of American Railroads worked out details which increased New 
England's supply by 142,000 barrels a day -- a thirty-fold increase of 
shipments by rail. 10 
Finally, by the end of July, Congress enacted the Cole Bill which 
contained the authority to grant rights-of-way to private pipeline com-
panies engaged in construction vital to national defense. By mid-1941 
German sinkings of Allied tankers in the Atlantic portended the need for 
a long-term solution to the supply problem. At a conference called by 
Ickes of leading pipeline operators in Tulsa, Okla., 23 March 1942, a 
detailed plan of construction for a pipeline to be privately financed 
was drawn up, but it still would not meet New England's needs. 
Ickes began campaigning for construction of the Big and Little Inch 
Pipelines to the Northeast as the most feasible alternatives to seagoing 
tankers. Due to the wartime scarcity of railway cars and tanker trucks, 
transport by rail and trucks was eliminated as' a viable solution. ll By 
June 1942 Ickes begged the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce for steel allocations vital to the construction of the Big 
Inch. Although the Petroleum War Industries Committee (PWIC) strongly 
supported the Big Inch Project, Donald Nelson of the War Production 
Board (WPB) and the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board refused re-
quests from Ickes for necessary building materials on three separate 
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occasions. He finally relented after worsening shortages in fall 
1942. 12 Thus, amid much controversy, the Big and Little Inch Pipelines 
were constructed at the expense of the Defense Plant Corporation: 
together they supplied 800,000 barrels of crude to the Northeast from 
Texas between 1943-1945. 13 
In July 1942 President Roosevelt agreed to let Ickes draw up tenta-
tive plans for the consolidation of forty separate federal agencies con-
cerned with oil which were circulated among Cabinet members and industry 
leaders. Under the plan, Ickes would secure centralized controls over: 
(1) oil production; (2) domestic and foreign oil distribution; (3) oil 
prices; and (4) scarce war materials needed for drilling and manufactur-
ing equipment. 14 The Cabinet responded in unanimous opposition: 
Stimson, Hull, and Knox were particularly infuriated over Ickes' in-
fringements over their departments, as was Donald Nelson, director of 
the WPG.15 Industry leaders could not agree: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
introduced a bill on 19 August 1942 to create a National Petroleum Ad-
ministrator; Senator Harry Byrd (Va.) urged national gasoline ration-
ing;16 and Deputy Administrator Davies was distressed over public apathy 
in practicing conservation. 17 
In a series of conferences between August and December 1942 Ickes 
was directed by Roosevelt to work out a suitable compromise between in-
dustry leaders, cabinet members and agency administrators. The result 
was the creation of the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) by execu-
tive order, giving Ickes, as administrator, autority to develop neces-
sary policies to increase production by fostering improved conservation 
practices, encouraging drilling, or changing consumption patterns. The 
WPB retained control over the allocation of scarce resources, and the 
157 
office of price administration (OPA) retained the power to regulate 
prices for petroleum products. 18 
The PAW sought to procure allocations from the WPB for scarce oil 
exploration tools and machinery. The discovery of wildcat and stripper 
wells was encouraged by publicizing potential locations and offering fi-
nancial incentives for their exploitation. 19 Unitization agreements and 
secondary recovery methods were enforced by the PAW's distribution of 
scarce machinery.20 Ickes finally succumbed to subsidies as a means of 
encouraging production instead of higher prices. The RFC at PAW prod-
ding, ammended long-term contracts for 100-octane gasoline; it also en-
couraged the development of a major new synthetic rubber industry by an 
RFC subsidiary, the Rubber Reserve Corporation. 21 
Despite a 25 percent increase in drilling in 1942, only four new 
big producing wells had been discovered. Five industry committees rep-
resenting the geographical divisions made by the PAW began planning con-
struction of new facilities for large scale production of 100-octane 
gasoline using Ickes' 1941 survey.22 
Oklahoma ammended its unitization laws in 1943 at Ickes' instiga-
tion; Texas passed a resolution in 1943 urging the OPA to raise prices; 
and o. E. Thompson of the Texas Railroad Commission wrote Roosevelt for 
his support in raising prices. 23 The API strongly supported Ickes' at-
tempts to raise prices while Representative Disney introduced a bill to 
raise oil price ceilings. 
However, the OPA steadfastly refused to authorize a price hike, de-
ferring to a Presidential order to maintain the status quo on prices, 
suggesting subsidies as an alternative. After much heated discussion, 
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James F. Byrnes, director of economic stabilization, authorized the PAW 
to pay subsidies as a solution to the price conflict on 24 June 1944. 24 
The building of a pipeline to increase availability of supply to 
New England came to be accepted as a priority by all parties concerned; 
yet the issue of public versus private funding of that pipeline was hot-
ly disputed, concerning its long-term effect on the market place. As a 
last resort the industry reluctantly agreed to public financing as the 
only pragmatic solution to the supply-and-demand problem. Similarly the 
issue of higher prices for oil was not in question; all factions of the 
system agreed that higher prices would result in greater production. 
The conflict lay in the use of subsidies as a temporary war measure as 
opposed to a government dictated price hike which could bridge the 
wartime-peacetime operations gap and thereby affect the peacetime market 
as well. In this instance long-term policy maintained its priority. 
The wartime emergency cooperation between American industry and 
government during World War II had been limited as much as was pragmatic 
at the time to temporary measures which could be abandoned in peacetime 
in favor of a return to the pre-war status quo. The industry's fear of 
direct government involvement, which would shift the advantage of influ-
ence over petroleum affairs from the companies to the government, insti-
gated a strong movement to quickly dismantle the war machinery. Unlike 
the post World War I period, many industry leaders opposed continuation 
of peacetime counterparts to various emergency commissions for fear of 
antitrust violations which could conceivably be used against them in a 
nationalization rationale. Nationalization of oil industries was being 
utilized by most countries throughout the world as the colonial system 
ended, and was, therefore, a realistic threat. 
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Truman, however, in implementing his demobilization program, in-
structed Secretary of Interior Krug to create some advisory agency to 
replace PAW in coordinating the petroleum policies of more than thirty 
federal agencies. This was accomplished by establishing the Oil and Gas 
Division of the Department of the Interior. (Truman's demobilization 
program allowed for a relatively smooth transition from war to peace 
which constrasted most favorably with Woodrow Wilson's post World War I 
handling of similar problems.) Krug also revitalized the Petroleum In-
dustry War Council, after first checking with Attorney General Tom Clark 
on the status of such an industry advisory board under antitrust and 
other municipal laws. 
Over the next twenty years, a quiet period existed of re-evaluating 
existing regulation, making minor adjustments, adding new or more de-
tailed regulation for such issues as secondary drilling, intangible 
drilling, etc., and considering the possibilities of deregulation. 
After the whirlwind years of FDR a relative calm was necessary to 
reinforce the apparent consensus between government and industry. Com-
mittees investigated, made policy suggestions, and recommended legisla-
tion, but the end result was satisfaction with the status quo with the 
noteable exception of three issues -- the tidelands ownership, percent-
age depletion allowance, and foreign imports. 
Harry Truman was primarily .concerned with national security and he 
had hoped to secure direct access to petroleum resources for the federal 
government, but Congress ruled this out. For similar reasons the Presi-
dent favored retainment of federal title to offshore tidelands. The is-
sue had been debated in Congress since FDR's second Administration when 
it became technologically possible to tap subsea resources. 
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The Truman Proclamation, 28 September 1945, stated that the U.S. 
Government regarded natural resources of the seabed of the continental 
shelf as federal property. The President vetoed a Congressional resolu-
tion surrendering tidelands to the states, and instituted direct legal 
action to secure explicit recognition of national control. Congress was 
unable to reach a compromise throughout Truman's Administration over the 
tidelands issue which had come to the forefront of public opinion. 
The controversy over a bill before Congress granting federal tide-
lands to the states was potentiated by Truman's nomination of Edwin 
Pauley to be Under-Secreatry of Interior, Ickes, in testimony before the 
usual Senate hearings on a Presidential nomination, accused Pauley, a 
prominent California oil operator and treasurer of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee, of offering a campaign contribution of several hundred 
thousand dollars to the Democrats if the Justice Department would drop 
the pending federal suit against California, Texas, and several other 
states to secure title of the offshore tidelands. This proposal alleg-
edly took place on the Presidential train returning from FDR's funeral. 
Truman was furious that Ickes had ruined the chances of Senate approval 
of his nomination, and amidst much pUblicity Ickes resigned. A few 
weeks later after it became clear that public opinion had caused the 
Senate to block the nomination, Truman was forced to withdraw Pauley's 
name. 
Thus, title over the tidelands became a major issue in the 1952 
election. With Ike in the White House, Congress quickly passed the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 22 May 1953 which deeded title to the tidelands 
(within the three mile continental limit) to the states. A few months 
later on 7 August 1953 Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Act, 
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which designated the area outside the three mile limit as federal prop-
erty which could be leased by competitive bidding to private enter-
prises. Thus a political compromise had been worked out giving rise to 
a unique situation in which the coastal states held title to the first 
three miles of tidelands and the federal government held title to the 
outer continental shelf beyond the three mile limit. 
The Korean War presented a brief interruption to the relative quiet 
of the period in which the wartime emergency machinery was quickly in-
stalled and operated efficiently according to the precedents established 
during World Wars I and II, and then almost as quickly dissolved as 
business returned to its normal peacetime role. 
Although Truman's various committees had supported retention of a 
percentage depletion allowance, he had hoped to at least reduce the per-
centage from 27.5 percent to 15 percent of gross income. However, de-
spite vociferous support from a minority of Senators including paul 
Doughs (Ill.), Hubert Humphrey (Minn.), William proxmire (Wis.), and 
John Williams (Del.), Truman failed to achieve the percentage cut. Sen-
ator Lyndon B. Johnson (Tx.), in advocating the 27.5 percent figure had 
expanded the debate to include the needs of national security, promoting 
the idea of maintaining a reserve supply of 15 percent annual produc-
tion. Johnson also pointed to the cycle of reduced dividend payments 
which would lead to the necessity to obtain more outside financing, thus 
reducing production, and federal tax payments. In short, a reduction in 
the percentage depletion allowance could undermine the economic stabili-
ty of the entire nation. Irregardless of the economic arguments for and 
against the issue, Johnson managed to muster a seventy-one to nine vote 
defeating Humphrey's amendment to lower the percentage rate of the 
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depletion allowance. The same men rehashed the the same arguments every 
four years, and each vote retained the status quo by large majorities. 
Ike avoided involvement whenever possible and when forced to take 
action, followed Hoover's model, creating a committee to study the prob-
lem and then hoping that Congress, the states, or the companies would 
take care of the situation, whatever it may be. 
Therefore, when the independents cried for import quotas to protect 
them from the cheap competition, rather than face the political implica-
tions -- both domestic and foreign -- Ike created a Cabinet committee to 
investigate, and then never commented on their proposals. Congress fi-
nally took action by passing the Reciprocal Trades Agreement Act of 1955 
with a compromise clause giving the President power to impose import 
quotas if such imports constituted a threat to the national economy or 
security. Ike preferred to rely on industry cooperation to limit im-
ports voluntarily, which, in accordance with precedents, were about as 
effective as they had been under Hoover. 
By 1959, after delaying as long as possible, Eisenhower was liter-
ally forced to use his powers to license oil imports and establish 
quotas. 
During the 1960s such pressing problems as domestic unrest and 
Vietnam preoccupied all levels of government while the oil companies 
began to investigate the potentialities of Alaska. 
Concurrent with these domestic developments was the expansion of 
the American oil companies in the Middle East, where wartime government-
industry cooperation was utilized to assure their position. Yet the 
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industry remained adamant that the nature of this cooperation remain 
temporary: a war emergency measure -- not a permanent union. 
Market entry into the Middle East and the method of that entry be-
came the key issues. While both American industry and government agreed 
on the former -- indeed, cooperated toward achievement of the goal, the 
latter became the point of conflict. British industry and government 
presented a united negative front to both issues, hoping to maintain 
status quo in this area, until the shift in world political leadership 
from Great Britain to the U.S. made compromise the only remaining viable 
option -- in effect, negating the Red Line Agreement which had served 
well since 1928. 
Although the Red Line Agreement had allowed American entrants to 
purchase the Persian Gulf concessions on the Island of Barhein, it took 
direct State Department intervention to convince the British Foreign Of-
fice that Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) should be permitted to 
operate the Bahrein Concession without political interference. When 
SOCAL first raised the problem, the State Department instructed the 
charge d'affairs in London to approach the British Government on the 
subject. 
You are desired by the Department to discuss this case infor-
mally at an early date with the appropriate authorities of the 
British Government. You should point out in your conversation 
that existing legislation is extremely liberal in the United 
States; and you should add that the Department of State would 
be glad to obtain a statement of the British Government's pol-
icy respecting the holding and operating by foreigners of pe-
troleum concessions in territories such as Bahrein. 25 
Throughout the 1930s the consortium of American major oil companies 
(ARAMCO) was unable to convince President Roosevelt of the tactical 
importance of Saudi Arabia. 
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In his attempt to conserve American domestic reserves, Ickes in 
December 1941 appointed nine major executives to the Foreign Oil Commit-
tee to investigate the feasibility of foreign oil imports. He main-
tained contact with the petroleum representatives of the U.K. and the 
Netherlands who were stationed in Washington, and he secured the ap-
pointment of a petroleum attache in London. Between 1941 and 1943 Ickes 
also continually urged Roosevelt to establish U.s. Government-owned 
producing and refining facilities in Mexico. 26 Cordell Hull, Donald 
Nelson, and others objected to Ickes' plan which could have embroiled 
the U.S. in the nationalization of Mexican oil. Instead, attention was 
focused on the Middle East. 27 
Roosevelt, although sympathetic to the needs of both ARAMCO and 
Saudi Arabia, informed the cartel that direct aid would be in violation 
of Lend Lease. The U.S. Congress had passed the Lend-Lease Act 11 March 
1941 to enable "the government of any country whose defense the Presi-
dent deems vital to the defense of the United States" to obtain raw 
materials in the United States without cash payment. The bill was de-
signed to continue supplying Great Britain with aircraft, guns, and 
munitions, as set out in the Atlantic Charter between Roosevelt and 
Churchill, although Britain had exhausted her dollar resources (includ-
ing all British private investments in the United States which had been 
taken over by the British government and paid for in sterling), and 
could no longer afford to pay for the supplies she so desperately 
needed. 28 
The Roosevelt Administration insisted that primary responsibility 
for Saudi Arabia belonged to Great Britain in her role as the most domi-
nant influence in the Middle East. As war drew closer the 
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Administration realized Saudi Arabia's immense strategic value. FDR 
contived a bazaar solution: Britain could divert part of her $400 
million of U.S. Lend Lease to King Saud, which she did between 1941 and 
1943 totalling almost $34 million. 29 
Not until the devastating effects of World War II when King Saud's 
revenues plummeted and he asked ARAMCO for aid, was Saudi Arabia's posi-
tion recognized as strategic to the U.S. Government. By June 1941 Ibn 
Saud approached Washington directly, asking for $10 million. 
As a result of ARAMCO's pressure, the State Department, in the 
Roger8' Memorandum, emphasized the great importance of the ARAMCO con-
cession in the American lo"ng-range petroleum needs. 
In 1941 ARAMCO was asked by King Saud for $6 million; unable to 
supply the amount, ARAMCO referred the problem to the American Govern-
ment, calling for direct Lend Lease to King Saud. ARAMCO perceived the 
U.K. Government as attempting to consolidate her gains in Saudi Arabia 
by portraying herself as the real benefactor, while in reality, she was 
merely acting as a conduit of U.S. assistance throug the mirrage of Lend 
Lease -- a result of the American joint venture's own lobbying to get 
assistance for her interests in Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO feared this decep-
tion might eventually jeopardize her future" role in the concession, and 
called for direct Lend Lease to King Saud as the only way to keep the 
Arabian Concession out of British hands. 
The officials of both the Standard Oil of California and the 
Texas Company are much disturbed about the future security of 
their concession not only because of the normal insecurity in 
Arabia but also because they feel that the British may be able 
to lead either Ibn Saud or his successors to diddle them out 
of the concession and the British into it. American experts 
on Saudia Arabia are inclined to agree with this estimate of 
the situation. They point out that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany had every opportunity to get this concession and, after 
examination, rejected it on the ground that there was no oil 
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in Saudia Arabia -- and have been regarding the concession 
with covetous eyes ever since the Americans struck oil. The 
recent British move to set up a bank of issue for Ibn Saud, 
and the more recent act of the British Charge d'Affaires in 
Jeddah -- who just after our minister, Mr. Kirk, had visited 
Ibn Saud, and promised him Lend-Lease aid, informed Ibn Saud 
that he could get further American Lend-Lease only by applying 
to the British authorities either in Jeddah or London seem 
to indicate a desire to strengthen British influence, in a 
manner not quite healthy for the oil concession. 30 
In February 1943 Roosevelt, after increasing pressure from the 
American oilmen,31 gave the go-ahead to the Lend Lease Administrator: 
in order to enable you to arrange Lend Lease aid to the Government 
of Saudi Arabia, I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital 
to the defense of the United States ... 32 The Saudis received $99 million 
from Lend Lease either directly or indirectly which bolstered ARAMCO's 
stature in Saudi Arabia; however, access to Persian crude was still 
controlled by Britain. 
In 1943 the U.K. through British Petroleum -- controlled 81 
percent of all Middle East oil production, compared to 14 percent 
American control; this same dominance was exhibited in refinery capacity 
and other down-stream activities. 
Roosevelt avoided wartime projects which could conceivably benefit 
the British position regarding Persian Gulf oil, and helped to increase 
production in Saudi Arabia by supplying American companies with scarce 
construction materials. 
A successful attempt to arrange for maximum possible withdraw-
als of petroleum for use from British-owned reserves would 
probably be quite adverse to American interests, because it 
would entail building up British-controlled refining facili-
ties beyond the present proportions. These are already much 
greater than the American-controlled refining facilities in 
the Middle East, with the result that American-held conces-
sions are jeopardized by the dissatisfaction of the proprie-
tary governments with the relatively small amount of oil pro-
duction (and resulting revenue realized by these governments) 
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from American-operated concessions, as compared to British-
operated concessions. 33 
By mid-1943 many industry leaders, as well as government officials, 
feared an oil shortage. 34 
On 14 July 1943 president Roosevelt called a Cabinet conference to 
plan u.s. global oil policy.35 A systematic analysis of the major com-
panies' position was published entitled "A Foreign Oil Policy for the 
United States." Briefly, it recommended that the government should not 
enter into competition with domestic oil interests. But instead, the 
government should act in coordination with the companies in securing 
concessions, especially when in competition with British houses. This 
policy was an early successful attempt of the companies to have a dual 
system of laws; i.e., that they should be exempt from antitrust laws if 
their foreign competitive position vis-a-vis alien multinational was at 
stake, and that the government would not participate directly or indi-
rectly in the ownership of overseas oil operations. 36 
On 8 June 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported their alarm to 
the President over the dangerous depletion of domestic reserves, sug-
gesting foreign exploitation. On 12 June 1943 James F. Byrnes, Office 
of War Mobilization Director, presided over a White House meeting at 
which Stimson, Knox, Ickes, and Herbert Feis agreed that the federal 
government itself must acquire new oil reserves. For ten days an inter-
departmental committee representing the Departments of War, State, Navy, 
and Interior worked out plans for the proposed Petroleum Reserves Corpo-
ration (PRC) first suggested by Ickes -- which was approved and es-
tablished by 30 June 1943. 37 The idea failed to gain widespread accep-
tance even among government agencies. By December 1943 the PWC itself 
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went on record protesting the PRC and established its own committee to 
outline a foreign oil policy.38 
In line with his previous attempts to involve government in indus-
try, Ickes advocated federal exploitation of Saudi oil reserves by cre-
ating a Petroleum Reserves Corporation -- under the RFC -- which would 
acquire and develop foreign oil reserves. He detailed functions of his 
proposed government corporation which included conserving domestic oil 
and counteracting British influence. With Cabinet agreement the RFC 
created the Petroleum Reserves Corporation which lost no time in trying 
to buy all of ARAMCO's lucrative Saudi properties. Opposition to joint 
private and public exploitation of Arabian oil reserves was not limited 
to the major oil firms: the Foreign Oil Committee of PAW omitted any 
mention of direct government involvement in its Proposal for a Foreign 
Oil Policy. Despite the growing negative feelings, the PRC sent an ex-
ploratory mission to Saudi Arabia in November 1943, composed of E. L. 
Degolier, a well-known geologist; W. E. Wirtner, Director of the u.S. 
Geological Survey; and C. S. Snodgrass, Director of the Foreign Refining 
Division of the PAW; whose report in January 1944 confirmed that the 
center of global oil production had shifted to the Middle East. The PRC 
then proposed a joint venture with Gulf and ARAMCO. 
Collier and Rodgers of ARAMCO furiously refused Ickes initial bid 
for the PRC to buy their Saudi properties. Ickes' next proposal was 
government stock acquisition of 70 percent, or 50 percent, or even a 
mere 33.3 percent. Negotiations broke off in October 1944 after 
Rommel's threat to Mid-East oil supply routes had diminished somewhat. 39 
To emphasize her objection to federal involvement in foreign oil, the 
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API adopted a resolution condemning it: Ickes had spoken at the annual 
meeting in defense of the PRC. 
Meanwhile Admiral Andrew Carter, Petroleum Administrator of the 
U.S. Navy, proposed a U.S.-built pipeline from the Saudi oilfields to 
the Eastern Mediterranean Coast. By February 1944 the PWC advocated the 
PRC's abolition. By 6 February 1944, after Admiral Carter's call for a 
government-owned pipeline, Gulf and ARAMCO signed an agreement with the 
PRC to build and operate such a pipeline. Under the agreement ARAMCO 
was to build a privately owned and operated refinery at Bahrein to Pro-
duce oil for the U.S. The companies were to repay the $160 million cost 
to the government who would retain ownership; the U.S. would be entitled 
to buy one billion barrels of crude from the companies' reserves at a 25 
percent discount of the American market price. 40 
Emphasizing the necessity to conserve rapidly depleting domestic 
reserves, the strategic importance of Middle East oil not only to the 
war effort but also to future U.S. national security, the importance of 
U.S. Government support for private American investments abroad, and the 
potential profitability of the pipeline, the President, Ickes, Knox, and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly supported the PRC-Gulf-ARAMCO Agree-
ment. 41 Opposition to the Agreement was strong: Senator E. H. Moore 
(Okla.) called the pipeline imperialistic and demanded a review of U.S. 
oil policy; the PIWC again condemned it as did the Independent Petroleum 
Association President Ralph T. Zook who feared the collapse of domestic 
operators because of cheap foreign competition; and the Truman Committee 
urged a u.S. policy stressing private enterprise. 42 
When it became evident that implementation of the U.S. Government's 
joint venture in the Middle East would cause serious rifts in the 
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U.S.-British alliance as well as in the government's relations with the 
American majors, ARAMCO began construction of the pipeline on her own 
and the American Government never said a word. 43 The PWC began pushing 
for a formal commitment on the part of the federal government to extend 
diplomatic support to American oil interests wherever needed. President 
Roosevelt in response to the demand for diplomatic intervention on be-
half of industry interests, and in attempt to reconcile British and 
American Governmental policy on the issue, called an Anglo-American Con-
ference on the matter. 
Hull and Ickes served as Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, 
of the Anglo-American Conference with ten important oil executives 
appointed by the State Department -- as advisors. Charles Bryner, the 
State Department's Petroleum Advisor, began technical discussions with 
British representatives, led by Sir William Brown. 44 In essence, the 
U.S. was asking the Government of Britain to relinquish her exercise of 
colonial prerogatives which prevented American oil companies from com-
peting on an equal basis with the empire. 
Prime Minister Churchill cabled President Roosevelt that Britain 
was worried over American attempts to oust the British from Saudi 
Arabia, and agreed to begin discussions on Roosevelt's proposed treaty. 
Members of Parliament were particularly critical, not having been previ-
ously consulted, and feared that the U.S. was trying to force the hand 
of the British Government. Even Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was 
forced to confess that he had received no formal notice of any related 
meetings by April 1944. It was not until after it became clear that 
ARAMCO -- without government assistance -- would build the Bahrein 
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Pipeline that Lord Beaverbrook added Cabinet-level prestige to the Wash-
ington delegation. 45 
On 8 August 1944 after difficult negotiations,46 a vaguely worded 
Anglo-American Agreement was initialed. 
We go on record against the tying of hands and the closing of 
doors which have cramped the normal operation of trade in the 
past •••• There will be no more nobbling of American nation-
als with such devices as the Red Line Agreement. This Red 
Line Agreement ••• was the price that American companies had 
to pay in order to participate in the development of the Iraq 
fields. It provided ••• that no participating company would 
go after oil within a territory roughly comprising the Old 
Ottoman Empire. Or, if any such company did go in there and 
find oil, then it had to share the concession with the certain 
favored others. Now, whatever else this Red Line Agreement 
may be, it certainly is not competitive. I say, therefore, 
that there is no place for it in the new scheme of things 
which our Anglo-American oil treaty contemplates. Neither is 
there a place for a certain type of marketing restriction ••• 
in which a company promises -- as the price of a concession 
-- that it will not market in places which another company has 
staked out as its own. I mention these as just a couple of 
cartel practices which we hope, and expect, to consign to 
oblivion through the operation of the Anglo-American Agree-
ment. 47 
This Agreement went to the U.S. Senate as a treaty, but action was 
never taken, due in part to heavy political pressure against it from the 
American petroleum industry. The treaty was renegotiated,48 revised,49 
and resubmitted by President Truman in 1947 -- this time with the back-
ing of the PIWC and the API -- but Texas producers, with Senator Tom 
Connally and Speaker Sam Rayburn as their representatives, stalled again 
and the treaty was never ratified. 50 
The Anglo-American Conference from its inception angered those ex-
ecutives not consulted in the treaty's preparation like J. Howard Pew of 
Sun Oil. Others feared the creation of a cartel. James Moffet, among 
others, saw the agreement as a first step toward nationalization of the 
American industry. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the 
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, spoke for many independent pro-
ducers in voicing his fear that large-scale imports of foreign petroleum 
would seriously depress the American market. 
An example of one of the more controversial aspects of the agree-
ment was an international petroleum commission, whose function was: 
to analyze such short-term problems of joint interest as 
may arise in connection with production, processing transpor-
tation, and disposition of petroleum on a world-wide basis, 
wherever the nationals of either country have a significant 
interest, and to recommend to both governments such action as 
may appear appropriate. 51 
During World War II both the U.K. - U.S. Government relationship 
and the U.K. - U.S. industry relationship were strained. Although 
strong political allies, the Americans challenged British economic au-
thority in the Middle East regarding oil. It was that part of American 
policy -- led by Ickes -- that attempted to gain governmental entry into 
the petroleum market which alienated the other participants and caused 
them to unite in the prevention of it. When confronted with such a for-
midable mutual competitor as the United States Government, BP and the 
American majors quickly and quietly began to look for alternatives in 
correcting the apparent regulatory failure of the Red Line Agreement 
now inefficient as a voluntary regulation of the global oligopoly. 
As has been shown, the end of World War II created considerable al-
teration in the balance of power between Great Britain and the United 
States, not only politically and militarily, but also commercially: The 
American majors expanded their presence in the Middle East as well as in 
the European and Japanese markets. The primary factor restricting 
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American expansion was the Red Line Agreement, the legal negation of 
which was actively sought by Exxon and Mobil. 
The companies' legal framework came from three English barristers 
who advised the two majors that the Red Line Agreement had been termi-
nated on the technicality that two of their partners in the Iraq Petro-
leum Co. -- Compagnie Francaise de Petrole and Gulbenkian -- had become 
"enemies" as a result of Hitler's occupation of France. 
Mobile Vice-President Harrold Sheets informally raised the subject 
with State Department petroleum advisor Charles Rayner before notifying 
the Department officially that they would leave for England to invite 
their European partners to formulate a new agreement, enabling them to 
keep their existing arrangements in Iraq while eliminating the provi-
sions that would obligate them to share their new participation with 
ARAMCO. 
I took Charlie Rayner into my confidence Thursday P.M., June 
27th. C.R. came to my apartment in New York, spent the even-
ing with me, and I disclosed to him the nature, extent and 
present status of our negotiations with ARAMCO, with particu-
lar emphasis on the Red Line problem •••• I urged Rayner to 
get Byrne's and Acheson's support for asking British Govern-
ment to join with U.S.A. in bringing about the elimination of 
the Red Line restrictions and Kuwait restrictions as soon as 
possible. The British and Americans should be mutually inter-
est in cleaning up, as between themselves, any unpleasant sit-
uations such as those resulting from the restraint of interna-
tional trade resulting from Red Line and Kuwait agreements. 52 
Having obtained State Department approval,53 Mobil and Exxon undertook 
to enlist support for their scheme from BP and Shell. 
The English were rather uneasy at the prospect of changing the 
structure of their relationship with the two American majors. 
Sir William [Fraser, BP's chief executive officer], ••• con-
sidered the maintenance of the Agreement ••• important under 
[the day's] political conditions when the dangers of govern-
ment intervention were so great -- so much so that if he 
couldn't secure a revised Group Agreement with his partners, 
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he personally would be prepared to carryon with the old one 
rather than rock the boat, as he felt that the undisturbed 
continuity of the partnership was infinitely more important as 
a defense against the governmental and other international 
dangers which might otherwise threaten us than anything 
else. 54 
Like BP, Royal Dutch Shell was apprehensive: She feared that the 
French and Gulbenkian would "drag the ugly question into the public 
arena" -- an eventuality which all parties wished to avoid. 
Not by coincidence, Shell and BP received similar legal counsel to 
the Americans regarding the technical invalidity of the Red Line Agree-
ment. British Petroleum was reluctant, however, to change her position 
on the agreement until Exxon and Mobil consented to purchase large vol-
umes of crude from BP's concession in either Iran or Kuwait for a 
twenty-year span at BP's option. 
It seems paradoxical that the American companies insisted that u.S. 
antitrust would prohibit them from signing a new IPC agreement contain-
ing many of the old restrictions, although they could and did sign the 
long-term supply contracts with BP, specifying marketing restric-
tions .55 
The State Department welcomed the long-term arrangements made be-
tween the British and American c'ompanies, announcing that the companies 
had informed them in advance. 
The political stability of the early post-war p~riod in the Middle 
East soon gave way to grave instability arising from the growth of na-
tionalist feeling, the decline of Britain's influence, and the conflict 
over the establishment of Israel. There had been little interference 
either from the countries in which production happened to be concen-
trated or from consuming countries, most of which used oil simply as a 
fuel to supplement the indigenous coal or hydroelectricity on which most 
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of them then depended. The international companies, moreover, effec-
tively organized their activities around the world behind the guarantee 
of security offered by the political and/or military presences of the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which between them provided the 
home base for six and a half of the Seven Sisters (with the remaining 
half -- the Royal Dutch part of Shell -- domiciled in the Netherlands). 
Instability in this apparently stable system, however, first 
appeared, paradoxically, when the United States took action to 
ensure that its tough domestic line against cartels and monop-
olies, through the medium of its anti-trust legislation, also 
affected the foreign operations of American companies. This 
action, moreover, more or less coincided with another which 
further undermined the traditional organization of the oil in-
dustry by the oil companies. This was the insistence by the 
administrators of the Marshall Plan that the oil companies 
would cease to charge for the oil they sold to Europe (which 
was to be paid for out of Marshall Plan Funds) as though it 
came out of expensive fields in the United States and as 
though it were transported from the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, a 
posted price system orientated towards non-U.S. points of oil 
production and freight rates related to actual, rather than to 
hypothetical, movements of oil around the world was intro-
duced. 56 
This in conjunction with the inevitable rise of nationalism on the 
part of host countries forced the oil companies to restrict their pro-
duction and development efforts, or pursue measures which made it impos-
sible for the companies to continue to operate as they had been. 
The nature of concessions changed dramatically. Pre-World War II 
. concessions 
••• were specially negotiated, covered large areas, were of 
very long duration, and vested the development of a country's 
oil resources in one or a few oil companies with established 
marketing organizations. Concessionaires were given wide lat-
itude to explore for, develop, produce, and market petroleum, 
in return for these privileges, the companies paid royalties 
and taxes to the host governments. 57 
After World War II, however, these conditions no longer existed: 
General petroleum laws were enacted by most countries to rene-
gotiate the terms of all exploration and development 
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concessions: Areas conceded to anyone firm were sharply 
limited to both in space and in time. The duration of new 
concessions was reduced and local partners were often 
required. 58 
Consequently, the number of concessionaires rose in nearly every oil-
producing country. 
Under these general petroleum laws, separate grants of rights to 
oil companies were often required for the successive stages of opera-
tion: (1) a reconnaissance permit authorized preliminary exploration, 
often on a non-exclusive basis; (2) an exploration license limited ex-
ploration rights to a defined area; and (3) a development lease granted 
the privilege to develop all or part of an area previously explored, 
with the state retaining either a percentage of the area or "checker-
boarded" blocks of land within the area. 
In addition, the holder of the concession was frequently obligated 
to fulfill one or more of the following requirements: to refine speci-
fied amounts of crude oil domestically; to deliver to a government com-
pany a pro rata share of oil for domestic consumption; to acquire local 
partners; to begin operation within a specified number of months and to 
expend specified amounts; or to cooperate in unitized development. 
In order to further encourage a larger number of firms to partici-
pate in the rapid development of a country's resources, and thereby 
speed the flow of revenues to the public treasury, maximum limits were 
set for areas granted to foreign concessionaires. 
Relinquishment of concession areas to the state has been 
pressed even beyond the requirements of law. Thus government 
pressure caused 'voluntary' relinquishments of half the entire 
area of their Kuwait concession by Gulf and BP, one-third of 
the Quatar concession by the IPC group, and three-quarters of 
ARAMCO's original concession in Saudi Arabia. 59 
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American municipal developments during and immediately after World 
War II exemplify the limited cooperation for a common goal between enti-
ties who stubbornly retain their sectional interests. The precedents 
set in dealing with the issues of public versus private financing of 
pipelines, sovereignty over offshore activities, and the development of 
a foreign policy to accommodate the newly emerging geographic and eco-
nomic post World War II realities, are still being applied today in the 
formulation of international customary law. 
While these entities the American Government and the American 
petroleum industry -- may not both hold full international personality, 
and therefore their resulting cooperative efforts may lack the status of 
international customary laws, these municipal developments do ultimately 
effect international customary law. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE MIDDLE EAST: EMERGENCE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
The sphere of freedom of action for subjects of in-
ternational law -- what, in relation to typical in-
ternational persons may also be termed unlimited 
state jurisdiction -- is governed primarily by the 
rules on sovereignty. Limitations of this jurisdic-
tion come about as the result of the interplay of 
the rules underlying some of the other fundamental 
principles with those on sovereignty. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
••• a kind of private supranational government, an intricate 
system which has grown up through close to a half century of 
closely co-ordinated and co-operating joint ventures and ar-
rangements around the world among these seven international 
companies ••• a private United Nations ••• its members sev-
erally and collectively possess massive wealth and resources, 
including an exchequer, shipping fleets, production facili-
ties, pipelines, refineries, etc., which exceed by far the re-
sources available to many nations of the world. Furthermore, 
these companies have shared for many years a broad community 
of interest and a functional unity of policies and actions in 
the dispositions of such wealth and resources. 
David I. Haberman 
Iran is an example of developing international customary law based 
on municipal law in America. The concession which had been held by BP 
since its formation in 1901, was the major source of non-Arab oil pro-
duction; its oil was sold not only in Great Britain and to the Royal 
Navy -- its first and biggest customer -- but also to European markets. 
By 1939 Iran was already producing ahout 10 million tons per year 
twice as much as all other Middle Eastern countries combined. 1 
By 1951 there were strong anti-British feelings: EP's labor policy 
preclu(ted Iranian nationals from rising above the level of laborers; 
high profits were inflamatory -- with annual oil exports valued at $360 
million, Iran Was getting $35 million in royalties and $65 million 
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through the company's local expenditures; Great Britain was receiving 
more in taxes from the profits than was Iran. Based on a comprehensive 
study by outside experts who maintained Iran had the necessary re-
sources, a seven-year national development program for the economy and 
welfare needs had been begun in 1949. A politically inept bureaucracy 
coupled with a selfish and corrupt ruling class, however, helped dissi-
pate the oil revenues. 
Of the 20 million population, 90 percent were illiterate; the in-
fant mortality rate was 500 deaths for every 1,000 live births; 70 per-
cent of the land was held by 2 percent of the people, although farming 
Was the major occupation. 2 
The major conflict between BP and Iran as the host government over 
the issue of nationalization soon expanded to include the U.K. Govern-
ment as BP's home government, and the U.S. Government in her role as ar-
bitrator, which was soon over-shadowed by her role as home government to 
the American majors who were -- by this time -- in conflict with BP over 
market entry in Iran. 
BP had accepted a new supplemental oil agreement in 1949, providing 
for an increase in the royalty from 22i to 33i a barrel, hut she flatly 
refused to accept the 50-50 profit sharing arrangement conceded by 
American firms to the governments of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Thus 
the British Government found her-self in the position of rejecting the 
option of brute force in deference to the changing world power struc-
ture, particularly the danger of Soviet intervention, while at the same 
time unwilling to simply accept Iran's offers for compensation in other 
countries, and also because any reasonable settlement for the physical 
properties of the company would be inadequate to compensate the British 
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economy. Stressing the importance of Iran for strategic reasons, 
Richard Funkhouser, U.S. State Department Petroleum Attache, urged the 
British to accept Hossadeq's request for the immediate initiation of 
payments under the higher royalty schedule. 
Both the U.S. and U.K. Governments believe it important that 
AIOC comply with this request because of the economic, politi-
cal and strategic considerations involved [i.e., the Russian 
threat]. AIOC, however, refuses to pay until the agreement is 
ratified; progress is nil, the Prime Minister had threatened 
concession cancellation. 3 
Faced with Iran's nationalization of BP, the major companies uni-
laterally favored BP's position, refusing to operate the Iranian Conces-
sion themselves. A Department of State press release of 15 May 1951 
stated that "U.S. oil companies ••• have indicated ••• that they would 
not, in the face of unilateral action by Iran against the British compa-
ny, be willing to undertake operations in that country.,,4 
The Truman Administration quickly attempted to mediate a settlement 
of the dispute between BP and Iran -- for more than oil was at stake: 
merely a month after Mossadeq's nationalization actions, on 27 June 1951 
President Truman created the National Security Countil (NSC) which made 
an attempt to define U.S. policy. The National Security Council con-
sists of top ranking cabinet officers and the joint chiefs of staff. 
Bring (U.S.) influence to bear in an effort to effect an early 
settlement of the oil controversy between Iran and the United 
Kingdom, making clear both our recognition of the rights of 
sovereign states to control their natural resources and the 
importance we attach to international relationships.5 
Although Britain had just gone through nationalization of several 
of her own basic industries, the leadership found it difficult to accept 
such acts in Iran. Winston Churchill dramatized the negative effects of 
the nationalization on Britain's balance of payments. 
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Now that Abadan refinery has passed out of our hands we have 
to buy oil in dollars instead of sterling. This means that at 
least 300 million dollars have to be found every year by other 
forms of exports and services. The working people of this 
country must make and export at a rate of 1 million dollars 
more for every working day in a year. This is a dead loss 
which will affect our purchasing power abroad and the cost of 
living at home. 6 
Great Britain first took her case to the International Court which 
held that it did not have any jurisdiction in the case; next, she ap-
plied to the Security Council which also took no effective action. BP 
then decided to employ economic retaliations on Iran, the most important 
of which was the boycott of the export of Iranian oil. Prospective buy-
ers were warned of legal action on the grounds that without a compensa-
tion agreement between Iran and BP, the oil was still the property of 
BP. 
The U.S. Ambassador to Iran at that time described the British line 
of reasoning: 
The concept that financial pressures would bring the Iranians 
into line and solve the oil problem in Iran was from the be-
ginning the key to the British blunders which proved so cost-
ly. This notion springs from a colonial state of mind which 
was fashionable and perhaps ever supportable in Queen 
Victoria's time, but is not only wrong and impractical today 
but positively disastrous. It is an attitude which seems to 
persist in spite of the British experiences in India, Burma, 
Ceylon and Egypt. In Iran, it was expressed in variations of 
this theme: "Just wait until the beggars need the money badly 
enough -- that will bring them to their knees." I heard that 
vapid statement so often that it began to sound like a phono-
graph record. 7 
On 4 July 1952 Secretary of State Acheson, British Ambassador 
Oliver Franks, George McGhee, and Averell Harriman met at Harriman's 
Washington office to discuss the Iranian question. According to 
Acheson: "Sir Oliver left no doubt how seriously and angrily both the 
British government and public viewed what they regarded as the insolent 
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defiance of decency, legality and reason by a group of wild men in Iran 
who proposed to despoil Britain.,,8 
The events of the boycott were described by Noori as follows: 
The British oil tanker fleet was withdrawn from Abadan so that 
Iranian oil could not be transported to foreign ports. Public 
warnings were issued that legal proceedings would be insti-
tuted against any and all purchasers of Iranian crude or re-
fined products. In fact British charge d'Affaires in Iran re-
portedly averred that the British government would pursue the 
matter all the way to the North Pole if necessary in search of 
a court that would adjudicate such a dispute. Dirlomatic 
pressures were also hrought to bear upon foreign governments 
to discourage or prohibit sales of Iranian petroleum products. 
As a result of these and other embargo measures only an inde-
pendent Japanese oil distributor and two independent Japanese 
oil distributor and two independent Italian companies exported 
any significant quantities of oil from Iran during the more 
than three-year span between nationalization and Mossadeq's 
fall. 9 
The Ameri~an companies cooperated with BP in the boycott, thus 
adding to its effectiveness. In his testimony before the MNC Hearings, 
Howard Page, then Middle East coorninator for Exxon, described the role 
of the major oil companies in refusing to purchase and market Iranian 
oil: 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Hr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Mossadeq nationalized the oil. 
He had nationalized the oil. 
And the reason Iran was in such trouble 
was, as you say, it couldn't sell the oil. 
Yes. 
Because the companies had boycotted 
Iranian oil, isn't that true? 
We didn't boycott it. 
You didn't boycott it? 
Of course not. Why should we buy it? 
we weren't buying it before, and we 
weren't buying it afterwards. 
And since you had such a very large mea-
sure of control over the market, this 
meant that Iran wasn't able to sell its 
oil or enough of it to prevent economic 
chaos in Iran, isn't that correct? 
Well, that is not only that. Remember 
that they could bring lawsuits and did 
bring successful lawsuits against buyers 
for purchasing stolen property ••.. 
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Because it was their property and it had 
been stolen from them. They had a right 
of action, no question about that. We 
don't deal with stolen property and people 
who do sometimes get lawsuits and some-
times they win them too. 10 
On the surface Page's assertions are correct: as stated previous-
ly, Exxon in 1947 entered into a long-term contract with British Petro-
leum which committed Exxon to purchasing large quantities of crude oil 
from BP's concessions in Iran or Kuwait over a period of twenty years at 
BP's disgression. The contract, although negotiated in 1947, was not 
scheduled to take effect until 1952; so, in fact, Exxon was preparing in 
1951 to begin purchasing Iranian crude. 
Page is also correct when he stated that BP threatened to sue any 
company which lifted "hot" oil out of Iran -- a claim she substantiated 
by placing notices in the world's major newspapers, and even more vivid-
ly, by successfully prosecuting the Rose ~~r~ case, in which a British 
court, sitting in Aden, found that crude from the BP Concession, pur-
chased from NIOC, which had come within the court's providence, remained 
the property of BP([1953] W.L.R. 246). 
Exxon's refusal to purchase Iranian oil goes much deeper: she was 
unlikely to purchase oil from the nationalized concession of another 
company for fear of setting a very dangerous precedent. The embargo was 
effective due to the cooperation of the major oil companies. 
There was one thwarted attempt to break the boycott. Mossadeq 
sought the assistance of W. Alton Jones, Chairman of the 
Cities Service Corporation of New York, with the hope of re-
newing oil operations in Iran. This was the most serious move 
of all, because Jones was believed capable not only of setting 
up an adequate marketing organization, but also of providing a 
fleet of tankers to carry Iranian oil to forei~n ports. On 
August 16, 1952, Jones arrived at Teheran. After a tour of 
works, including the refinery of Abadan, he was hrimming with 
enthusiasm. "The free world knows the Iranians can manage 
their own oil industry and operate the refinery," he was 
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prompt to declaim. He found the refinery at Abadan upon in-
spection to be in good repair and estimated that full scale 
production could be resumed with a minimum expenditure of some 
$10,000,000. Jones also volunteered the services of Cities 
Service in enlisting European and American technicians to as-
sist in starting up the industry again, and indicated that 
tankers could be secured within a matter of months to make re-
sumption of full scale production in Iran. Upon leaving Iran, 
he publicly announced that "there was interest in buying 
Iranian oil" and indicated strongly, although he would not en-
large upon it, that "his company shared this interest." As 
for the blocked [sic] and the possibility of extended litiga-
tion over oil purchases, Jones proclaimed that "he might buy 
oil from Iran ••• irrespective of whether Britain or the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. would take legal action against his Com-
pany for handling Iranian oil products."ll 
With these ausplC10US beginnings, the ultimate failure of 
the Jones mission to revive the Iranian oil inciustry is a 
matter for major conjecture 
It is known that two concerns with which Jones was affil-
iated, Cities Service and Sinclair, each received hand-
some long-term contracts for Middle Eastern crude at sub-
stantial discounts from the posted price of the interna-
tional cartel. It has been publicly charged that one of 
these contracts was offered to Cities Service by cartel 
members in order to dissuade it from executing its re-
ported agreement to market Iranian oil. We at least know 
that companies with which Jones was identified were sub-
sequently given a share in the consortium arrangement 
which ultimately comprised the Iranian controversy. 12 
Iran's oil exports dropped from over $400 million in 1950 to less 
than $2 million in the two-year period from July 1951 to August 1953. 
"If between 1951 and 1955 Iranian production had held at its 1950 level, 
the net loss (after deducting some 300 million barrels actually pro-
duced) would have totaled approximately 900 million barre1s.,,13 
At the same time, neither BP nor Great Britain suffered the losses 
that might have been feared, owing to the company's ability to draw upon 
its fabulous oil reserves in Kuwait. "Oil was available -- even to AIOC 
in abundance in neighboring countries, and world surplus production 
capacity of crude oil was estimated then at about 1.5 million barrels 
per day pressing for outlets."14 
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Yet the financial effect of the boycott was not so pronounced as 
was expected on Iran, since oil revenues accounted for only about 12 
percent of total government revenues, and only 120,000 workers had been 
involved in the local petroleum industry. 
However, as it became obvious that a reconstruction of the original 
concession would be impossible, the Administration turned to the 
American oil companies asking them to enter into a joint venture agree-
ment with BP. On 8 October 1952, Secretary of State Acheson submitted a 
plan to the NSC which stated that "no-one other than the majors and ••• 
[BP} had sufficient tankers to move large volumes of Iranian oil," and 
raised the question whether the majors should be asked to move Iranian 
oil. 15 
This would, however, conflict with American antitrust policy and 
the government herself after much deliberation -- re-evaluated her 
priorities in favor of an American-BP joint venture in Iran by relaxing 
her stand on antitrust. Attorney General HcGranery's reaction was that 
Acheson had "presented a most formidable legal meal. It would be most 
difficult to work out a program involving the majors and at the same 
time maintain the present antitrust action" (MNC _H_e_aF_~nx~, Part 8). He 
concluded, however, that the basic problem was whether the national in-
terest in finding a solution to the Iranian crisis was more important 
than the principles involved in the suit. 
Despite the Attorney General's qualms, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Lovett also argued that the possibility of using the five major compa-
nies to move Iran's oil should be explored. "This would involve some 
action to get around the present obstacle of the government suit against 
those companies. However, there is no doubt in my mind that the 
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interests of the U.S. in connection with the present Iranian crisis re-
quires (sic) some such action" (MNC Hearings, Part 8). 
In his reply, Secretary Acheson agreed that: "One of the concrete 
problems in securing a resumption of the flow of Iranian oil is to de-
termine whom it is we can calIon, and who is able in fact to move Ira-
nian oil in the volume which is required to save Iran. The independents 
are not in a position to give us any real help" (MNC He~rings, Part 8). 
On 26 November 1952 President Truman requested the Secretary of 
State to ..... engage urgently in exploratory discussion with representa-
tives of United States oil companies and with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany in order that I may determine what type of agreement and pro-
gram would be most likely to contribute to the national defense by lead-
ing to a solution of this (Iranian oil) situation ... 16 
The oil companies saw this opportunity to assist the British and 
American Governments as a matter of patriotism. The same companies that 
were being enlisted by the State Department to solve the Iranian con-
flict were, incongruously, the same companies that were being investi-
gated by a Justice Department Grand Jury for possible criminal violation 
of antitrust laws -- a matter soon remedied by the State Department. 
The position paper'presented to the NSC on 9 January 1953 recom-· 
mended that the grand jury investigation be terminated. (The following 
discussion is based on this report as discussed in MNC_H~_~~~ngs, Part 
8.) 
The argument began by noting the critical importance of petroleum 
in the modern world. "With the increase in demand that will occur under 
War conditions, the successful conduct of a major war by the United 
States and its allies will be dependent upon continuing availability of 
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foreign petroleum supplies." Even in peace-time, "major sources of 
foreign oil are now indispensable to the economy of the United States." 
The only areas which could supply Great Britain and America with 
their oil needs were Venezuela and the Middle East. Venezuela was to 
American domestic oil supply in time of war as the Middle East was to 
the supply of Europe in peace-time. "Since Venezuela and the Middle 
East are the only sources from which the free world's import requirement 
can be supplied ••• nothing can be allowed to interfere substantially 
with the availability of oil from these sources to the free world." 
It was vitally important that these two remaining areas of avail-
able free world imports not fall under communist control. Yet, turning 
to the Middle East, this danger seemed real and present. "Because," the 
position paper continued, the oil producing states of the Middle East 
"are on or near the borders of the Soviet Union," and because of certain 
local conditions, "the Middle East comprises one of the most explosive 
areas of the world." Since oil is "the principle source of wealth and 
income ill the Middle Eastern countries in which the deposits exist," the 
"economic and political existence" of these countries "depends upon the 
rate and terms on which oil is produced." Since the rate and terms in 
question are to a large extent under the control of the oil companies 
operating in the area, the "American oil operations are, for all practi-
cal purposes, instruments of our foreign policy toward these countries 
We cannot afford to leave unchallenged the assertations that these 
companies are engaged in a criminal conspiracy for 'the purposes of pred-
atoryexploration." To do so, would leave the companies at the mercy of 
their critics in the producing countries, the report stated; hence the 
"entire situation," Le., criminal prosecution, is " ••• fraught with 
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great potential danger to the U.S • ••• in both Venezuela and the Middle 
East a wave of economic nationalism which might endanger American inter-
ests is entirely possible •••• " 
In many fields no legal or formal control over the action of 
American private interests abroad is exercised by this Govern-
ment. This is in accord with the view that a minimum of regu-
lation and control is an accepted American principle. On the 
other hand, this means that if Government and industry are to 
act together to promote foreign policy and security objectives 
in petroleum there must be a basis of mutual confidence be-
tween them. Criminal proceedings are not likely to produce 
such confidence between the two parties in this disupte •••• 
A trial might well be avoided and hence the great reduction in 
the number of possible sensational disclosures brought about. 
The report further recommended the formation of a Presidential Com-
mission composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Interior and Com-
merce to "give careful attention to the inter-relationships of anti-
trust, security and foreign policies in petroleum." 
The Department of Justice opposed the recommendations to abandon 
the criminal investigations, because it felt that the cartel Was to be 
attacked effectively. 
Tile cartel arrangements are in effect private treaties negoti-
ated by private companies to whom the profit incentive is 
paramount. The national security should rest instead upon de-
cisions made by the Government with primary concern for the 
national interst •••• The discovery process in a civil suit 
is a grea~ deal more cumbersome and could be drawn out over an 
extended period of time by an infinite variety of legal mo-
tions designed to delay and wear down the Department. Tile 
grand jury investigation, on the other hand, would. permit the 
Department to ltrlC.:OITer all of the relevant facts in a substan-
tially shorter time •••• The facts presently available 
strongly suggest that the high policy represented by the 
Sherman Act has been consciously and persistently violated by 
activities long since determined by the Supreme Court to he 
illegal. The cartel should be prosecuted criminally if there 
is to be equal justice under the law and if respect for the 
law and its even-handed administration is to be maintained. 
Enforcement of national competition was the Justice Department's 
primary concern: the companies contravened antitrust which directly and 
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substantially effected the domestic economy; the companies were and have 
been acting in a manner contrary to U.S. national interests and to the 
laws in which the U.S. Justice Department was sworn by oath to enforce. 
On 9 January 1953 President Truman, on the advice of the recommen-
dation, and over the objections of the Justice Department, announced 
that the grand jury investigation would be terminated. It was " ••• with 
great reluctance ••• that he was constrained to take that decision not 
on the advice of those Cabinet members who attended the Security Council 
meetings, but solely on the assurance of General Omar Bradley that the 
national security called for that action" (MNC H~?~j_~~~, Part 7, p. 
103). 
On 12 January President Truman wrote the Attorney General formally 
of his decision, which resulted in the Department of Justice's teLmina-
tion of the grand jury in~estigation and the filing of a civil suit in 
the District of Columbia. 
Iran, who had become dissatisfied with the amount of revenues she 
Was receiving from BP, called for renegotiations of the 1933 Concession 
Agreement, the result of which was signed 17 July 1949, providing Iran 
with betteL financial remuneration than any other producing country in 
the Middle East. A year later the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) set up an 
oil commission, chaired by Dr. Muhammed Mossadeq, who recommended rejec-
tion of the supplemental oil agreement. 
When no agreement with BP was forthcoming, the Iranian Parliament 
at the instigation of Mossadeq -- passed a nationalization bill in 
l1arch 1950. RP's resulting embargo had less of a financial effect than 
had been expected, since oil revenues accounted for only about 12 per-
cent of total government Levenues, and only 120,000 workers had been 
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involved in the local petroleum industry. Yet the boycott had helped to 
undermine Mossadeq's leadership by forcing him to take measures which 
contributed to internal political discontent, particularly on the part 
of the Iranian upper class. 
Needing money desperately, on August 21, 1952, the Premier de-
creed the creation of a commission to collect the immense 
arrears of unpaid taxes of the rich for the last ten years. 
The commissioners were empowered to throw the wealthy Irani-
ans' so called 'thousand families' in jail and confiscate 
their property if they did not pay. An additional blow to 
them was Mossadeq's decree that they cut feudal dues receive'l 
from sharecroppers and return 10 percent of the profits de-
rived from the land they worked •••• 17 
Iran had been the first country to receive Point Four Aid. The 
limited assistance of $1 million for the fiscal year 1951 had been in-
creased to $23 million in 1952 and 1953. Requests to the United States 
by Mossadeq for additional loans to meet budgetary needs aggravated by 
the complete loss of oil revenues were turned down by Presi,lent 
Eisenhower. 
There is a strong feeling in the United States ••• that it 
would not he fair for the United States Government to exter1'l 
any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as 
Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its 
oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were reached 
with regard to compensation whereby the large-scale marketing 
of Iranian oil would be resumed. Similarly, many American 
citizens would he deeply opposed to the purchase by the United 
States Government of Iranian oil in the absence of an oil 
settlement.1~ 
By 1953 a power struggle ensued between Mossadeq and the army, and 
a series of interrelated events led to the eventual overthrow of 
Mossadeq. 
In an effort to IDlnlmlze the power of the King and to ease the 
cOllntry's financial woes, Dr. Mossadeq decided to cut into the 
Shah's $720,000 a year government allotment and his $2,000,000 
a year income from other sources. The tension between the 
Shah and Mossadeq was intensified ••• A chain of ominous 
events followed one after another •••• 19 
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The State Department did not appreciate Mossadeq's laxity in deal-
ing with the domestic communist party, whose position was strengthened 
by the economic squeeze play engineered by the anti-communist West. It 
was primarily America's fear of communism that motivated her to actively 
assist in the overthrow of Mossadeq. 
When the Parliament refused to grant Mossadeq's demand that it 
extend for one year his right to govern hy decree, a wave of 
demonstrations swept the country. Mossadeq directly chal-
lenged the Shah, ordered a plebiscite to dissolve Parliament 
and won more than 99 percent of the votes cast and counted. 
In a swiftly moving series of events, the Shah attempted to 
oust Mossadeq hy decree, failed, and fled the country as 
~~ssadeq's supporters demonstrated in the streets smashing the 
statues of the Shah and his father. The military moved in, 
and in bloody street fighting deposed Hossadeq and restored 
the Shah to his Throne, a move which was assisted clandestine-
ly by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.20 
British secret agents had devised a plan early in the crisis to 
help bring about the fall of Mossadeq which London passed on to the 
American CIA. In April 1953 Churchill sanctioned the plan and the 
Americans actively pursued it. 
Behind the scenes mysterious forces Were at work in Iran, who 
were waiting for their moment. Early in the crisis, British 
secret agents had reported to London that there were many 
anti-Mossadeq elements in Iran who with encouragement, includ-
ing cash, from Britain, could halp bring Mossadeq down. The 
coup, ann the project was passed on to the CIA in Washington, 
who were in turn hesitant to act without British support. 
Eventually the plan was sanctioned, not by Eden, but by 
Churchill, who happened to he in temporary command of the For-
eign Office ,-turing Eden's illness in April 1953. The conspir-
ators were duly assisted, master-minded by Kermit Roosevelt, 
and their chance soon came. Mossadeq took control over the 
army; the Shah tried to oust him, failed, and fled the country 
in August. Three days later the Shah's supporters, led by 
paid agents, took to the streets to fight Mossadeq's 
troops.21 
Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, [grandson of President Theodore 
Roosevelt], also a seventh cousin of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, is still known as "Mr. Iran" around the CIA for his 
spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago •••• 
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One legend that grew up inside the CIA had it that Roosevelt, 
in the grand Rough Rider tradition, led the revolt against the 
weeping Mossadeq with a gun at the head of an Iranian tank 
commander as the column rolled into Teheran. 
A CIA man familiar with the Iran story characterized this as 
"a bit romantic" but said: "Kim did run the operation from a 
basement in Teheran -- not from our embassy." He added 
admiringly: "It was a real James Bond operation." 22 
Kim Roosevelt later left the CIA and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as 
"government relations" director in its Washington office. Gulf named 
him a vice-president in 1960. 
Mossadeq was forced out of office, the Shah's man General 
Zahedi took over the government, and the Shah returned to his 
carital in qualified triumph-- conscious that it was more the 
CIA's victory than his, though he did not care to admit it. 
The cost of the covert operation, according to one source, was 
about $700,000. 23 
••• when this crlS1S came on and the thing was about to col-
lapse, we violated our normal criteria and among other things 
We did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis 
blankets, hoots, uniforms, electric generators, and medical 
supplies that permitted and created an atmosphere in which 
they could support the Shah •••• The guns that they had in 
their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars 
that they drove through the streets, and the radio communica-
tions that permitted their control, were all furnished through 
the military defense assistance program •••• Had it not been 
for this program, a government unfriendly to the United States 
probably lYould now be in power. 24 
In November 1953 Herbert Hoover, Jr., Special Representative of the 
u.S. Government, visited Teheran and London where he urged BP's Chairman 
of the Board ~villiam Fraser to include American companies in a consor.-
tium which would enter into an equitahle agreement with the Shah of Iran 
for the production and marketing of Iranian oil. 
Fraser duly sent a letter dated 3 December 1953 inviting the chief 
executive officers of the five American Sisters to London to discuss the 
tentative formation of a consortium of the seven major oil companies of 
the world to form what was later to become known as the Iranian 
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Consortium. As Fraser wrote: 
Mr. Hoover has informed me that the ideal solution, in his 
opinion, would be for the Anglo Iranian Company to return to 
Persia alone, a view which is, of course, held by me and is, I 
think, shared by you. He has, however, said that he doubts 
whether it is possible to achieve this and his conversations 
in Tehran led him to the view that a solution might be found 
through the medium of a group of companies rather than through 
a single company 
Be has suggested to me that valuable time could well be saved 
if discussions could be opened with representatives of compa-
nies able to make some contribution to a solution of the prob-
lem who might, in the interests of progress and stability in 
the countries of the Middle East, be ready to participate in 
such a group. 
I have felt that the companies which could make a constructive 
contribution to a solution are those who are now engaged in 
the production of oil in the Middle East and in the marketing 
of it on a large scale internationally.25 
Orville Hardin, a vice-president of Exxon, wrote a letter to Secre-
tary of State Dulles referring to the Fraser invitation, asking for the 
Department's view as to the propriety of accepting the invitation and 
noting that Exxon's motivation in entering the consortium was strictly 
patriotic. Hardin wrote, "from the strictly commercial viewpoint, our 
company has no particular interest in entering such a group but we are 
very conscious of the large national security interests involved.,,26 
Exxon's conception of the "large national security interests in-
volved" seemed sOfTle"lvhat at variance with that of the State Department: 
while the Department Was primarily concerned with security of supply --
that Iranian oil might be lost to the West, Exxon was apparently more 
concerned that Iranian oil might be "(lumped" on the world market below 
prevailing prices. "We recognized the dangers if Russia got in, we had 
a real interest in seeing to it that the problem was solved. ~Je didn't 
balk at participation. Had the Russians gotten Iranian oil, and dumped 
it on world markets, that would have been serious."27 
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The State Department, without exploring her motivational differ-
ences with the majors, gave them her unconditional approval for meeting 
with the BP chiefs. Negotiations began in London on 8 January 1954 
where the American majors made rapid progress, recognizing the strength 
of their bargaining leverage. They informed Hoover, however, that there 
was one impediment blocking further progress -- that of antitrust. 
Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor to the Department of State, summa-
rized a cable from Herbert Hoover, Jr., reporting rapid progress in the 
London talks: 
••• he points out that our Government has been putting pres-
sure on the United Kingdom and its highest officials over a 
long period to solve the Iranian problem in aid of our highest 
security interests and that in this connection our Government 
has undertaken obligations to the new government of Iran for 
the same purposes; that if our Government was now to determine 
that it could not pr<)ceed at this time because of antitrust 
considerations and as a result, negoU.Cli:i.')Tl" cv'~re suspended, 
the consequeTw~,s nf.ghi: \v,~ll be of the gravest kind. 2B 
The National Security Council decided, on 21 .JaniJary that it was in 
the interest of U.S. security for the American companies to participate 
in the consortium -- thus, once again relaxing her stand on antitrust 
when it became an impediment to nCli:ior'lal security. Congressional lead-
ers were informed of the NSC decision the following day. On 22 January 
1954 Vice-President Nixon, the Secretaries of Defense and Navy, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, members of the State Department, and Herbert 
Hoover, Jr., met with a group of nine leaders of Congress: 
Recent National Security Council decisions in connection with 
the proposed oil consortium were frankly discussed according 
to the State Department's record. The Attorney General's 
opinion was made clear. No objection was raised by any Member 
of Congress concerning the decision and the course of action 
contemplated. Substantial interest was expressed in the 
matter of possible imports to the Western Hemisphere from 
Iranian sources. Secretary Anderson pointed out emphatically 
that the production developed in Iran would replace other 
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Eastern Hemisphere production and the sale of oil and petrole-
Um products from Iran would be in the Eastern Hemisphere. 29 
In letters dated 28 January 1954, the heads of the five major 
American oil companies informed the British that: 
the ~ational Security Council has determined that it is in 
the security interests of the United States that United States 
petroleum companies participate in an international consortium 
to contract with the Government of Iran, within the area of 
the former concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd., 
for the production, refining and acquisition of petroleum and 
petroleum products, in order to permit the friendly government 
of Iran substantial revenues on terms which will protect the 
interests of the Western World in the petroleum resources of 
the Middle East. 30 
The British and American Governments held talks in August 1954 on 
Iran and the increasing dependence of Western Europe on Middle Eastern 
oil. The British pointed out that "these problems [were], therefore, 
highly strategic and political, not just economic in nature and 
scope."31 They wished to establish a framework within which the British 
Government, the American Government, the British oil companies, and the 
American oil companies could coordinate their efforts to settle the 
Iranian oil enigma in such a cohesive alliance so as to avoid possible 
future repercussions in the area. They specifically noted that the U.K. 
was not "primarily concerned in protecting the profit position of the 
British companies."32 The British stated flatly that they were more in-
. teres ted in improving relations and stabilizing conditions in countries 
concerned in order to insure the smooth flow of oil. 
The Foreign Office suggested several modes of coordination which 
ranged from strategy planning among the major oil companies to an Inter-
national Petroleum Council, consisting of consuming and producing coun-
tries. Biannual coordination meetings between America and Britain were 
also advocated. The Americans raised several objections: the type of 
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consult1ations between companies involved antitrust problems; the forma-
tion of an International Petroleum Council could be encouraging 
producer-consumer conflict and accelerate coordination among oil produc-
ing countries, especially in the Arab nations; and officially the Gov-
ernment was cool to direct involvement. 
An agreement was finally signed on 29 October 1954 between the 
Iranian Government, the National Iranian Oil Company, and a consortium 
of British and American companies. 
A summary of the agreement follows: 
1. On the one hand, there was the NOIC, a state company, who 
owned the assets (oilfields and installations). The principle 
of nationalization was not brought into the agreement. 
2. On the other hand, there was a consortium (Iranian Oil 
Participants) composed of BP (40 per-cent.), Shell (14 per-
cent.), Gnlf Oil (7 per-cent.), Mobil Oil (7 per-cent.), SOCAL 
(7 per-cent.), Standard Oil of New Jersey (7 per-cent.), CFP 
(6 per-cent.) and Iricon (5 per-cent.). This consortium held 
the capital of two operating companies: an exploration and 
production company and a refining company. These two compa-
nies made neither profits nor losses, their expenses being 
covered by the members of the consortium (at a minimal rate of 
$1 per ton, bearing in mind the expenditure to be made). 
These two companies produced for the account of the NIOC. 
3. Each member of the consortium set up its own trading com-
pany, who would announce each year how much oil it would off-
lift. It was on the basis of these announcements (and the in-
ternal requirements of the NIOC) that the production volume 
would be fixed. The oil was purchased by the trading compa-
nies at a price equal to 12.5 per-cent. of its posted price. 
They would be taxed on the OPEC basis. 
4. Iran undertook to pay Anglo-Iranian compensation of 25 
million pounds, payable in ten years. 
5. The consortium's assets were valued at 1,000 million 
dollars and the new participants paid BP 600 million dollars 
for their share of the old rights. Of this sum, 15 per-cent. 
was paid in eighteen months and the remainder at a rate of 75i 
per ton of oil (this so-called BP royalty was terminated in 
1970).33 
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According to Petroleum Week, the deal was a sweet one all around. 
Each 1/12 share cost $625,000 paid to the American members of the Con-
sortium. From the posted price of $1.90 a barrel the companies paid the 
costs of production, 20 cents, a dime to British Petroleum, and 80 cents 
to the Iranian Government, leaving a profit of 80 cents each barrel. As 
the income ranged, according to estimates, from $416,000 to $730,000 a 
year on each 1/12 share, it was a rather neat investment. One company 
which staked a claim to a share and later ,qithdrew was able to sell its 
"rights' for a good sum, Ivithout ever having ventured a penny. 
In 1958 the country gained more revenue than it had in the entire 
half century of Anglo-Iranian's sway. The principle of nationalization 
had been upheld even if direct control had been evaded."34 
The American independents were perturbed at the manner in which 
participants in the consortium were selected. The independent oil com-
panies had been interested from the beginning in Iranian oil operations 
and had only refrained from entering Persia because of the Iranian-BP 
dispute. When it became known that the independents were to be excluded 
from the consortium Ralph Davies, president of the American Independent 
Oil Company (A~INOIL), wrote Secretary of State Thllles reminding him of 
the government's obligation to them as well as to the majors. 
Suffice it to say that We cannot accept the proposition that 
the benefits to be derived from a proposed consortium be lim-
ited to the five major companies that are parties to it. Our 
governluent has no less an obligation to independent enterprise 
than to the integrated giants of the industry whose practices, 
both at home and abroad, have made them a tar~et for wide-
spread criticism and, indeed, investigations. 5 
Hoover's response to the independents' complaint persuaded the 
majors to relinquish 5 percent -- 1 percent each -- to be made available 
to the American independent companies. 
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Page again explained the reasons to Senator Church for including 
the independents: 
Mr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Now they, -- I don't know their reasons 
for it -- but they had a feeling, well 
"Because people were always yacking about 
it we had better put Some independents in 
there." 
Put a few independents in? 
Yes. 
~"indow dressing? 
That's right. 37 
As of 4 March 1955 Price Waterhouse certified eleven independents 
as reliable applicants, rejecting fu~INOIL because of what they alleged 
to be a lack of financial capacity. Financial capacity of companies was 
not certified by any governmental institution, but hy the public ac-
counting firm of Price, 'tJaterhouse and Co., which at this time was under 
retainer to three of the five major producers, and at one time or an-
other, represented all seven of the major international oil companies. 
Their power was so great that inter-cartel disputes between the Seven 
Sisters were sorted out and settled by Price Waterhouse, acting as a 
court of last resort in binding arbitration. The firm also set lliJ a 
single corporation to represent all new participants and divide the to-
tal 5 percent participation among thenselves. The eleven companies were 
appalleli and as a unit demanded a 36 percent share, \~hich they never 
got. 
Page of Exxon was later questioned by Senator Church as to why they 
were not allowed the 36 percent share they were asking: 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
Why couldn't they handle up to 36%, be-
cause they didn't have the outlets? 
Of course, these were Ameriedn indepen-
dents who didn't have any outlets abroad, 
they only had outlets here and you had the 
problem of disposing of all kinds of 
204 
Senator CHURCH. 
Mr. PAGE. 
products and it was almost an impossible 
task unless you had certain outlets for 
it. 
And the majors had those outlets but the 
independents did not have access to them? 
That's right. 36 
Iran illustrates the abilities of the multinational companies and 
their t.JesterD governments to maintain an equilibrium in the face of a 
changing world, until one country emerged with the leadership necessary 
to alter the entire petroleum industry and the established international 
legal regime; Libya, for a country with such a unique history -- trans-
formed by World f.Jar II from an obscure Italian colony to a protectorate 
under joint Anglo-French military rule until King Idris was restored to 
his throne in 1951 was a lat~ starter in the international petroleum 
game. Yet she was to have a tremendous influence on the international 
legal regime during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
In return for direct American financial aid, Idris invited the 
United States Air Force to build Wheelus Air Force Ease in an attempt to 
dilute the British presence in the area. Like the Saudis, in dealing 
with the all pervasive issue of developing his country's oil reSOllrces, 
Idris decided to encourage AmericR.n grollps over the Eritish. This con-
flicted sharply with HMG.' s claim that her companies (BP and Shell) had 
prior rights to most of Idris' prime drilling sites. The Libyan Govern-
ment, however, invited all interested companies in order to avoid a sit-
uation similar to that in Iran of single company domination. 
To further secure their position, the Libyans drafted a law under 
which all oil production would be regulated, giving bidding preference 
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to independents. The American companies controlled the drafting panel 
with seven firms represented; the British had only two panel members, 
and France had one. The American contingent included new entrants to 
the Middle East fraternity of oil developers -- such independent partic-
ipants as Nelson Bunker Hunt of Dallas, and Marathon Oil of Finley, 
Ohio. Of course, Exxon, Mobil and Caltex were also represented. The 
British companies tried in vain to receive preferential treatment in the 
Libyan concession bids. 
In his disposition Faud Kabazi admits, "I didn't want my country to 
be in the hands of one oil company.,,37 The 1955 Petroleum Law estab-
lished a highly fragmented concessionary pattern. In the first round of 
bidding, for example, seventeen companies received eighty-four separate 
concession areas. This system of bidding gave independent companies an 
opportunity to secure reserves which otherwise had been unattainable. 
The Libyan bidding regime was designed to facilitate rapid develop-
ment -- a pattern followed by the British in the North Sea over twenty 
years later. The constituent part of the bids consisted of committing 
the companies, in terms of both time and financing, to exploration and 
development rather than the older system of cash bonus payments to the 
Idris regime. When overlapping bids took place, a special petroleum 
council awarded the concessions to the companies who seemed most likely 
to produce the most oil in the shortest period of time. 
The companies were encouraged to explore their allotted concession 
area quickly by the so-called "5-3-3" clause. This clause in the con-
cession agreements gave the Libyan Government the right to repossess 
one-quarter of each company's exploration concession after five years, 
another quarter three years later, and a third quarter three years 
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thereafter. These areas could then be reassigned to other companies. 
Since in practice, the companies Were permitted to designate that por-
tion of their concession area which they would relinquish, they had a'n 
incentive to explore the whole area quickly in order to make an intelli-
gent determination. 
In deciding who should receive a bid, considerable weight was 
placed on whether or not the company was a major or an independent. 
Well, if in an acreage I found an independent who had spent 
more energy and discovered oil, this would permit me to talk 
to his neighbor and tell him, "Look here; your neighbor has 
discovered oil. You are almost on the same structure. Come 
on, now: try to drill." 39 
Exxon, first to strike oil in commercial quantities, had finished 
pipeline and port facilities and was exporting oil by 1961. The Oasis 
Group (Continental, Marathon, and Amerada) were supplying Europe with 
Libyan crude by the end of 1962. What made the Libyan situation unique 
Was that the independents produced nearly 46 percent of the 1.2 million 
barrels per day production. Due to the oil import quota, Libyan crude 
Was marketed almost entirely in Western Europe, causing a quick drop in 
the price of oil in that market. For example, gasoline on the Rotterdam 
Spot market fell 22 perc~nt between 1961 and 1965 while Libyan crude 
soared. 
In 1966 Libya initiated a new round of concessions, many of which 
were awarded to Occidental Petroleum Company, a novice in the interna-
tional oil game. Occidental's chairman, Dr. Armand Hammer, ~"as uncon-
ventional, to say the least. His enticements, bound with ribbons of 
red, green and black (the Libyan national colors), included the con-
struction of a fertilizer plant. 
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To compound matters, Occidental was sweetening the Libyans' take 
just after the international oil companies' capitulation to the new 
Libyan tax struccture. "Occidental was a relatively new and very rapid-
ly rising company that was using new techniques, and also offering ap-
parently new arrangements that were a little more favorable to the host 
government," Ambassador Newsome testified. 
I think it is safe to say that the advent of Occidental on the 
scene was not warmly welcomed by all of the other companies. 
There was some concern over the precedent-shattering character 
of the Occidental management. This view was perhaps stronger 
with the majors but not entirely confined to them. 40 
Occidental had tremendous success in her exploitation of Libyan oil 
wealth: by May 1967 she had already drilled nine successful wells and 
had begun commercial production. By late 1969 the small American inde-
pendent Was the largest producer in Lihya. To give some idea of Libya's 
tremendous speed in increasing production capacity, it surpassed Saudi 
Arabian output during one quarter of 1969 -- even though Libya's re-
serves were miniscule compared with the Saudis'. In addition, the 
closure in 1967 of the Suez Canal helped Libya increase her share of the 
European market. 
"By 1968 the increase in Libyan output had become a cause for 
alarm, posing a real threat to .the maiors continued control of the mar-
ket," Dr. John Blair testified. "Not only had its growth rate been 
vastly underestimated, but the independents were proving to be far more 
important than had been anticipated. ,,41 
This gave companies like British Petroleum and Exxon a tremendous 
problem as was pointed out in a 1968 SOCAL document: 
Some companies such as Occidental, Continental and others, 
without large interests in the Middle East, will be under 
heavy pressure to expand production rapidly and therefore are 
not likely to limit their Libyan liftings. Their Libyan oil 
208 
will be competing vigorously with the majors' oil from the 
Middle East and Africa.42 
As George Piercy of Exxon explained the dilemma that the demand-
limited market posed for the majors during the 1960s: 
Well, I think that if some capacity was brought on anywhere 
else in the world, as Mr. Page has said, it is like a balloon 
and if you bring it in on one place, something has to give 
somewhere else, because the fact that oil was brought on here 
or there does not in any way mean there is any more consump-
tion. The consumption is fixed by what customers want to 
buy.43 
By the mid-1960s, Iran, having watched the Libyan developments 
carefully, demanded a 17 percent increase in the consortium's 1966 pro-
duction commitments, which the Shah desperately needed for his develop-
ment plans. The consortium insisted that 9 percent was a more reason-
able production rate. The Iranian Government, fearing that the majors 
would be adamant in their denial of production increments, sent repre-
sentatives to the British and American Governments. The Foreign Office, 
having listened to the representatives, took Iran's case to the State 
Department, charging that it was the U.S. major oil companies' fault for 
the consortium's inability to go above the 1966 export targets. The 
British accused the American Sisters of not taking anywhere near their 
allowable share of consortium upliftings. They went on to state that 
the teems of the agreements for taking quantities of crude above 
company-set allowables (overlifting) were more favorable to American 
partners in ARAMCO than the terms of inner-company agreements in Iran. 
The Foreign Office thus urged the Department of State to give the 
Iranians a percentage increase through their major multinational oil 
companies. 44 
Under intense pressure from the British and Iranian Governments, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roger Davis met with Exxon's 
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Vice-President Howard Page and Mobil Vice-President Henry Moses on 19 
April 1966 and informed them of the diplomatic representatives' request. 
Both men denied unequivocally that American majors were holding down the 
1966 production levels, arguing that British Petroleum and Shell were 
not lifting enough crude, thus resulting in a smaller percentage in-
crease than that of the American oil companies. They also stated that 
neither the consortium nor their inner-company arrangements in ARAMCO 
favored Saudi Arabia over Iran. The two men emphasized that they and 
their partners were making an effort to expand 1966 liftings from Iran 
so as to keep the consortium's increase on par with the ~1iddle East 
average. 
The State Department relayed ARAMCO's argument to the British Gov-
ernment along with their conclusion that the international oil companies 
were doing their best to increase the consortium's production. The 
State Department went on to urge that the British Government in future 
encourage the consortium's members to keep their differences among them-
selves, and, above all, to stress that unity must prevail in their deal-
ings with the Iranian Government. This presupposed secrecy' of inter-
company agreements. 
Acting Secretary of State r~orge Ball instructed the embassy in 
Teheran that "this sensitive subject should not become part of the argu-
ment with the Iranians."45 The State Department refused to intervene 
when the companies might not appropriate percentage increases in the 
consortium taking the view that Iranian exports were a matter agreed 
upon within the Iranian consortium after each company analyzed her mar-
ket demands and other production obligations. 1'h(-:, ::;i::{i>~ f),~J1!lctment for-
mally told the British that the production dispute was for the 
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consortium to negotiate with the Iranians and that the U.S. Government 
Was in no position to even suggest that the companies change their 
methods of allocation. 
The Shah, disappointed that his production demands were shunned, 
summoned the top executives of the consortium to Teheran in August 1966, 
but to no avail. In the fall of 1966, the Shah, noting that without 
U.S. Government support production increases would not be adequate, at-
tempted to get more capital out of the consortium's present assets. He 
made two more demands: (1) to relinquish part of the concession to the 
government which would attempt through a competitive bid to get more 
outside development in the form of countries other than the United King-
dom and the United States and to attract independent companies -- as the 
Libyans had done; (2) to relinquish a percentage of the consortium's 
crude to the NIOC so they could market the oil and sell it at a profit. 
Concerned about the new Iranian governmental demands, the five 
American majors went to Washington in October 1966 to seek help from the 
State Department, to whom they always turned in time of crisis. It 
should be noted that RP's perspective was also explained to the U.S. 
Government because she was still the single largest producer in Iran. 
The companies vehemently attacked the Shah's new terms, and the State 
Department, while mindful' of Iran's long-term economic development, 
agreed with the companies that the Shah's budget deficits resulted from 
his spending too much on military hardware: " ••• (the Shah) is blaming 
us for high prices, even though it is not our idea that he should have 
all the mos t expensive equipment." 46 
The Secretary of State for Near East Affairs had been concerned by 
the Shah's negotiation to modernize his military, and by his pressure 
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for more oil revenue which was relaten to the purchase of modern weap-
ons. He noted that Iran was receiving military aid from the U.S. plus 
AID development loans and export-import bank loans. 
The recommendations of the five American majors (with a great deal 
of quasi-official input by their partners BP and Shell) was, as Piercy 
of Exxon summed up: "The companies will appreciate anything Ambassador 
Meyer (U.S.) and Sir Denis Wright (British) can do to keep the lid on 
and they hope it might be possible for them to find out more about what 
is really going on in Teheran." Assistant Secretary Hare declared that 
the U.S. Ambassador in Teheran would continue to do what he could to 
"keep the lid on" Iran's demands. "As the visitors started to leave," 
the State Department record notes, 
Hare asked if his understanding was correct that the companies 
did not wish the U.S. Government to become involved in the 
substance of this problem at this time. He was assured that 
the companies nesired only that the U.S. Government do its 
best to dissuade the Iranians from rash action and discretely 
probe Iranian intentions. 
In early November the British Government, which seemed at this 
point to take a much more independent line from British Petroleum (as 
contrasted with the State Department), requested a meeting concerning 
the Shah's demands with the State Department. The Foreign Office con-
sidered a solution vital, directing the consortium to respond with 
counter-proposals. They stated that they would put pressure on BP and 
Shell to be as forthcoming as possible and hoped that the State Depart-
ment would do the same with her nationals in the consortium. 
The British, armed with statistics, reitereated that the U.S. ma-
jors were not overlifiting as pursuant to their agreements, thus failing 
to deliver an annual increase in Iran which would satisfy the Shah. In 
response the U.S. Government insisted that her figures did not agree, 
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and defended the consortium, saying that the companies were giving the 
Iranians adequate annual growth. The Department's position concluded: 
"We are convinced that this has been the case solely because the compa-
nies could not fit that volume of Iranian oil into their global crude 
oil requirement. ,,47 
Hence, the U.S. Government viewed herself as merely a good broker 
in urging the companies and the Iranians to reach a solution. While she 
strongly disapproved of acquiescing to the Shah by giving the NIoe a 
greater say in the production and disposition of oil, she insisted that 
oil con'cession contracts should be respected by foreign governments. In 
effect, then, the State Department was at the oil companies disposal in 
this matter. 
The consortium secretly agreed to an 11 percent annual increment 
and the relinquishment of 25 percent of its concessions, allowing NIoe 
to buy "oil in kind". 
An international oil consultant privately advised.the Under Secre-
tary of State to encourage the U.S. companies to eliminate the secret 
agreement immediately. The Department discussed the problem with the 
U.S. companies but decided against making a specific recommendation 
since the consortium had already begun to consider a relaxation of its 
overlifiting arrangement. "The overlifting arrangement is a highly sen-
sitive, intercompany commercial policy matter with implications for the 
competitive situation among the major and independent companies and of 
the companies in other countries versus Iran," the State Department con-
cluded in December 1966. "These sensitive aspects make it desirable for 
the U.S. Government to limit its involvement in this problem unless ur-
gent reasons arise for doing so."48 The Department restricted itself 
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to monitoring the situation while the consortium moved in mid-1967 
toward lowering its overlift price from the posted price to a half-way 
price. 
In 1967 the Iranians somehow secured a copy of the secret partici-
pants' agreement, and the companies immediately suspected each other of 
leaking the tightly held information. The State Department tried to 
minimize the damage by suggesting that "it would be to the consortium's 
advantage if it could see its way clear to giving the Iranians the same 
advantage as the Saudis now enjoyed.,,49 
Although OPEC had been founded in 1960, it had lacked the leader-
ship needed to unify the organization, allowing it to reach its poten-
tial as a force limiting the exploitation of its oil by the British and 
American companies. 
With the Libyan revolution, however, that leadership emerged, and 
the effect was devastating. The OPEC countries learned the game quickly 
and by using many of the techniques perfected by the oil companies them-
selves, managed to shift the advantage away from the firms, into their 
own laps. 
On 1 September 1969 Libyan Colonel Muamer Qaddafi deposed King 
Idris. Qaddafi's first priority was the removal of British and American 
military bases from Libyan soil. Meanwhile, on 26 October 1969 the Shah 
of Iran said that if the United States increased its imports of Iranian 
oil, Iran would spend the money earned from the sale on American goods. 
On 1 December 1969 OPEC ended its three-day meeting in Qatar at which 
discussions centered on participation, Algerian negotiations with 
France, and member control over production programs. Algeria became an 
OPEC member. By 7 January the National Oil Companies of Algeria, Libya, 
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Iraq, and Egypt ended a three-day meeting on their policies toward for-
eign monopolies operating in their countries. Iraq announced the can-
cellation of Article 3 of Law No. 80 of 1961, which allowed the govern-
ment to allocate other lands to the IPC in lieu of the concession areas 
expropriated under the law. This announcement came on 12 February 
1970. 
By January 1970 Qaddafi's regime had started its campaign against 
the oil companies for unprecedented increases in oil revenue: the revo-
lutionary government, through Qaddafi, made it a matter of public record 
that the American oil companies should pay handsomely for their govern-
ment's pro-Israel stance. 
What made this argument so persuasive was the fact that Libya's 
small population even with its recent oil wealth, upon which it was 
not dependent -- and its leaders boasted that they lived 5000 years 
without petroleum and could do so again. 
Neither the oil companies nor the embassies in Tripoli had antici-
pated the 1969 revolution, nor Were they familiar with the members of 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). They could not, therefore, an-
ticipate the revolutionary changes that the radical government would 
make concerning ~1iddle Eastern oil. 
The American Government believed wrongly that Oaddafi's regime had 
a firm dome~tic political base and that Libya's strong nationalistic and 
religious fanatics would be compatible with the foreign policy objective 
of maintaining American investment coupled with sphere of influence in 
Libya. So when the Libyans demanded the closing of \<lheelus Air Force 
Base and the removal of any British military presence, the Americans 
acquiesced. Again in 1970 when there was domestic resistance to the 
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Qaddafi regime, the American embassy learned of the attempted expedition 
and informed the Libyan Government. The rationalle for this extraordi-
nary act was the safety of American nationals in Libya, i.e., the oil 
companies' employees, and that the U.S. did not want the Oaddafi regime 
to think that she was in any way or form associated with the anti-
Qaddafi movement. 50 
From the first days of his regime, Qaddafi made it quite clear that 
one of his main objectives was to exact better terms from the oil com-
panies for the express purpose of discrediting the Idris regime. Early 
in 1970 Oaddafi started negotiations with two diverse American companies 
Exxon, the largest oil company in the world, and the maveric indepen-
dent, Occidental. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) promptly ad-
monished the multinational companies for stalling the negotiations, and 
warned the U.S. that her petroleum interests in the Middle East were 
balanced on a razor's edge due to her support for Israel. 
At this point oil can no longer be classified in terms of commodi-
ty, but must be considered in relation to the greater geopolitical aims 
of the Qaddafi regime. For the regime now threw open its door to every 
foreign firm that had a proposal regarding Libyan oil. Officials of 
governments and companies from Russia, Hungary, Germany, France and 
Japan as well as many of Libya's OPEC partners, met in Tripoli. 
The companies were shocked at the Libyan demands. As the 
negotiations continued throughout the Spring, Exxon publicly announced 
that she did not believe Libya's demands were justified, or that Libya 
would expropriate her operations. However, on 15 March 1970 the RCC 
formed the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LINOCO) which took over all 
oil and gas distribution in Libya on 5 July 1970, announcing that 
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companies would be paid compensation for their nationalized holdings. 
To compound matters, the Trans-American Pipeline was ruptured and the 
Syrians refused to allow any repairs a situation which aided Libya's 
position immensely, making Oaddafi's low sulphur oil, along with her 
geographical location on the right side of the canal, the most attrac-
tive oil to the European market. 
Thus when the Libyans posted their prices upwards, it not only ef-
fected rates in Libya, but those in the entire Persian Gulf. This gave 
rise to the operative word of the Libyan experience -- leapfrog. The 
Libyan Government simply ignored Exxon by breaking off all negotiations 
and concentrating on Occidental, renewing her nationalization threats 
against the independent as the first anniversary of the revolution ap-
proached. 
It was rumored that Occidental was damaging the oil fields through 
overproduction. Thus Occidental had unique and peculiar vulnerabilities 
to the Libyans, and in a matter of months her production was cut from 2 
million barrels a day to 500,000 on 12 June. Since her crude oil and 
profits were largely concentrated in Libya her negotiating position with 
Qaddafi was precarious. 
When Shell refused to accept similar demands to those made to the 
independents, she was promptly refused permission to produce any more 
oil. Exxon was similarly denied the right to export light natural gas 
(LNG) from its new plant. 
James Aikins, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Petroleum Matters, 
speculated that an Iranian-type boycott in the face of Libyan nationali-
zation would fail due to Europe's total dependence on Libyan oil. 
It was also to our interest, I thought, that the companies 
have a reasonable working relationship with the Libyans and 
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with other producers. If the Libyans concluded they were be-
ing cheated, this I thought guaranteed a breakdown in rela-
tions with the companies and all sorts of subsequent problems 
•••• If Libya moves in and takes over the companies, Europe, 
one way or another, is going to get Libyan oil, and if the 
companies then try to block the sale of Libyan oil, as they 
said they would, through controlling their tankers or people 
that bought the Libyan oil, in this case, they would find 
themselves nationalized in Europe as well. 51 
The international majors were thus confronted with fundamental 
strategy. If they refused the regime, they would probably lose their 
concessions; if they acquiesed, Libya would not be the only country to 
receive better terms, but the idea would soon "leapfrog" to the rest of 
the Persian Gulf. Thus the oil companies' situation Was of crisis pro-
portions, and they turned for help to their home governments, i.e., the 
U.S. State Department and selected bureaucrats from Whitehall's upper 
echelons. 
Exxon felt she could stand up to Lihya. Thinking the independents 
were responsible for the European price war by dumping excess Libyan 
crude, the majors refused to support Occidental. Occidental knew that 
the only way she could withstand the Libyan pressures was to secure 
guarantees of crude supply from one of the Seven Sisters in the eventu-
ality of a Libyan shut-in. Having received no help from the majors, 
Hammer of Occidental Went to Tripoli to make the best deal he could with 
the Lihyan Government under the circumstances. The reSUlting agreement 
contained the most radical increases in revenue for the producing coun-
tries since 1950. 
The agreement with Occidental set a precedent giving the Libyan 
Government tremendous leverage in coersing the other independents to 
follow suit. Libya was now to move into battle with Some of the largest 
organizations in the world -- Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, and SOCAL from the 
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American side, and British Petroleum and Shell representing Western 
Europe. On 22 September the Libyans gave these companies five days to 
accept their demands or the alternative of a production shut-down. The 
ultimate success of Quaddafi in achieving an incredible 30 percent in-
crease in the posted price as well as an increase in the entire tax-rate 
structure presented a new situation. 
Elsewhere, the NIOC and the Iranian consortium had met on 12, 13, 
and 14 March but failed to reach an agreement. A second meeting ended 
on 20 April -- still without agreement. By 6 Mayan Iranian Ministry of 
Finance communique announced that negotiations had been successfully 
concluded. The Shah of Iran stated on 8 June that the present system of 
exploiting companies must disappear, noting that profits are not made at 
the well head but downstream. The Iranian consortium agreed on 9 
September to raise crude production by 200,000 barrels a day. However, 
by 6 October the Shah warned the consortium either to increase produc-
tion again or face the consequences. 
An American firm, Distrigas Corporation, a subsidiary of the Cabot 
Corporation, signed a long-term contract for Algerian LNG on 16 March 
1970. By 20 May the 1965 Kuwait-Saudi Arabian agreement to divide the 
neutral zone between their two countries went into effect. Oil mini-
sters from Libya, Algeria, and Iraq issued a communique dated 23 May 
stating that the limits on company negotiations would be set, realizing 
their demands by unilateral action if necessary, and establishing a 
joint fund in case of a confrontation with the companies. Algeria na-
tionalized the holdings of Royal Dutch Shell, Elwerath, and Phillips on 
15 June. Algerian President Boumedienne suggested bypassing companies 
by direct contracts between producing and consuming countries at the 
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OPEC meeting on 24 June. Algeria had raised the reference price of CFP 
crude retroactively to January 1969 just three days prior to this, an 
act which France rejected, requesting arbitration under the 1965 Franco-
Algerian Agreement. By 30 August Iraq signed an agreement with Soviet 
Techno-Expert for the development of the North Rumaylah Field -- similar 
to the 1967 Franco-Iraqi Agreement. By the end of September the compa-
nies raised the posted price of Iraqi crude by 20~ a barrel. 
The governments and their oil companies knew that the entire pat-
tern of concession agreements worked out since the 1920s would be shat-
teredo Under Secretary of State Johnson convened a meeting of the major 
and independent companies plus BP and Shell on 25 September 1970, the 
main purpose of which was the discussion of the Libyan shut-down of pro-
duction. 
... 
Sir David Barran, then Chief Executive Officer of Shell, urged that 
the dangers to our own and the consumers' interests lay much 
more in yielding than in resisting the demands then being made 
upon us ••• our conclusion was that sooner or later we, both 
oil company and consumer, would have to face an avalanche of 
escalating demands from the producer governments and that we 
should at least try to stem the avalanche. [Barran, however, 
was] left with the impression that the U.S. Government offi-
cials were not at all convinced by it. 52 
John J. McCloy, attorney at one time or another for twenty-nine oil 
companies, including all seven Sisters, who attended the meeting thought 
that the Under Secretary offered little hope for help from the govern-
ment, for now she had little or no influence in Tripoli and such inter-
vention would be "ineffective at best". It would be superfluous to of-
fer economic aid to proportionately one of the richest countries in the 
world, thus rendering the State Department ineffective. 
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By 30 September the remaining companies involved agreed to Libya's 
demands for increases in the posted price and a 5 percent tax hike. The 
oil companies' worst scenario was becoming a reality: the effect of the 
Libyan leapfrog was swift and dramatic. Kuwait demanded that British 
Petroleum was paying too low of a posted price and the same pattern was 
followed throughout the Persian Gulf, from where it jumped into Nigeria, 
and by early December of that year, into Venezuela. No country or com-
pany now had impunity from oil prices or supply fluctuations after 
Libya. 
Against this backdrop of rapid price increases, OPEC sensing victo-
ry met in Caracus in December 1970. John J. McCloy summarized OPEC's 
demands from the companies' point of view: 
The companies were thus faced with the threat of repeated 
"leapfrogging" on pain of seisure of oil producing properties 
or serious stoppages with consequent disruption of the supply 
of oil to the consuming countries. In the circumstances, it 
was clear that the only hope of achieving stability of supply 
was for the companies to join together and negotiate with all 
members of OPEC as a group. Unified action by the governments 
required unified action by the companies. This was not only 
in their own interests but in the interests of economic sta-
bility in Western Europe, Japan and Australia, which were 
heavily dependent on the Middle East as a source of energy 
supply. Confronted with the mounting demands of foreign gov-
ernments acting in concert, the companies resolved to attempt 
to devise a mechanism which would tend to equalize to the ex-
tent possible, the bargaining powers of the two sides. 53 
On 9 October 1970 Hammer of Occidental met with Sir David Barron of 
Shell in London and advised him of his earlier unsuccessful efforts to 
secure assurances from the major oil companies about stubstitute oil to 
replace production that his company might lose in Libya, as a result of 
resisting Libyan demands. In late 1970, Hammer again contacted Sir 
David. He asked him "whether Shell would be prepared to make oil avail-
able to so-called 'independent' companies producing in Libya in order to 
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strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the Libyan Government." 
Sir David replied that his company would cooperate in any industry-wide 
agreement that could be arranged to replace production cost by indepen-
dents in the course of resisting Libyan demands. 
my initial doubts about the feasibility of the oil indus-
try putting together such an arrangement, since I was uncer-
tain about the legal and practical issues involved in it, but 
assured him that, if suitable arrangements could be devised by 
the industry, Shell would participate in them. 54 
Our Shell view was that the avalanche had begun and that our 
best hope of withstanding the pressures being exerted by the 
members of OPEC would lie in the companies' refusing to be 
picked off one by one in any country and by declining to deal 
with the Producers except on a total, global basis.55 
Thus, a quasi-international legal agreement, the Libyan Producers 
Agreement (also known as the Safety Net Agreement), came about which was 
a sophisticated form of insurance that provided, in essence, that if one 
company was forced to cut production by the Libyans while resisting 
Qaddafi's demands, the other producers in Libya would replace the shut 
in production with crude oil at near cost. This broke several domestic 
U.S. laws but When the companies turned to their friends in the State 
Department, clearance was granted to circumvent the law. 
The oil titans thus sent the message to OPEC that under no circum-
stances would piecemeal negotiations with individual OPEC countries be 
tolerated. 
We have concluded that We cannot further negotiate the devel-
opment of claims by member countries of OPEC on any other 
basis than one which reaches a settlement simultaneously with 
all producing governments concerned. It is therefore our pro-
posal that an all-embracing negotiation should be commenced 
between representatives of ourselves ••• on the one hand, and 
OPEC as representing all its Member Countries on the other 
hand, under which an overall and durable settlement could be 
achieved. 56 
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The companies also approached the U.S. State Department for assis-
tance in persuading the OPEC countries to moderate their demands and en-
gage in fair bargaining practices. McCloy explained before the Senate 
Hearings: 
We thought that in addition to what we were endeavoring to do 
in the way of the OPEC message and the other arrangements that 
we were making with respect to Libya that it would be wise if 
the Government could enter into this thing and get the heads 
of the countries involved to moderate their demands, to per-
suade them at least to engage in fair bargaining practices, 
and we, wi thout specifying any individual, just felt we would 
like to have the assistance of the State Department, whatever 
assistance the State Department could give. 
As a result of that, Mr. Irwin -- we were told that Mr. Irwin 
would be prepared to make a tour through those producing coun-
tries, and he did go off on that, and that was the object of 
his mission. 
Senator CHURCH Did you, yourself, suggest that Mr. Irwin 
be the one? 
Mr. McCLOY No. As long as it was a person of 
dignity, with clout, to use that 
expression. 
Senator CHURCH 
Mr. McCLOY 
Senator CHURCH 
Mr. McCLOY 
Senator CHURCH 
Mr. McCLOY 
Senator CHURCH 
Mr. McCLOY 
With clout, high-ranking. 
That is right. 
At the meeting or those meetings with the 
State Department, did you emphasize the 
reasons for and the importance of a united 
front? 
Yes, I thought it was important that we 
have some form of collective bargaining 
here. Otherwise, the weakest in the chain 
would be taken off and the pressures would 
be duplicated by reason of that. 
Did you explain the experience that the 
industry previously had with the ratchet-
ing effect of Libyan prices going up and 
then Persian Gulf prices going up? 
Yes~ 
And your desire to avoid that in the 
future? 
As far as possible, yes. 57 
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President Nixon personally authorized Ambassador Irwin to travel to 
Teheran and Tripoli to place the power and prestige of the U.S. Govern-
ment and the West at the disposal of the oil companies. 
As Irwin understood it, the general objectives of his mission were: 
(1) To prevent an imminent impasse in discussions between the oil-
producing countries and oil companies from resulting in an interruption 
of oil supplies; (2) To explain the reasons why the U.S. Government had 
taken steps to make it possible under American antitrust laws for the 
oil companies to negotiate jointly; and (3) To seek assurances from the 
Gulf producers to continue to supply oil at reasonable prices to the 
free world. 58 
Irwin arrived in Teheran on 17 January where he told the Shah that 
the U.S. Government was not in the oil business, and further, that they 
did not intend to get involved in the details of the producing coun-
tries' negotiations with MNCs.59 Irwin, impressed by the Shah's argu-
ments accepted his assurances that the Gulf countries would not be in-
fluenced by whatever deal was concluded with Libya, regardless of the 
terms, and recommended that the State Department "encourage the compa-
nies to negotiate with the Gulf countries separately unless the compa-
nies had good reasons to the contrary."60 The Shah informed Irwin that 
any attempt by the companies to say that they would not sign the agree-
ment unless other OPEC members signed it would be taken by them and OPEC 
as a whole as a sign of bad faith. On the other hand, if the oil compa-
nies dealt with the Gulf producers as a separate group, the latter "were 
prepared to sign an agreement, even though producers in other areas ob-
tained better terms from the companies. 
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Finally the London Policy Group (LPG) was formed: all the partici-
pating companies were invited to send their most senior executives to 
London (they would also have a counterpart based in New York) to unify 
their negotiating position with OPEC members. McCloy summarized the or-
ganizational functions of the LPG as follows: 
The principal function of the London Policy Group was to es-
tablish the terms of reference for the negotiating teams in 
Teheran and Libya: to assist chief executives in selecting 
the team members as well as the members of the groups of tech-
nical experts to accompany the teams to Teheran and Tripoli. 
The principal function of the New York group was to review and 
comment on policy decisions proposed in London and to provide 
technical expertise and information to London for use in con-
nection with the negotiations. 61 
In New York the logistics of the entire operation were amazingly 
well run and organized: backup committees were formed for public rela-
tions, finance, transport data analysis with regards to freight rates, 
and implementation of the Safety Net Agreement, should the eventuality 
occur. In London parallel committees were organized. Meetings, held in 
New York, were held with batteries of company attorneys to consider 
drafting tax and legal problems in connection with the negotiations. 
From time to time, as important questions regarding policy arose, the 
chief executive officers of the companies met in New York and London. 
These meetings must have been of immense proportions since neither the 
Departments of Justice or State were allowed to attend. Instead the 
. highest legal office and the chief foreign policy department in the U.S. 
had to rely upon ex post factor oral reports by company executives. It 
is not known whether anyone from HMG attended; it would seem likely that 
no one did. 
The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States along 
with the oil companies thought that they had developed a coherent sound 
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counter-strategy against OPEC. However, this was contingent upon OPEC's 
compliance with the exact terms of the message that the companies had 
sent, calling for one global negotiation in order to avoid a Libyan 
leapfrog eventuality. The precarious situation of the independents was 
alleviated somewhat by the Libyan Producers Agreement, giving them the 
needed security to withstand Libya's pressures. They were under no al-
Ius ions about the magnanimity of charity on the part of the majors. Be-
cause it now suited them to support the independents, the majors were 
prepared if necessary to supply crude to the independents from their 
backup Persian Gulf concessions. (This was the same assurance Hammer 
had sought from Exxon but was denied in July 1970). 
The LPG selected quite logically George Piercy of Exxon and Lord 
Strathalmond of BP to speak as a single voice for all of them. They ar-
rived in Teheran on 19 January and were briefed like heads of state by 
the British, American, Dutch, and French ambassadors. They were told of 
the Irwin mission and of the U.S. Government's changed policy position. 
Ambassador MacArthur reported that both the Shah and Amozegar insisted 
that a one-table OPEC negotiation was a "most monumental error." Since 
the "moderates" could not restrain Venezuela and Libya and the resulting 
settlement would be at the highest common denominator. 
Mr. Piercy pointed out to Ambassador MacArthur that pursuing 
the Gulf negotiations by itself without any agreement on a 
comprehensive approach was in violation of the document (Mes-
sage to OPEC) that we had submitted on Saturday. He ques-
tioned whether there was anything in the record from dealings 
in this area that would give us any confidence that these Gulf 
countries would be able to keep an agreement if we subsequent-
ly made a preposterous settlement in Libya. The Ambassador 
went on to urge in the strongest terms that we go ahead and 
settle with the Gulf. We were afraid that we did not get 
across to him the complexity of our agreements with all the 
companies involved, both the majors and the independents. The 
essence of the combined strategy did not seem to be appreci-
ated. The Dutch Ambassador seemed to promptly grasp the 
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situation, and volunteered that what was being suggested was 
in violation of the statement submitted on Saturday.62 
Piercy had thought that the message to OPEC which committed the 
companies to global negotiations had been approved by their home govern-
ments. Amouzegar declared: "If you think you have a problem wi th your 
Governments, I am quite confident that they will agree to a regional or 
Gulf approach. ,,63 
McCloy was not convinced by the Shah's assurances that the Gulf 
countries would adhere to a new price structure if the terms were less 
advantageous than the ones accorded Libya or other OPEC countries. As 
he sarcastically referred to the State Department's decision for the 
companies to spli t the negotiations: "We weren't too much impressed, if 
I may say so, by the attitude of the U.S. Government."64 
Thus the grand battleplan with its elaborate apparatus of the West-
ern oil companies and "tacid approval from their home governments" had 
been totally undermined by Irwin's Mission to the Middle East and the 
resulting adaptation of Irwin's recommendations. The OPEC nations, 
through their Gulf Committee, had illustrated vividly that they could 
split the industry negotiato'rs from their governments -- something the 
oil companies used to do with sovereign states. OPEC had devised a co-
ordinated strategy and maintained it, whereas the governments of the 
West and the industry seemed totally uncoordinated. Henry Schuler, 
Bunker Hunt's chief representative in the LPG, summed up quite succinct-
ly the position they now faced: "The momentum had shifted to OPEC. ,,65 
From this time onward, OPEC would succeed in the 1970s much in the 
same way as the British and American companies succeeded for dec~des. 
The negotiations that followed showed the industry retreating with OPEC 
demands escalating. 
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In talking with Strathalmond and Piercy, Amouzegar insisted that 
the companies must change their position in the negotiations rather than 
the governments since OPEC was an intergovernmental, not a supranational 
organization. OPEC's Gulf Committee would have nothing to do with East 
Mediterranian postings to act as a hinge to link the Gulf settlements 
with later agreements in Libya. On 22 September 1971 the OPEC meeting 
in Beruit passed Resolution 139 calling for effective OPEC participation 
in the companies' assets on an individual, country, or group basis. 
Next they passed Resolution 140, calling for "necessary action and/or 
negotiations" to avoid what they felt was the adverse effect of the 
floating dollar. 
After the briefing, Strathalmond and Piercy met with Amouzegar, 
Saudi Arabia's Amani, and Iraqi Oil Minister Hamadi. Strathalmond 
sought in vain to convince the "moderates" of the need for global nego-
tiations. When the global approach had been abandoned, the companies 
adopted a "separate but necessarily connected formula." 
In reali ty this meant that discussions were to be held in "groups 
comprising fewer than all OPEC members, but with the understanding that 
it be realized that any negotiated settlement must be acceptable overall 
and would not lead to further leapfrogging. ,,66 
The precept was to present one all-encompassing proposal simul-
taneously in two separate cities -- Teheran and Tripoli. This necessi-
tated the diplomats of the oil industry to split into two sections; a 
Libyan team, led by Exxon's Piercy, and a Persian team led by BP's Lord 
Strathalmond. "Neither half of the team should be prepared to negotiate 
on the proposals or counter-proposals. The line to be taken would be 
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the team as a whole may consider what new terms are presented to both 
groups to insure that there was no doubt as to what we are intending. ,,67 
Nonetheless, as with their strategy of global negotiation, so this 
"separate but necessarily connected" scheme was also abandoned almost 
from the outset. The Gulf Committee demanded immediate substantive ne-
gotiations and in a letter from the Iranian finance minister proposed 
this to Lord Strathalmond, who by instruction should have rejected the 
letter for the LPG, instead accepted the letter and, supported by the 
British and American embassies, returned to London to receive instruc-
tions for new terms. 
When this also failed, the LPG attempted to make the two regional 
settlements "hinge" together. In essence, they were trying to tie the 
terms of sale of the world's oil to the Persian Gulf in the hope that 
they could thus impose on Western Mediterranean supplies, and isolate 
the wild-eyed Libyans. The companies believed that the independents, 
secure in the Safety Net Agreement, could now withstand Libyan 
pressures. 
Meeting total resistance on this policy as well, the LPG and the 
New York heads accepted Strathalmond's assessment about East Mediterra-
nean postings and recognized their hinge was nonnegotiable, and instead 
tried to get Gulf assurances against embargoes and price ricocheting. 
On 14 February 1971 the Teheran Agreement was signed between the compa-
nies and the Gulf Committee to bring about security of supply and sta-
bility of financial arrangements, which was intended to last through 31 
December 1975. 
An important aspect was an anti-leapfrogging amendment that simply 
stated that the Gulf countries would not seek to obtain advantageous 
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terms which might be negotiated by other Gulf states. In addition, 
there was a 30i a barrel increase in price. McCloy felt that from the 
financial aspect the costs were extremely high, but went on to comfort 
the U.S. and Britain on the grounds that in return for the increase, the 
companies had security of supply and price stability for a five year 
period. 
The supposition that the Teheran agreement would last five years 
was preposterous. Even before the agreement was concluded, Piercy was 
told by Yamani in Teheran "that he was not so sure that we would obtain 
the five year stability that we were seeking. ,,68 
Yamani knew that the companies had no spare capacity outside OPEC 
and thus the oil companies had lost their advantages in negotiating with 
the Gulf countries. To compound matters, reserves in the U.S. had de-
clined to virtually zero. 69 Yamani had thus observed to Piercy, 
"George, you know the supply situation better than 1. You know you 
cannot take a shutdown. ,,70 
The Libyans stated that they would not even begin negotiations un-
til those with Teheran were concluded, making it obvious that Libya 
would seek to better whatever terms the Gulf states reached. After the 
Teheran Agreement the Libyans settled with the companies on 20 March for 
a 65i a barrel increase over their agreement of September-October 1970. 
Thus, once again Libya forged ahead of the Gulf-producing countries, who 
reacted swiftly despite their earlier claims. 
Despite earlier insistence on the conduct of Gulf negotiations 
independently from negotiations covering Mediterranean ex-
ports, and professed lack of concern for the outcome of the 
Mediterranean discussions, Iranian officials expressed with 
increasing vigor the resentment of Iran at the outcome of 
Libyan negotiations. 71 
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Before a solution between the Gulf countries and the LPG could be 
reached in Geneva, on 7 December 1971 Libya nationalized all of BP's 
rights and assets in Libya following Iranian occupation of three tiny 
islands in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian occupation was blamed on the 
British Government since the islands were nominally under British pro-
tection until a day after the occupation. 
The oil weapon was now a potent political tool; Qaddafi's national-
ization transformed him into the champion of Arab political causes. 
Shortly afterwards on 1 June 1972 Iraq Petroleum Company followed suit. 
After the signing of the general agreement, Libya, who now had a 
classic pattern of expropriation and nationalization, tried to demon-
strate that she could obtain better participation terms than those of 
what Qaddafi perceived as his weaker, politically moderate bretheren in 
the Persian Gulf. In her usual role of attacking individual oil compa-
nies one by one, Libya trained her sights on the independent Bunker 
Hunt, BP's partner, who was now unabashedly vulnerable. Libya demanded 
50 percent of the Texas company's assets. 
Hunt, feeling some security in the Producers' Agreement, rejected 
Qaddafi's demands for 50 percent participation and instead, offered to 
negotiate on the basis of the Persian Gulf's terms agreed with Sheik 
Yamani, only to have all her Libyan assets nationalized on 11 June 1973. 
In August 1973 Occidental Petroleum had no choice but to accept Libyan 
participation demands of 51 percent at new book value compensation. As 
in September 1970, the independent companies -- as a domino column --
capitulated to Libyan demands. 
Soon after the fall of the independents to Libyan participation, 
the remaining companies -- Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Shell, and ARCO -- were 
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also decreed to have 51 percent participation with the Tripoli 
Government. 
The U.S. Government reacted swiftly but totally ineffectively by 
suggesting an Iranian style embargo. In a Presidential news conference, 
the following exchange took place: 
Question. What exactly are you doing to meet these threats 
from the Arab countries to use oil as a club to force a 
change in our Middle East policy? 
Answer. The radical elements that presently seem to be on 
ascendancy in various countries in the Mid-East, like 
Libya. Those elements, of course, we are not in a position 
to influence them, influence them for this reason: oil 
without a market, as Mr. Mossadegh learned many, many years 
ago, does not do a country much good. 
We and Europe are the Market and I think that the responsi-
ble Arab leaders will see to it that if they continue to 
expropriate, if they do expropriate without fair compensa-
tion, the inevitable result is that they will lose their 
markets, and other sources will be developed. 72 
Nonetheless, the New England Petroleum Company, the third largest 
purchaser of Libyan crude, began purchasing her supplies directly from 
the Libyan Government, circumventing Standard Oil of California. Her 
pattern was soon followed by other companies purchasing nationalized oil 
from the Libyan regime -- no matter what the legal consequence. 
The OPEC meeting in September made new negotiations with the Gulf 
states inevitable. Thus, on 20 January 1973 the LPG's opening offer in 
Geneva, which was based on the IMF index of export data was quickly dis-
missed and the companies were forced to accept OPEC's unequivocal demand 
that gold be the point of reference and that posting be increased by 8.9 
percent. Once the currency parity question was resolved, participation 
came to the forefront in the Geneva talks. OPEC's initial suggestion of 
20 percent ownership quickly escalated to 51 percent participation, for 
which the OPEC countries would pay only net value. The companies could 
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buy back the shares at a considerably inflated price. By 5 October 1971 
the companies and five producing governments in the Gulf reached an 
agreement in New York providing for government participation in the pro-
ducing concessions. It would start with an immediate 25 percent govern-
ment share and progress until 51 percent ownership, management struc-
ture, and exact role of host governments to each of the parties in-
volved, which proved to be its undoing. The Kuwait National Assembly 
refused to ratify the settlement and reopened negotiations. 
The Libyans were also instrumental indirectly in other negotiations 
in the Middle East. From December 1972 to December 1973 the ARAMCO con-
sortium negotiated with the Saudis, ending in a stalemate as it became 
obvious that the Saudis were watching developments in Libya and Iran. 
Finally in August 1973 Yamani told the companies what the new arrange-
ments would be: the Teheran Agreement was certain to be renegotiated 
before 1975; the next change would be a very large one; it would be im-
posed rather than negotiated; and -- like the "wild ones" in OPEC would 
insist on very high prices leaving the companies no real choice. Yamani 
then began a discussion of the stability of the participation agreement, 
reviewing the developments country by country and finally saying, "You 
will have to improve on the Kuwaiti deal if you are to avoid nationali-
zation and then I'll have something even better than Kuwait.,,73 
As the negotiations reopened on 13 September, Yamani and Taher told 
the company team that the developments of the last few weeks had drasti-
cally altered the participation issue. Yamani said that Kuwait would 
not accept the 51 percent that Libya had taken in August; it would have 
to press for more. Observing that the European governments, in need of 
sweet crude would not support the major companies in their efforts to 
233 
stand off Libyan nationalization, Yamani added that the deal in Iran 
which enabled the Shah to say he had full control required Saudi Arabia 
to react forcefully. Throughout he told the companies that there were 
political problems the companies did not understand, that participation 
was being described as a sham in which ownership is given with one hand 
and taken back with another. After making demands that the companies 
immediately accept a buyback price set at 93 percent of posted price, 
Yamani told the companies he would meet with them again in ten days in 
the United States. 
On 17 September 1973 in San Francisco the company negotiators sur-
rendered to Yamani's terms of 93 percent buyback price with an escala-
tion clause for increases resulting from changes in the posted price 
from the agreement in Geneva. From this time on, buyback prices were 
set by the average sale of third party customers. Before the agreement 
could be signed Yamani left the country, and in the interim the October 
war in Israel started and the rapid moving events of oil were thrown in-
to chaos. 
While the Libyan leapfrog had taught OPEC members to play against 
one another effectively in dealing with the oil companies, the organiza-
tion still lacked any single un·ified motivation. What advantages the 
OPEC members had gained before the Israeli War of 1973, could probably 
have been acquired without any formal organization. They had been func-
tioning in much the same way as the world oligopoly members had been 
operating for years without any formal unification. 
The Israeli War presented a temporary unifying factor. Each leader 
was safe in assuming that his people would favor action against Israel 
based on historical enmity. Each leader also knew that increased oil 
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revenues meant rapid development and was therefore the key to obtaining 
all the other objectives of his particular government. By using Western 
support of Israel as an excuse to evaporate the existing surplus and 
raise prices, the Middle East leaders of OPEC stood only to gain in the 
short-term. 
Without deliberating in any great detail over the long-term ef-
fects, and without much anticipation of success, the boycott was called. 
It was immediately successful beyond OPEC's wildest imaginations: The 
price of oil quintupled and although Israel was effected only superfi-
cially, propaganda gains were sufficient to satisfy the domestic goals 
of the OPEC leaders. As the boycott faded from view, so did the war-
like emergency cooperation between OPEC members. 
In effect then, struggle over sovereignty was a key issue in the 
Middle East between home governments, host governments and MNCs. Iran 
in the 1950s illustrates the international application of principles es-
tablished on a municipal level in Texas in the 1930s. Iran, like the 
independents in Texas, wanted more upliftings; whereas, the majors pre-
ferred not to rely so heavily on anyone source. After nationalization, 
Bri tish Petroleum declared Iranian oil "hot" and applied that concept on 
a global basis. The effectiveness of the boycott was due. primarily to 
voluntary cooperation on the part of the majors. The independents, on 
the other hand, were viewed by the majors as a disruptive force until 
they could be neutralized by appeasement. The use of clandestine activ-
ities to affect favorable results, while following the example set in 
the East Texas oil fields, would never again be so blatant as was the 
CIA action in Iran. 
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The changing relationships in the Middle East reflect the general 
alterations in the international legal regime. With the decline of 
Britain's military strength at the close of World War II, her political 
strength was also diminished which therefore effected BP's long-standing 
association with Iran. The American Government's involvement illus-
trates her management of her new role as the world's policeman with her 
traditionally strong protectionist attitude toward her oil companies op-
erating abroad. 
Refusal by the Seven Sisters to sell oil directly to the American 
and British fleets during the 1973 Middle Eastern Crisis, in effect, 
marked a shift in policy promoting company interest above patriotism on 
the list of company priorities. This action shocked the Americans into 
convening the famous MNC Congressional Hearings, investigating the com-
panies' improprieties and reviewing the threat of nationalization. 
Britain's position with BP was even more paradoxical because of her par-
tial ownership. Heath used the threat of a government veto but to no 
~ail. 
BP's relationship with the American companies survived the competi-
tive struggle and reinforced her allignment with her Sisters in order to 
minimize the independents' involvement in the Middle East. Since 1973 
these major companies have illustrated near-sovereignty in their global 
actions. 
As we have seen, Qadaffi created a new model in his concession 
agreements which favored independents •. He utilized the divide-and-
conquer methods of the oil companies to his own advantage in regulating 
the development of his own fields, irrespective of global supply imbal-
ances. His leapfrog concept was essentially applied in order to exact 
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unprecedented prices; however, in so doing, previously uneconomical 
sources of crude became viable. Sanctity of contract, good faith, etc., 
were interpreted differently in the Middle East than in the West, negat-
ing any long-term security of supply and price stability. Therefore, 
the U.K. and U.S. Governments, spurred by the Arab boycott into encour-
aging development of their own indigenous oil in the North Sea and 
Alaska, respectively, have strengthened the hands of the oil companies 
by diminishing their dependence on Middle East crude. 
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CHAPTER 9 
ALASKA: THE AMERICAN LEGAL REGIME 
In any mature legal system, the law of property 
counts among the most technical branches of the law. 
It needs the change of but one word, and a more for-
midable subject emerges: law and property. Now, we 
no longer think of the writers-oI standard textbooks 
on personal or real property, but of revolutionaries 
in the field of property relations: William the 
Conqueror, Henry VIII, Pizarro, Cortez, Lenin, 
Stalin, Mao Tse-tung and, perhaps, even tragicomic 
figures such as Hitler, Musaddiq and Sukarno. 
Behind the technicalities of the more sophisticated 
systems of property law lie, shrewdly hidden, the 
fundamental political, social and economic decisions 
on which these legal rules are based. Once they are 
laid bare, we have uncovered one of the deepest 
roots of this law. It then becomes easier to under-
stand why a subject that, on the surface, is merely 
technical is inextricably bound up with the most 
crucial decisions any social group has to make. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
This [community of interest] has been facilitated by the high-
ly developed technical and diplomatic capabilities which these 
companies have frequently and effectively exercised en bloc in 
sophisticated high-level dealings with the governments of the 
world. 
David I. Haberman 
The synergistic relationship between the American legal regime and 
the petroleum industry has evolved with its recurring pattern of oligop-
oly, cooperation, and continuity affecting the development of petroleum 
law. This pattern has been traced through the establishment of Rocke-
feller's model of monopoly, the ambivalence toward antitrust enforce-
ment, the effectiveness of government-industry cooperation during World 
War I, participation in the quasi-diplomatic activities of the 1920s, 
the advent of the Texas Railroad Commission during the trauma of the 
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Great Depression, and as a result of World War II, the emergence of 
America as the pre-eminent world power. 
After the post-war era which lessened BP's prior predominance in 
the Middle East, she began looking for alternative sources of secure oil 
supplies. America became a likely choice of location for investment for 
three reasons: (1) As her Sisters had already demonstrated, companies 
operating in America were somewhat pr-otected by government import quotas 
from European price-cutting created by forced increases in Middle 
Eastern oil production; (2) Alaska was believed to have the largest un-
developed oil reserves in the world; and (3) the United States Govern-
ment was the least likely of host governments to nationalize her oil in-
dustry. Disadvantages of investing in America included: (1) entering a 
highly developed competitive system on a grassroots level; (2) incurring 
the extremely high cost of extracting Alaskan crude; and (3) dealing 
with the sophisticated and technical municipal system of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. 
Petroleum exploration on the Arctic Slope of Alaska began in 
the early 1900s after oil seeps were discovered near Cape 
Simpson, east of Barrow. Early exploration work by the U.S. 
Geological Survey confirmed the petroleum potential of the 
area and led to the establishment of the 23-million acre Naval 
Petroleum Reserve No.4 (NPR-4) by -order of President Harding 
in 1923 
Between 1944 and 1953, the U.S. Navy spent about $60 million 
in exploration work in [NPR-4] drilling a total of eighty 
wells. One small oil field and two small gas fields were 
found during this period of exploration. Only two of the 
wells drilled in NPR-4, however, reached the stratigraphic 
equivalent of the main reservoir at Prudhoe Bay.1 
Having evaluated the factors, BP decided the advantages -- although 
they would incur short-term losses would eventually out-weigh the 
disadvantages. Thus when the opportunity arose to enter the U.S. market 
through Sinclair in 1958, BP jumped at the chance despite the fact that 
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a mere thousand, generally run-down Northeastern service stations could 
hardly satisfy BP's need for a major outlet for her Middle-East crude 
surplusses. 2 In fact when the U.S. Government shortly thereafter sud-
denly reimposed a mandatory imports policy, BP's justification for her 
Sinclair association would have seemed negligible had it not been for 
the continuing exploration agreements in Alaska. 3 
Early in this association -- still 1958 -- a team of BP geophysi-
cists, utilizing specially developed cold-weather seismic techniques, 
underwent preliminary exploration in Alaska and their report of February 
1959 stated that the sedimentary basins on the Arctic Slope were larger 
than the company's entire Iranian concessions, containing a wealth of 
drillable anticlines on the Iranian scale with lengths of up to 20 
miles. 4 These techniques were later to win BP the coveted European en-
gineering prize -- the MacRobert Award. 
On the basis of this feasibility report, along with its modest ex-
penditure estimate, BP proceeded to acquire leases, or options to lease, 
for 150,000 acres around the North Slope. Most other oil companies, 
while acquiring a few protective land holdings in the North, concen-
trated their prospecting activities in the South, and merely watched 
with interest as BP and Sinclair began drilling dry hole after dry hole 
in the remote, inaccessible and climatically hostile North. Their in-
terest may have turned to amusement as BP arranged in 1963 to have a 
drilling rig floated 2000 miles down the Mackenzie River from Canada to 
the North Slope. 5 
Thus, when Alaska held its first lease of lands near the mouth of 
the Colville River on the North Slope in 1964, BP and Sinclair secured 
317,934 acres -- almost all the acreage covering the delta area. 
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Sinclair dropped out of further bidding since subsequent drilling had 
still been unproductive so that in 1965, BP's acquisition of thirty-five 
additional blocks in the Prudhoe Bay area was without Sinclair. In 
cooperation with Union Oil of California she began drilling again in the 
Colville Delta -- again unsuccessfully. By 1967 BP decided to sit on 
her acreage (including six off-shore blocks acquired that year) until 
further exploration by the ARCO-Exxon partnership on adjacent land had 
been completed. 
In February 1968 ARCO hit the largest deposit ever found in the 
U.S. (and a hundred times that of any other Alaskan deposit) as she was 
completing exploration in the Prudhoe Bay State No. 1. 6 BP resumed 
drilling immediately and on 20 November 1968 finally struck oil -- just 
three miles from ARCO's original discovery well. Drilling continued 
throughout the winter and by March 1969 BP announced that she had dis-
covered oil in the porous sandstone below 8,000 feet. Due to her stub-
born acquisition of leases over the last ten years, she held claim to 
about half of the entire Prudhoe Bay field. 7 
BP now desperately needed management and marketing outlets in the 
U.S. Not having the time nor the expertise to build up a grass-roots 
marketing organization, she opted for a compatible partnership·with some 
existing company already proficient in marketing and management prac-
tices. 
Meanwhile Sinclair, avoiding a take-over bid by Gulf and Western, 
chose to go in with ARCO, which meant divesting herself of certain prop-
erties in compliance with antitrust restrictions. 8 BP Oil Corp. was 
quickly set up in New York and an agreement was struck whereby BP Oil 
Corp. would buy Sinclair's marketing assets in eleven eastern states and 
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the District of Columbia, the Atlantic-Richfield refinery at Port 
Arthur, Texas, the Sinclair refinery at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, and 
interests in the Colonial Pipeline and other systems -- all for about 
$400 million. 9 
Although the Sinclair acquisition established a marketing presence, 
it failed to meet all of BP's objectives: She was still in the market 
for a suitable partner. In the Spring of 1969, therefore, she began 
amalgamation discussions with Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO) even before 
the Sinclair deal was completed, and entered into a consent decree with 
the Ohio company in March 1969. 
SOHIO was incorporated in Ohio on 10 January 1870; prior to Decem-
ber 1911 the company was a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey which subsequently distributed the stock to its own shareholders 
in accordance with U.S. Supreme Court dissolution decree. Their Chair-
man of the Board Charlie Spahr described the more recent history of his 
company before the MNC Hearings in 1973 as follows: 
••• we were a regional refiner-marketer with domestic produc-
tion amounting to 16% of our refinery runs. By the early 
1960s we had made some fundamental decisions. We would seek 
to acquire petroleum reserves by acquisition since our finding 
efforts were not too successful; we would expand our marketing 
into states surrounding Ohio; we would expand our chemical 
activities, acquire a fabricated plastics business and enter 
the vending, motor inn and restaurant business. As the 
figures show, we were successful in the petroleum business in 
the environment that existed in the second half of the 1960s. 
There were ample supplies of low cost crude oil and the prod-
uct price wars of the early 1960s were ending. Our non-
petroleum investments slipped into a loss position as we 
broadened our investments and the agricultural chemicals began 
to run into problems. 
By the mid-1960s we recognized that our program of acquiring 
oil reserves was not progressing as fast as the oncoming crude 
oil shortage. We attempted mergers with several companies who 
owned large oil reserves but we were not successful. We ac-
quired oil shale properties and have done developmental re-
search in oil shale which is continuing. We identified the 
246 
potential for coal at a time when many investors thought coal 
would have no future due to its environmental problems and the 
anticipated conversion of electric generation to nuclear fuel, 
and in 1968 we acquired Old Ben Coal Company. Old Ben is a 
profitable operation. It has expanded its production 15% 
since we acquired it and it has a new mine under development. 
Old Ben's capital investments have equalled its cash genera-
tion since we acquired it. 
With the crude oil shortage clearly in sight, we were anxious 
to acquire a major source of crude. When the North Slope of 
Alaska reserves were discovered we sought ways to participate. 
When The British Petroleum Company Limited approached us in 
late 1968 regarding a possible merger, we were receptive. 10 
Again before MNC Hearings, Spahr further explains his company's 
motivation for the BP merger: 
We have tried every way that we could to increase production. 
We have tried to change our exploratory program. We tried to 
arrange for mergers, absorbing companies that might like to 
exchange stock on a tax-free basis, particularly if the heads 
of those companies were getting older and they were privately 
held. 11 
When the opportunity to acquire British Petroleum's interest 
in the newly discovered reserves in Prudhoe Bay on the North 
Slope of Alaska presented itself, we seized it believing that 
it offered a never to be paralleled chance to cover our future 
requirements for raw material for a substantial period of 
time. 12 
Any history of SOHIO is incomplete without mention of the 
contribution of Charles Spahr. 
[He] ••• grew up in Missouri, where his father was a stillman 
a t a ref inery, and had long harbored ambitions of being a 
builder. Young Charlie Spahr put himself through the Univer-
sity of Kansas, earning a degree in civil engineering and went 
on to Harvard Business School -- until his money ran out dur-
ing the Depression. For a while it seemed as if his biggest 
job of building would be overseeing construction of a fuel 
pipeline in India during World War II. Soon afterward he 
headed back to SOHIO, where he had been an engineer before the 
war. A prodigious worker, Spahr rose rapidly, and in 1959 
when he was just forty-five -- he became chief executive. It 
is fair to say, as one vice president does, that "for the past 
eighteen years, Charlie Spahr has dominated this company. 
Informal but strong willed, Spahr quickly proved himself a 
decisive executive. For decades, SOHIO had consistently made 
money in refining and marketing when others hadn't, mostly by 
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concentrating its retail outlets in Ohio and supplying them 
through a pipeline distribution system that cut down on truck-
ing costs. But the company's return on investment was running 
a slim 8.1 percent when Spahr took over; he thought that he 
could do better than that through diversification. Soon he 
ventured into plastics, acquired Old Ben Coal Co., and built 
chains of motor inns and restaurants. By the late sixties, 
the refining and marketing operation, which still contributed 
some three-quarters of SORIO's revenues, had improved and the 
new businesses were paying off. The total return on invest-
ment climbed to a handsome 12.5 percent. 
But as time went on, Spahr became increasingly worried about 
SORIO's supply of crude. The company purchased three-quarters 
of the crude it refined and with overall domestic reserves 
showing signs of decline, he figured that less would be avail-
able on the open market. Unless SORIO could buy or find its 
own reserves, it might fall victim to a takeover. 
Spahr was fully aware of that possibility, and determined to 
make the best of it. "Through diversification," he says, "we 
had become more attractive to someone who might want to ac-
quire us and pay a substantial premium, which would enhance 
our stockholders' investment." To have a job title to give 
away to an acquiring company, he left the position of chairman 
unfilled throughout the Sixties. 13 
BP's 1969 consent decree with SORIO was challenged by the U.S. 
Justice Department on antitrust grounds and not allowed to go through 
until 1 January 1970 with certain divestiture requirements in compliance 
with antitrust regulations. BP now had her marketing organization and 
SORIO had crude sources, and together they set out to develop their 
Alaskan holdings. 
On 1 January 1970 Standard Oil of Ohio acquired all outstanding 
capital stock of British Petroleum (Roldings) Inc. in exchange for 1,000 
shares of SORIO special stock which were received by British Petroleum 
(Overzee) N.V., a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Petroleum Co. Ltd •• 
These 1,000 shares of SORIO special stock were equivalent to a 25 per-
cent common interest in the company. Rer percentage ownership of SORIO 
was to reach approximately 54 percent by the time 600,000 barrels a day 
were produced by SORIO from the Prudhoe Bay leases acquired by SORIO in 
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the deal, prior to 1 January 1978 (this date was amended in 1973 to 
extend the deadline until 1984, due to delays in building TAPS). 
British Petroleum would retain 75 percent net profit interest in 
production from Prudhoe Bay in excess of 600,000 barrels a day. Each 
share of special stock had rights equivalent to those of a holder of 
8,932 shares of common stock, except that until 1 January 1975 such spe-
cial stock was not entitled to dividends. After that date if a dividend 
was declared on the common stock, a dividend would also be declared on 
the special stock in an amount commensurate with the number of shares of 
common stock to which the special stock was then equivalent. The number 
of common shares to which each special stock would be equivalent was 
based on achievement of sustainable net production from the Prudhoe Bay 
properties, at any time prior to 1 January 1984 (the amended deadline), 
as follows: 
Rate of Sustained Shares of Common Stock 
Net Production to which each share 
(bid) of special stock is 
equivalent 
200,000 13,806 
250,000 15,740 
300,000 17,866 
350,000 20,218 
400,000 22,830 
450,000 27,894 
500,000 29,034 
550,000 30,222 
600,000 31,460 
Special stock included provisions restricting, among other things, 
changes in its terms, disposition of the Prudhoe Bay or other proper-
ties, mergers, and issuance of senior shares. It also placed limita-
tions on cash dividends and other capital stock transactions, and con-
tained antidilution provisions. Production of 600,000 barrels a day was 
reached by July 1977. 14 
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No sooner had BP overcome one of the disadvantages of investing in 
America -- that of entering a highly developed competitive system on a 
grass-roots level -- by combining forces with the established integrated 
firm of SORIO, than she encountered the U.S. Government municipal sys-
tern. BP's acquisition of Sinclair's previous holdings only hurt SORIO's 
overall plans; she inherited two refineries which she didn't need at the 
time, and was forced to rid herself of quite a few service stations in 
Ohio. 
When Spahr took over BP's Sinclair properties, the Justice De-
partment forced SORIO to divest itself of about a thousand 
service stations in Ohio within four years, to encourage com-
petition. But after the embargo, the federal government in-
stituted an allocation program for petroleum products, guaran-
teeing each existing station only as much product as it has 
been selling during a base period in 1972. Prospective buyers 
of the SORIO stations were interested only if they could in-
crease volume -- and in this case, they had no assurance of 
getting more product. Spahr practically had to give the sta-
tions away. Making matters worse, the divestiture requirement 
meant that SORIO would lose market share, just when Spahr was 
eager to beef up sales by switching to high-volume stations. 
Yet another restriction, limiting the amount of higher crude-
oil costs that companies could pass through, sent SORIO's 
profits from petroleum products into a nose dive. Though that 
business still contributed more than four-fifths of the compa-
ny's overall revenues in 1974, it produced only 18 percent of 
pretax profits (down from 75 percent in 1970). After taxes 
and interest, it was in the red. 15 
On May 12, 1970, [SORIO] announced that a subsidiary, BP Oil 
Corp., had asked the Federal Court at Cleveland for a declara-
tory judgment cutting [the] price paid for properties pur-
chased from Sinclair Oil Corp. by about $36 1000,000. 
BP Oil, then a subsidiary of British Petroleum, Ltd., agreed' 
last year to buy the properties for about $400,000,000 from 
Atlantic Richfield Co. [The] purchase price was [to be] sub-
ject to audit and certain other conditions. SORIO acquired BP 
Oil in a merger and has assumed obligations of that [company]. 
"The audi t has been comple ted," SORIO said, "but there remain 
differences of opinion on certain items." 
A spokesman for Atlantic Richfield said the [company] had been 
holding some discussions with SORIO about [the] price to be 
paid for Sinclair and Atlantic Richfield properties acquired 
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by BP Oil. However, he said, the [company] had not received a 
copy of the BP Oil court action and could not comment on it at 
this time. 
[The] largest single disagreement is SOHIO's contention that 
[the] purchase price should be reduced because [the] number of 
service stations owned or leased by Sinclair was far fewer 
than [that] provided in [the] purchase agreement, which called 
for 814 Sinclair-owned stations or stations where the [compa-
ny] owned improvements on property, 2,037 stations with ini-
tial leases of at least 10 years and 1,550 stations with one-
year leases. [The] purchase price was to be reduced by 
$100,000 for each owned station less than [the] number speci-
fied, by $50,000 for each 10-year lease station short of [the] 
agreement and by $10,000 for each one-year lease station under 
the specified number. 
An audit showed there were only 782 owned stations, 1,561 sta-
tions with leases of 10 years or more and 613 stations with 
one-year leases, according to [the] suit. Atlantic Richfield 
contends there was a "mutual mistake of fact resulting from a 
misunderstanding of Sinclair Oil Corp. records before [the] 
agreement to sell the properties," the sui t said. It also 
said Atlantic Richfield asserts that any reduction in purchase 
price resulting from shortages in service stations so trans-
ferred do not exceed $15,100,000. 16 
No one could have foreseen the magnitude of the project at hand --
that of marketing Alaskan crude. While exploration and production costs 
have outranked transportation costs, the sheer jump in the latter, due 
primarily to the complexities involved in building the Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline System (TAPS), warrants a close examination. Prior to 1974 
capital expenditures for pieplines in the U.S. had never exceeded $550 
million in a single year. In 1975 capital expenditures for pipelines in 
the U.S. was $3,500 million; in 1976 this figure rose to $3,625 million. 
The extraordinary high levels of spending have been due to the huge cost 
of constructing TAPS.17 
The building of TAPS would escalate the original $900 million ex-
penditure estimate to a completion bill of well over $14 billion. The 
preliminary cost estimate for construction to initial capacity of 
600,000 barrels a day was $900 million. This budgetary figure was based 
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on general information available at the time. By March 1970 Alyeska re-
ported that TAPS would cost $1.3 billion. Preliminary estimates revised 
in March 1971 indicated that the requirements set out in the initial 
draft of the environmental schedule and technical stipulations would in-
crease the cost to $2.2 billion. The March 1972 estimate included ex-
pansion of the line to a 1.2 million barrels a day capacity at an esti-
mated cost of $2.45 billion. This figure had risen to $2.86 billion by 
March 1973. 
The October 1974 estimate which placed the figure at $5.982 billion 
was due -- according to Alyeska press releases and material provided by 
SORIO -- to three major factors: (1) increased costs of materials; (2) 
increased costs of labor; and (3) more sophisticated design and engi-
neering. By June 1975 the forecast cost of TAPS reached $6.375 billion. 
Increases in the estimate resulted from construction experience, im-
proved definition of construction and support requirements, and compres-
sion of the construction schedule to meet the 1977 startup date. 
The June 1976 forecast figure of $7.7 billion reflected the effects 
of lower productivity, additional materials and associated freight and 
transportation, and additional construction equipment. Anticipated re-
inspection or repair costs for resolution of the welding and x-ray prob-
lems were included; however, as the GAO notes, none of the documents re-
viewed by them (primarily Alyeska press releases and material from 
SORIO) ascribed a specific part of the expected total cost to negli-
gence, mis-management, illegal, or improper activities. 
David P. Goodman, managing director of Morgan Stanley and Co., 
Inc., investment bankers to SORIO, Exxon, Mobil, and BP, also a member 
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of the Energy Financial Advisory Committee to the Federal Energy Admini-
stration, made the following statement on 21 March 1977: 
The companies which own the Prudhoe Bay reserves will likely 
spend $14 to $15 billion to develop the 9.6 billion barrels of 
oil reserves and transportation facilities needed to bring the 
oil to market. Expenditures of similar magnitude will be re-
quired to bring Prudhoe Bay gas reserves to market. Probably 
in excess of $9 billion of financing for the oil project has 
been arranged since the Pipeline Right of Way Act was passed 
in January 1974 •••• 19 
The $9 billion figure is greater than the assets of all but three of 
TAPS eight owners. 20 
No less than 70,000 people from allover the world would work on 
the pipeline, creating managerial and technical problems never before 
tackled. However, it would be the legislative process which would turn 
the largest modern-day industrial enterprise ever attempted into a 
nightmare. 
Experts would be recruited in the thousands. Engineers from all 
manner of disciplines would construct a 4B-inch diameter pipeline across 
a wilderness (much of which was permanently frozen), across three moun-
tain ranges and at least BOO rivers and streams. Experts in weather 
patterns would be required since temperatures dropped to -75 degrees 
Fareinheit; experts in natural science, ecology, and the environment 
would contribute so that everything could be built to withstand 90-pound 
snow loads, 90-mile-an-hour winds, and earthquakes registering B.5 on 
the Richter scale. More than BOO animal crossings would be built to 
allow caribou and moose migrations across Alaska. 
Some of the abandoned ideas would include ice-breaking oil carriers 
and submarine tankers. Creating a tanker harbor by means of a nuclear 
explosion would also be suggested, as would oil-carrying airships and 
tractor trains carrying oil in drums through an BOO mile subway tube. 
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At one point aluminum-foil containers to be floated through the line 
would be considered, as well as air-propelled canisters. But perhaps 
the most novel idea would be the use of trained sea-gulls to detect 
leaks. 
Certain illegalities would arise as in the case of "the falsified 
welding x-rays which included the mysterious death by syanide of the 
engineer in charge. 21 
In selecting TAPS as a viable option, the companies involved first 
identified probable markets: at that time it was expected that all the 
Alaskan oil could be consumed on the West Coast, although the Midwest 
and Northeast also desperately needed supplies. This assumption still 
appeared valid when Congress was debating the TAPS Authorization Act in 
1973. 22 
However, after the Middle East Oil Crisis two changes affected this 
evaluation: (1) Japan became considered by the oil companies as an 
important possible market (although this would incur negative public 
opinion as well as legislation); and (2) with changes in consumption 
patterns it became evident that there would be a surplus of oil on the 
West Coast (opinions and forecasts differ as to the estimated duration 
of this glut). 
Thus, after the Crisis the oil companies put forward a plan to 
sell Alaskan crude to Japan, displacing her allotted supply of Middle 
Eastern crude directly to the Northeastern United States. The TAPS 
Authorization Act, however, requires that "before any crude oil ••• may 
be exported •.• the President must make and publish an express finding 
that such exports will not diminish the total quantity or quality of 
petroleum available to the U.S." 
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The Act also provides for congressional veto power over a 
President's decision to export any oil. There has been some 
discussion in recent newspaper and trade journal articles re-
garding exchanges with Japan, but it has been limited to dis-
cussion because of the problems foreseen in getting approval 
from the President and the Congress. An exchange with Japan 
would involve shipping Alaskan oil southwest to Tokyo, Japan. 
An equivalent amount of Persian Gulf oil, originally intended 
for Japan, would be shipped around Africa and into the U.S. 
gulf or east coast. Standard Oil Company of California offi-
cials have stated that in the shortrun, exchanges with Japan 
probably would be the most efficient and least costly means of 
moving Prudhoe Bay oil to market. 
A more likely possibility, according to a recent trade journal 
article, is that of short-term exchanges involving Canada 
(permitted by the TAPS Authorization Act). Some congressional 
leaders, who are opposed to exports to Japan, have urged the 
Federal Energy Administration to arrange for such an exchange 
with Canada. The problems with any direct exchange, according 
to the article, are that western Canada refineries are 
equipped to process only low-sulfur crude, not North Slope 
high-sulfur crude, and tankering Prudhoe Bay oil around Cape 
Horn to eastern Canada refineries which do process high-sulfur 
crude would be costly. 
Another option that has been discussed in a recent trade 
journal would involve a three-way trade involving both Canada 
and Japan. Under such a system, Canada would deliver oil to 
the U.S. northern tier and Puget Sound; an equal amount of 
Prudhoe Bay oil would go to Japan; and an equal amount of 
Middle East oil, otherwise destined for Japan, would go to 
eastern Canada. However, this option would require specific 
Presidential and congressional approvel. 23 
Having identified the market, various transportation alternatives 
were considered, and by process of elimination were narrowed to the 
following. 
The most obvious was an alternative to TAPS -- a Trans-Canadian 
pipeline directly connecting the North Slope with the Midwest. While 
this would appear at first glance to be an appropriate choice, further 
study indicated that completion of such a pipeline would take nine or 
ten years. 
The nine to ten year estimate for completion of a Trans-Canadian 
pipeline is based upon the following (From GAO Alaskan Markets Report, 
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pp. 6-7): 
(1) Ownership and operating agreements must be negotiated and a 
corporate entity must be formed to undertake all the responsibilities 
associated with financing, designing and constructing a project of this 
magnitude. 
(2) The Canadian Native Claims issue must be resolved and negotia-
tions might take several years. The fact that the proper mechanism for 
settlement is unclear would add to, rather than shorten, the time re-
q~r~. 
(3) The detailed route analysis through Canada to determine the 
most desirable location and appropriate mode of construction would take 
at least as much time, and probably more, than was spent on TAPS because 
the Canadian route is approximately four times longer. Since Alyeska 
will have taken three years to complete its route analysis and its mile-
by-mile design, a longer period of time will be required to write the 
revised project description, prepare and review the environmental impact 
statement for the new route through Alaska to the Canadian border, hold 
public hearings, solicit the views of the various U.S. federal agencies 
and secure U.S. and Canadian permits for the Trans-Canadian system. 
This time period would, of course, run concurrently with the Canadian 
Native Claims negotiations. 
(4) TAPS construction plans, barring major interruptions, call for 
three years from start to commissioning. It is inconceivable that a 
line four times as long and travelling through twice th~ length of dif-
ficult construction terrain could be built in the same time, particular-
ly when there is a shortage of massive equipment to outfit more than a 
few construction spreads. The best estimate available indicates more 
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clearly five to six years would be required for constructing the Trans-
Canadian alternative. This time period would not run concurrently with 
the above since all permits, native claims settlements, labor agre,ements 
and other issues would have to be identified, understood and settled be-
fore such a massive undertaking could be started. 
The total of nine to ten years required to accomplish route analy-
sis, design and construction of the Trans-Canadian line does not envi-
sion any prolonged delay for either Canadian or United States govern-
mental actions or approvals. Nevertheless, it would be understandable 
if the Canadian federal and provincial governments wanted the same op-
portunity that the United States Government had, to carefully review 
proposals, to consider alternatives, and to determine appropriate stipu-
lations. Negotiations between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on 
energy-related matters of mutual concern that could be triggered by con-
sideration of a Trans-Canadian line would delay the start of production 
from Prudhoe Bay beyond the nine to ten years referred to above. 
The prolonged delay in production of North Slope crude oil, which 
would be the inevitable result of a decision to build a pipeline through 
Canada, would have the following undesirable effects: 
(1) North Slope crude oil will displace imported foreign crude re-
gardless of whether it moves to the West Coast or the Midwest. A delay 
in production will, in turn, delay the reduction of our dependence upon 
imported oil. While the North Slope will not eliminate our need for oil 
imports, it is an important means of reducing them by a significant 
amount. 
(2) North Slope gas deliveries will be delayed until after produc-
tion of North Slope crude begins because: (a) Conservation practices 
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prohibit production of gas prior to production of oil (Gas will be pro-
duced in a manner that will maintain sufficient reservoir pressures to 
insure maximum recovery of oil); (b) Physical restrictions due to lim-
ited availability of the massive construction equipment, qualified pipe-
line contractors, skilled workers and governmental inspectors will make 
it practically impossible to begin construction of the gas pipeline 
prior to completion of the oil pipeline without significantly extending 
the time required for construction of both lines. 
The remaining alternatives to TAPS would each employ a Trans-
Alask~n pipeline to Valdez and then branch out in different directions; 
however, it should be noted that a Trans-Alaskan pipeline would not pre-
clude a Trans-Canadian pipeline for the second leg of the journey. 
The trans-provincial pipeline proposal calls for constructing a new 
port at Kitimat, British Columbia, and constructing a new 30-inch, 780-
mile pipeline extending from Kitimat to Edmonton, Alberta. The pipeline 
would transport some Canadian as well as Alaskan oil. At Edmonton, the 
new pipeline would connect with existing lines and would serve about a 
dozen refineries in Washington, Montana, Minnesota, and North Dakota 
that currently depend on Canadian oil. The sponsors, which are refiners 
in the northern tier plus two major Canadian pipeline companies, claim 
the pipeline could be initially operational with a capacity of 300,000 
barrels a day within 16 to 22 months after receipt of permits to start 
construction. The sponsors estimate that the eventual capacity of the 
pipeline could be 600,000 barrels a day, of which 420,000 barrels a day 
could be Alaskan oil. The sponsors estimate that the line will cost 
$418 million and capacity will be achieved 2 years after startup. 
258 
A Federal Energy Administration official stated that this line 
could be built faster than some of the other proposed lines because it 
has few environmental problems and would require fewer permits. How-
ever, according to the Federal Energy Administration official, the 
northern tier refineries are not currently equipped to process oil with 
the high sulphur content of Alaskan oil.24 
Two Trans-American pipelines were suggested: the northern tier and 
the mid-continent pipelines, the latter of which was proposed by SOHIO 
with the backing of other major companies. 
The northern tier pipeline proposal calls for construction of a new 
40/42-inch, l,sOO-mile pipeline from Port Angeles, Washington, to Clear-
brook, Minnesota. At this point, it would connect to the Minnesota 
pipeline and the Lakehead pipeline. This line would serve basically the 
same region as the trans-provincial pipeline. The sponsors, which are 
two railroads, three consulting firms, and two small oil companies, 
claim the pipeline system could be initially operational, with a capaci-
ty ~f 600,000 barrels a day, 24 months after receipt of permits to start 
construction. The eventual capacity could be 800,000 barrels to 1.2 
million barrels a day, of which 600,000 barrels a day could be Alaskan 
oil. The sponsors estimate that the line will cost about $868 million. 
A problem with this proposal, according to a Federal Energy Admini-
stration official, is that 1,500 miles of new pipeline would have to be 
constructed which would require many government permits. Also, citizens 
of Port Angeles, Washington, voted against construction of a proposed 
Port Angeles tanker port that would have to be built as part of the 
project. City officials said they would abide by the vote in future 
dealings with northern tier officials. 
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Another problem is a recently enacted Washington State law which 
limits the size of tankers entering Puget Sound to 125,000 deadweight 
tons. This law also mandates that a tug escort all tankers larger than 
40,000 deadweight tons through the Sound. Although ARCO has successful-
ly challenged the constitutionality of the law in Seattle Federal dis-
trict court, the state government intends to continue to enforce the law 
and appeal the court's decision. 25 
The SORIO mid-continent pipeline proposal calls for a 100-mile 
pipeline system extending from Long Beach, California, to Midland, 
Texas. This proposal involves reversing the flow in an existing 800-
mile natural gas pipeline and converting it to an oil carrier, which ac-
cording to SORIO is a relatively simple and inexpensive operation. This 
would be connected to about 200 miles of new pipeline. At Midland 
[Texas] the system would connect with existing oil lines which serve the 
Midwest. SORIO stated that initial capacity will be 500,000 barrels a 
day, with potential for expansion up to 1 million barrels a day. SORIO 
believes that the pipeline would be able to handle most, if not all of 
the surplus Alaskan oil and estimates that it would be completed 12 to 
14 months after receiving permits to start construction. SORIO esti-
mated the cost of this system at $500 million. 
The California Air Resources Board has expressed concern about this 
proposal because it contends that the emissions resulting from the un-
loading of oil tankers in Long Beach harbor and escaping from the stor-
age tanks would violate state and federal air-quality standards. SORIO 
has stated that it is willing to guarantee an equivalent reduction in 
emission by paying for pollution controls at other companies' plants in 
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the Long Beach area. In this way, SORIO said, there would be no overall 
deterioration of air quality.26 
Although SORIO has received rights of way for her proposal (Dallas 
Morning News, 26 July 1978), she has now cancelled the PACTEX line in a 
~ramatic objection to government bureaucracy.27 
A short term solution would be to ship tankers from Valdez, through 
the Panama Canal, to the Gulf or Eastern Coasts. 
Since the canal is only capable of handling tankers of 58,000 to 
60,000 deadweight tons (d,vt), the following three methods have been 
proposed to move Alaskan oil through the canal: 
(1) Transport the oil on small (60,000 dwt) tankers, fully loaded, 
for the entire route. 
(2) Use medium-size tankers (60,000 to 90,000 dwt) from Valdez to 
the canal's Pacific side. Both would then transit the canal to the Gulf 
Coast. 
(3) Use large tankers (greater than 100,000 dwt) from Valdez to the 
canal's Pacific side and off-load to smaller vessels for the final leg 
through the canal to the Gulf Coast. 
SORIO estimated that the marine transportation cost for a Panama 
route will range from $2.10 to $2.55 a barrel regardless of which method 
may be used. This cost is $1.50 to $1.75 a barrel more than the marine 
transportation cost from Valdez to California markets, which SORIO esti-
mates would range from $0.60 to $0.80 a barrel. Standard Oil Company of 
California estimated that the marine transportation cost for the Panama 
Canal route would be $2.72 a barrel. A recent trade journal article 
stated that the higher transportation cost of this proposal might be 
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absorbed by the producers to make the oil competitive with foreign oil 
delivered to the Gulf Coast. 28 
After careful consideration, then, those companies with the largest 
stake in Alaska (See Figure 2) decided to develop TAPS as a fi~st step 
in transporting their oil to market, leaving their future options open 
as to a long-term selection of a trans-continental pipeline. 29 
FIGURE 2 
ESTIMATED OWNERSHIP OF PRUDHOE BAY FIELD 
Owner Estimated Percent 
Companies Recoverable Reserves Ownership 
(billion barrels) 
SOHIO 5.100 51.0 
ARCO 1. 970 19.7 
Exxon 1. 970 19.7 
Mobil .325 3.3 
Phillips .290 2.9 
Others* .345 3.4 
Total 10.000 100.0 
*Primarily Amerada Hess, Louisiana Land, and Getty. From 
GAO Alaskan Markets Report, Appendix I, p. 3. 
Thus the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company was formed in 1970 as a 
non-profit contracting firm by the permitee companies as their common 
agent for the express purpose of designing, constructing, operating, and 
maintaining TAPS, a 48-inch diameter, 800-mile pipeline with initial 
capacity of 1.2 million barrels a day which can be increased to 2 mil-
lion barrels a day (See Figure 3). 
Once formed, Alyeska began the design stage by compiling a detailed 
feasibility report including an environmental impact statement to be 
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FIGURE 3 
OWNERSHIP OF ALYESKA* 
Companies 
SOHIO Pipeline Co. 
BP Pipeline Co. 
ARCO Pipeline Co. 
Exxon Pipeline Co. 
Mobil Alaska Pipeline Co. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Union Alaska Pipeline Co. 
Amerada Hess Corp. 
Total 
Percentage 
Ownership 
33.34 
15.84 
21.00 
20.00 
5.00 
1.66 
1.66 
1.50 
100.00 
*These owners are either major oil companies or sub-
sidiaries of major oil companies. The assets are 
owned in common; each of the owners is an individ-
ual common carrier and will file for its own tariff 
rate in accordance with state and federal laws and 
regulations covering its share of the capacity in 
TAPS. The owners will each collect their own reve-
nues payable by shippers under such tariffs. In-
formation compiled from Moody, Moody's Transporta-
tion Manual. 
approved ,by the Interior Department, while each member company was ac-
tively arranging for its part of the financing. Obviously, the comple-
tion of each of these two steps is mutually dependent on the other. 
These activities are further hindered by Justice Department investiga-
tions of antitrust violations and environmental interest groups concern 
for strict adherance to the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act and the 1971 
National Environmental Protection Act. 
The companies involved must, therefore, not only set out to system-
atically attack the complex job of planning, financing, and executing 
the pipeline design, they must also anticipate any possible obstructions 
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with workable alternatives. As can be seen by the numerous delays, this 
was not a simple matter. 
The American policy on oil imports was finally defined after many 
years of debate by the 1958 oil tarrif which charged $1 a barrel on im-
ported oil in order to protect domestic producers from the glut of cheap 
Middle Eastern oil. As has already been discussed, BP originally had 
hoped to enter the U.S. market to unload some of her Middle Eastern sur-
plusses. However, this was only the short-term motivation for her de-
sire to enter the American market; her long-term motivation was to enjoy 
the position of security which her American Sisters had already estab-
lished by spreading their investment risks. 
British Petroleum's entry into the U.S. Market in 1969 seems 
to have been motivated by' [several] considerations. Lacking a 
U.S. base, B.P. was at a clear disadvantage vis-a-vis American 
majors, who were well established in both European and Common-
wealth markets. During the Sixties, oil was in oversupply 
throughout Europe, and the u.S. companies cut prices sharply. 
At the same time, the u.S. market was relatively insulated 
from price competition because of our import quotas. By buy-
ing Sinclair Oil, some of ARCO's service stations, and then a 
piece of SOHI06 BP sought to restore a semblance of competi-tive balance. 3 
This decision to enter the U.S. market was based on two well-known 
axiomatic principles of the business: (1) the greater the quantity and 
quality of oil supply sources acquired by a company, the greater her 
position of confidence will be both in her home country and in the 
global sphere; (2) the greater the stability of both the home and host 
governments and the stronger the political friendship between the two, 
the more secure the company's sources of oil supply will be. 
Thus, the 1958 oil tariff, while seemingly spoiling BP's short-term 
motivation for entering the American market, actually strengthened her 
long-term motivation, so that twenty years later, by functioning as a 
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home company through the SORIa merger -- even though BP still remains a 
foreign investor -- the oil tariff serves as a protection for BP's 
extensive investments in America. 
After the drastic price rises of Middle East oil resulting from the 
growing power of OPEC and the 1973 Crisis, justification for the oil 
tariff became invalid. Both the U.S. Government and her oil companies 
were now more concerned with limiting increases in the price of oil. 
With Middle Eastern oil finding a more realistic world price and thus 
insuring profitability for the more expensive production of domestic oil 
-- the $1 a barrel import tariff had lost its meaning, and was duly 
eliminated. 
After assuring her own entry into the American market by securing 
over 50 percent of the Prudhoe Bay reserves, and by combining with vari-
ous established companies -- primarily SORIa and other Alyeska partners 
-- to carry out downstream activities, BP's position on market entry in-
evitably changed in order to protect her newly gained position. It 
should be remembered that including BP's original 25 percent share of 
SORIa, BP's actual share of Alyeska was 24.175 percent initially; how-
ever, after the 600,000 barrels a day production from Prudhoe Bay ful-
filled the conditions of the SaRlO merger and BP's share of the Ohio 
company reached 54 percent, BP's actual share of Alyeska proportionately 
increased to 33.84 percent. 
It was now in her interest to limit market entry of potential com-
petitors and encourage market exit of existing competitors. While the 
Alyeska cooperation was necessary for each member to market her previ-
ously acquired and proven Alaskan reserves, fierce competition remained 
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between the companies as to specific conditions leading to favorable 
advantages. 
Thus the very structure of Alyeska as a condominium pipeline in 
which each member was responsible for the use of the pipeline according 
to her percentage share of Alyeska, meant that those companies outside 
the organization must arrange transportation rights for use of TAPS with 
some Alyeska member before even bidding for leases in Alaska. 
The scheduling of pipeline input is very complex and must be 
worked out in advance of the shipment. Because of this pro-
cess, an independent crude producer may have great difficulty 
in securing a place in the flow, especially if he does not 
have storage tanks at the trunkline station and ships a rela-
tively small amount of crude •••• Furthermore, pipeline own-
ers may employ a variety of harassing or delaying tactics to 
cut off or limit use of their pipeline by independents, in-
cluding irregular shipping dates and limited storage facili-
ties. 31 
In this way BP and SORIO had an active role in limiting potential 
competitors. This practice was not without its restraint of trade com-
plications which were first brought to the Justice Department's atten-
tion in the 1969 litigation between Alyeska members over details of 
their arrangement. 
The litigation itself exemplifies the degree of competition among 
Alyeska members for personal advantages. Exxon was, by all accounts, 
the least cooperative of the Alyeska partners since she could best 
afford to delay the operation of TAPS • 
••• Interior Department officials who had to deal with TAPS 
and the parent companies regularly during this period general-
ly agree that Rumble was the least cooperative of the compa-
nies involved •••• Exxon, with access to plenty of petroleum 
even in 1973, had always felt ambivalent about the pipeline 
and the potential com~etition of a BP-SORIO combination with 
ready domestic crude. 2 
Exxon was especially wary of the formidable new competitive threat 
of BP-SOHIO and was none too anxious to expedi te her progress. "None of 
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the eight owners, except perhaps Exxon, has the financial capability to 
build the line alone. ,,33 
These, then, are a few examples of BP's involvement and motivation 
regarding the issues of market entry and exit. 
The government, for her part, has demons trated her continued" insis-
tence on strict antitrust enforcement in line with her political-
economic program of advancing her macro-economic policy objectives, the 
basis of which is the projected flourishing of the free-enterprise sys-
tem and, thus, competition. However, exceptions to this occur, as has 
been historically proven, whenever some other government policy gains 
temporary predominance. 
Therefore, when the need to implement TAPS was heightened by the 
rise of OPEC, Attorney General John Mitchell pointedly instructed the 
Justice Department to drop its sure antitrust prosecution in August 
1971, saying, "In view of what is going on, this is not the time. ,,34 
With national conventions that same summer, and Mitchell preparing to 
resign as Attorney General in order to head the Committee to Re-elect 
.the President (CREEP), he was fully cognizant of the need for coopera-
tion with the oil companies and of the Watergate implications inherent 
in campaign financing. 
As a company progresses through the various stages of exploring and 
producing, transporting, refining, and marketing, she must deal with the 
various forms of regulation which apply. Generally speaking, the compa-
ny must exhibit the necessary technical expertise in meeting established 
standards before she is granted the various rights needed to proceed. 
She must also demonstrate her financial reliability in meeting these ob-
ligations. 
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In the exploring and producing stage, for example, the company must 
first obtain exploration rights: 
Preliminary studies of surface conditions that may be indica-
tive of potentially oil-bearing or gas-bearing strata are fre-
quently made on public lands, such as the public highways, or 
are made from water and airways. If the preliminary surveys 
indicate the possible existence of petroleum, more intensive 
surveys become necessary or desirable. In order to make these 
intensive surveys, it is often necessary to obtain permission 
to enter property for purposes of conducting geological or 
geophysical surveys from the landowners to enter private or 
public lands. Permission is frequently obtained without cost. 
In some instances such rights are secured by paying the land-
owner a nominal amount for exploration rights, either with or 
without an allowance for crop or other surface damages. Fre-
quently an oil and gas lease is acquired before beginning the 
survey, since such a lease usually grants the right to make 
geological surveys as well as the right to develop the mineral 
deposits, if any are found. An acreage selection clause in 
the lease permits a large area to be surveyed geologically, 
with an option on the part of the lessee to select, within a 
limited period of time, only a portion of the acreage for 
leasing. Under such an arrangement the lessee usually pays a 
relatively small amount for the survey rights and a larger 
amount for the acreage which is ultimately selected. 
Inherent in the ownership of minerals is the right to extract 
them. This right is frequently granted to another person by 
means of an oil and gas lease. Extraction of the mineral is 
then made possible by the drilling, equipping, and operation 
of one or more wells. 
Under the ordinary oil and gas lease, the lessee is given the 
right to enter upon a property, to survey it and locate a well 
site, to perform drilling operations, and to remove any miner-
als found. The lessee is also given, expressly or by implica-
tion, the right to perform all acts necessary and incident to 
this ultimate objective. The term of the lease is most often 
for a specified number of years, called the primary term, and 
for as long thereafter as production is obtained from the 
property. Usually lessee may terminate the lease without 
penalty. 
In consideration of the granting of the lease, the lessee or-
dinarily (1) pays the mineral owner a bonus in cash, which is 
usually equal to a specified amount per acre under lease, (2) 
promises to pay a specified amount per acre in delay rentals, 
usually annually, until production commences or until the 
lessee terminates the lease, and (3) promises to deliver to 
the mineral owner, at no cost to him a fraction of all oil and 
gas produced and saved from the property or, at the lessor's 
option, to pay him the cash value at the wellhead of a 
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fraction of all oil and gas produced and saved from the prop-
erty. The lessor's share of production is known as the land-
owner's royalty or fee royalty, and the interest acquired by 
the lessee is known as the working interest. 
The most commonly accepted fraction of production designated 
as the landowner's royalty in the southwestern United States 
has, through custom, come to be one-eighth. In other parts of 
the United States, one-sixth or one-fifth of the production 
has been specified as the landowner's royalty. The size of 
the fractional interest representing the landowner's royalty 
may depend in part upon the relative bargaining positions of 
the landowner and the prospective lessee. 
It might appear, from the relatively small fraction accruing 
to the landowner's royalty, whether it be one-eighth, one-
sixth or one-fifth, that the landowner is not obtaining an 
equitable share of the production from the part of the devel-
opment or operating costs of the property, all of which are 
borne by the lessee, it becomes apparent that the landowner's 
royalty may be worth as much as, and in some cases more than, 
the lessee's working interest. There is nothing to prevent a 
person who desires to acquire a mineral property from purchas-
ing the entire mineral interest, so that he owns both royalty 
and working interest. However, the financial burdens and 
risks are so great that it is more common to separate these 
two interests, and it often occurs that the owner of the work-
ing interest will induce others to share part of the burdens 
and risks by transferring to them certain portions of his in-
terest, such transfer commonly referred to as a farmout. 35 
Before any exploration and production may take place, capital ex-
penditure must be anticipated and financing arranged. Preliminary ex-
ploration establishes the probability of the existence of a certain 
quantity and quality of oil. This becomes known as proven reserves and 
once mineral rights are established these reserves are considered assets 
of the company for financing purposes, so that private loans may be ar-
ranged to cover exploration and production costs until the oil is actu-
ally sold on the market enabling the company to repay the loan as well 
as the accrued interest. 
In the case of Alyeska, each member company was responsible for her 
share of the financing, so that SOHIO had to finance 33.34 percent of 
TAPS. Since her loans totaled six times her assets and nearly fifty 
269 
times her debt in the late 1960s at one point,36 private financing was 
only possible by delaying repayment until returns on the investment be-
gan to payoff. BF for her part in the merger with SORIO was initially 
responsible for arranging 25 percent of SORIO's financing as well as 
15.84 percent of BF's direct ownership of Alyeska. Rer financial lia-
bility only increased in direct proportion to production, an advanta-
geous position illustrating BF's leverage in the arrangement. 
Federal income taxes apply to every phase of the industry and will 
be discussed in their most general terms. 37 
In general, all of the costs incurred by the party making geo-
logical surveys are to be capitalized as a part of the lease-
hold costs of the property or properties acquired or retained 
as a result of the surveys. In addition, payments made to 
landowners in the form of damages or bonuses for the acquisi-
tion of a lease must also be capitalized as a part of the cost 
of the properties acquired. If the landowner receives a cash 
consideration for the granting of a lease on the property, 
such cash is a lease bonus, which is treated as ordinary in-
come subject to depletion because it is considered to be an 
advance royalty 
The costs of drilling and completing an oil and gas well are 
divisible for tax purposes into two classes, intangible drill-
ing costs and equipment costs. The equipment costs must be 
capitalized and recovered through depreciation. As to intan-
gible drilling costs, the lessee has the option to expense or 
capitalize such costs; however, an election once made in the 
first taxable year in which such costs are incurred is binding 
upon that taxpayer as to treatment of such expenditures on all 
properties for all future years. 
The landowner is not considered to have derived any taxable 
income by reason of the fact that a well has been drilled upon 
his property. Although there is an enhancement in value of 
his property, such enhancement is not recognized as taxable 
income because it has not been realized •••• 
Assuming that oil has been found and that the well has been 
completed as a producer, the income from the well is divided 
between the landowner, who owns the royalty, and the lessee, 
who may be referred to as the operator or owner of the working 
interest. Each of them is entitled to recover by depletion 
allowance his capital investment, if any, in the property. A 
taxpayer is entitled to claim the higher amount of depletion 
computed by two methods. The first method is cost depletion, 
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which is computed by dividing the depletable cost of the prop-
erty by the estimated recoverable reserves to arrive at a unit 
cost. Such unit cost is then multiplied by current unit sales 
to arrive at cost depletion for the taxable year. The second 
method is percentage depletion, which is computed at 22 per-
cent of the gross income from the property. Allowable deple-
tion is not limited in amount to taxpayer's basis in the prop-
erty. Thus, he may continue to claim percentage depletion 
after his full depletable capital investment in the property 
has been recovered •••• 
Production or severance taxes levied by the various states on 
the production of oil or gas are deducted by the purchaser of 
production from the well, in making remittance to the various 
owners of interests in the property. This expense is borne by 
the royalty owner proportionately with the owner of the work-
ing interest; the cost of treating the oil on the lease to 
make it marketable may also be shared by the royalty owner. 
All other expenses incurred in connection with the operation 
of the well are borne entirely by the lessee or owner of the 
working interest in the property •••• 38 
Problems in relation to bidding, leasing, and royalties arose in 
Alaska. First of all, land ownership was questioned by the natives and 
required a federal law to settle the issue. 39 Secondly, the govern-
ment's lack of expertise in exploratory techniques put her at a disad-
vantage when it came to bidding for leases. The 1969 bidding round 
should have brought in more revenue than $900 million. The American 
Government is presently studying the British system of license alloca-
tion as developed through the North Sea experience. 
In addition to taxation regulating bidding for leases, permits, 
licenses, and certification, other regulatory standards exist and must 
also be complied with such as production quotas and unitization agree-
ments. 
Production quotas are most useful in limiting production, and since 
it is to the government's advantage at this point in history to encour-
age production -- not to limit it -- mandatory production quotas would 
be inappropriate, with the exception of regulating conservation 
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standards. Instead, tax incentives are used by the government to en-
courage production. These incentives cover many facets of the industry, 
and the minimization of taxation is effected by the method of accounting 
employed. 40 
Without actually embarking on this technical subject, a short dis-
cussion of the depletion allowance is necessary since it has recieved so 
much attention in recent years. 
The removal of a mineral from its natural reservoir diminishes 
the quantity remaining in the reservoir until eventually the 
recoverable supply is exhausted. The exhaustion of supply of 
a wasting asset is called physical depletion. As the supply 
of the mineral diminishes, the value of the mineral deposit 
also undergoes a gradual reduction, which is known as economic 
depletion •••• 
Although physfcal and economic depletion depend upon the units 
produced, the Federal income tax concept makes depletion de-
pend not upon units produced but upon the income derived from 
that production. In other words, depletion, for Federal tax 
purposes, depends not upon production of a mineral but upon 
its sale 
On March 29, 1975, the "Tax Reduction Act of 1975" ••• became 
law. Among other things, the Act provides substantial changes 
with respect to the percentage depletion deduction for domes-
tic and foreign oil and gas production. The principle change 
is the repeal of percentage depletion for all domestic and 
foreign oil and gas production effective- January 1, 1975, with 
limited exceptions. These exceptions include retention of 
percentage depletion at the rate of 22 percent for ••• a per-
day barrel •.. exemption for oil •••• 41 
Thus, the depletion allowance continues to be one of the most effective 
tax incentives the government can use to encourage production. 
Although mandatory production quotas -- those imposed by government 
for the purpose of limiting production -- are inappropriate at this 
time, voluntary inter-company production quotas are a necessary manage-
rial method of effectively using TAPS. Since each member of Alyeska is 
allotted a percentage use of TAPS, then only that amount permitted to be 
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transported should be produced in order to avoid massive storage 
problems. 
Unitization agreements for the purpose of more economic development 
and operation have been used since the development of the East Texas 
field, and have generally been encouraged by the government. Such an 
agreement is one 
••• under which two or more persons owning operating mineral 
interests agree to have the interests operated on a unified 
basis and further agree to share in production on a stipulated 
percentage or fractional basis regardless of from which inter-
est or interests the oil or gas is produced. 42 
Because of the sheer size and number of leases involved in the uni-
tization agreement between A1yeska members, the government has shown 
considerable concern over the regulation of future unitization agree-
ments. 
Once oil is extracted from the ground, the wellhead price is fixed 
by the federal government. In setting the price, the government direct-
1y effects the ultimate profit of the companies, and must consider the 
projected rate of return of the companies investments. 
Certain large lenders were not willing to participate in the Prud-
hoe Bay-TAPS project because of uncertainty as to government policy on 
the pricing of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, and companies undertaking 
projects involving significant risk are unwilling to accept a rate of 
return of less than 14 to 16 percent as the projections for TAPS 
showed. 43 The American oil companies, then, are highly motivated 
towards the deregulation of price-fixing, so that the price of domestic 
oil will be allowed to float and find its own place, competitive with 
the current world price of oil. 
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While the government is considering such deregulation, she is aware 
that as a result, not only would prices rise significantly, but so would 
the profits of the oil companies. Thus the windfall profits tax has 
been suggested as a means to achieve a certain parity. 
These, then, compile a general survey of the municipal isssues 
involved in the exploration and production stage of the oil industry. 
In the transportation stage the company may choose one or any com-
bination of various transportation methods: via land the oil may be 
transported by rail, truck, or pipeline (the latter being accepted today 
as the most cost feasible); by sea the oil may be transported by tanker 
or sub-sea pipelines; by air the oil may be transported by air tankers, 
although as yet, this choice remains cost-infeasible. 
Irregardless of the method of transportation chosen, the procedure 
of progressing through this stage is similar. Rights of way, be they on 
land, sea, or air, must be acquired. This generally entails submission 
of detailed plans illustrating the company's proposal for compliance 
with established standards. The list of standards is numerous and range 
from ecological considerations to physical safety. Construction and op-
eration permits or licenses must be obtained by the company from the 
appropriate regulatory body (international, federal, state, local, and/ 
or permission from private individuals). 
Regulation of interstate transportation has been in the hands of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission since 1888, who has the right to set 
rates and insure their use as common carriers. However, the use of pri-
vate tankers or those not sailing under the American flag raises a few 
jurisdicial questions for the ICC.44 
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Antitrust implications of Alyeska's structure and functions have 
already been discussed regarding restraint of trade in acquiring leases 
as well as in use of TAPS as a common carrier. 
As in the production stage, financing is based on the expectation 
of marketing proven reserves, and must have been arranged originally to 
cover all stages of the business. 
The pattern remains constant throughout the refining and marketing 
stages, in that the company must exhibit the necessary technical exper-
tise in meeting established standards before she is granted the neces-
sary rights to proceed. Rer financial reliability will have been met 
prior to this time, assuming she can maintain interest payments and ser-
vice her debt. 
Baving defined the various positions on municipal issues, a brief 
description of SORIO's relationships will exemplify the complexity of 
the business environment in which petroleum companies operate in 
America. 
To influence government policy SORIO employed one official lobbyist 
as of 1974, and in 1972 she had twelve representatives on federal advis-
ory committees. 45 In addition to these direct influences, Spahr, as 
president of the API in 1973 gained an additional position of influence 
not only with the government, but also with fellow companies. 
Relationships between companies take various forms, many of which 
become difficult to measure when scrutinized from the level of interper-
sonal relationships between men who happen to work for different compa-
nies. 
Directors are not likely to be scoundrels, they are likely to 
be gentlemen. And gentlemen respect other gentlemen with whom 
they are closely associated. And that is far more profound a 
problem than scoundrelism. The problem is that if gentlemen 
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associate on boards, they are not likely to be something 
really hostile to the interests of the other gentlemen with 
whom they are associated. 46 
A study of interlocking directorates becomes a game of trading in-
fluence and is generally played on several levels simultaneously. To 
qualitatively measure the influence generated by SORIO or exerted over 
her in this game would be impossible. Suffice it to say that such con-
flicts of interests have been discussed in Congress throughout the his-
tory of the petroleum industry. 
A Congressional Committee in 1912 said, "When we find common 
directorships in banks and other businesses located in the 
same city and representing the same class of interests, all 
further pretense of competition is useless" •••• 
In the past, Congress has paid particular attention to bank 
interlocks sin~e credit, bank loans and terms of financing are 
crucial to the success of a business. A bank director is pro-
hibited from being the director of another bank. Bank direc-
tors or a director of any other business will consciously or 
unconsciously favor those corporations with which he has con-
nections. 
Oil company directors who are directors of banks and other 
corporations form a cozy and exclusive club where it is con-
venient for them to reach understandings and agreements which 
result in common, if not conspiratorial, action. Oil company 
interests in large banks, particularly where a relatively 
large number of oil men are bank directors, could generate a 
multitude of potential conflicts of interests. 47 
Closely related to the question of interlocking directorates is the 
situation of subsidiaries and joint ventures. This again involves a 
complex web of changing relationships between companies. While mergers 
and joint ventures may be convenient -- or even necessary -- for a small 
company's operation or existence the scale tips when major companies en-
gage in these activities, and the sheer magnitude of the venture inevit-
ably straddles the antitrust violation tightrope. 
BP has experienced -- through her merger with SORIO and their oper-
ations both in Alaska and the lower forty-eight states -- a new role in 
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her relationship with the u.s. Government. Not only is the u.s. Govern-
ment now a host country to BP, she is the home country to SORIO, and 
thus, indirectly also to BP. BP gained the advantages she aimed for in 
investing in America and in so doing strengthened her competitive posi-
tion with her American Sisters. By selecting Alaska as her first major 
challenge, BP's initiation into the American legal regime only illus-
trates the sophistication of the company's adaptable ingenuity. 
American municipal law regulating petroleum has been studied metic-
ulously by virtually every oil producing and consuming state. There-
fore, the analogy may be made that as British law has dominated the in-
ternational maritime legal regime, so American law has dominated the in-
ternational petroleum legal regime. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE NORTH SEA: THE BRITISH LEGAL REGIME 
As the cradle of Anglo-American law and in its posi-
tion on the Atlantic fringe of Western Europe, the 
United Kingdom continues to form a bridge between 
the legal systems of the transatlantic and Continen-
tal capital-exporting States as well as between the 
Anglo-American legal systems and those of a consid-
erable number of new independent States. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
••• several nations sought in various ways over the years to 
regulate these companies for their respective national inter-
ests ••• the resulting general patchwork of country-by-country 
regulation has fallen far short of the comprehensive system re-
quired for effective control of international cartel activities 
operating far beyond national boundaries. 
David I. Haberman 
The development of British petroleum's relationship with her home 
government developed along different lines than those of her American 
Sisters with their home government primarily because of the U.K.'s lack 
of indigenous oil. There had never been a need for specific regulatory 
legislation, nor for a domestic policy statement. 
Government ownership of over 50 percent of BP's stocks has actually 
been considered a handicap in her foreign operations since many develop-
ing countries viewed state enterprises as a suspicious new form of colo-
nialism. Consequentially, the government role in BP was minimized as 
she developed into a fully integrated company engaging in all phases of 
industry and thus functioning as a private enterprise •. 
Recently the company declared that the right of veto held by the 
government's "ex officio" directors had never been exercised. In testi-
mony given to a Commons Committee in 1974, BP's Chairman stated that 
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"our policies are normally those of a commercial company which have been 
agreed for 60 years or more with Government and have, I think, suited 
successive governments. This has never been a controversial matter 
we take our decisions commercially and without influence from Min-
isters ... 
After the Iranian fiasco of the early 1950s which marked the de-
cline of British influence in the Middle East, developing the off-shore 
oil fields of the North Sea took on new meaning for both the government 
and the oil company. What better way to satisfy supply needs than to 
develop ones own indigenous oil fields. For BP it meant gaining a new 
and powerful source of supply potentiating her established positions 
throughout the world. 
Technological and cost limitations had delayed serious exploration 
in the North Sea until the late 1950s, as was the case in Alaska, al-
though knowledge of the existence of oil in the area had been prevalent 
since 1920. 2 By 1958, however, with at least twenty firms undergoing 
initial exploration in the area, the neighboring countries were spurred 
into negotiating the legal territorial ownership of the waters at the UN 
Geneva Continental Shelf Convention (Also known as the Law of the Sea 
Conference), 
In 1959 a giant onshore gasfield was discovered at Gronigan, the 
Netherla~ds, giving a definite urgency to the Geneva Conference, since 
many firms were interested in exploring the southern waters of the North 
Sea where it was believed that additional substantial reserves of gas 
were located. 
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However, not until 1964 did the U.K. ratify the UN Convention, 
bringing the number of signatories to the level required for 
international adoption. 
The Convention had the effect of extending the sovereign 
rights of the North Sea coastal countries to include the ex-
ploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the 
seabed on the Continental Shelf. Boundaries were to be nego-
tiated QY any set of principles. However, the Convention 
stIpulated that when mutual agreements between countries could 
not be reached, in the absence of special circumstances, 
boundary lines would be determined by the principle of equi-
distance (measuring the width of the North Sea at the widest 
point between two countries and giving half of the area to 
each country). 
The line demarcating the U.K. sector of the North Sea was 
established by five separate agreements with each of the 
coastal countries. 3 
Having obtained the authority to regulate the exploration activi-
ties occurring on the U.K. Continental Shelf, the government quickly em-
barked on the job of defining such regulation in more specific terms by 
legislation. 
In preparing such legislation the government first had to crystal-
ize a general petroleum policy, by considering both her long-term and 
short-term needs, arranging them according to priority, and reviewing 
any existing legislation for guidelines as to the most effective way to 
implement these policy objectives. 
Having given top priority to balancing her growing trade deficit, 
Britain needed rapid development. From the beginning it was recognized 
that ~orth Sea oil would bring only temporary relief in this area, but 
it was hoped that the interval would be sufficient -- in conjunction 
with other domestic economic policies -- to allow Britain to reverse her 
down-hill trend. 
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With this aim in mind, the U.K. Government prepared the Continental 
Shelf Act of 1964, vesting in the Crown those rights to explore and ex-
ploit the seabed and subsoil of the North Sea as outlined in the Geneva 
Cbnferencp and extending the relevant provisions of the 1934 Petroleum 
/ 
(Production) Act to apply to offshore activities, primarily the right of 
the Secretary of State for Energy to grant licences for such exploration 
and exploitation. 
Other previous legislation relied upon to form the framework of the 
1964 Act included the Coal Industry Nationalization Act of 1946, the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power Act 1945, the Coast Protection Act of 1949, 
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1955, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, 
the Radioactive Substances Act 1960, the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, 
the Gas Act 1948, the Companies Act 1948, and the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Acts 1946 to 1963. 
Under the terms of the 1964 Act the Energy Secretary also has the 
power to make orders specifying safety zones around offshore installa-
tions employed in the exploitation of the U.K. Continental Shelf as well 
as to execute various ecological and safety standards. 
Not only had the government to consider her own aims in developing 
the North Sea, but she also had to consider the needs of the other mem-
bers of the petroleum community. The 1964 Act was formulated at a time 
when 
the North Sea was completely unproven as an area in which pe-
troleum existed. The considerable interest of the companies 
pointed to the existence of structures that might contain pe-
troleum. Whether or not they did could only be determined by 
deep drilling, a risky and expensive operation, much more so 
offshore than on land and in offshore conditions never before 
met by the oil industry.4 
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Thus the policymakers needed to find ways of enticing the oil com-
panies to commit large amounts of capital to a risky and expensive ven-
ture when massive reserves were readily available elsewhere, particular-
ly in OPEC countries. It was feared that "if the U.K. were to impose 
onerous financial term it might have incited OPEC countries to follow 
suit, to the detriment of our [the U.K's] overseas oil interest and bal-
ance of payments."S 
H.M. Government was also in effectual competition with the U.S. 
Government in attracting large scale industry investments, since Alaska 
was developing during the same time period. Obviously, the firms would 
be shopping for the deal which would best maximize their profits. 
The 1964 Act's treatment of such specific issues as bidding, li-
censing, royalties and taxes were thought to be workable compromises 
which would invite investors and accomplish British aims simultaneously 
without instigating unwanted reprisals in British foreign investments. 6 
The discretionary method of allocating licences was retained as 
outlined in the 1934 petroleum (Production) Act and exercised by most 
countries -- with the notable exception of the United States who relies 
on competitive bidding. Under the discretionary method, a government 
simply grants licences according to her own estimate of companies' abil-
ities and willingness to do the work; under the competitive bidding 
method companies submit cash bids for exclusive rights to the licence 
area. 
It was judged in 1964 that, in the unproven North Sea, compet-
itive bidding would be unlikely to lead to full and thorough 
exploration, and it was thought that bids might well have been 
small, and confined to strictly limited areas, and that 
British participation might well have been less than was pos-
sible to achieve under a discretionary system •••• Under a 
discretionary system, the Department felt that they would be 
able to insist, as a condition of a production licence, that 
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the licensee carry out an effective work prOgraMme and also to 
persuade him to buy British goods and services where they were 
readily available. 7 
Thus with a single experimental exception in 1971, the discretion-
ary system has been retained in U.K. hidding rounds. R 
In addition to the method of licence allocation, the other maior 
decision that had to be made by the framers of the Continental Shelf Act 
Was on the type of licence to offer. Exn10ration licences were granted 
that were non-exclusive, valid for three years, and entitled the 1i-
censee to carry out geological prohes in any area not covered hy an ex-
c1usive production 1icence. Q An exploration licence did not provine anv 
claim on suspected oil or gas areas. 
A production licence gave the holder exclusive rights to search for 
and extract oil or gas in a specific area. Blocks generally were sec-
tioned in 100-square-mile areas. This licence lasted for an initial 
period of six years, after which at least half the area had to he sur-
rendered. The holder was then entitled to continue operations in the 
remainder for a further forty years. The surrendered area could be re-
licensed hy the government. 10 
The licensee made initial payment of £6,250 for the first 6 years 
of a licence, per average block, a nayment of £10,000 ner block in the 
seyenth year, followed by annual increments thereafter of £6,250, to a 
maxiMum of £72,500. 11 
Taxes consisted of a royalty rate of 12.5 nercent of the value of 
oil produced, and a comnany taxation rate of 53.75 percent. 12 
Government control over the disposal of oil and gas was incorpo-
rated in the licence by requiring the Energy Secretary of State's writ-
ten consent for the delivery of petroleUM elsewhere than onshore in the 
2R6 
United Kingdom. The Minister was given the further power to impose con-
ditions on the place of delivery and the price to be obtained. 13 
Work programs could be imposed upon licensees hy the Secretary of 
State for Energy. These could have included general drilling obliga-
tions, such as requiring that one well be drilled in each hlock, but it 
was decided to leave such specifics to the discretion of the Energy Min-
ister. 
In the First Round of oil licensing, April 1964, 3q4 blocks were 
applied for and 53 licences were awarded covering 348 of the hlocks. 
The Conservative Government of that year required "that the applicant 
for a licence ••• be incorporated in the United Kingdom" and stated that 
it would "look at the contrihution the applicant has already made or is 
making towards the development of resources of our Continental Shelf and 
the development of our fuel economy generally."14 
The British firms of BP, Burmah, Shell, and one puhlic sector ener-
gy company, the Gas Council (later the British Gas Corp. BGC), who 
joined with AMOCO, Amerada, and Texas Eastern to receive four licences, 
Were given 30 percent of the total area. The remaining 70 percent went 
mostly to foreign companies although some British firms participated as 
investors. Most of the blocks offered in this First Round were in the 
southern region and although a few natural gas fields were discovered, 
no commercial quantities of oil were found in this sector until 1969 
when the British Gas Corp. consortium struck oil in the northernmost 
block released in that First Round -- hlock 22/17. 
The Second Round took place in August 1965 and the consideration of 
licences include the newly elected Labour Party's philosophy of encour-
aging participation of public enterprise. The immediate result was a 6 
287 
percent share of the blocks going to the BGC (as opposed to a 3 percent 
share of the First Round). In order to increase the public enterprise 
share, the Labour Government passed the National Coal Boarn (Additional 
Powers) Act of 1966, giving the National Coal Board (NCB) the right to 
participate in offshore activities. The NCB quickly accepted a previ-
ously arranged offer to buy a 50 percent interest in all of Conoco's li-
cences, a 40 percent interest in some of Gulf's licences, and a carried 
interest in the Allied Chemical licences, which brought the public sec-
tor share of the Second Round from 6 percent to 10 percent. These sub-
sequent NCB assets would play an important part in the development of 
BNOC. 
In October 1965 BP announced the first maior gas discovery, the 
West Sole field, which necessitated the formulation of a government gas 
policy as to its disposal. The BGC's monopolistic position enabled the 
government to control all the activities of this industry, from the 
wellhead to the market. 
Consideration of the BGC's position gave rise to a government poli-
cy review in which a reassessment of state participation took place en-
couraging the suggestion of establishing a National Hydrocarbons Corpo-
ration to "assume sole responsibility for exploration and development in 
all the offshore areas not retained by existing licences."lS The pro-
posal was not adopted at the time since (1) oil reserves Rad still to be 
proven, (2) the establishment of a state company might discourage pri-
vate investment, and (3) such action might have adverse effects on 
British oil interests abroad. 
Thus the Third Round in 1969 was to be conducted under the existing 
terms except that more weight was to be given to those bids including 
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public sector participation, and a retroactive provision for all blocks 
in the Irish Sea, not yet seriously explored to include an option for 
either the BGC or the NCB to share the existing licence. 
While the government was considering the 34 bids it received, cov-
ering 117 of the 157 blocks on offer, AMOCO announced the discovery of 
the Montrose oil field -- the first maior North Sea oil find. During 
the next year BP discovered the Forties field and the Ekofisk field in 
the Norwegian sector was also discovered. 
The new enthusiasm generated by these discoveries combined with the 
drop in exploration apparently due to inadequate acreage under lease and 
the series of events occurring in the Middle East -- specifically 
Lybia's increased participation -- led to a much larger Fourth Round in 
1971-1972, which concentrated on the more promising areas of the north-
ern section. 
The Conservatives, who had returned to power by this time, decided 
to place 15 of the 436 blocks open in this round up for auction as.an 
experiment in the competitive bidding method of allocating licences: 
Looking to future policy, Ministers also decided •.• to carry 
out a limited sample tendering exercise to gain experience in 
this method for later rounds and to test the market by offer-
ing 15 blocks which, though all in areas where hydrocarbons 
had been discovered, ranged from blocks which appeared very 
attractive to others which appeared indifferent. 16 
The result was that those 15 blocks brought in £37.2 million as op-
posed to the figure of less than £3 million collected from the remaining 
IRS blocks applied for, giving rise to public concern over the govern-
ment's take as opposed to the companies' profits. 
The government retained her preference for discretionary bidding; 
as one Minister testified: 
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The exploration programmes which have been insisted on as part 
of the discretionary licensing system would be very difficult 
to apply in auction, and absolutely impossible in the early 
days of exploration of a province, because not enough knowl-
edge exists about the province to discuss and lay down an ex-
ploration programme or a work programme, such as is part of 
every licence agreement under the discretionary system. 17 
Yet, the public debate over method of bidding led to an investiga-
tion by the House of Commons' Committee of Public Accounts. The inquiry 
delved into the method of allocation, the terms of the licences, and the 
corporate income tax situation in Britain. The latter was particularly 
important. Britain had a corporate tax, applicable to the entire set of 
operations of the integrated oil companies, but not a petroleum tax, ap-
plicable only to revenues earned from production of North Sea oil. In· 
1972, British tax laws provided companies to earn double relief on their 
U.K. corporate income taxes: one relief by means of free depreciation 
on capital expenditures, including exploration expenditures; the other 
by means of the provision whereby "the tax take, in the oil production 
country, takes the form of a local tax which is set against United King-
dom tax and not against the profits of the company."IR Free deprecia-
tion allows expenditures to be written off against the first year's 
profits, at the company's discretion. The second provision extinguished 
the U.K. tax oblication of Shell and BP before North Sea oil started 
flowing, but the real concern was that "losses" on overseas operations 
that exceeded the U.K. tax obligations in anyone year could he accumu-
lated and carried forward to offset U.K. tax obligations in future 
years. This cumulative loss had reached the order of £1,500 million for 
nine of the ma.ior companies, and under the tax laws, could be used to 
offset some of the potential profits from U.K. Continental Shelf opera-
tions. 19 
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The Committee regarded it as "unsatisfactory that U.K. tax revenue 
from Continental Shelf operations should be pre-empted by the tax de-
mands of administrations elsewhere in the world," and recommended that 
"the Government should take action suhstantially to improve the effec-
tive tax yield from operations on the continental shelf; and should con-
sider among other methods the possihility of imposing a system of quan-
tity taxation," such as a tax on each barrel of oil produceri in the 
North Sea. 20 
Meanwhile government regulation of standards continued to develop. 
The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 was enacted 
which introduced a comprehensive code of safety regulations which covers 
the following: registration of all installations with the Department of 
Energy; appointment of installation managers to be responsible for over-
all installation safety; keeping of logbooks, and the registration of 
deaths of persons on installations; functions and powers of the Depart-
ment's Inspectors, and the notification of accidents; surveying of off-
shore structures and the issuing of Certificates of Fitness hy appoint en 
certifying authorities; safety of diving operations from or in connec-
tion with installations; extension of the Emplovers' Liahility (Compul-
sory Insurance) Act 1Qnq to require that employers of persons working on 
offshore installations obtain insurance coverage against employee claims 
for injuries; day-to-day personnel safety, the safety of equip~ent ann 
working procedures, and the provision of medical facilities: life-saving 
appliances; and emerging procedures and the holning of regular drills 
and practice musters. Enforcement of these regulations lies with the 
Department of Energy's Petroleum Engineering Inspectorate. Further 
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regulations were to be prepared which would cover the provision of fire-
fighting systems and equipment. 
In addition, the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 was en-
acted which places a liability on the owner of a tanker from which oil 
escapes and requires him to carry insurance against the liabiliti. 
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 makes it an offence for 
ships of any nationality to discharge any oil into U.K. waters, and ad-
ditionally for U.K. - registered ships to discharge any persistent oil 
anywhere at sea, except in accordance with very strigent regulations. 
The act also controls discharge of oil or oily water from installations 
on land into U.K. waters and from offshore platforms or pipelines on the 
U.K. Continental Shelf into the sea. The prevention of accidental pol-
lution from offshore installations is essentially a matter of using safe 
working practices which, while aimed primarilv at the safety of men and 
installations, undoubtedly reduces the risks of pollution from oil 
spills. 
The Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 provides local 
government with the authority to plan for land development. It requires 
that each proposal for development be the subiect of a planning applica-
tion to the planning authority for review and decision. 
The Merchant Shipping Act 1974 provides that oil importers contrib-
ute to an international fund that will compensate for pollution damage 
in the U.K. where persons suffering the damage are unable to obtain full 
compensation under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971. The 
act also enables the Secretary of State for Energy to regulate the de-
sign and construction of British oil tankers and the admission of for-
eign tankers to British ports. 
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The Dumping at Sea Act 1974 provides legislative support in the 
United Kingdom for control of dumping at sea and replaces a previous 
voluntary control scheme. It provides that before any materials can be 
disposed of at sea by "dumping" (excluding discharge through pipelines) 
a certificate must be obtained. The determining factor in deciding 
whether to grant a licence is the need to protect the marine environment 
and its living resources. 
By this time the loss of oil supplies due to the 1973 Arab embargo 
had threatened Britain, as well as other countries, with economic disas-
. 
ter. The Heath Government had taken certain steps including bilateral 
oil supply agreements with Iran and Saudi Arabia, to assure that the 
country would receive adequate amounts of oil; yet, in spite of these 
agreements, Britain lost a proportion of her supply similar to other 
European countries. 
BP could not be persuaded to give her home country favored treat-
ment regarding oil allocations, even though that home country held over 
50 percent of her shares. She assumed the attitude that all nations 
must be treated equally stating that British "laws and the contracts 
written under those took priority over instructions from their share-
holders." Robert Stobaugh reports the Heath Government ordered BP to 
give British customers priority, but was refused. 21 
The incident serves to further exemplify BP's independent role as a 
private firm as opposed to a state company, which contrihuted to the 
Labour Party's later demand for the creation of a state oil company. 
Had BP functioned in the country's interest at this time, there may have 
been no need for establishing BNOC; however, had she condescended to op-
erating strictly in the interest of the government, she would have lost 
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her status as an independent, private firm -- something she refused to 
do. The government, for her part, asked, begged, and finally ordered BP 
to deviate from her established pattern of behavior in terms of their 
relationship. It was the decision of BP -- not that of the government 
-- that the company maintain the distance as established by precedence, 
between herself and her government-shareholders. 
The government traditionally does not interfere with the com-
mercial running of the company. This policy started back in 
1914, when the assurance was given by the then government. 
Successive governments have observed that practice. 
When the combined government and Bank of England shareholding 
in BP Was 70 per-cent. it'was difficult to make this credible. 
Many people were saying, how can you still be running as a 
commercial and independent company when the government and the 
Bank of England have 70 per-cent.? 
Viewed in this light, 51 per-cent. (which is about what the 
government percentage has been for many years) is not signifi-
cant in terms of control, and, as I say, the main thing is 
that we continue in our relationships and carryon and run our 
own business. 22 . 
The issue raised questions over the government's power to control 
the rate of production and ultimate destination of North Sea oil in time 
of crisis since the Continental Shelf Act had only vaguely touched these 
questions. Domestic political events namely the 1973 coalminers' 
strike leading to the 3-day work-week took precedence temporarily un-
til after the 1974 C~neral Election when the new Wilson C~vernment 
quickly instituted a review of oil policy that produced an important 
White Paper 23 setting forth a new set of conditions for the regulation 
of North Sea oil development. It established two principal government 
objectives: "To secure a fairer share of profits for the nation and to 
maximise the gain to the balance of payments to assert greater puhlic 
control. ,,24 
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To achieve these objectives, the White Paper proposed the following 
measures: 
Legislation will be proposed in an early Finance Bill to im-
pose an additional tax on the companies' profits from the Con-
tinental Shelf •••• 
It will be made a condition of future licences that the li-
censees shall, if the Government so require, ~rant maiority 
participation to the State in all fields discovered under 
those licences •••• 
It is the Government's belief that ma.iority State participa-
tion in the existing licences for commercial fields provides 
the best means for the nation to share fully in the benefits 
of North Sea oil .... 
A British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) will be set UP, 
through which the Government will exercise their participation 
rights. This Corporation will represent the Government in the 
present consortia ••• and also build up a powerful and expert 
supervisory staff that will enable it to play an active part 
in the future development, exploration and exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf. It will also have powers to extend its ac-
tivities ultimately to the refining and distribution of oil. 
The Government will extend their powers to control physical 
production and pipelines ••.. They will also take powers ••• 
to require licensees to provide more information about their 
activities than is now obligatory. 25 
The general principles as outlined in the White Paper had broad bi-
partizan support; e.g., maximizing national revenue from North Sea oil, 
improving government access to information, and implementing effective 
governmental powers over the rate of oilfield development. 
The 1973 Crisis was the impetus, then, for the abrupt change in 
U.K. Government policy. Where she had wanted rapid development of North 
Sea potential to aid her balance of payments, she now favored conserva-
tion rather than depletion of supply. The role of inflation --
irregardless of its origins was that of defeating the original pur-
pose of rapid development. No matter how speedily production took 
place, inflation was spoiling the intended benefits to balance of 
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payments. Therefore, a shift in priorities of government demands was 
effected. The reallocation of scarce resources in favor of the govern-
ment, with the inherent alteration to income needed to provide uneconom-
ical services -- especially those related to Britain's unemployment 
problem -- took precedence over rapid realization of North Sea profits. 
The Labour Government viewed BNOC as a tool for achieving these ob-
jectives, but the Conservatives insisted consideration of alternatives. 
The Conservative Party argued that the profits of a state-owned oil com-
pany would not enlarge the public's direct share of North Sea oil wealth 
for several reasons. First, BNOC would not be an efficient oil company: 
"There may now descend on British oil operations the same dead hand of 
political control as is afflicting the steel industry, the Post Office, 
and other sad examples in the public sector.,,26 Second, BNOC would find 
it difficult to attract a competent staff because the private companies 
could offer salary levels and a range of worldwide opportunities that 
the state company could not easily match. Third, the increase in gov-
ernment participation via BNOC in oil investments, if made with govern-
ment funds, would decrease the amount of government revenues usable for 
other pressing purposes. If BNOC sought funds on the private money mar-
ket, the public would ultimately lose out because the big private corpo-
rations could get such funds at a lower rate of interest than BNOC, and 
indeed than the British Government itself. 
Banks were so hesitant to finance projects developing small, unpro-
ductive fields during 1974, due primarily to the failure of the British 
Government to quantify the return which they would allow companies to 
earn, and to the weak position of international money markets, that only 
one partially financed project was announced. 
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Republic National Bank of Dallas (now RepublicBank Dallas) and In-
ternational Energy Bank co-managed the syndication of $250 million of 
financing for the Piper field, consummated in October 1974, the only 
project financed that year. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Allied Chemical Corporation, 
Getty Oil Company, and Thomson Scottish Associates Limited (through 
their respective subsidiaries) made a significant discovery in Block 
15/17 on Licence P 220 in the U.K. sector of the North Sea. The field 
Was discovered in January 1973, and Was defined by drilling eight ex-
pendable wells. DeGolyer and MacNaughton, one of the world's most immi-
nent firms of petroleum geologists, acclaimed for the accuracy of their 
reserve estimates, reported recoverable reserves of the Piper Field at 
642 million barrels of oil, and Occidental's engineers project a maximum 
production rate of 250,000 barrels per day. Occidental and Thomson 
Scottish own 36.5 percent and 20 percent, respectively, in the licence. 
Both Occidental and Thomson desired separate credit facilities for their 
respective development costs, to construct and install a 36-slot plat-
form in 480 feet of water, lay 127 miles of 30-inch pipeline to a load-
ing terminal in the Orkney Islands, and construct the terminal and shore 
facilities. 
A credit facility of $150 million was consummated for Occidental of 
Britain, Inc. in October 1974, secured by a first charge on Occidental's 
interest in the Piper field facilities and licence. Occidental agreed 
to provide the facilities and field development in accordance with a 
specified development plan, and guaranteed repayment of the facility if 
construction was not completed by a specified date. 
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After completion of development, production of a specified amount 
of Piper crude, and verification of the reserves, Occidental has the op-
tion to convert all but $30 million of the financing to a production 
payment. Repayment of the financing is from a variable percentage of 
the proceeds from the sale of Occidental's share of Piper crude. This 
variable percentage is designed to accomplish repayment within nine 
years from the closing date, and to maintain minimum ratios of present 
worth of future net revenue to the outstanding loan balance. 
The Thomson Scottish Petroleum financing involved a $100 million 
credit facility for development of the Piper field. Obligations of 
Thomson were limited to providing $20 million before drawing under the 
facility and an additional $30 million, if required, after the facility 
was fully drawn. Repayment was contractually limited to gross proceeds 
from the sale of Piper crude and also provided a variable dedication of 
gross proceeds to accomplish repayment nine years from the closing date 
and to maintain minimum ratios of present worth of future net revenues 
to the outstanding loan balance. In addition to a normal interest rate, 
the banks receive a 2.5 percent royalty interest on the Thomson interest 
on the first 642 million barrels produced to compensate for the addi-
tional risk of the limited recourse facility. 
Both of the Piper credit facilities required the consent of all the 
consortia partners and the consent of the U.K. Government to the securi-
ty provisions contained in the charge against the licence and the Piper 
field facilities. In addition, of course, agreements on the part of the 
Bank of England regarding convertibility of funds for repayment and cer-
tain tax rulings by the Inland Revenue were required. 
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In order to insulate the bank's security from defaults that might 
occur outside the Piper field area, Licence P 220 was restricted to the 
Piper field area, and the residual area of P 220 was cancelled by the 
Department of Energy and reissued as Licence P. 247.28 
On the issues of Governmental access to information and control 
over North Sea oil development and disposal, the Conservatives proposed 
a small regulatory body -- the United Kingdom Oil Conservation Authority 
(UKOCA) inspired by the Texas Railroad Commission and the Energy Re-
sources Board of Alberta. 29 
After a year's debate the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act of 
1975 (P&SPA) was passed, over the objections of the Conservatives, and 
became law on 12 November 1975. Its main provisions include: (1) The 
setting up of the British National Oil Corporation with powers to ex-
plore for and produce petroleum; transport and refine petroleum; store, 
distribute, and buy and sell petroleum and products; take over the Gov-
ernment's participation interest in U.K. licences; carry out consultan-
cy, research, and training in petroleum matters; build, hire, or operate 
refineries, pipelines, and tankers. Certain activities (.e.g., explora-
tion and production abroad, "downstream" activities such as refining and 
trading in products, setting up or acquiring subsidiaries, giving loans 
and guarantees) can be carried out by BNOC only with the consent of the 
Secretary of State for Energy. (2) The introduction of ~dditional con-
trols over exploration and exploitation of the U.K. Continental Shelf to 
assure its orderly development; this includes Government powers to con-
trol future rates of oil depletion. (3) The introduction of controls 
over the construction and operation of submarine pipelines, including 
the use of third parties of both proposed and existing pipelines. The 
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Act also empowers the Secretary of State for Energy to assure the safety 
of pipelines and the safety and health of people working on them. (4) 
Powers to control the construction of new refineries and the expansion 
of existing refineries. 
Account. 
(5) The setting up of the National Oil 
Other legislation of this time period relating to oil include the 
Oil Taxation Act 1975 which established the current taxation and royalty 
system used in the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. Its main 
features include the petroleum revenue tax of 45 percent, a corporation 
tax of 52 percent, and a 12.5 percent royalty. Also included are tax 
incentives for developing marginal fields, and provisions which prohibit 
losses and allowances for activities outside the North Sea to be used to 
reduce a company's tax liability for activities there. 
The Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Act 1975 gave the 
government control of certain types of oil-related developments in the 
public interest. The Act provides for the acquisition and reinstatement 
of oil sites in Scotland and for the control of certain oil-related op-
erations within territorial waters. The Secretary of State for Scotland 
is given the power to acquire land either by agreement or compulsorily 
if it is required for one of a number of defined oil-related purposes. 
Where such land is urgently 'required (and planning permission has been 
given) the Secretary of State may acquire it by an expedited acquisition 
order. A statutory instrument containing such an order cannot be made 
unless a draft of it has been laid before, and approved by resolution 
of, each House of Parliament. The Act stresses the rehabilitation of 
oil sites after use, and local authorities are empowered to make 
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financial arrangements with developers to assure that money is available 
for restoration. 
The Submarine Pipelines (Diving Operations) Regulations 1976, which 
came into force on 10 July 1976 relates to diving operations carried out 
in respect to submarine pipelines and associated works. They closely 
follow the Offshore Installations (Diving Operations) Regulations 1974 
and the Merchant Shipping (Diving Operations) 1975. 
The most important of these, of course, is the P&SPA which created 
BNOC; however the Act failed to outline in any detail the ways in which 
the company is to resolve the conflicts inherent in her nature as a 
government-owned company. 
The P&SPA attempted to ease the dilemma by making BNOC more ac-
countable to government than most other State enterprises, and yet, on 
the other hand, endowing her with sufficient quantities of oil to become 
the leader in the North Sea and a large, oil-rich company even by inter-
national standards. BNOC's inheritance included holdings of Burmah, 
BGC, NCB, as well as options in 51 percent of all existing leases and 51 
percent participation in all future leases. 
The question of attracting suitable leadership is interlaced in the 
same paradox. The more dynami c the personali ty· of the leader, the more 
concerned he will be with creating a dynamic and successful enterprise, 
and the less satisfied he will be with governmental accountability limi-
tations. It remains to be seen whether the leadership selected will be 
able to fill both roles satisfactorily. 
BNOC's first employee was its Chairman and Chief Exec/utive, 
Lord Kearton. Kearton had retired as Chairman of Cotirau~ds, 
which during his tenure grew to be the second largest chemi-
cals conglomerate in Britain. By all accounts, he is an ag-
gressive businessman and a forceful personality, although it 
is unlikely that he will be with the Corporation beyond 1980 
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-- he is presently 65 years old. BNOC's other Board Members 
include Lord Ballogh, formerly a Labour Minister of State for 
Energy and an early advocate for a State oil company; two 
civil servants, one from Treasury and the other from the Ener-
gy Department; two bankers; two industrialists, including the 
Chairman of the British Gas Corporation; and two trade union 
executives. One board member, Mr. W.H.A. Camp, previously had 
served as a political advisor to an oil company. Aside from 
Lords Kearton and Balogh and Mr. Camp, the Board has little 
direct experience in the oil industry.30 
Participation agreements with companies holding leases prior to the 
Fifth Round in which 51 percent participation with BNOC was mandatory, 
created other problems for the state company. Initial participation 
agreements were secured by making the degree to which a company exhib-
ited her willingness to concede to the state a majority (51 percent) 
share in existing leases a prime consideration in awarding leases in the 
Fifth Round. Conditional awards were given to 65 companies in respect 
to 44 of the 51 blocks applied for (71 blocks had been offered). 
Ideally, of course, according to Labour Party conception, BNOC 
would have liked to buy her 51 percent share of the existing leases. 
Due to limited government funds, however, this was impossible, so BNOC 
had to settle for an option to buy 51 percent of oil produced on the 
leased property with the further stipulation in most cases that she be 
obliged to resell the oil to the original owner at the same price at 
which she bought it. The Financial Times editorialized that the Shell! 
Esso agreement with BNOC, the first of these arrangements, was an "un-
necessary oil deal .... Only in a politician's eye does it come any-
where near to the spirit of the original intention." (6 January 1977). 
The details were worked out in individually negotiated contracts 
between licensees, BNOC, and the government and were concerned with the 
conditions under which BNOC must resell the oil. While the companies 
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were willing to grant negation on national emergency terms, BNOC -- at 
the government's insistence -- demanded broader, less confining terms. 
BP's participation agreement, signed 1 June 1977, while granting 
BNOC the right to purhcase up to 51 percent of BP's light North Sea 
crude (as well as some of its heavy crude -- primarily from the Middle 
East) at current market prices, stipulated that in the first 18 months, 
all the oil BNOC bought was to be resold to BP at the original selling 
price. Between 1979 and 1981 BNOC was to retain only 12 to 16 percent 
of production. During 1982-1989 BNOC and BP would operate under a fixed 
contract with BNOC retaining 16 percent of output in 1982 and 12.75 per-
cent in the remaining years. 
Article 12 of the participation agreement outlined the downstream 
cooperation set out in a separate document, effective to 31 December 
1981, in which BNOC is to have training and a non-voting presence in BP 
Oil's (BP's U.K. refining and marketing subsidiary's) internal counsels 
dealing with refining, distribution, and marketing, as well as the manu-
facture of chemical feedstocks, on the condition that she not enter into 
competition with BP in these areas during the time period. However, the 
document stated that BP Oil and BNOC were to establish a long term basis 
for cooperation in U.K. refining and marketing, "which would indicate 
that joint ventures may well be possible after 1981 when ostensibly the 
training aspect ceases.,,31 
Article 13 provided for consultation between BP and the Secretary 
of State for Energy on BP's U.K. offshore activities and her U.K. 
petroleum supply, refining, exports, and imports. 
Public opinion mocked the agreement depicting BP sitting BNOC on 
her knees teaching her the business. 32 
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Perhaps the government had previously been unable to persuade or 
even order BP to act as her tool, yet as a condition of discretionary 
leasing, she managed to coerCe BP into imparting her expertise to the 
government's (now tightly controlled) state company, with insinuations 
of a future partnership on at least a limited scale. 
Did BP, however, submit any of her freedom as an independent firm? 
Since BP has always been a crude-rich company with more crude than she 
can refine, competition from BNOC in this area was unlikely to cut in on 
her sphere. Acting as a purely private enterprise, however, BP was 
careful to prepare for BNOC's eventual venture into the refining and 
marketing aspects of the oil business by assuring a future partnership 
between the two and thereby gaining for herself a much larger percentage 
of the market than she would be allowed under unrestricted competitive 
practices. She had arranged a remarkably favorable buy-back agreement 
with BNOC; she had assured herself a partnership in the possible future 
monopoly of the marketing and refining aspects of the business; she had 
positioned herself as the teacher of her probable future partner; and 
she had acquired the enviable position of funneling information to the 
government on which the government was likely to make any future policy 
decisions -- all the while maintaining the secrecy of her independent 
operations elsewhere in the world, particularly those in America and the 
Middle East. 
Her fellow Sisters were not so lucky, as the Shell/Exxon Participa-
tion agreement illustrates; although they, too, retained certain privi-
leges. BNOC was granted the option to purchase up to 51 percent of pro-
duction, "on a basis which recognizes the company's need for crude oil 
to support its U.K. refining and marketing commitments and which 
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therefore provides for the sale back of oil at the same market price. 
In the event of short-fall between the companies' U.K. production and 
their U.K. oil requirements, the participation arrangements provide for 
the sale back by BNOC to the companies of up to 100 percent of its par-
ticipation oil entitlement. In return, the companies declared their in-
tention to use their U.K. North Sea oil "from existing licences" to feed 
their U.K. refineries, to "optimize" the use of U.K. oil and to "trade 
at fair market prices using their best endeavors to safeguard U.K. Gov-
ernment petroleum revenues and maximize the benefit to the U.K. balance 
of payments." 
Clause No. 5 in the Agreement stated specifically that the Secre-
tary of State for Energy could order BNOC not to sell back to a company 
crude acquired under the terms of the Agreements. The government need 
only give thirty days' notice that BNOC will not sell back. This clause 
applied to all other participation agreements that include buy-back ar-
rangements, including the BP Agreement. The circumstances under which 
the clause would be applied deal, in part, with how a company disposes 
of oil it buys back. The clause would allow the U.K. Government to stop 
selling back crude if a company sold the crude contrary to government 
policy. 
The threat of withholding buy-back crude might be used to force 
compliance with government guidelines limiting exports of North Sea 
crude to one-third of production. The government in 1977 started meet-
ing with producers to discuss the fact that exports had been exceeding 
these guidelines, averaging about 40 percent of output. It indicated it 
would be flexible in applying the rule but was calling on producers to 
conform. 33 
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The agreement made BNOC a joint licence-holder in all present and 
future commercial finds made under existing licences. The companies re-
tained their beneficial interest in the oil and remained responsible for 
all costs, including royalties and taxes. BNOC received rights to in-
formation customarily provided to co-licensees, as well as an effective 
voice and a vote, but no veto, in the development and operatio? of the 
fields. The companies provided a defined program of training for BNOC 
employees in crude supply, transportation and refining operations. 
An additional area provided for consultation between BNOC and the 
companies on, but not limited to, historical and planned production 
levels, U.K. refinery throughput and output, use of U.K. oil in their 
refineries, arrangements for securing other crudes needed for refin-
eries, crude and products import-and-export balances, plans for con-
struction of refineries, upgrading or modification of existing refin-
eries and pertinent information about relevant prices. 
In May 1978 invitations for Sixth Round licence bids went out 
whereby the U.K. Government notified companies they must offer BNOC more 
than a 51 percent equity in Sixth Round bidding for licences. Other 
terms to be imposed on companies included the carried interest formula, 
in which BNOC would maintain its equity rights as a licensee but would 
not pay "for any costs or be liable for any obligations which would 
otherwise be attributable to the share for which it is being carried, 
except and to the extent that it elects to participate in any develop-
ment program." If BNOC opts into a commercial development, it will then 
reimburse the companies for its share of the exploration and appraisal 
costs and will pay its share of the development costs. 
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The companies were also asked to grant BNOC options to buy, at mar-
ket prices, their "shares of oil and natural gas liquids" and to state 
what portion of their shares they would so sell. In attition, the com-
panies were asked to grant BNOC options to sell to them at market prices 
BNOC's share of oil and gas liquids and to state what portion they would 
buy back. 
If BNOC should decide not to take part in any development, it would 
still hold a 51 percent equity interest and be represented at meetings 
concerning development. It would not be entitled to a share in the oil 
or in the ownership of assets, nor have a vote on development matters. 
Of forty blocks offered in the Sixth Round, the government wanted 
BNOC to be operator in the exploration phase for six blocks; selection 
of such blocks were to be made after all applications for the forty 
blocks received. 
Companies were judged on their Fifth Round performance in agreeing 
to government participation and their implementation of any agreements. 
The government also looked at a company's performance in providing ac-
cess to offshore installations for trade union representatives and in 
providing offshore training. 
The government proposed to hike the licence application fee to 
£1,000 as well as all rentals by 25 percent. Another financial change 
was a requirement that applicants produce their annual audited accounts. 
The development of North Sea oil placed the U.K. Government in new 
positions; indigenous oil had provided the opportunity to stimulate her 
domestic industry and the regulation of that industry, and in so doing 
she created and nourished her own state company -- BNOC. 
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However, she now found herself as a host government as well, and 
adapted accordingly: her previous affinity towards American companies 
became a direct relationship on terms differing totally from the past. 
Thus her connection with the U.S. Government was also slightly altered. 
BP maintained her peculiar association with the U.K. Government 
amidst stress to revise it, and emerged even stronger as a commercially 
independent company. She continued the unofficial alliance with the 
American majors while taking advantage of her new ties with BNOC. 
If one only considers BP's contribution of her technical expertise 
to the municipal law creating process of her home government, that in 
itself would be a significant contribution to future international regu-
lation. But compounded with her alliance in the Sisterhood, her voice 
in unorganized international society is more powerful than any single 
state; and, in organized international society, than any confederation 
of states. 
As has been shown BP successfully boycotted Iran, exemplified by ! 
the Rose Mary case; she also refused a direct order from her home gov-
ernment to supply fuel to the Navy during the 1973 Crisis; but perhaps 
the best example is that of Rhodesia, where she not only defied her home 
government, but mocked the U.N. and, indeed, the entire international 
legal community as well. 
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CHAPTER 11 
. RHODESIA: FAILURE OF ORGANIZED INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
Global multipurpose institutions such as the League 
of Nations and the United Nations are best under-
stood as organizational superstructures of interna-
tional customary law on a consensual and confederate 
basis. Their impact on international law is three-
fold: modification by express consent of the rules 
underlying the fundamental principles of interna-
tional law, indirect modification of these rules by 
acquiescence on the part of member states in the 
action of organs not actually authorized to exercise 
lawmaking functions, and initiation of the further 
codification and development of international law. 
Georg Schwarzenberger 
••• (the U.S. [and U.K.]) government has, to date, shared the 
general failure to regulate those companies effectively ••. 
the signal shortcoming of national policy and, indeed, that of 
the Western European nations on this issue, has been our col-
lective failure to recognize, at least since the end of World 
War II, the central proposition that the orderly disposition 
of world petroleum resources between the producing and consum-
ing nations must ultimately be resolved internationally on a 
sovereign level, i.e., as between governments, through multi-
lateral treaties, international arbitration and enforcement, 
e~. 
David I. Haberman 
In examining a company's relationship with both home and host gov-
ernments it has been illustrated that in most cases the objectives of 
home companies and governments have been parallel and thus little dis-
cord has arisen between them; in fact, mutual support has nourished this 
alignment for years. 
Rhodesia, however, exemplifies some of the conflicts inherent in a 
situation where objectives of home companies and governments are in di-
rect opposition. As has been illustrated, a large oil firm is motivated 
by profit and is generally apolitical, in that politics which could 
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limit profits are shunned; politics which could enhance profits are 
adopted. The home government, as a general rule, benefits from a suc-
cessful home oil company so that the established pattern is one of coop-
eration. However, in a case where a home government's political priori-
ties inhibit the company's profit incentive, the relationship between 
the two bodies is stressed. While this contradiction of objectives and 
behavior may damage the relationship on one level, it need not adversely 
effect all the aspects of the relationship. 
Thus while a serious rift may have divided BP and the U.K. Govern-
ment over Rhodesian sanctions, no indication of this rift was evident 
over BP's activities in the Middle East, America or Britain. 
BP, for her part, acted in accordance with her general philosophy 
of business practices. Her financial interest in the area was specified 
in the Red Line Agreement of 1928 when it was determined by the emerging 
world oligopoly members that the "area between Cyprus, South Africa and 
Ceylon" would be divided fifty-fifty between Shell and BP for supply and 
distribution purposes. 
Shell had previously begun developing the area for herself and had 
already gained brand-name recognition in the area; so it was decided to 
capitalize on this and allow Shell's established management in the area 
to continue. The 1931 Management Agreement spelled out the details of 
the arrangement whereby Shell (then the Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.) 
would manage the operations of the Consolidated Petroleum Co. Ltd., the 
company established by Shell and BP to service the Cyprus-South Africa-
Ceylon triangle. 1 
This was a logical progression following the established pattern of 
efficient scientific management in order to best maximize profits. BP 
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was always a crude-rich company, while Shell specialized in refining and 
marketing. It mattered little to BP that the products would be marketed 
under a Shell label so long as BP received her 50 percent share of the 
profi ts. 
This arrangement worked well for close to fifty years, and was, 
then, 'in existence when on 11 November 1965 Ian Smith and the "Govern-
ment of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia illegally and unilater-
ally announced its independence of the United Kingdom" (UDI), and when 
the resultant sanctions took effect. 
On the 16th November the British Parliament enacted The 
Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, declaring that Southern Rhodesia 
continued to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and glvlng 
power by Order in Council to impose economic and other sanc-
tions against Southern Rhodesia •••• Then, on the 17th Decem-
ber 1965, sanctions were imposed in respect of petroleum and 
petroleum products. 2 
On 29 May 1968 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted 
Resolution No. 253 which prevented the sale or supply of commodities or 
products to Rhodesia. 3 
Her Majesty's Government responded by making The Southern 
Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968 (S.I. 1968/885) 
("the 1968 Sanctions Order") which became effective on the 
14th June 1968. The 1968 Sanctions Order obtained the neces-
sary approval of the House of Commons but not of the House of 
Lords. A further Order was therefore made: The Southern 
Rhodesia (United National Sanctions) (No.2) Order 1968 (S.I. 
1968/1020) ("the Sanctions Order") which became effective on 
the 3rd July 1968 and was duly approved by both Houses of 
Parliament •••• [The 1968 Sanctions Order] revoked a number 
of earlier Sanctions Orders, including the Southern Rhodesia 
(Petroleum) Order 1965 (S.1. 1965/2140) ("the 1965 Sanctions 
Order") but contained transitional provisions and provlslons 
concerning the liability of Directors and company officers 
•••• 4 
Since the U.N. has never been endowed with enforcement powers, its 
Resolutions serve as a model which may be incorporated into members' 
separate domestic laws and thus enforced by individual members only when 
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offences fall within that members' jurisdiction. Therefore, the U.K. 
Government's power of enforcement of the sanctions she imposed on 
Rhodesia were limited to 
(i) ••• companies incorporated in the United Kingdom and also, 
under both the 1968 Orders, by companies incorporated in any 
other country or place to which the Southern Rhodesia Act "1965 
extends: such countries or places include Southern Rhodesia, 
Colonies and Protectorates within the meaning of the British 
Nationality Act 1948 and foreign countries and territories in 
which Her Majesty has jurisdiction. (ii) ••• British citizens 
and subjects (although only, under the 1965 Sanctions Order, 
if ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom). (iii) citizens 
of Southern Rhodesia (but only in resEect of exports to 
Rhodesia, under the two 1968 Orders). 
It becomes important to examine the corporate home of the companies 
operating in the area (See Figure 4). 'Prior to UDI five companies mar-
keted petroleum products in Rhodesia, a land-locked country with no in-
digenous source of crude: Shell Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd. enjoyed a 39.1 
percent share of the market; BP Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd., held 12.9 percent; 
Mobil Oil Southern Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd. and Caltex Oil Rhodesia (Pvt) 
Ltd. each had 20.0 percent; and Total Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd. constituted 
the remaining 8.0 percent of the market. All of these companies, incor-
porated in Rhodesia, were obtaining their supplies in 1965 from the new-
ly opened Feruka Refinery in Umtali, Rhodesia, which was owned by Cen-
tral African Petroleum Refineries (Pvt) Ltd. (CAPREF), also incorporated 
in Rhodesia. CAP REF was established in 1963 for the purpose of con-
structing and operating the refinery by the following companies in ac-
cordance with their respective share-holding percentages: Shell Petro-
leum Co. Ltd. (20.75 percent), British Petroleum Co. Ltd. (20.75 per-
cent), Mobil Petroleum Co. Inc. (17.75 percent), Caltex U.K. Ltd. (15.75 
percent), American Independent Oil Co. (15.00 percent), and Kuwait Na-
tional Petroleum Co. (5.00 percent). 
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. FIGURE 4 
CORPORATE REGISTRATION IN THE RHODESIAN CHAIN OF SUPPLY (1965-NOVEMBERI967) 
, -
The sophisticated and modern refinery, intended to serve the needs 
of Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, was supplied from the Mozambique port of 
Beira by a pipeline owned by Lonrho Ltd. (U.K. incorporation) and Com-
panhis do Pipeline Mozambique Rhodesia SARL (CPMR) , a company controlled 
by Lonrho. Those products not supplied by CAPREF came from South Africa 
primarily by sea from Durban to Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), Mozam-
bique, and then continued by rail to Rhodesia, although some were routed 
by rail from Durban through Botswana to Rhodesia. Any remaining prod-
ucts unavailable from South African sources would be shipped from the 
Persian Gulf or elsewhere to Beira, Mozambique, and forwarded by rail to 
Rhodesia. 
Since South Africa supplied such a large proportion of products to 
pre-UDI Rhodesia, a look at the South African market is indicated. Mar-
keting of petroleum goods was proportionately shared as follows: Shell 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd. (27 percent), BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd. (13 
percent), Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd. (26 percent), Caltex Oil 
(S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. (18 percent), Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd. (8 per-
cent), South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corp. Ltd. (SASOL) (5 percent), 
Esso (1 percent), and others (2 percent). In 1965 there were two major 
refineries in South Africa -- South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty) 
Ltd. (SAPREF) owned by Shell and B.P., and Mobil Refining Company South-
ern Africa (Pty) Ltd., owned by her American parent company. 
Market shares of Mozambique are hard to establish, but Shell/ 
BP and SONAP, a local marketing company in which the Mozam-
bique Government had a majority interest, enjoyed about one 
third of the trade each; the remaining third was split between 
Caltex and Mobil, roughly equally but probably with Caltex en-
joying a slight advantage. The business of Shell and BP was 
carried on by Shell Mozambique Ltd. and by a Mozambique branch 
of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd. Caltex and Mobil also con-
ducted business in Mozambique through branches of their South 
African marketing companies. 6 
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A single refinery situated at Matola near Lourenco Marques was 
owned by the Sociedade National de Refinacao de Petroleos (SONAREP). 
The majority interest was held by Manuel Boullosa, and CPF held a sub-
stantial minority interest with a supply agreement for crude. SONAREP 
was protected by a Portuguese Government requirement for all marketers 
to obtain from the refinery volumes of certain products equal to the 
amount sold in 1961 plus 80 percent yearly growth demand. A series of 
international agreements secured by the Portuguese insured the use of 
Mozambique's ports and railways for supplying the inland areas so that 
both before and after UDr the quantities of oil products carried from or 
through Lourenco Marques exceeded the entire domestic consumption of 
Mozambique and that of Rhodesia. 
Following the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 7 April 
1966, the Royal Navy at the express invitation of the Council, undertook 
the patrol of the port of Beira to enforce the sanctions. As Lord 
George Wigg pointed out in a letter to the Times (London) on 3 March 
1971, had the Navy not accepted the commission, little could have been 
done to stop the Council from inviting the Soviet Union to do the job 
with all the consequences inherent in such a decision. From March 1966 
no attempt by tankers was made to use the port of Beira. However, no 
such patrol guarded the port of Lourenco Marques, which was well known 
"as a base from which oil travelled to Rhodesia. 
The British Embassy in Pretoria had made excellent arrange-
ments to ascertain with great accuracy what oil was being 
taken from Lourenco Marques into Southern Rhodesia and, there-
fore, there can be no doubt this information was well known to 
the Foreign Office. 7 
An entry in Richard Crossman's diary, dated 10 September 1966, 
records a meeting with Lord Wigg, who was then Paymaster-General and 
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security advisor to Prime Minister Harold Wilson: 
I found him entirely absorbed in ••• sanctions. He busily set 
about proving to me that the military intelligence at his dis-
posal confirmed the view that petrol moved by rail can only go 
one way and could be cut off as it passed through Lourenco 
Marques. 
Early that morning [September 8, 1966] I had just had time to 
read the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee]. I'd seen the 
stuff George was talking about but I'd also read the end of 
the staff paper, which said that petrol could also be taken 
through by road and at a not much greater price. So even if 
Portugal did cut off supplies it would not be the end of 
Rhodesia. 
Mr. Crossman's note of a meeting of the Cabinet's Rhodesia Comrnit-
tee the same day records Lord George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, as 
saying: "I must make my views clear and I must tell you that I am not 
speaking for my department, because my department want no sanctions. ,,8 
From this evidence alone it seems likely that the U.K. Government 
was cognizant of the possible and probable supply routes to Rhodesia, 
which would be congruent with her general practice of keeping informed. 
It is also clear that the government position was not popular in all de-
partments. What remains unproven is the degree to which the government 
was informed at various stages and why comprehensive action (such as 
patrolling Lourenco Marques and other notable points of entry) failed to 
materialize. 
During 1965-1966 the chain of supply operated in three ways. The 
SAPREF connection in South Africa accounts for a large percentage of 
Rhodesia's supplies at this time. The South African marketing subsidi-
aries of BP and Shell, Shell South Africa and BP Southern Africa, would 
submit estimates of their needs to the Consolidated operation who for-
warded the figures to SAPREF. SAP REF , in turn, would submit an order to 
the parent companies for various quantities and types of crude necessary 
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for filling the order. The Shell (SIMC) and BP Trading companies would 
sell the allotted crude to the Shell and BP South African trading compa-
nies on cif. terms with property passing with the exchange of documents 
on the high seas. The crude was then processed by SAPREF (SAPREF never 
owned any goods; she only processed them for a fee). Upon departure 
from SAPREF title transferred to the South African marketing subsidi-
aries, who later sold the goods to Freight Services. Freight Services 
oversaw the connection with GENTA in Rhodesia. Processed products fol-
lowed the same chain of supply, omitting the unnecessary refining stage 
wi th SAPREF. 
Shell Mozambique, under direct orders from the South African trad-
ing subsidiaries, loaded 500 rail tank wagons per annum at Lorenco 
Marques which had then been railed direct to Rhodesia. 
At first the trains had been sent into South Africa and then 
shunted back over the Mozambique frontier to Moamba and thence 
north into Rhodesia. When this movement had been stopped by 
South African Railways in 1966, the trains had instead pro-
ceeded direct to Rhodesia. 9 
In 1967 SERVICO came into existence and added an additional link to 
the chain at the refinery fence title passed not to the marketing 
companies but to SERVICO, which owned the local storage and distribution 
facilities. Title remained in SERVICO until the time of delivery to the 
customer, when a rapid transfer of title to the local marketing company 
and then to the customer occurred. SERVICO also handled previously pro-
cessed products acquired from CPF. 
According to BP she only learned of Shell Mozambique's direct in-
volvement on 23 January 1968, and immediately worked out steps to ar-
range a swap agreement with the French company Total, an option dis-
cussed before UDI.I0 According to a BP file note, in a discussion of 
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the swap arrangement at Shell Centre in London, 19 February 1968, BP's 
then managing director William Fraser (later Lord Strathalmond) took 
"the stand that a full disclosure of the facts should now be made to the 
Commonwealth Secretary [George Thomson], and Shell that a quite differ-
ent approach was called for. Shell resisted point by point •••• 11 
Two days later the government was told something of what happened: 
Among those present were Mr. William Fraser the late Lord 
Strathalmond of BP, Sir Frank McFadzean, of Shell, Mr. George 
(now Lord) Thomson of Monifieth, then Commonwealth Secretary, 
Sir Leslie Monson of the Foreign Office, Mr. (now Sir) James 
Bottomly, of the Commonwealth Office, and Mr. Barry Powell 
from the Ministry of Power. 
Mr. McFadzean, as he then was, has a note of the meeting which 
made it clear that Mr. Thomson correctly understood that al-
though he had recently told the African countries that "no 
British company was supplying oil to Rhodesia" it was now ap-
parent that "this probably was not correct." 
A more detailed version of events, however was given to Mr. 
Alan Gregory a civil servant at the Ministry of Power [on 15 
May 1968]. 
Mr. Gregory, [later to become a BP employee], accepted that 
the effect of the change (that is to the swap arrangements) 
would "be a purely cosmetic one, in the sense that the same 
amount of oil would reach Rhodesia by the same route but would 
appear to have originated from a French instead of an English 
one. 
BP says that the Shell representative at the meeting agreed 
the information could be passed to the responsible desk office 
at the Foreign Office "on a purely personal basis." 
BP says that "by one route or another, therefore, all the 
relevant facts regarding the 1968 arrangements were fully and 
clearly communicated to the Government." 12 
The oil companies had told the government shortly after the imposi-
tion of sanctions that it would be impossible to prevent oil from reach-
ing Rhodesia without blockading South Africa. "At no stage were the 
Government prepared to do this," according to Sir Frank McFadzean, then 
chairman of the Shell Petroleum Company. 
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Lord Thomson, Commonwealth Secretary 1968-1969, had admitted that a 
prosecution of Shell Mozambique was considered at this time but re-
jected. 
If there had been a prosecution, the disclosure that British 
companies had been supplying oil would have boosted Rhodesian 
morale, provided ammunition for critics of Britain at the 
United Nations; and would not have stopped oil flowing in from 
other countries. 
So in 1968, the Government concentrated on ensuring that 
British oil companies were observing British law, while the 
efforts went on from a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia on 
the basis of majority rule. 13 
The question of government knowledge at this time has been hotly 
debated and until such time as government records are made public the 
issue may remain blurred. However, according to Jorge Jardim, Mozam-
bique representative of the Portuguese dictator Dr. Salazar, Mozambican 
Railways documents show that even in 1969-1970 Shell Mozambique was 
still handling large quantities of oil which were knowingly being sent 
to Rhodesia. 14 A long silence ensued between government and the oil 
companies over the question of sanctions breaking which BP interpreted 
as government approval of existing arrangements. 
Early in 1968 Shell wished to separate her U.K marketing operation 
(which had been jointly owned and operated with BP); and, according to 
the pa ttern of barter in inter-company negotiations, BP agreed to the 
split under the condition that a similar division be made in South 
Africa. The exercise of splitting Consolidated South Africa was not 
completed until 25 June 1975 (See Figures 5 and 6). In the interim, 
however, management was gradually transferred to the subsidiaries. 
The Operating Agreement of 1969 stipulated that Shell would main-
tain operating and managing control of Consolidated and Consolidated 
Supply but would act only as advisor to the remaining subsidiaries. It 
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has been intended that a similar division of the groups' interests in 
the Consolidated companies in Mozambique should be effected. This plan 
was at a late stage given up, but the provision of services and advice 
to the jointly owned Consolidated marketing company in Mozambique, now 
called BP and Shell Mozambique Ltd., has since September 1975 been un-
dertaken by BP and not by Shell. 
No formal change has been made in the Consolidated Agreements so 
far as they affect Rhodesia although Rhodesian legislation has so oper-
ated as to oust both Consolidated and the parent groups from effective 
control of the Rhodesian marketing companies. 1s 
In May 1971 Denys Milne, then chairman of BP Southern Oil Ltd., was 
sent to Cape Town to oversee the Consolidated split. Shortly there-
after, he commissioned John Rounce, one of his assistants, to investi-
gate the Freight Services operation. The resulting "Rounce Memorandum" 
of February 1974 described in great detail BP and Shell's arrangements 
to supply 51 percent of the Rhodesian market, pointing out that the swap 
agreement with Total had not been operative since early 1973. He illus-
trated how business continued as normal with Exxon vying for the entire 
market in 1970 by offering to supply 100 percent of GENTA volumes at 
heavily discounted prices only to be refused in deference to the "con-
tinued relationship with the established marketers." 
The report was forwarded to London and to Ian McCutcheon, a British 
director of Shell Mozambique, with whom Milne conspired to cover up the 
facts. 1s Milne is now managing director and chief executive of BP Oil 
Ltd. in London; McCutcheon is now financial controller of the Royal 
Dutch Shell Group. 
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The BP London office did not seem to be concerned over the memoran-
dum, and in 1975 the Central Planning Department made references to the 
loss of Rhodesian trade with its Durban refinery should a settlement be 
reached .16 
In 1976 when newly independent Mozambique closed its borders with 
Rhodesia, reports were reaching BP London about sales to Freight Ser-
vices drying up and the need for an alternative supply route. 
But it was not until June 1977 -- a month after Bingham's appoint-
ment to conduct the investigation -- that a team from BP was sent to 
South Africa "to discover, if it could, whether BP's marketing subsidi-
ary was still selling petroleum or petroleum supplies to Freight Ser-
vices and, if so, what steps, if any could be taken to end such sales." 
BP explains that assurance of the subsidiary's non-involvement entailed 
approval of the South African Minister of Economic Affairs. Not being 
satisfied with "the wording" of the first letter of assurance received, 
on 12 July the company wi thheld "all products which they thought might 
be the subject of sales to Freight Services until a clear assurance had 
been given." Nine days later BP received the properly worded letter of 
assurance she had wanted. Shortly thereafter rumors of a new swap deal 
emerged linking Shell/BP wi th the "South African state oil group Sasol, 
whereby Sasol supplies Rhodesia and Shell/BP supply Sasol's customers in 
South Africa. As Sasol's refinery, Natref, in which Sasol has a con-
trolling interest, has a capacity equal to Rhodesia's needs, this is 
seen as a neat arrangement. 17 
According to BP's established pattern of behavior, at the first 
sign of a problem -- be it legal, political, technical, or whatever --
she would enlist expert advice (she has done this in America by being 
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the first to employ an Alaskan expert). She made gestures to the gov-
ernment early in the series of events about possible sanctions breaking 
via South Africa to secure some indication as to how strictly the rules 
were to be enforced. 
Reassured by inaction and silence on the part of the government, BP 
continued her business practices as usual. For this reason -- that she 
continued her business practices as usual -- her statement that she was 
unaware of Shell Mozambique's activities prior to 1968 and that she 
could not exercise much control over her subsidiaries must be chal-
lenged. For it was her business practices that would have held a tight 
rein on her subsidiaries, studying every report. 
However, with the single exception of how much the London office 
knew at any given time, there is nothing in BP's report to Bingham that 
contradicts her philosophy. She has taken care to stay within the let-
ter of the law, changing her arrangements to comply with successive in-
terpretations of that law. At the same time she has used the protection 
of South African law to claim ignorance on certain issues. This prac-
tice of adhering to the letter while skirting the spirit of the law has 
been evident in dealing with U.S. antitrust laws in the past. 
An interesting question arises concerning the amount of knowledge 
of the two government-appointed BP board members. Without minutes of 
board meetings, only speculation can be conjectured as to what they 
knew. Answers to this question might shed illumination as to the nature 
of BP's relationship with her government share-holders. 
The position of Lord Greenhill is especially intriguing. From 
1969 to 1973 he was head of the Foreign Office, and intimately 
involved with Government policy towards Rhodesia. On his re-
tirement in 1973 the Heath government appointed him to the BP 
board. 
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Whether or not he knew of BP's sanctions-busting activities, 
he continued to take a close interest in Rhodesia. In 
February 1976 James Callaghan, then Foreign secretarrs sent 
him as a personal emissary for talks with Ian Smith. 
It would appear that Sir Frank McFadzean's appraisal of the 
Rhodesian situation as one in which "there was a conflict of law and 
poli tical obj ectives between the United Kingdom and South Africa" 19 is 
correct. 
As has been shown, BP continued to operate in Rhodesia after UDI 
for various political, social, and economic reasons, defying her home 
government's resolve in the matter, and, more specifically, ignoring 
U.N. sanctions. It should be noted, however, that Rhodesia is not nec-
essarily an exception to the rule. MNCs have frequently operated in 
their own best interests, even when this contradicts their home govern-
ment's policy. 
Just as Iran was boycotted under Mossadeq, so Rhodesia could have 
been, had BP so wished. Such is the continuity of the cooperation of 
the oligopoly. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
The example of Rhodesia serves well to illustrate not only the 
failure of municipal law -- even that of a strong home government -- but 
more importantly, the failure of law in organized international society 
; 
to effectively regulate and control multinational corporations. 
The rapid growth of MNCs since World War II in conjunction with the 
global dependency on oil has rendered multinational petroleum corpora-
tions virtually as powerful as sovereign states. If international law 
prescribes standards of conduct for a society, it must be reflective of 
any major changes in this society. Yet, it is these very changes which 
the international legal regime has been so slow to address. 
The regime has digressed over such technical discussions as at-
tempts to outline the problems inherent in both structural and func-
tional definitions of MNCs; as well as attempts to categorize the trans-
actions of MNCs in an effort to determine whether they should be subject 
to public or private international law, or whether a new field of inter-
national economic law is indicated. 
Both the OECD and the UN Commission on TNCs have stated that it is 
possible to progress in the writing of guidelines for the conduct of 
multinational corporations without ever agreeing on a particular defini-
tion. In fact, they have done just that. Perhaps this is something 
that will be interpreted by future international judicial bodies. 
This work utilizes an interdisciplinary approach to international 
law in respect to multinational corporations and their various symbionic 
relationships with states. The actual functioning of MNCs in 
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unorganized world society has been traced from social, historical and 
ethical perspectives, the result of which indicates that MNCs already 
exhibit a degree of at least quasi-sovereignty in their dealings in the 
international arena. Since recognition of subjects of international law 
is a matter of evidence, the organized world society should recognize 
MNCs as limited international legal personalities in their own right and 
commence the process of defining what limits are inherent in their 
nature. 
One of the more obvious definitional problems involves the concept 
of sovereignty with its traditional implication of territory. The issue 
of sovereignty over a state's own natural resources becomes inextricably 
muddled when -- in practice -- MNCs exercise quasi-sovereignty over the 
lands they own, lease, or for which they contract for mineral extraction 
rights. In fact, the entire history of concession agreements -- usually 
with states or state-owned corporations formed for the express purpose 
of contracting with multinational corporations -- indicates that such 
sovereignty is in effect, negotiable, and bound by contract as an imple-
ment of international law. 
Advantages of recognizing MNCs as limited international legal per-
sonalities include the rights and duties of states. MNCs would be en-
titled to utilize international courts and judicial bodies for third 
party binding arbitration and contribute to the law creating process as 
well. On the other hand, they would be obligated under international 
law to either abide by any applicable international agreements or to 
make reparation, as are sovereign states. 
The two best examples of the results of the call for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order include the OECD Guidelines and the U.N. 
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Commission's Code of Conduct. While the results and implications of 
these conflicting behaviour guidelines for MNCs have been widely de-
bated, suffice it to say that the OECD Guidelines reflect the Western 
bias of its Group of Experts, while the Commission mirrors the Third 
World cries for NIEO. Thus, while the OECD has developed an entire set 
of Competition Guidelines in respect to restraint of trade based on the 
precedents set in the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act and the EEC Treaty of 
Rome, the concept of competition is anathema to many of the LDCs and 
host government participation -- if not nationalization -- is called 
for. 
While municipal law of more sophisticated countries who have devel-
oped their own municipal regulation from the dual perspective of both a 
home and a host country is so advanced as to serve as precedents for in-
ternational law, the Guidelines and Codes will probably serve as models 
for national legislation for less developed countries whose municipal 
regulation of MNCs is not yet highly developed. Therefore, the impor-
tance of American municipal petroleum law is emphasized and has been 
closely examined. 
As was outlined in the introduction, British Petroleum was selected 
as the ideal vehicle through which to examine the overall developments 
of the industry. BP remains as one of the few great remnants of the 
British Empire in that she still operates in over 130 countries today. 
Not only was she the first great oil company outside America, almost as 
old as Exxon herself, her global rank with Exxon and Shell today is un-
questioned. When she did enter the American market, in which she con-
trols 11 percent of the proven indigenous oil and gas reserves, she 
chose to do so through the auspices of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio 
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(SORIO), a direct offspring of Rockebeller's great monopoly. Steeped in 
the tradition of both common and international law, her contributions to 
the industry in general, and specifically her influence on American 
municipal law -- especially that of antitrust -- was apparent long be-
fore she actually entered the American market. BP's close history of 
working relationships with the biggest of the American majors, particu-
larly in view of her British nationality, would appear to render her a 
more objective observer, offering a slightly different slant in her re-
lationship with the U.S. Government as well. 
It is her paradoxical relationship with her own part-owner horne 
government, however, which allows for exploration of the implications 
inherent in a mixed economy such as Britain's. 
These various relationships have been examined over an extended 
period of time under diverse circumstances in order to fully analyze 
their synergistic nature. 
Several theories have been proposed regarding the future of multi-
national corporations and their relationships with governments. 1 
Raymond Vernon in Sovereignty at Bay2 suggests that the nation-state has 
become obsolete with the technological advances in communication and 
transportation which have increased economic interdependence; that the 
multinational corporation is better equipped to meet the needs of the 
international system than the nation-state and will, therefore, assume 
responsibility for maintaining the new world economic order of interde-
pendency. 
A second model, "dependency",3 portrays a Marxist concept of a 
hierarchical and exploitative world order, in which the multinational 
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corporation produces affluence for some nations and dependent underde-
velopment for others. 
The "mercantilist"4 view sees the nation-state as the dominating 
factor manipulating economic arrangements to suit their particular 
national interests. According to this theory a new political order is 
developing in which American power is declining and taking with it the 
influence of the multinational corporation. 
While it may be true that the efficiency of scientific management 
employed by companies better equips them to handle economic arrange-
ments, the fact that they are less directly responsible to public opin-
ion than governments suggests that they will be less efficient in meet-
ing the wide range of public needs. Therefore, the nation-state will 
not be so quickly replaced as the "beyond sovereignty" theory suggests. 
According to the symbionic nature of industry and government rela-
tionships, the hierarchical and exploitative world order as described in 
the "dependency" model appears to be valid; however, the way in which 
this order develops is seldom left simply to the discretion of multina-
tional corporations. Instead, a combination of social, historical, eth-
ical, economic, and legal factors affecting home-host relationships de-
termine the priority of affluence. In this way a country such as 
Britain, through her strength as a dominant cultural influence combined 
with her position of home country to one of the most powerful multina-
tional petroleum corporations, guarantees her place in the world order, 
compensating for her physical or economic deficiencies. A country such 
as Japan on the other hand, who qualifies neither as a host nor a home 
country in the petroleum industry will never attain a position of 
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leverage in this industry, although in another field such as electron-
ics, the picture may be altered dramatically. 
Similarly while the strength of a nation-state plays an important 
role in forming economic arrangements, this role is but one of a series 
of factors and thus cannot be simply viewed as a single dominant manipu-
lative force. Instead, a combination of factors in a definitive pattern 
of mutual manipulation forms a synergenic approach to establishing and 
maintaining a world hierarchical and exploitative order in which each 
Actor plays the Role he performs most efficiently. 
The relationship between multinational corporations and governments 
has been analyzed in terms of the inter-related functions performed by 
the two entities, reflecting the resolution of inherent conflicts be-
tween their structural natures which materialize in agreements, laws, 
and customary practics. Over a period of time these customs establish a 
pattern from which future projections may be deduced. 
One of the key elements of this synergistic relationship is the 
congruent goals of home states and companies regarding security of sup-
ply -- whether the implication is one of national security or pure prof-
it motivation. This commonality of interest can be expanded to include, 
to a lesser degree, Western alliances and cartel members. 
It should be noted that figures on crude reserves fluctuate since 
they are effected by technological improvements which determine cost-
feasibility of extraction. Validity of such data becomes complicated by 
the incorporation of propaganda, which mayor may not be intentional on 
the part of the compilers, so that the same information may be inter-
preted in several ways. Since the oil companies are the recognized ex-
perts in this area of estimating reserves and it is from them we receive 
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such information, it is likely that their conclusions are conservative, 
that supplies of crude may last longer than present conjectures suggest, 
assuming the consumer is willing to pay increased premiums for the addi-
tion of technological innovations. It is inconceivable that the needs 
of the world for supplies of energy will diminish; thus it is plausible 
that the petroleum industry will flourish proportionately to these 
needs, and that security of supply will remain a predominant issue. 
Security of supply was one of John D. Rockefeller's primary con-
cerns in developing the Standard into the prototype of a monopoly, and 
World War I brought security of supply to the top of all priority lists. 
Churchill had emphasized profit motivation in his House of Commons argu-
ment for investing in British Petroleum in 1914, but without indigenous 
oil at the time, security of supply for national defense was probably a 
more persuasive factor. American companies began looking for foreign 
sources of oil to alleviate depletion of her own reserves; while BP's 
position outside America was seemingly impregnable at the time. 
When overproduction in Texas threatened to further deplete proven 
American reserves, security of supply took on a new implication in that 
overproduction could debase the entire competitive nature of the 
American industry by bankrupting the independents. World War II renewed 
the call for secure supplies with a slightly different twist: America 
very carefully avoided any projects which might conceiv~bly aid the 
British after the war; she diverted Lend Lease Aid to King Saud, and al-
located scarce machinery for construction in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the 
Gulf-ARAMCO Agreement for U.S. Government financing of the Bahrein pipe-
line was considered such an overt threat to the U.S.-British Alliance 
that it took a series of Anglo-American conferences to work out a treaty 
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-- never to be ratified -- in which Britain was to relinquish her colo-
nial perogative which had so far prevented American companies from com-
peting Qn an equal basis with the empire. During all the commotion 
ARAMCO began construction on her own and the issue was subdued. 
Post World War II political shifts marked the entry of American-
based MNCs into the Middle East Market in an attempt to utilize cheap 
foreign oil, reserving her more expensive indigenous supply. Britain, 
on the other hand, was forced to begin looking for more secure sources 
of crude to develop after nationalization in Iran, especially in light 
of this new American competition in the area. In fact, the OPEC experi-
ence, culminating in the 1973 Oil Embargo, was the primary impetus for 
the timely development of Alaska and the North Sea. 
Thus, as has been traced throughout the paper, security of supply 
whether for profit or national security -- is a key element of the 
synergistic nature of home government-industry relationships. 
Since the actions of multinationals reflect the desires of their 
stockholders, it has been suggested that Were governments to nationalize 
the companies, the rationale for existence of these companies would 
change so that their performance would then mirror the needs of govern-
ment, eliminating conflict between the two. 
If the assumption that nationalization of oil companies would elim-
inate contention over government-industry conflicts were proven, then 
such action would potentially negate the existing relationships. How-
ever, as House of Commons debates over the creation of BNOC exemplified, 
the characteristic antipathy would still exist so that a government-
controlled company might still function as a private firm, as in the 
case of BP, or its loss of profit motivation in favor of such 
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governmental policies as job creation to eliminate unemployment or pro-
viding uneconomical services would create an impediment of inefficiency. 
The pattern of interactions between companies also reflects symbi-
otic relationships between private enterprise in that there is a plural-
istic competitive force pitting companies against one another. In the 
early stages of development these internal struggles can be quite 
vicious, as has been illustrated from the perspective of the American 
independent during the monopoly of Standard Oil, or amongst the wild-
catters in the East Texas field. During such unstable times market en-
try and exit tend to transpire overnight. Alliances first develop be-
tween companies in the course of self-defense or preservation in opposi-
tion to another company or coalition whose actions either threaten the 
existence or profit of the first. Successful associations may be re-
peated in similar future conflicts. 
Organizations with common structural bonds naturally tend to unite 
and this federation is more likely to survive over a period of time than 
any without such a liaison. Common experience such as language, nation-
ality, and cultural background are contributing factors to the strength 
of an affiliation but cannot be its sole determining factor. 
It is only natural that a certain affinity exists between BP and 
the U.K. Government; between BP and the other Sisters; and to a lesser 
degree between BP and the American Government. Yet this affinity does 
not eliminate conflict between organizations; it tends to materialize 
when confronted with a mutual opponent. 
Relationships are clearly defined on different levels; for in-
stance, both the American majors and the U.S. Government would benefit 
by expanding their influence to Saudi Arabia during World War II in a . 
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nationalistic bid, challenging the established British dominance. How-
ever, when the government proposed entering the oil business there, the 
American majors immediately called upon their alliance with BP as a ma-
jor company to check the common threat. 
When a company engages in business with a host country, the natural 
coal~tion between that company and her home government is usually roused 
by mutual potential benefit in opposition to the host. The U.K. 's en-
dorsement of BF in her commercial transaction with Iran exemplifies this 
concept, in that not only did the government obtain secure supplies for 
herself, she became BF's most consequential client, providing both dip-
lomatic and military protection for the company. 
When nationalism replaced colonialism after World War II, and BF's 
holdings in Iran were seized, condemnation was evoked in both the compa-
ny and the home country. To enlist support in the ensuing boycott, RF 
appealed to her Sisters, while Whitehall approached the American Govern-
ment. The coalition produced a resounding defeat for Mossadeq, but the 
cost of this assistance was American participation in a previously all-
British sphere of influence. 
By arranging for the Shah to return to the throne, all parties con-
cerned could comfortably rely on Iran's solid commitment to them -- a 
commitment which lasted for twenty-five years. Khomeni's Revolution de-
posed the Shah and with him, Iran's obligation. The present chaos re-
flects a period of instability which will eventually correct itself. 
While similarities exist bet,ween the Khomeni Regime and that of 
Mossadeq, the difference is that today no firm or country is totally de-
pendent on Iranian crude. While impositions may occur, no such drastic 
action as a boycott is likely to recur. This time, a period of 
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readjustment will be allowed until a certain political stability is re-
covered when the companies will once again negotiate terms. 
When a company engages in business within her home country, the 
natural coalition between companies as free enterprises is sparked by 
mutual potential benefit in opposition to government regulatidn. The 
situation becomes slightly more complex when divisions within the compa-
nies obstruct the basic drives of other firms for maintaining their own 
existence or maximizing their own profits. 
Such divisions occur along nationalistic lines of domestic versus 
foreign investors in which instances the domestic investors will gener-
ally affiliate -- at least partially -- with their home government to 
protect their spheres of influence. 
With the U.K. Government employing a discretionary form of bidding, 
BP is assured of the advantage inherent in British citizenship. At the 
same time, she is careful not to allow this privilege to be used as lev-
erage by the government or by the foreign investors who may invoke the 
principle of reciprocity against her operations in their country. 
Another division which may exist is between independents and the 
majors with each group vying for support from the home government. Gov-
ernments tend to reward those groups which consistently. generate the 
most qualitative support for them. Therefore, since the majors not only 
have more resources on the domestic level but also on the foreign plane 
(where industry , usually supports home government), it is the majors who 
consistently generate the most qualitative support for the government 
and thus are most frequently rewarded. 
The pattern for this dissent between independents and majors was 
set by the 1911 Dissolution decree, which used antitrust legislation to 
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ensure the survival of independents. This in effect, has frozen the 
proportionate distribution of the market, limiting any future aspira-
tions of independents. No independent has since bridged the gap of 
transformation into a major company. Note that SOHIO was bought by BP 
and infused with her Alaskan holdings and the technology to achieve this 
end which is, actually, the expansion of a major, not the transfor-
mation of an independent. This situation is limited by antitrust legis-
lation so that it can never be repeated; it was only allowed originally 
because BP had no major prior holdings in America. 
Conversely, on a broader scope, since the home government consis-
tently generates qualitative support for the majors, the companies, in 
turn, reward the government in such ways as volunteering information, 
creating jobs, developing technology, investing capital, and establish-
ing a tremendous tax base as well as prestige and power, supplying the 
resources with which the government may satisfy its demands. Ultimate-
ly, the American Government is rewarded by the implied power to regulate 
the world-wide activities (through municipal control) of each of the 
Seven Sisters since each operates under American domestic law. This 
power has recently been employed by the U.S., offering a $5 subsidy to 
oil companies for every barrel of Western Hemisphere oil imported in or-
der to perpeturate her secure supply of cheap oil. She was limited by 
the principle of reciprocity to proposing this incentive only in the 
Western Hemisphere which she can justify by referring to the precedents 
established in the Roosevelt Correlary to the Monroe Doctrine. 
On still another level, cartel members will compete feverishly 
amongst themselves, forming partnerships with whoever is convenient for 
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the purpose, until such time as a mutual opponent presents a threat pro-
voking the cartel fraternity into unified action. 
OPEC is the obvious example. From the early part of this century 
the Seven Sisters played one Middle Eastern country against the other 
for personal competitive advantage. With the Libyan Revolution came 
resistance to the exploitative practices of the companies, who immedi-
ately called on all the -- by now traditional alliances to counter 
this adversity. The inefficiency of the London Policy Group was due to 
a breach in home government-industry strategy, weakening the coalition. 
This shifted the temporary advantage of leverage to OPEC members, each 
of whom utilized Machiavellian tactics to realize his terms. 
Unification of OPEC failed to materialize until the Israeli War of 
1973 provided the impetus necessary for integrated action. However, 
since this conjuncture was based on a political goal totally unrelated 
to oil policy, the unity of OPEC was superficial. By failing to main-
tain cohesion, the Arab coalition has become impotent. The companies, 
having armed themselves with new supplies of oil in order to minimize 
the Arab leverage, have enhanced their position so that the prevailing 
pattern of multinational corporation dominance has return. 
Relationships in the international petroleum industry follow the 
precedent of set alliances to meet given circumstances. This practice 
can be illustrated from the perspective of British Petroleum. 
In her relationship with her home government she will continue to 
enjoy diplomatic and cultural strength in her dealings with h~st govern-
ments, unless -- as in the case of Rhodesia -- either the company or the 
government adopts a policy which is inconsistent with her primary goals 
and objectives. Continuity of leadership and the efficiency of 
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scientific management inherent in company structure is less likely to 
allow the development of such an inconsistent policy than is the fluctu-
ating political nature of governments. 
Domestically, they will cooperate to a certain degree to ensure 
nationalistic development of a large portion of the North Sea; but as 
the British regulatory system develops, BP is likely to identify with 
other companies to attain more favorable results. 
In order to encourage North Sea development, the Conservatives have 
lowered corporate taxes and allowed the industry freedom to engage in 
voluntary cooperation for their own benefit. According to the pattern, 
however, voluntary intra-company cooperation is seldom so practical as 
it appears on paper and the traditional dominance of the majors in such 
agreements will eventually lead to a call for government imposed regula-
tion by the companies themselves. 
The U.K. Government is still bidding against the U.S. for industry 
investments and unless certain incentives are offered to industry, she 
is unlikely to attract the momentum of development she so desperately 
needs to accomplish her broad national goals. The advantage of leverage 
clearly lies with the companies who will reward whichever government 
makes the best offer, allowing the greater return on the companies' in-
vestments. 
In BP's relationships with her other Sisters the established mode 
of competition will continue so that in the American market BP, through 
SORIa, will continue to be a leading competitor; BP, in a possible joint 
venture with BNOC will enhance her already powerful North Sea invest-
ments; and in the rest of the world she will compete as she has for her 
fair share of the market. Together the majors will contend with the 
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independents and face such adversaries as OPEC and other host govern-
ments. 
Her relationship with the U.S. Government, through SOHIO, will 
become more direct and influential as her men participate more in the 
established federal, state, and local levels of American Government. 
Since the U.S. Government has already made overtures towards indus-
try's demands for profit maximization by allowing the domestic price to 
float and gradually find its competitive place in the world market and 
by offering a five dollar subsidy for every barrel imported from the 
Western Hemisphere, the government has assured herself of supplies of 
cheap oil to meet her national goals and at the same time to foster her 
relationship with the companies. 
With the exception of supplying Israel's oil needs from Alaska for 
at least fifteen years in a special case to underwrite the Middle East 
peace, American oil will be consumed on her own soil while she continues 
to import ever increasing amounts. Rates, prices, and profits, have 
been partially deregulated although a windfall profits tax was passed to 
limit the inevitable boost in profits. 
Antitrust enforcement will continue to be an important issue on the 
American domestic scene, although according to precedent, it will be 
waived at the discretion of the government whenever it is deemed an im-
pediment to some other more pressing need. Likewise, the procedure for 
bidding for leases, permits, and certification is well established and 
there is no apparent need for radical change. 
The traditional American attitude of abhorence toward public fi-
nance will encourage private arrangements to continue to develop as the 
projects become more costly, and interlocking directorates will become 
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even more prevalent between oil companies and financial institutions. 
However, public finance will always remain an option which may at least 
be partially employed, although such a move would require industry back-
ing and will, according to history, be reserved as a last resort, as in 
the case of the Big Inch pipeline. 
Since the nationalistic nature of governments dictates that the 
stronger a nation is, the more resources she will have available to 
enhance her position, the American Government will continue to encourage 
cooperation with her companies. BP has assured herself a large share of 
this market. 
So long as the need for supplies of cheap energy outweigh the need 
to alter income distribution, the companies will maintain a slight edge 
in leverage over the U.S. Government, allowing them to achieve most of 
their goals. This advantage need not work to the detriment of the gov-
ernment however; in fact, so long as each continues to meet the major 
needs of the other, the natural horne industry-government alliance will 
fourish. 
In operating with OPEC members and other host governments, BP will 
continue in her synergenic role with the U.K. and U.S. Governments and 
the American majors to extract the most rewarding terms possible. 
The alliance will benefit from the inevitable price rises since 
Alaskan and North Sea oil become progressively more attractive as the 
margin of price differential narrows. Conversely, the narrower the mar-
gin becomes, the more leverage the alliance gains over the Middle East-
ern producers. The company will function from company oriented goals, 
thus opposing any attempts at regulation on the part of host govern-
ments. So long as it is in the interest of the home governments for the 
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companies to thrive unfettered in host situations, the nationalistic 
selfish interests of the home country will support the companies rather 
than limit them. In fact they are likely to cater their home regulation 
as it affects foreign operations to the needs of the companies, waiving 
antitrust enforcement, for instance, if need be, as has been done on 
several occasions in the past. On non-industry related issues home 
governments will follow the pattern of supplying any needs of hosts 
which might strengthen dependency on Western trade, thus enhancing their 
leverage. 
Ultimately, under the present system of municipal regulation, it is 
the public opinion of the home country population which dictates the 
limits on multinational corporations. 
In short, BP will continue as she has in the past to participate in 
the pluralistic balance of power. 
The interdisciplinary approach to the study of international law, 
illustrates the complexities of the global order: it indicates patterns 
of behavior which reflect the motivational nature of the participants; 
demonstrates the interaction and mutual manipulation involved in the 
functioning of conflict management; and defines alternatives to current 
legislation on both domestic and international levels. The practical 
application of this approach enables an active participation in the law 
creating process of effecting appropriate international legislation, 
which may be expanded effectively from precedents of municipal laws only 
when similar needs and proportionate support exist between the two situ-
ations. Since the evolution of multinational corporations -- and thus 
the need to regulate them is relatively recent, case studies must be 
fortified with some basis for projecting the suitability of specific 
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international law, considering the practicality of enacting and enforc-
ing such a law. 
One such contribution from American municipal law is the issue of 
antitrust or restraint of trade. While examination of the Sherman Act 
and various related court cases is important, perhaps equally important 
is a survey of America's officially ambivalent attitude toward antitrust 
enforcement, especially in relation to foreign investments. Merely by 
tracing official government investigations of the oil industry and not-
ing the types of situations in which the Justice Department was stifled 
in its attempts to "enforce the laws of the land," a definite pattern 
emerges in which antitrust is pragmatically used as a coersive negotiat-
ing tool. 
The Sherman Act (1890) was passed primarily with the Standard Oil 
Co. in mind. A 1903 Bureau of Corporations investigation under the aus-
pices of the Department of Commerce and Labor reviewed affairs of corpo-
rations involved in interstate commerce. Two important developments can 
be traced to this investigation: (1) The Hepburn Act (1906) defined 
pipelines as common carriers" and, as such, interstate commerce to be 
regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission; and (2) the U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately issued the 1911 Dissolution Decree against 
Standard. 
A few years later the Federal Trade Commission investigation of 
1915 (the results of which were published in 1918) charged Standard Oil 
of Indiana with violating both the FTC and Clayton Acts (the latter be-
ing part of the Sherman Act). This was intended as a direct challenge 
to Mark Requa's World War I regulatory commissions as evidenced by the 
negotiated settlement of the issues in a signed agreement between Requa 
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and the FTC in which Standard Oil of Indiana, in effect, plea bargained 
for the lesser charges of false advertising, etc., in exchange for an 
industry promise not to raise prices. It was Bedford of Standard who 
was selected by Requa to convince the industry to cooperate. 
The Red Line Agreement by its very nature as an intra-company 
agreement intended to restrain the trade of independents, indeed, of any 
petroleum company who was not a signatory. Perhaps because it was a 
"secret" agreement, but more likely because it was in the interest of 
American national security under the security of supply rationalle, no 
antitrust objections were raised. 
Roosevelt in his New Deal attempted to renew antitrust policies 
more from political motivation than economic concerns since the oil in-
dustry's problems during this recovery period were not so much reflec-
tive of restraint of trade as they were of unrestrained overproduction. 
Nevertheless, the Cole Sub-Committee of the House committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce held the most exhaustive herings till 
then, investigating antitrust allegations regarding, among other things, 
the entire Southeast oil transportation system. 
Attorney General Robert Jackson initiated a grand jury investiga-
tion in Madison, Wis., which returned a guilty verdict to a misdemeanor 
charge rather than to the" criminal charges of price fixing. An even 
more extensive investigation was that of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee between 1938-1941, filling 37 volumes with testimony alone. 
Soon to follow was the ultimate antitrust suit dubbed the Mother-Hubbard 
case which was suspended during World War II and dropped in 1951. 
347 
One further issue under the Roosevelt Era with antitrust complica-
tions was the voluntary nature of the industry code of fair competition 
not unlike the OECD Guidelines. 
World War II renewed the wartime emergency commissions with its ac-
companying special case antitrust dispensations from the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, allowing lower freight rates; and from the Department 
of Justice, allowing the pooling of reserves and shipments, and the 
sharing of increased transportation costs. 
At the conclusion of the War, industry favored rapid dismantlement 
of the domestic wartime machinery in order to avoid charges of antitrust 
as an excuse to nationalize the industry. The majors also asked for ex-
emption from antitrust considerations, in effect, when competing with BP 
for Middle Eastern concessions after the War. 
In the post war renegotiations of the Iraq Petroleum Co. Agreement 
in which Mobil and Exxon had sought for and acquired the legal negation 
of the Red Line Agreement in order to acquire a bigger share of the 
spoils of war, State Department approval was granted concerning anti-
trust implications in participating in the new IPC Agreement. Later, in 
the midst of dealing with the leapfrog effect of Libya's spiraling de-
mands, the State Department refused a U.K. Foreign Office request to ask 
U.S.-based members of the Iranian concession to grant a participation 
percentage increase to Iran similar to that already agreed with.Libya. 
The State Department insisted that the companies should work out their 
own differences to the exclusion of the home governments which presup-
poses secrecy of intra-company agreements, in direct conflict with anti-
trust principles. Similar disregard for antitrust principles is evident 
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in the Libyan Producers' Agreement, not to mention the obvious example 
of the London Policy Group. 
The BP-SOHLO merger was delayed by the Justice Department as a 
matter of standard practice until the proposed holdings were brought 
into line with current antitrust guidelines. 
Attorney General John Mitchell recommended dropping antitrust 
charges in 1971. But after the 1973 Oil Embargo during which several of 
the MNCs had refused to sell oil to the Mediterranean Fleet, the much 
publicized MNC Hearings, as they came to be known, were held which again 
became the most extensive investigation to date. The hearings covered 
many issues but among the most frequently heard complaint was that of 
restraint of trade. 
Many of the other issues being addressed by OECD and the UN Commis-
sion also have precedents in the American as well as the British munici-
pal legal regimes. 
Such issues as allocation of leases, permits, licenses, and certi-
fication, toyalties, methods of disclosure, accounting procedures and 
taxes -- both domestic and foreign -- including depletion and deprecia-
tion allowances, import tariffs, and foreign tax credits, are also 
traced from the inception of the industry. 
Balance of payments, rates, profits, and prices, are also recurring 
issues. But perhaps second only to antitrust are the complex isuses of 
financing with the implications of joint ventures and interlocking di-
rectorates in the private sector; of direct government control through 
participation or nationalization; of indirect government control through 
subsidies or public utility status -- all of which have received a great 
deal of attention on the municipal level. 
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While every industry can probably caricature its leaders, it only 
follows that the oilmen have developed a mystique surrounding their en-
trepreneur image equal in economies of scale to the size and importance 
of the industry itself. Such giants as John D. Rockefeller, William 
Knox D'Arcy, Gulbenkian, Admiral Lord Fisher, Civil Lord of the Admiral-
ty E. G. Prettyman, Lord Strathcona, Winston Churchill, and Theodore 
Roosevelt are only the beginning of a long list of industry and govern-
ment personalities. 
Many of the same names appear time and time again, e.g., A. C. 
Bedford (Standard), Mark Requa (World War I regulatory commissions), 
Deterding (Shell), Ames (Texaco), Teagle (Standard, N.J.). In fact the 
chapter describing the chaotic Roosevelt Era reads as a Who's Who of the 
industry, as does the description of the London Policy Group with Fraser 
and Peircy leading the negotiations. Other colorful industry leaders as 
Sam Rayburn (Speaker of the House from Texas), Kim Roosevelt (Mr. Iran), 
Secretary of Interior Ickes, not to mention Libya's Quaddafi or Iran's 
Mossadeq -- while not oilmen, per se -- have certainly left their mark 
on the development of petroleum law. It seems quite fitting that such 
an industrious, dynamic personality as Charlie Spahr is responsible for 
so successfully maneuvering BP's American investment through the maze of 
u.S. ~unicipal law dealing with many of the same issues as did the fore-
father of his company -- John D. Rockefeller. 
Thus the functions of the Seven Sisters, and particularly those of 
British Petroleum, have been traced from the virtual birth of the indus-
try through the complex global operations which provide the evidence 
necessary for recognition of these multinational petroleum corporations 
as limited international legal personalities. 
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As was discussed in the Introduction, a recent provision made by 
the World Bank-sponsored Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes for a conciliation and arbitration procedure between governmental 
and private participants in investment transactions on a level of equal-
ity is the first overture by an international organization toward recog-
nition of MNCs. as -- at least in this instance equal to sovereign 
states. The EEC has made a similar concession by establishing a proce-
dural standing for MNCs equal to that of governments in the right to ap-
peal against decisions and recommendations of the High Authority on the 
grounds of legal violations of the EEC Treaty. And the UN General As-
sembly Resolution calling for the study of treaties concluded between 
two or more international organizations is yet another indication of 
recognition oby organized international society of multinational corpo-
rations as subjeccts of international law. 
Although this paper concentrates on the relationships of British 
Petroleum, the method of investigation should be applicable to any mul-
tinational corporation regardless of the industry or countries in which 
the company operates. 
The validity of this synergenic theory may be further tested by ap-
plication to industries other than petroleum. A multinational corpora-
tion such as IBM, for instance, may not be geographically limited to 
producing areas as in the petroleum industry, yet her relationships with 
home and host countries follows the same general outline as described 
for the oil industry. 
The regulatory process remains constant in any industry with only a 
few differences in special-case treatment of specific issues due to the 
nature of the industry under inspection. For instance, product safety 
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is heavily regulated in the automobile industry, whereas in the communi-
cations field regulation covers the more abstract areas of privacy and 
ethics. However, it would be an interesting study to trace the develop-
ment of regulation for several industries to see if the pattern of de-
velopment remains the same. 
The international legal regime regards the call for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order as reflective of the growing insurrection of the 
Third World against the traditional forms of Western domination: Post 
War nationalism of newly emerging states has successfully curtailed ex-
pansion of Empire, while much clammor over economic imperialism as a 
more subtle threat to LDC sovereignty has been made. 
There are approximately 200 major multinational corporations oper-
ating in the world today, most of which reflect the Western values of 
their home countries. Having already saturated the markets in Japan and 
the West, MNCs are becoming more and more dependent on LDCs not only 
for the development of new markets, but also for new resources as well. 
Keeping in mind the motivation of MNCs, they must now be regarded 
from a global perspective, divorced from their so-called home countries. 
For instance, Exxon, like the majority of American-based MNCs, makes a 
higher percentage of profits outside the U.S. than she does at home; the 
same is true of BP's profits in the U.K. 
Thus it now becomes not merely advantageous but almost compulsory 
for MNCs to expand their operations in LDCs. 
It should be possible, then, for countries to enforce an appropri-
ate code of conduct by means of economic sanctions or fines. For in-
stance, if an appropriate code of conduct for MNCs were agreed upon by 
international agreement or treaty among countries with an accompanying 
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schedule of fines to be imposed on a percentage of net profits per coun-
try basis, an offense in one country -- no matter how trivial -- could 
be punishable by fine in all signatory countries. While a fine of 1 
percent (arbitrarily selected for the sake of argument) of BP's total 
net profi ts in Ghana, for example, may not be enough to dissuade the 
company from committing such an offense, that mypothetical 1 percent of 
total net profits in Venezuela or Mexico, on the other hand, begins to 
alter the cost feasibility of committing the offense. The cumulative 
effect of paying multiple fines for the same offense in probably over 
100 countries should be enough to insure compliance. 
Enforcement of any code of conduct is obviously the key to its suc-
cess. And administration of sanctions and/or fines on a municipal level 
raises the inevitable question of how to persuade all signatories of 
such an agreement to consistently enforce the code. By allowing the 
signatory countries to spend the revenues collected from such fines as 
they see fit, reserving a minimal amount to cover the international co-
ordination of administration costs -- it would be to the advantage of 
each country to collect on every charge. If this were not forthcoming 
automatically, the principle of reciprocity could be applied to assure 
uniform enforcement of sanctions or collection of fines. In reality, 
however, most MNCs will have throughly evaluated the expected cost to be 
incurred by committing a given offense, and would most likely curb their 
conduct to conform to the code. 
While strong Western home countries may not support such interna-
tional regulation, it would appear to be irrelevant since application 
and enforcement on the basis of LDCs alone would be sufficient to render 
such a plan operative. 
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In this manner a confederacy of LDCs could conceivably initiate 
some of the goals of NIEO into international practice without totally 
eliminating the existing world economic order. 
Another practical aspect of such a plan is that as an international 
treaty or agreement between countries, effective regulation of multina-
tional corporations could conceivably be made operational without ever 
addressing the abstract philosophical debate about the degree to which 
MNCs may be said to have international legal personality or sovereignty. 
While such a debate may still need to be resolved, a confederacy of LDCs 
could enact and enforce international law regulating MNCs in such a way 
as to simultaneously aid in their own development, impact on MNCs, and 
ultimately affect the direction of the development of multinational cor-
poration law in the international legal regime. 
In such a light it would be advantageous for Western countries to 
participate in such a plan especially in the formulation of the code 
in order to infuse some of the already well established principles from 
Western municipal experience into the codes or at least to act as a 
nulifying counterbalance to some of the more radical demands which are 
likely to be made. 
Irregardless of the outcome, the fact remains -- as evidenced by 
the extent of the current international dialogue concerning the regula-
tion of multinational corporations -- that the synergistic relationship 
between MNCs and governments has had an impact on international law. 
The question remains as to the extent and direction of that impact. 
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APPENDIX A 
A GLOSSARY OF LNTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IMPACTING MNCs (JANUARY 1981) 
(From International Organizations Monitoring Service) 
BIRPI - United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property: BIRPI, which was established in 1893, over-
sees the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Copyright Convention for those states 
which are members of the Paris or Berne Unions but which 
have not yet become members of WIPO. In practice, it is in-
distinguishable from WIPO. 
CIEC - Conference on International Economic Cooperation: a group 
of 27 nations (8 industrial and 19 developing) organized in 
December 1974 to help resolve the NIEO confrontations. The 
Conference, co-chaired by Allan MacEachen of Canada and 
Manuel Perez-Guerrero of Venezuela, met monthly in Paris 
during 1976 in the framework of commissions on energy, raw 
materials, development and finance, to study and negotiate 
proposals in these issue areas. The Conference ended up 
with little accomplished in May 1977. 
Council of Europe: inter-governmental organization of 18 European coun-
tries which studies problems, makes recommendations to other 
international bodies and even works on multilateral treaties 
itself, usually in social areas such as human rights. The 
Council, which was created in 1949, has been more and more 
involved in international issues, especially national policy 
towards MNCs. 
EEC - European Economic Community: an association of ten (origi-
nally six) European countries founded as a "Common Market" 
by the Rome Treaty in 1957. Its institutions have legal 
status and its decision-making process is based on a dual 
executive: the Commission which proposes and supervises the 
execution of laws and policies, and the Council of Ministers 
which enacts laws and programs, based on Commission pro-
posals. 
ECA - Economic Commission for Africa: a UN regional commission of 
ECOSOC based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which studies the ec-
onomic and social problems of its African member countries 
and which authorizes financial, technical and other assis-
tance to help solve these problems. 
EEC Commission: the executive arm of the European Economic Community, 
comprised of a staff of almost 10,000 and a board of 14 com-
missioners. The Commission administers Common Market pro-
grams and drafts policy directives to send to the Council of 
Ministers for approval. 
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ECE 
ECLA 
ECOSOC 
ECWA 
ESCAP 
Economic Commission for Europe: a UN regional commission of 
ECOSOC headquartered in Geneva which studies the economic 
problems of the European member governments and authorizes 
assistance if needed. 
- Economic Commission for Latin America: a UN regional com-
mission of ECOSOC based in Santiago, Chile, which studies 
the economic and social development of the Latin American 
region and authorizes financial and technical assistance 
where and when needed. 
Economic and Social Council: one of the six principal 
organs of the UN. It coordinates the work of the UN in the 
economic, social and human rights fields. It oversees the 
UN Commission and Centre on TNCs and is responsible for most 
MNC issues. 
- Economic Commission for Western Asia: a UN regional com-
mission of ECOSOC presently headquartered in Beirut which 
studies the economic problems of its member countries (all 
Middle Eastern nations with the exception of Israel) and 
authorizes the required financial and technical assistance 
to solve these problems. 
- Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: a 
UN regional commission of ECOSOC headquartered in Bangkok, 
Thailand, which studies the economic and social problems of 
its Asian member countries and authorizes assistance, if 
needed. 
European Parliament: the legislative arm of the European 
now elected directly by the people in the EEC, 
consultative body, but it must pass on most EC 
and it~ legislative power will slowly increase 
years. 
Community, 
is mainly a 
legislation, 
in the coming 
FAO 
GATT 
Group 
of 77 
- Food and Agriculture Organization: a specialized agency of 
the United Nations, whose mission is to raise the levels of 
nutrition and living standards as well as to improve the 
efficiency of food production and distribution in all UN 
member countries. 
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: a multilateral 
treaty applied to trading nations which seeks to reduce bar-
riers to trade. The Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations, 
completed in 1979 in Geneva, is designed to lower tariffs 
and eliminate non-tariff barriers. It is now being imple-
mented by member nations. 
- The bloc of less-developed countries, now numbering about 
113, which comprise the so-called Third World. Since 1972 
this bloc of nations has campaigned for the "New Order" both 
within the United Nations system and in other international 
organizations. 
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IBRD 
ICC 
ICFrU 
ILO 
NIEO 
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: the 
official name of the World Bank, which now helps developing 
countries finance development through loans and technical 
assistance. 
- International Chamber of Commerce: the international orga-
nization of world business which seeks to improve business 
conditions around the world by supporting and defending the 
free enterprise system. 
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: a group 
of international trade unions which seeks to promote the 
interests of the worker, and which has been very critical of 
many of the practices of the MNC. The United Mine Workers 
is the only U.S. member of this organization which also 
serves as a loose coordinator of several large multinational 
unions. 
- International Labor Organization: a specialized agency of 
the UN arranged in a tripartite framework which brings to-
gether government, employer and worker representatives to 
discuss working conditions, collective bargaining and other 
issues and which sometimes acts through its ILO Conventions 
and Codes as a first stage for national legislation on labor 
and industrial relations. 
- New International Economic Order: the program advocated by 
the developing nations to promote their economic growth 
through rapid economic change and based on the premise that 
governments must playa preeminent role in this process. 
Non-Aligned Nations Centre on TNCs: an "Information Centre on TNCs" be-
ing planned by a group of 86 developing countries in Havana, 
Cuba, designed to coordinate their regulatory policies to-
ward MNCs and to monitor the activities of these companies. 
OAS 
OECD 
- Organization of American States: an association of Western 
Hemisphere, mostly Latin American, countries which seeks to 
promote more economic and social cooperation between member 
countries, including the granting of preferential treatment 
to the developing countries in the areas of technology 
transfer and trade. 
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: an 
association of 24 developed nations which seeks to promote 
economic growth in member countries through private interna-
tional investment channeled under guidelines for both compa-
nies and governments. The OECD also serves to coordinate 
the member countries' economic policies before and during 
bargaining sessions with the developing world. 
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RBP 
SELA 
- Abbreviation for restrictive business practice. 
- Sistema Economico Latino Americano: the 23-member Latin 
American Economic System, which includes only Latin American 
and Caribbean countries including Cuba, established in 1975 
to unite the economic power of the Latin American nations in 
negotiations in international organizations, to coordinate 
national programs to regulate MNCs and even to grant assis-
tance to joint member country efforts to establish Latin 
American MNCs to compete with those from the industrialized 
world. 
UN Centre on TNCs: a New York-based research center, headed by Fin-
land's Klaus Sahlgren, which was created to assist the UN 
Commission on TNCs in drafting an MNC Code of Conduct, gath-
ering data on MNCs, writing studies on the impact of MNCs on 
host countries and providing technical assistance to these 
countries. 
UN Commission on TNCs: a committee of 48 member countries established 
under the aegis of ECOSOC to study the MNC phenomenon and 
recommend. a policy approach for host governments, especially 
those of developing nations. The Commission has begun to 
draft a UN Code of Conduct for MNCs. 
UNCSTD 
UNCTAD 
UNIDO 
UNDP 
- United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for De-
velopment: the latest in a series of UN "mega-conferences". 
This one, held in Vienna, Austria, from August 20-31, 1979, 
was designed to help UN member states, especially the devel-
oping nations, to harness science and technology to achieve 
national socio-economic goals, with as few negative side-
effects as possible. Its resolutions will be implemented by 
a new centre and committee at the UN in New York. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: the 
permanent organ of the UN which promotes trade between de-
veloped and developing countries and which serves as a base 
for the developing world's demands for NIEO and as a battle-
ground for debates over such issues as technology transfer, 
restrictive business practices and MNC production-sourcing. 
- United Nations Industrial Development Organization: the UN 
organ which assists developing countries in fostering indus-
trialization efforts through technical assistance as part of 
its program to achieve NIEO. 
- United Nations Development Programme: the UN organ which 
coordinates technical and pre-investment assistance to 
developing countries and which is the outlet for all UN 
financial development aid. 
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UNCITRAL - United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: a 
subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly which promotes 
the harmonization of international trade law. 
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme: the UN organ which 
promotes environmentally sound economic and social develop-
ment in both urban and rural areas. 
WHO - World Health Organization: the specialized agency of the UN 
which promotes global health care programs, especially for 
developing countries. 
WIPO - World Intellectual Property Organization: the specialized 
agency of the UN which promotes the protection of inven-
tions, scientific works, trademarks, copyrights and other 
rights as part of its oversight of the Paris Industrial 
Property Convention and the Berne Copyright Convention. The 
organization is also the focus of developing country efforts 
to revise the international patent and trademark system. 
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